nation that has carried on a war with disadvantage, and is unable to continue it, can be said, under such circumstances, to be independent; and while either side thinks itself in a condition to demand an indemnification, there is no man in his senses, but will, cæteris paribus, prefer an indemnification, that is a cheaper and more effectual security than any other he can think of. Nations in this situation demand and cede countries by almost every treaty of peace that is made. The French part of the island of St. Christophers was added to Great Britain in circumstances altogether similar to those in which a few months may probably place the country of Canada. Farther security has always been deemed a motive with a conqueror to be less moderate; and even the vanquished insist upon security as a reason for demanding what they acknowledge they could not otherwise properly ask. The security of the frontier of France on the side of the Netherlands was always considered in the negotiation, that began at Gertrudenburg, and ended with that war. For the same reason they demanded and had Cape Breton. But a war, concluded to the advantage of France, has always added something to the power, either of France, or the house of Bourbon. Even that of 1733, which she commenced with declarations of her having no ambitious views, and which finished by a treaty, at which the ministers of France repeatedly declared, that she desired nothing for herself, in effect gained for her Lorrain, an indemnification ten times the value of all her North American possessions. In short, security and quiet of princes and states have ever been deemed sufficient reasons, when supported by power, for disposing of rights; and such dispositions have never been looked on as want of moderation. It has always been the foundation of the most general treaties. The security of Germany was the argument for yielding considerable possessions there to the Swedes: and the security of Europe divided the Spanish monarchy by the partition treaty, made between powers who had no other right to dispose of any part of it. There can be no cession that is not supposed at least, to increase the power of the party to whom it is made. It is enough that he has a right to ask it, and that he does it not merely to serve the purposes of a dangerous ambition. Canada, in the hands of Britain, will endanger the kingdom of France as little as any other cession; and from its situation and circumstances cannot be hurtful to any other state. Rather, if peace be an advantage, this cession may be such to all Europe. The present war teaches us, that disputes arising in America, may be an occasion of embroiling nations who have no concerns there. If the French remain in Canada and Louisiana, fix the boundaries as you will between us and

them, we must border on each other for more than fifteen hundred miles. The people that inhabit the frontiers are generally the refuse of both nations, often of the worst morals and the least discretion; remote from the eye, the prudence, and the restraint of government. Injuries are therefore frequently, in some part or other of so long a frontier, committed on both sides, resentment provoked, the colonies are first engaged, and then the mother coun tries. And two great nations can scarce be at war in Europe, but some other prince or state thinks it a convenient opportunity to revive some ancient claim, seize some advantage, obtain some territory, or enlarge some power at the expense of a neighbour. The flames of war, once kindled, often spread far and wide, and the mischief is infinite. Happy it proved to both nations, that the Dutch were prevailed on finally to cede the New Netherlands (now the province of New York) to us at the peace of 1674; a peace that has ever since continued between us, but must have been frequently disturbed, if they had retained the possession of that country, bordering several hundred miles on our colonies of Pennsylvania westward, Connecticut and the Massachusetts eastward. Nor is it to be wondered at, that people of different language, religion, and manners, should in those remote parts engage in frequent quarrels; when we find, that even the people of our own colonies have frequently been so exasperated against each other, in their disputes about boundaries, as to proceed to open violence and bloodshed.

2. Erecting forts in the back settlements, almost in no instance a sufficient security against the Indians and the French; but the possession of Canada implies every security, and ought to be had, while in our power.

But the remarker thinks we shall be sufficiently secure in America, if we "raise English forts at such passes as may at once make us respectable to the French and to the Indian nations." The security desirable in America may be considered as of three kinds. 1. A security of possession that the French shall not drive us out of the country. 2. A security of our planters from the inroads of savages, and the murders committed by them. 3. A security that the British nation shall not be obliged, on every new war, to repeat the immense expense occasioned by this, to defend its possessions in America. Forts, in the most important passes, may, I acknowledge, be of use to obtain the first kind of security: but as those situations are far advanced beyond the inhabitants, the expense of maintaining and supplying the garrisons will be very great, even in time of full peace, immense on every interruption of it; as it is easy for skulking-parties of the enemy, in such long roads through the woods, to inter

