Mentzer v. Telegraph Co. Dam. sec. 980. We find a well recognized exception to the general rule that damages cannot be had for mental anguish in cases of breach of contract, in the action for breach of promise of marriage, and the reason for this exception is quite applicable here. In such cases the defendant, in making his contract, is dealing with the feelings and emotions. The contract relates almost wholly to the affections, and one is not allowed to so trifle with another's feelings. He knows at the time he makes the contract that if he breaks it the other will suffer great mental pain, and the courts, without exception, have allowed recovery in such a case. See Holloway v. Griffith, 32 Iowa, 409; Royal v. Smith, 40 Iowa, 615. The distinction we have pointed out is well stated in 1 Suth. Dam. sec. 92. Other exceptions have sometimes been made, which we need not further refer to. As said in the case of Wadsworth v. Telegraph Co., supra: "These illustrations serve the purpose of showing that in the ordinary contract only pecuniary benefits are contemplated by the contracting parties, and that, therefore, the damages resulting from such breach of contract must be measured by pecuniary standards, and that, where other than pecuniary benefits are contracted for, other than pecuniary standards should be applied in the ascertainment of damages flowing from the breach." "The case before us, so far as it is an action for breach of contract, is subject to the same general rule; and the defendant is answerable in damages for the breach, according to the nature of the contract, and the character and extent of the injury suffered by reason of its non-performance. The message was sent for a particular purpose, of which the defendant had knowledge. That purpose was not of a pecuniary nature. There was no offer or instruction to buy or sell anything-no proposition or promise with respect to any business transaction. The message was of far greater importance to the receiver than any of these. It was information which Mentzer v. Telegraph Co. defendant undertook to convey for a stipulated sum, and which, if promptly conveyed, would have enabled plaintiff to have been with him at the last moments, and would have saved her the injury of which she complains. The messages were in proper language, and lawful in purpose. She was entitled to the information they contained, and to whatever benefits that information would have conferred upon her, even though such benefits be mainly or altogether to the feelings and affections. The defendant contracted that she should have those benefits, and that she should be spared whatever pain and anguish such information, properly conveyed, would prevent." Reverting now to the damages which may be allowed if the action is treated as ex delicto, and to the broader rule of damages in cases of tort, we find that, in very many of these actions, damages are recoverable for mental anguish, some of which we will refer to hereafter. It is conceded by appellant's counsel that such damages may in certain cases be recovered, but they insist that they are never recoverable unless accompanied by some physical injury. It seems to us that, when it is conceded that mental suffering may be compensated for in actions of tort, the right of plaintiff to recover in this case is established. Let us look to some of the cases authorizing recovery in such cases, and see if there are no analogies. Damages for injuries to the feelings are given, though there are no physical injuries, where a person is wrongfully ejected from a rain. Shepard v. Railway Co., 77 Iowa, 54. In actions for slander and libel. Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54. For malicious prosecution. Fisher v. Hamilton, 49 Ind. 341. For false imprisonment. Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51. For crim. con. and seduction, and for assault. So damages for injured feelings were allowed where a conductor kissed a female passenger against her will. Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657. So, likewise, it has been held that the removal of the body of a child from the lot Mentzer v. Telegraph Co. in which it was rightfully buried, to a charter plot, gives the parent a right to recover for injury to his feelings. Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281. And a widow may recover for such suffering and nervous shock, against the person who unlawfully mutilates the dead body of her husband, although no actual pecuniary damages are alleged or proven. