feems to be confirmed, by a letter which was written by the Grand Vizir, during the height of the conferences at Bucharest, to the chiefs of the confederacy in Poland, in which he affures them and the Poles in general, in the name and upon the irrevocable word of his mafter, that he never would abandon them, nor enter into any peace, till their country was restored to its rights and independency, and they again enjoyed the government of a free republic, according to its ancient laws and conftitution.

As this letter was publicly fhewn in Poland, and no difavowal of it was required from the Grand Vizir, nor no breach of the conferences took place in confequence of it, we may be fatisfied that the Porte had not agreed to the dismemberment of that country, and that as the partitioning powers, had already gone fuch lengths towards the completion of that defign, as nothing but neceffity could make them recede from, it is evident that the peace could have been but little thought of at the congrefs. It is faid, that the navigation on the Black Sea, was another infurmountable obftacle to an accommodation, the Ruffians not only infifting on that right in its utmoft extent but alfo on a free liberty of trade, through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean, in all the coafts of Greece and the Archipelago, and even in the ports of Egypt and Syria. As these were the great obftacles to the fuccefs of the congrefs at Foczani, it becomes a matter of difficulty to conceive, what the commiffioners at Bucharest could treat upon or upon what ground a fresh negociation could have been entered into, without

the removal of fome of those impediments which were found infuperable in the former; and feems only to be accounted for, by fuppofing that an armistice being equally neceffary to both parties, was all that was looked for by either.

now

Previous, however, to the breaking up of the conferences at Bucharest, the Turkish commiffioners propofed a prolongation of them, as well as of the armistice, to the latter end of the enfuing month of June, which being refufed by thofe of Ruffia, and the time March 22d. limited for the negociations being 1773. elapfed, the commiffioners retired, and both fides accordingly prepared for the opening of the Campaign.. As the Danube was the boundary between the hostile armies, it became of courfe the fcene of continued action; its wide extended waters, its islands, and its banks,' affording endless opportunities for that defultory kind of war, which confifts of furprizes by night, and ambufcades by day, of alternate flight and purfuit, and in which, from the vicinity of the hoftile troops, and the facility of embarkation and defcent, neither reft nor fecurity is to be obtained on either fide. A bloody ruinous kind of war, which foon devours great armies; and in which lives are loft without effect, and courage exerted without honour,

This deftructive kind of war, was not, however, a matter of choice with the Ruffians; and the Turks were too skilfully commanded, to forego the advantages which the nature of the country and the river afforded. To them, who were at home, and abounded

with men, the lofs of lives, if attended with no other confequence, was productive of no real weaknefs; while on the fide of the Ruffians every lofs was irreparable, or at beft, could fcarcely be fupplied fooner than the end of the cam

paign. In fuch circumftances, it would be wrong to judge from events; nor were the Ruflian generals blameable, for using their utmost efforts to bring matters to an immediate crifis on the other fide of the Danube, as it was the only means by which they could change the nature of the war, and preferve their best troops from mouldering away in an ineffectual fervice. On the other hand it must be acknowledged, that the Grand Vizir, by not foregoing any of the advantages, and by making the beft ufe of the means that were in his power; by preferving the grand army whole, and by wifely abitaining from a general engagement, though frequently urged to it, at the fame time, that by repeatedly pouring detachments upon them, he kept the Ruffians in hot and continued action, has undoubtedly performed in this campaign, the part of a great captain.

As the Turks give no detail of their military tranfactions, and the Ruffians only fuch a one as is fuited to the meridian of their own people, and calculated for certain purpofes, no regular account of this campaign is to be expected, until fome future Manstein, among their foreign officers, fhall get free from the fhackles of power, and give an account of things as they really were. In the prefent circumftances we can do little more, than to judge of particular tranfactions by their general confequences.