and

militia, in such a country, we find they can keep an army of ours in full employ for several years. We therefore shall not need to be told by our colonies, that if we leave Canada, however circumscribed, to the French, "we have done nothing;" we shall soon be made sensible ourselves of this truth, and to our cost. I would not be understood to deny, that even if we subdue and retain Canada, some few forts may be of use to secure the goods of the traders, and protect the commerce, in case of any sudden misunderstanding with any tribe of Indians: but these forts will be best under the care of the colonies interested in the Indian trade, and garrisoned by their provincial forces, and at their own expense. Their own interest will then inducc the American governments to take care of such forts in proportion to their importance, and see that the officers keep their corps full, and mind their duty. But any troops of ours placed there, and accountable here, would, in such remote and obscure places, and at so great a distance from the eye and inspection of superiors, soon become of little consequence, even though the French were left in possession of Canada. If the four independent com

cept and cut off our convoys, unless guarded continually by great bodies of men.-The second kind of security will not be obtained by such forts, unless they were connected by a wall like that of China, from one end of our settlements to the other. If the Indians, when at war, marched like the Europeans, with great armies, heavy cannon, baggage, and carriages; the passes through which alone such armies could penetrate our country, or receive their supplies, being secured, all might be sufficiently secure; but the case is widely different. They go to war, as they call it, in small parties; from fifty men down to five. Their hunting life has made them acquainted with the whole country, and scarce any part of it is impracticable to such a party. They can travel through the woods even by night, and know how to conceal their tracks. They pass easily between your forts undiscovered; and privately approach the settlements of your frontier inhabitants. They need no convoys of provisions to follow them; for whether they are shifting from place to place in the woods, or lying in wait for an opportunity to strike a blow, every thicket and every stream furnishes so small a number with sufficient subsistence. When they have sur-panies, maintained by the crown in New York prised separately, and murdered and scalped a dozen families, they are gone with inconceivable expedition through unknown ways: and it is very rare that pursuers have any chance of coming up with them. In short, long experience has taught our planters, that they cannot rely upon forts as a security against Indians; the inhabitants of Hackney might as well rely upon the tower of London, to secure them against highwaymen and housebreakers. As to the third kind of security, that we shall not, in a few years, have all we have done to do over again in America, and be obliged to employ the same number of troops, and ships, at the same immense expense, to defend our possessions there, while we are in proportion weakened here: such Now all the kinds of security we have menforts I think, cannot prevent this. During a tioned are obtained by subduing and retaining peace, it is not to be doubted the French, who Canada. Our present possessions in America are adroit at fortifying, will likewise erect are secured; our planters will no longer be forts in the most advantageous places of the massacred by the Indians, who, depending abcountry we leave them; which will make it solutely on us for what are now become the more difficult than ever to be reduced in case necessaries of life to them (guns, powder, of another war. We know by experience of hatchets, knives, and clothing) and having no this war, how extremely difficult it is to march other Europeans near, that can either supan army through the American woods, with ply them, or instigate them against us; there is its necessary cannon and stores, sufficient to no doubt of their being always disposed, if we reduce a very slight fort. The accounts at treat them with common justice, to live in the treasury will tell you, what amazing perpetual peace with us. And with regard sums we have necessarily spent in the expe- to France, she cannot, in case of another war, ditions against two very trifling forts, Du- put us to the immense expense of defending quesne and Crown Point. While the French that long extended frontier; we shall then, retain their influence over the Indians, they as it were, have our backs against a wall in can easily keep our long extended frontier in America; the sea coast will be easily protectcontinual alarm, by a very few of those peo-ed by our superior naval power: and here ple; and with a small number of regulars and "our own watchfulness and our own strength VOL. II.... 2 B 17

more than forty years, at a great expense, consisted, for most part of the time, of faggots chiefly; if their officers enjoyed their places as sinecures, and were only, as a writer of that country styles them, a kind of military monks; if this was the state of troops posted in a populous country, where the imposition could not be so well concealed; what may we expect will be the case of those, that shall be posted two, three, or four hundred miles from the inhabitants, in such obscure and remote places as Crown Point, Oswego, Duquesne, or Niagara? they would scarce be even faggots; they would dwindle to mere names upon paper, and appear no where but on the muster-rolls.

will be properly, and cannot but be success-foundation than this have they been supposed fully employed. In this situation, the force the authors of a war, carried on for their adnow employed in that part of the world, may vantage only. It is a great mistake to imabe spared for any other service here or else- gine that the American country in question where; so that both the offensive and defen-between Great Britain and France is claimed sive strength of the British empire, on the whole, will be greatly increased.