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307. See, also, Suth. Dam. sec. 979, and authorities cited for kindred cases. The wrongs complained of in these cases all directly affected the feelings, and injury thereto proximately resulted. But no more so than in the case at bar, where the injury to the feelings is apparent, and suffering necessarily followed. This rule of necessity applies. where the feelings are directly affected by the nature of the wrong complained of. It has no application to such mental suffering as indirectly results from the commission of every tort. Let us now look to our own cases for a moment, and see what has been held. In the case of Stevenson v. Belknap, 6 Iowa, 103, which was an action brought by a father for the seduction of his daughter, this court approved an instruction that damage may be given, not only for his loss of service and actual expenses, but also on account of the wounded feelings of the plaintiff, and of his anxiety, as a parent of other children, whose morals may be corrupted by the example. In the case of McKinley v. Railroad Co., 44 Iowa, 318, which was an action for assault by one of defendant's employes upon the plaintiff, the lower court instructed the jury that plaintiff might recover, as compensatory damages, not only for bodily pain and suffering, but for the outrage and indignity put upon him. This instruction was approved, and it was held that mental suffering not arising from bodily pain, but from the nature on the assault, might be recovered, the court using this language: "The question is fairly presented whether mental VOL. V-46. Mentzer v. Telegraph Co. . anguish, arising from the nature and character of the assault, constitutes an element of compensatory damages. We, on principle are unable to see why mental pain arising from or caused by the nature of the assault whereby the wound was inflicted. should not be an element of such damages." A careful examination of the authorities will disclose the fact that the weight of adjudicated cases is in favor of the proposition that mental anguish arising from the nature and character of the assault is an element of compensatory damages. The mind is no less a part of the person than the body, and the sufferings of the former are sometimes more acute and lasting than those of the latter. " It may also be said in this connection that the court in this case declined to follow the case of Johnson v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 6 Nev. 224, and kindred cases which are relied upon by appellant's counsel, remarking that "the decided weight of authority is opposed to the view taken in that case, and we are unwilling to follow it, and by so doing ignore the other authorities cited." That the question was well considered and deliberately decided was apparent from the fact that Mr. Justice DAY dissented from the conclusion of the majority. In the quite recent case of Shepard v. Railway Co., 77 Iowa, 58, we went still further, and squarely held that damages for mental suffering are recoverable, although there was no physical pain or injury. In that case we said: "If these things (wounded feelings) may be considered in connection with physical suffering, in estimating actual damages, we know no reason which forbids their being considered in the absence of physical suffering. It is said that the 'mental pain' contemplated by the court in the case last cited (144 Iowa, 315) includes something more than mere wounded feelings or wounded pride, and that the latter can be considered only where malice is alleged and proven, and where there has been proof of actual bodily injury. We do not think the claim is well Mentzer v. Telegraph Co, founded. Humiliation, wounded pride and the like may cause very acute mental anguish. The suffering caused would undoubtedly be different in different persons, and no exact rule for measuring it can be given. In ascertaining it, much must necessarily be left to the discretion of the jury, as enlightened by the charge of the court. The charge given in this case, as a whole, confined the jury to an allowance for compensatory damages." In the case of Curtis v. Railway Co., 54 N. W. Rep. 339, this court squarely held that damages might be recovered for mental pain and suffering, although the damages for physical injury were merely nominal; and further held that such damages were compensatory, and not punitive. In the case of Parkhurst v. Masteller, 57 Iowa, 480, which was an action for malicious prosecution, this court followed the McKinley case, and held that in such actions actual damages would include compensation for bodily and mental suffering, and clearly held that damages for mental suffering might be recovered in such cases, although entirely disconnected from bodily suffering or disability. In a case of assault and battery (Lucas v. Flinn, 35 Iowa, 9), this court held that damages for mental anguish might be allowed as compensation. In the case of Paine v. Railroad Co., 45 Iowa, 569, the rule in the McKinley case was recognized; but it was held there was no right of recovery for injury to feelings, on account of the peculiar facts of that case. And the case of Fitzgerald v. Railroad Co., 50 Iowa, 79, merely follows the Paine case, and holds that, under the facts, plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The rule of the McKinley case has never, to our knowledge, been doubted by any later decision. In the case of Stone v. Railroad Co., 47 Iowa, 88, it was held that the action in tha: case, owing to its peculiar facts, was an action for breach of contract; and that damages for mental suffering were not recoverable, and in this case it is said: "Insult and abuse accompanying a breach of contract cannot affect |