It appears upon the whole, that the kind of war which we have already noticed, began to grow very warm upon the Danube, immediately after the breaking up of the conferences at Buchareft. Every day, and almost every night, produced fome small action, or gave an opportunity for fome furprize, in most of which the Ruffians are faid to have been very fuccessful, and to have destroyed great numbers of the enemy. As forage grew more plenty, the grand army approached closer to the Danube, and matters became more ferious. We are not however to imagine that the Turks were entirely on the defenfive; on the contrary, they made repeated attempts upon the Ruffian fide of the river, and in one, to furprize the fortrefs of Giurgewo,, are faid to have loft a confiderable number of men. In one of these conflicts (which were frequently very fevere, and attended with various fuccefs) one of the Princes Repnin, with a confiderable number of Ruffians, taken prifoners on the Danube, and being fent to Conftantinople, were with the other prifoners who had been formerly taken, amounting in the whole to about three thoufand, led in cavalcade through the streets of that city; exhibiting by this means á kind of political triumph, calculated to flatter national vanity, and to keep up the fpirits of the people.

were

The Ruffian army was commanded by Count Romanzow, and was computed at the opening of the campaign to confift of about 87000 men, of which near one third was cavalry. About the middle of June preparations were made for its pafling the Danube,

and carrying the war into Bulgaria with effect, for which purpose it was intended to force the city of Siliftria, and make it a place of arms, by which means a communication would have been kept between the posts on the Danube, and the grand army, as it penetrated farther into the country. As the Turks have been uncommonly alert in their pofts during this campaign, the paffage was not effected without danger, and a confiderable lofs on both fides. The Generals Weisman and Potemkin, firft croffed the river near Brahilow, in the night between the 18th and 19th of June, at the head of a body of about 15000 men, foon after which they had a bloody engagement with a body of the enemy, in which the Ruffian horfe was defeated by the Turkish cavalry, and driven back upon their own foot; but being well fupported by the infantry, and returning to the charge, the main body of the enemy did not think proper to renew the engagement, and quitted the field. The two generals then marched up the river, and covered the paffage of the grand army, which was not compleated till the 24th of the fame month, when it marched in large divifions towards Siliftria.

form almoft an infuperable barrier between it and Bulgaria, as well as the neighbouring country of Macedonia. The vaft branches of this mountain, run every where deep into Bulgaria, and make the country in a very great degree rough and impracticable, even to the confines of the Danube, which feparates it on the lower fide, from the countries of Wallachia and Beffarabia to the Black-Sea. The Grand Vizir was encamped towards the foot of the mountains, from whence he commanded the lower country, into which he could pour his troops like a torrent as he faw occafion; at the fame time that the enemy could not force him to an engagement, except under such disadvantages of ground, as it was not probable any general would run the hazard of, and the mountains at his back afforded a fure protection, in cafe of the worst misfortune that could follow.

Upon the march to Siliftria, the Ruffians found themfelves continually harraffed, furrounded, and attacked by great bodies of the Turkish horfe, the Grand Vizir having detached 27000 of his best cavalry for that purpofe. It was to little purpofe that these troops were frequently repulfed they were ftill relieved by fresh detachments, and their attacks as continually renewed; while the Ruffians found it impoffible to procure forage, and could fcarcely obtain time for a moment's reft, or to take the bit out of their horfes mouths. In the mean time, the army fuffered greatly for want of water, and were expofed without cover to the night rains, and to the cold and winds which fell upon them from the mountains, and which, notwith

ftanding

ftanding the season of the year, they found to be very fevere. The badnefs of the roads, and the number of defiles, alfo made the carriage of the artillery and baggage extremely difficult; while the alertnefs of the enemy, who watched every advantage, and laid ambufcades in every defile, kept the foldiers conftantly under arms, and wore them down with continual fatigue.

The generals Weisman and Potemkin, having at length arrived with the vanguard at Siliftria, found it strongly defended by three Bahas at the head of a numerous body of troops, amounting in the whole to about 24000 men. The greater part of these troops, formed a ftrong encampment on the top of a hill, which was adjoining to, and commanded the town. The Ruf fian generals having June 28th. made the neceffary difpofitions upon their arrival, marched early the next morning to attack the Turkish camp.