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as the property of any individuals or public body in America; or that the possession of it by Great Britain is likely, in any lucrative view, to redound at all to the advantage of any person there. On the other hand, the the bulk of the inhabitants of North America are land-owners, whose lands are inferior in value to those of Britain, only by the want of an equal number of people. It is true, the accession of the large territory claimed before the war began (especially if that be secured by the possession of Canada) will tend to the increase of the British subjects faster, than if they had been confined within the mountains: yet the increase within the mountains only would evidently make the comparative popu

But to leave the French in possession of Canada, when it is in our power to remove them, and depend (as the remarker proposes) on our own strength and watchfulness" to prevent the mischiefs that may attend it, seems neither safe nor prudent. Happy as we now are, under the best of kings, and in the prospect of a succession promising every felicity a nation was ever blessed with; happy too in the wisdom and vigour of every part of the administration; we cannot, we ought not to promise ourselves the uninterrupted continuance of those blessings. The safety of a considerable part of the state, and the interest of the whole, are not to be trust-lation equal to that of Great Britain much ed to the wisdom and vigour of future admi- sooner than it can be expected, when our nistrations; when a security is to be had people are spread over a country six times as more effectual, more constant, and much less large. I think this is the only point of light expensive. They, who can be moved by the in which this account is to be viewed, and is apprehension of dangers so remote, as that of the only one in which any of the colonies are the future independence of our colonies (a concerned.-No colony, no possessor of lands point I shall hereafter consider) seem scarcely in any colony, therefore, wishes for conquests, consistent with themselves, when they sup- or can be benefited by them, otherwise than pose we may rely on the wisdom and vigour as they may be a means of securing peace of an administration for their safety.-I should on their borders. No considerable advantage indeed think it less material whether Canada has resulted to the colonies by the conquests were ceded to us or not, if I had in view only of this war, or can result from confirming the security of possession in our colonies. 1 them by the peace, but what they must enjoy entirely agree with the remarker, that we in common with the rest of the British peoare in North America “a far greater conti- ple; with this evident drawback from their nental as well as naval power;" and that on-share of these advantages, that they will nely cowardice or ignorance can subject our colonies there to a French conquest. But for the same reason I disagree with him widely upon another point.

3. The blood and treasure spent in the American wars, not spent in the cause of the

colonies alone.

cessarily lessen, or at least prevent the increase of the value of what makes the principal part of their private property- -their land. A people, spread though the whole tract of country, on this side the Mississippi, and secured by Canada in our hands, would probably for some centuries find employment in agriculture, and thereby free us at home I do not think, that our "blood and trea-effectually from our fears of American manusure has been expended," as he intimates, "in the cause of the colonies," and that we are "making conquests for them;" yet I believe this is too common an error. 1 do not say, they are altogether unconcerned in the event. The inhabitants of them are, in common with the other subjects of Great Britain, anxious for the glory of her crown, the extent of her power and commerce, the welfare and future repose of the whole British people. They could not therefore but take a large share in the affronts offered to Britain; and have been animated with a truly British spirit to exert themselves beyond their strength, and against their evident interest. Yet so unfortunate have they been, that their virtue has made against them; for upon no better

factures. Unprejudiced men well know, that all the penal and prohibitory laws that were ever thought on will not be sufficient to prevent manufactures in a country, whose inhabitants surpass the number that can subsist by the husbandry of it. That this will be the case in America soon, if our people remain confined within the mountains, and almost as soon should it be unsafe for them to live beyond, though the country be ceded to us, no man acquainted with political and commercial history can doubt. Manufactures are founded in poverty: it is the multitude of poor without land in a country, and who must work for others at low wages or starve, that enables undertakers to carry on a manufacture, and afford it cheap enough to prevent

