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Cable Co. v. Fleischner.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. J. Fill Linney, Court of Civil Appeals, Oct. 11, 1894 23 S. W. Rep. 234).

Questions of measure of damages for delay of commercial telegram, &c. W. U. Tel. Co. v. J. T. Ferguson, Court of Civil Appeals, Oct. 31, 1891 (28 S. W. Rep. 1048).

The stipulation in a telegraph blank, limiting the time within which claims for damages must be presented in writing, held, not sufficiently complied with by the commencement of an action and servics of citation within the time limited.

In W. U. Tel. Co. v. B. Gidcumb, Court of Civil Appeals. Nov. 3, 183+ (28 S. W. Rep. 699); W. U. Tel. Co. v. J. A. Kemp Grocer Co., Court of Civil Appeals, Dec. 5, 1894 (28 S. W. Rep. 905); W. U. Tel. Co. v. Robinson, Court of Civil Appeals, Jan. 2, 1895 (29 S. W. Rep. 71), the only questions related to measure of damages.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. Piner, Court of Civil Appeals, Dec. 12, 1894 (29 S. W. Rep. 66).

Commencement of an action within the time limited is sufficient compliance with the requirement that claims for damages be recovered within a given time.

Such stipulation is matter of defense.

$2,150 held not excessive damages for mental distress to a son, the addressee of a telegram, announcing his father's serious illness, by the delay of which he failed to arrive before his father became unconscious.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. Tim O'Keefe, Court of Civil Appeals, Jan. 16, 1895 (29 S. W. Rep. 1137).

A telegraph company is not relieved from liability by the fact of nonprepayment of special charges for delivery beyond the free delivery limit, the sender having notified the operator and having been told by him that the telegram would be delivered and any extra charge collected from the addressee.

$1,000 held not excessive damages where delay of a telegram prevented the address ee from reaching his daughter before her death.

Texas Tel. & Teleph. Co. v. John Seiders, Court of Civil Appeals, Jan. 30, 1895 (29 S. W. 258).

The addressee of a telegram may recover damages for mental suffering caused by negligent failure to deliver.

It being the custom of the employes of a telegraph company, known and acquiesced in by the company, to receive messages by telephone for the purpose of transmission, the company is bound to transmit any message so received which its employes agree to send.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. J. T. Jeanes, Court of Civil Appeals, Feb. 13, 1835 (29 S. W. Rep. 1130).

Questions of charge to jury.

Cable Co. v. Fleischner.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. A. C. Womack, Court of Civil Appeals, Feb. 18, 1895 (29 S. W. Rep. 932).

Proper to allow damages for mental suffering of father due to delay of telegram inquiring for lost son. No defense in such an action that the son was not really lost, but was at the home of the addressee.

Circumstances held to not exempt the company for failure to deliver outside the free delivery limit.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. Jack Terrell, Court of Civil Appeals, Feb. 27, 1895 (30 S. W. Rep. 70).

Where a telegram is sent to one person in care of another delivery to the latter is sufficient.

Notice of claim for damages not sufficiently served on telegraph company by delivery to messenger in employ of company to be delivered to the local agent.

Jane Thompson v. W. U. Tel. Co., Court of Civil Appeals, March 13, 1895 (30 S. W. Rep. 250).

Telegraph company not relieved from liability for failure to deliver a telegram, where the fault was that of.the person to whom it had entrusted the message for delivery pursuant to an arrangement with a person other than the addressee.

M. B. Ricketts v. W. U. Tel. Co., Court of Civil Appeals, March, 13, 1895 (30 S. W. Rep. 1105).

Company not liable for mental distress of sender, for delay in delivery of money sent by telegraph. Nor for mental anguish to addressee. De Voegler v. W. U. Tel. Co., Court of Civil Appeals, March 13, 1895 (30 S. W. Rep. 1107).

W. U. Tel. Co. v. J. M. Burrow, Court of Civil Appeals, March 18, 1895 (30 S. W. Rep. 378).

Unrepeated message stipulation will not relieve company from liability for delay arising after the receipt of the message at the terminal office.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. W. H. Smith, Supreme Court, March 25, 1895 (30 S. W. Rep. 549).

Held not reversible error to refuse to charge that plaintiff, the addressee of a telegram, summoning him to his dying father, could not recover for mental distress occasioned by his father's death, but only for such as was due to his failure to reach his father before he died.

In such a case the burden is upon plaintiff to show that if the message had been properly delivered the injury complained of would not have occurred.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. C. R. McMillan and Wife, Court of Civil Appeals, March 27, 1895 (30 S. W. Rep. 298).

Reasonable regulations of a telegraph company for the management of its business are binding on its patrons, though they have no knowlege of it.

Cable Co. v. Fleischner.