In their way to the entrenchments, they were furiously affaulted by the Turkish fpahis, or horfe, who lay in wait for them, and when thefe were difperfed by the artillery, they found the janiffaries well prepared to receive them at their entrenchments, which they defended with the greatest bravery. A warm and bloody engagement then enfued, in which the Ruffians were thrown into great diforder, and the Turks, hurried by their impetuofity, and the hopes of a compleat victory, quitted their trenches, and purfued them with great flaughter to the bottom of the hill. This injudicious measure being quickly perceived by General Weifman, he immediately made the proper ad

vantage of it, and fome Ruffian regiments having marched up the hill in another quarter, became mafters of the trenches without oppofition. The Turks now perceived too late, the error which they had committed, and as it was impoffible to regain the ground which they had loft, were obliged to retire into Siliftria.

The main body of the Ruffian army having arrived before the town on the following day, General Romanzow made preparations. for a general affault; but the continual and vigorous fallies made by the Turks, prevented the neceffary difpofitions from taking place, and rendered the defign impracticable. In the mean time the General received intelligence, that the Grand Vizir had detached 50000 men to the affiftance of the befieged, and was himself in person taking meafures to cut off the retreat of the Ruffians. In thefe untoward circumftances a retreat became abfolutely neceffary; but was not easily effected in the fight of fo alert an enemy. Marshal Romanzow, the better to cover his defign, feemed to renew the preparations for his attacks, and keeping up a continual fire on the town, decamped filently in the night, and began his retreat in as good order as the prefent circumftances would admit.

Uninformed though we are of particulars, fome judgment may be made of the nature of fuch a retreat, by recollecting the numberlefs obftacles that impeded their progrefs, upon their advancing triumphantly as invaders into the country. In this retreat, General Weifman who commanded the van, found a defile, through which the army must of neceffity pafs, ftrongly poffeffed

poffeffed by a body of 130co Turks; a defperate engagement enfued, in which the Ruffians were very roughly handled, and that brave general, in endeavouring to rally his broken troops, and lead them on to another charge, was fhot dead on the fpot. Some fresh regiments however coming up, and attacking the Turks in flank, they feem, unneceffarily, but happily for the Ruffians, to have given up the advantages they had gained, and to have abandoned their strong poft. The army having paffed this defile, gained the banks of the Danube, which they repaffed, on the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th of July, and on the 7th fung Te Deum for their fuccefs.

Some other actions happened in the course of this expedition, of which we are not able to give the particulars; among thefe, General Soltikoff, who commanded a detached body, is faid to have defeated and killed the Basha Fifula Sara. Upon the whole, it feems evident, as well from the immediate and fubfequent confequences, as from a confideration of the nature of the fervice, and country, that this expedition was very ruinous to the Ruffian army, and that the cavalry in particular, must have fuffered extremely. Some of the first letters from the Ruffian camp, computed their lofs at about 10000 men, and the writers confoled themfelves with the hopes, that the Turks had loft as many. This number, however, is reduced to 1200, in the account which was published by authority at Petersburg; a number which feems totally incompatible with the acknowledged feverity and danger of the fervice, and the final event of the expedition.

These fevere conflicts, and repeated trials of skill and courage, greatly cooled the ardour of the combatants on both fides, and the Danube became, till near the end of the campaign, a fufficient rampart to their hoftilities. Sickness, the confequence of exceffive fatigue, of the fcarcity and badness of provifions, the heat of the weather, and the unhealthy marshes of the Danube, made great progrefs in the Ruffian camp, and obliged General Romanzow to retire from the confines of the river, and to poft the army in the neighbourhood of Jaffi, and the higher countries. There feems but little room to doubt, that the Turks had fuffered very feverely in the late actions, as well as their enemies; nor could it otherwife be well accounted for, that they attempted to make no advantage of the fubfequent weak ftate of the Ruffian army; unless it fhould be imagined, that a thorough knowledge of the advantages of his fituation, together with the prudence and caution that are characteristic of the prefent Grand Vizir, fhould prevent him from, putting any thing to the hazard, where fo great an object was at ftake, as the immediate fecurity of the empire.

Though the greater part of the troops in Poland, as well as fome others in the neareft provinces, were immediately put in motion to reinforce Marihal Romanzow's army, a perfect filence and tran-" quillity, notwithfanding, reigned on the Danube, till about the middle of September, when we again find that the contending parties were in motion, and fome fmall actions took place on that river, in which the Rulians were fuccefsful. Towards