the importation of the same kind from abroad, | spent in this war, as spent in "the cause of and to bear the expense of its own exportation. the colonies" only; and that they are "absurd -But no man, who can have a piece of land and ungrateful," if they think we have done of his own, sufficient by his labour to subsist nothing, unless we "make conquests for his family in plenty, is poor enough to be a them," and reduce Canada to gratify their manufacturer, and work for a master. Hence," vain ambition," &c. It will not be a conwhile there is land enough in America for our people, there can never be manufactures to any amount or value. It is a striking observation of a very able pen,* that the natural livelihood of the thin inhabitants of a forest country is hunting; that of a greater number, pasturage: that of a middling population, agriculture; and that of the greatest, manufactures; which last must subsist the bulk of the people in a full country, or they must be subsisted by charity, or perish. The extended population, therefore, that is most advantageous to Great Britain, will be best effected, because only effectually secured, by the possession of Canada.

So far as the being of our present colonies in North America is concerned, I think indeed with the remarker, that the French there are not " an enemy to be apprehended;"-but the expression is too vague to be applicable to the present, or indeed to any other case. Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, unequal as they are to this nation in power and numbers of people, are enemies to be still apprehended: and the highlanders of Scotland have been so for many ages, by the greatest princes of Scotland and Britain. The wild Irish were able to give a great deal of disturbance even to queen Elizabeth, and cost her more blood and treasure than her war with Spain. Canada, in the hands of France, has always stinted the growth of our colonies, in the course of this war, and indeed before it, has disturbed and vexed even the best and strongest of them; has found means to murder thousands of their people, and unsettle a great part of their country. Much more able will it be to starve the growth of an infant settlement. Canada has also found means to make this nation spend two or three millions a year in America; and a people, how small soever, that in their present situation, can do this as often as we have a war with them, is, methinks, “an enemy to be apprehended.”

quest for them, nor gratify any vain ambition of theirs. It will be a conquest for the whole; and all our people will, in the increase of trade, and the case of taxes, find the advan. tage of it. Should we be obliged at any time, to make a war for the protection of our commerce, and to secure the exportation of our manufactures, would it be fair to represent such a war, merely as blood and treasure spent in the cause of the weavers of Yorkshire, Norwich, or the West; the cutlers of Sheffield, or the buttonmakers of Birmingham? I hope it will appear before I end these sheets, that if ever there was a national war, this is truly such a one: a war in which the interest of the whole nation is directly and fundamentally concerned. Those, who would be thought deeply skilled in human nature, affect to discover self-interested views every where, at the bottom of the fairest the most generous conduct. Suspicions and charges of this kind meet with ready reception and belief in the minds even of the multitude, and therefore less acuteness and address, than the remarker is possessed of, would be sufficient to persuade the nation generally, that all the zeal and spirit, manifested and exerted by the colonies in this war, was only in “their own cause," to "make conquest for themselves," to engage us to make more for them, to gratify their own "vain ambition."

But should they now humbly address the mother-country in the terms and the sentiments of the remarker; return her their grateful acknowledgments for the blood and treasure she had spent in "their cause;" confess that enough had not been done "for them;" allow that "English forts, raised in proper passes, will, with the wisdom and vigour of her administration," be a sufficient future protection; express their desires that their people may be confined within the mountains, lest, if they be suffered to spread and extend themselves in the fertile and pleasant Our North American colonies are to be country on the other side, they should "inconsidered as the frontier of the British em- crease infinitely from all causes," 66 live pire on that side. The frontier of any do- wholly on their own labour" and become inminion being attacked, it becomes not mere-dependent; beg therefore that the French ly "the cause" of the people immediately may be suffered to remain in possession of attacked (the inhabitants of that frontier) but Canada, as their neighbourhood may be use properly the cause" of the whole body. ful to prevent our increase, and the removing Where the frontier people owe and pay obe- them may "in its consequences be even dandience, there they have a right to look for gerous:"-I say, should such an address from protection: no political proposition is better the colonies make its appearance here (though, established than this. It is therefore invidi- according to the remarker, it would be a most ous, to represent the "blood and treasure" just and reasonable one) would it not, might it not with more justice be answered :-We understand you, gentlemen, perfectly well:

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* Dr. Adam Smith, who had not at this time printed his Political Economy.