Damages for mental distress will not be allowed unless the company had notice that failure to deliver would have such effect; and where the person whose death was announced was a brother-in-law of the addressee, such notice was not given by the message itself.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. Patsy McCoy, Court of Civil Appeals, April 2, 1895 (31 S. W. Rep. 210).

Sunday telegrams, in absence of special contract, are received with the understanding that they are to be transmitted and delivered subject to such reasonable rule as may have been established for the conduct of the business. A regulation fixing reasonable hours for the transaction of business on Sunday held valid.

A stipulation permitting delivery to be made on a day subsequent to that of its receipt at the terminal office is in absence of fraud valid.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. J. L. Russell, Court of Civil Appeals, May 1, 1895 (31 S. W. Rep. 698).

Circumstances held to show negligence of a telegraph company in failing to deliver a message after its receipt at the terminal office.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. James Boots, Court of Civil Appeals, May 29, 1895 (31 S. W. Rep. 825).

The mere fact of delay of a telegram makes a prima facie case of negligence, and throws the burden upon the company of proving that if its wire was out of order it was not in fault. Damages may be recovered for negligence in the delivery of an interstate telegram. WISCONSIN.

Gustav Hartstein v. W. U. Tel. Co., Supreme Court, March 5, 1895 (89 Wis. 531).

Nonsuit held properly granted in action for delay of telegram relating to business matters.

FEDERAL COurts.

C. R. L. Findlay v. W. U. Tel. Co., U. S. Circuit Court, Western District of Virginia, May 23, 1894 (64 Fed. Rep. 459).

The addressee is bound by the stipulation in a telegraph blank, limiting the time within which to present claims for damages.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. Thomas J. Coggin et al., U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, May 6, 1895 (68 Fed. Rep. 137).

In an action for damages for non-delivery of the following telegram: "Be on hand evening of third. I got early;" held, that no recovery could be had, since (1) it did not appear that the addressee would have understood the message if he had received it; and (2) neither the meaning nor importance of it were disclosed to the operator to whom the message was presented for transmission.

GENERAL NOTE.

Memoranda of ca ses not selected for reprinting in full, and not prieviously men tioned in notes.

ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY.-TAXATION.

Commonwealth v. Edison Electric Light & Power Company, Pennsyl vania Supreme Court, July 18, 1895 (32 Atl. Rep. 419). The following is the head-note:

"A company generating electricity, and selling it to customers for power, illuminating or heating purposes, is not a manufacturing company, within Act 1885, exempting the capital stock of manufacturing companies from taxation,"

ELECTRIC RAILWAY.-STREET USE.

Ann Curvin v. Rochester Railway Company, N. Y. General Term, Fifth Department, June, 1894 (78 Hun, 555).

The plaintiff, owner of real estate, signed, with a large number of other owners, the following instrument:

"For value received, I hereby grant to the Rochester Railway Company the right to construct, maintain and operate a double-tracked railroad upon Plymouth avenue, from the bridge over the abandoned Genesee Valley canal to the southerly end of Plymouth avenue, such railroad to consist of a single track upon each side of the roadway and to be operated by electricity as motive power."

The following is an extract from the head-note:

Held, that such instrument gave no right to the railroad company to lay and operate a railroad beyond the limits of the street therein referred to; That such instrument must have such practical operation as the case permitted of, and if there could not be two tracks in front of the premises of a person signing such instrument, the railroad company must be content with one, and if that one could not be laid outside of the traveled track of the highway it must be laid on the traveled track thereof, or the company must forego the privilege of laying any track at all over such portion of the road.

TELEGRAM, INVIOLABILITY OF.

In re Storrer, U. S. District Court, Northern District of California, Aug. 2, 1894 (63 Fed. Rep. 564).

A telegram is not a privileged communication in the hands of the telegraph company; its production may be compelled for the purpose of investigating, by a United States Grand Jury, charges of criminal acts of the parties to the messages, in which the telegraph company is not implicated. Contents of subpoena duces tecum, held sufficiently definite and specific under the circumstances of the given case.

(857)

Cases of this series cited in opinion: Ex parte Brown, vol. 1, p. 316; United States v. Hunter, vol. 1, p. 444; National Bank v. National Bank, vol. 1, p. 199; Woods v. Miller, vol. 1, p. 321; Ex parte Jaynes, vol. 2, p. 454.

TELEPHONE,-INFORMATION BY TO SUPPORT ATTACHMENT.

Charles S. Murphy v. William C. Jack et al., New York Court of Appeals, April 17, 1894 (142 N. Y. 215).

While the material averments to support an attachment may be made on information and belief, and such information may be communicated to the affiant by telephone, it must appear that the affiant knew the person so communicating with him and recognized his voice, or knew in some satisfactory way who was speaking with him.

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