with Canada in our possession, our people in America will increase amazingly. I know, that their common rate of increase, where they are not molested by the enemy, is doubling their numbers every twenty-five years, by natural generation only; exclusive of the accession of foreigners.* I think this increase continuing would probably, in a century more, make the number of British subjects on that side the water more numerous than they now are on this; But,

nies should cease being useful to the mother4. Not necessary that the American colocountry. Their preference over the WestIndian colonies stated.

you have only your interest in view: you want to have the people confined within your present limits, that in a few years the lands you are possessed of may increase tenfold in value! you want to reduce the price of labour, by increasing numbers on the same territory, that you may be able to set up manufactures and vie with your mother-country! you would have your people kept in a body, that you may be more able to dispute the commands of the crown, and obtain an independency. You would have the French left in Canada, to exercise your military virtue, and make you a warlike people, that you may have more confidence to embark in schemes of disobedience, and greater ability to support them! You have tasted too, the sweets of Two or I am far from entertaining on that acTHREE MILLIONS sterling per annum spent count, any fears of their becoming either useamong you by our fleets and forces, and you less or dangerous to us; and I look on those are unwilling to be without a pretence for fears to be merely imaginary, and without kindling up another war, and thereby occasion- any probable foundation.-The remarker is ing a repetition of the same delightful doses! reserved in giving his reasons; as in his opiBut, gentlemen, allow us to understand our nion this "is not a fit subject for discussion." interest a little likewise: we shall remove-I shall give mine, because I conceive it a the French from Canada, that you may live in peace, and we be no more drained by your quarrels. You shall have land enough to cultivate, that you may have neither necessity nor inclination to go into manufacture for you, and govern you.

A reader of the Remarks may be apt to say, if this writer would have us restore Canada, on principles of moderation, how can we, consistent with those principles, retain Gaudaloupe, which he represents of so much greater value!-I will endeavour to explain this, because by doing it, I shall have an opportunity of showing the truth and good sense of the answer to the interested application I have just supposed: the author then is only apparently and not really inconsistent with himself. If we can obtain the credit of moderation by restoring Canada, it is well: but we should, however, restore it at all events; because it would not only be of no use to us; but "the possession of it (in his opinion) may in its consequences be dangerous." As how? Why, plainly, (at length it comes out) if the French are not left there to check the growth of our colonies, "they will extend themselves almost without bounds into the inland parts, and increase infinitely, from all causes; becoming a numerous, hardy, independent people; possessed of a strong country, communicating little or not at all with England, living wholly on their own labour, and in process of time knowing little and inquiring little about the mother-country.' In short, according to this writer, our present colonies are large enough and numerous enough; and the French ought to be left in North America to prevent their increase, lest they become not only useless, but dangerous to Britain. I agree with the gentleman, that

subject necessary to be discussed; and the rather, as those fears, how groundless and chimerical soever, may by possessing the multitude, possibly induce the ablest ministry to conform to them against their own judgment; and thereby prevent the assuring to the British name and nation a stability and permanancy, that no man acquainted with history durst have hoped for, till our American possessions opened the pleasing prospect. The remarker thinks, that our people in America, "finding no check from Canada, would extend themselves almost without bounds into the inland parts, and increase infinitely from all causes.' The very reasons he assigns for their so extending, and which is indeed the true one (their being "invited to it by the pleasantness, fertility, and plenty of the country,") may satisfy us, that this extension will continue to proceed, as long as there remains any pleasant fertile country within their reach. And if we even suppose them confined by the waters of the Mississippi westward, and by those of St. Laurence and the lakes to the northward; yet still we shall leave them room enough to increase, even in the manner of settling now practised there, till they amount to perhaps a hundred millions of souls. This must take some centuries to ful

* The reason of this greater increase in America than in Europe is, that in old settled countries, all trades, farms, offices, and employments are full; and many people refrain from marriage till they see an opening, in which they can settle themselves, with a reasonable prospect of maintaining a family; but in America, it being easy to obtain land, which, with moderate labour will afford subsistence and something to spare, people marry more readily and earlier in life, whence arises a numerous offspring and the swift po pulation of those countries. It is a common error, that we cannot fill our provinces or increase the number of them, without draining this nation of its people. The increase alone of our present colonies is sufficient for both those purposes. Written in 1760.]