Congress the right to prohibit the importation of slaves during the first two decades after the Constitution went into force. In the meantime no import tax of more than ten dollars per slave was to be imposed.

THE THREE-FIFTHS COMPROMISE

Another question connected with the institution of slavery likewise gave the convention some difficulty, although not so much as later writers on the subject seem to have imagined. It will be remembered that by the terms of the Great Compromise, it had been arranged to have representation in the lower house of Congress apportioned among the states according to their respective populations. But were slaves to be counted in determining a state's population? Delegates from the states of the North, where slaves were few, held that slaves should not be counted as a basis of representation; delegates from the states of the South, where slaves formed a very considerable part of the entire population, insisted that they should be counted. A somewhat illogical settlement of this point was made by the Three-Fifths Compromise. It was agreed that slaves should be counted in determining the quota of representatives which a state should have in Congress, but at three fifths of their numerical strength only. In other words, one hundred slaves were to be counted, for purposes of representation, as the equivalent of sixty free men. There was little logic, of course, in this compromise. If slaves were citizens they should have been counted at their full numerical value; if they were mere chattels, they should not have been counted at all. The terms of the ThreeFifths Compromise were arranged on the idea that they were neither the one thing nor the other. Nevertheless, the fact that the members of the convention were willing to accept this arrangement, illogical as it was, is a tribute to their sound political sense. They were not wedded to logic or theory in government. They realized that their first task was to put some sort of central government on its feet and to desire the end was to tolerate the means.

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Various other matters made heavy demands upon the time and patience of the delegates. The proper position and authority of the executive head of the new federation was one of these. It was desired to provide for a president who would have dignity and powers commensurate with his position as the first citizen of a great nation; on the other hand it was just as strongly felt that the safety of a republican government required a due restriction of executive authority. The president was accordingly given great powers (e.g., the appointing and veto powers), but effective provision was made to forestall any future abuse of his authority. To do all this required the working out of wholly new details of government. When it came to providing potential legislative checks upon a powerful executive there were no foreign precedents to follow. The convention had to break new ground. James Madison had drawn up for his own use a set of "Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies” which covered the whole historical range of European experiments in federal government from the Achæan League to the Helvetic Republic. But these notes were more useful in showing what to avoid than in pointing safe routes to be followed. We have had many successful experiments in federalism during the last hundred years in Canada, Germany, Australia, South Africa, and elsewhere; but in 1787 the history of federal government was on the whole a chronicle of failures, partial or complete. It took courage to plan as boldly as the men of the Philadelphia convention planned; but the quality of courage was not lacking among the members of this body, some of whom had, eleven years before, put their signatures to the most daring document of their time.

INFLUENCE OF MONTESQUIEU

When one looks at the work of the constitutional convention in a broad way, there are two fundamental motives which appear to have guided the members. In the first place they

agreed with the French philosopher, Montesquieu, that no particular frame of government is suited to all men in all ages and in all places. That form of government is best which best suits its environment. If the delegates were not, as a body, proficient in political theory they were thoroughly conversant with the New World's problems and with the political psychology of its people. Most of them had been in public life either as members of the Continental Congress, as governors of states, or as state officers. No one can read the records of the convention without realizing that it contained among its members many politicians of a very shrewd and practical type. They set out to draft a frame of government which would suit the genius of the American people, and this latter test was, for the most part, the only one that they applied. The constitutional history of the United States during the last hundred and twenty-five years is a sufficient testimony to their sagacity in this regard.

ATTITUDE OF DELEGATES TOWARDS THE NEW CONSTITUTION

In the second place the convention was actuated by a desire to plan a scheme of government to which, in the words of Washington, "the wise and honest might repair," even though all its arrangements might not command the whole-hearted approval of any single delegate among its members. On great and small issues alike it was ready to compromise at all times, provided a safe and fair arrangement, duly regardful of every interest concerned, could be secured thereby. But it was not ready to adopt compromises for the sole purpose of drawing support to the new Constitution from the selfish and capricious elements in the national population. In other words, the members of the convention desired to frame a constitution that would gain acceptance at the hands of the people; but they also wanted to create a government that would endure. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the finished work of the convention commanded the unqualified approval of any one among the fifty-five who had a hand in making it. Only thirty-nine signed it; the other twenty-six had either left the convention before the new

Constitution was finished or declined to put their signatures to it at the convention's final session. Even among the thirty-nine who signed there were many serious doubters. Alexander Hamilton gave his signature gladly; but at the same time took occasion to remind the convention that no man's ideas were more remote from the new Constitution than his own. He realized that the new plan of government was likely to prove vastly superior to the old, and this seemed a sufficient reason for ranging himself with its supporters. Benjamin Franklin also had his misgivings; but after remarking that the experience of a long life had taught him to doubt the infallibility of his own opinions, he placed his name at the head of the Pennsylvania delegation. So it was with James Madison, who had done more than any other man to bring the work of the convention to a fruitful end. The final draft of the Constitution was not a mirror of his own political theories, but he was ready to shoulder his share of responsibility for it. There was a willingness to sink personal prejudices in a common effort to get what seemed to be the only scheme of central government on which there had been any approach to agreement. All those who signed the Constitution felt that it promised at least some improvement over the Articles of Confederation, but with several members of the convention that was the limit of their enthusiasm for it. To men of strong native convictions this action required both patriotism and courage, and in neither of these qualities was the constitutional convention found wanting.

II. THE CAMPAIGN FOR ITS ADOPTION

THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE THE STATES

WHEN the convention completed its work on September 17, 1787, the real campaign for the establishment of the new government was still ahead: for the convention had no final powers; the new Constitution required the indorsement of at least nine states before it could go into force. So the document was sent to the Congress of the Confederation, which in turn transmitted copies of it without comment to the legislatures of the thirteen

states in order that these might submit it for ratification. In none of the states was the Constitution submitted to popular vote, although several of the states had adopted their own state constitutions in that way. Instead, the people of each state were asked to choose delegates to a state convention, and to these conventions the Constitution was turned over for acceptance or rejection. Thereupon the whole country fairly seethed with warm discussion, the friends and foes of the new Constitution quickly ranging themselves into opposite camps. Letters poured into the newspapers; broadsides and pamphlets attacking the new scheme of government began to appear in profusion. It looked as though the Constitution stood little chance of acceptance unless some of the criticisms that were coming from all sides could be promptly and effectively answered.

IMPORTANCE OF NEW YORK

The pivotal point in the struggle was New York; for unless that state should accept the Constitution the new union would be split in twain. New York was not only one of the largest, most populous and most influential of the thirteen states, but geographically lay right athwart the country. Four states were to the north of her and eight to the south. No union could be solid without New York. It was in this state, rather ominously, that the most determined and best organized opposition to the new arrangements came forward, and it was here that regular newspapers afforded the largest opportunity for impressing the defects of the proposed Constitution on the public mind.

THE FAULT-FINDERS

It has been mentioned that the convention of 1787 met behind closed doors and that nothing was allowed to reach the public ear until its entire work was done. Naturally enough the new Constitution contained many surprises and its publication, as might have been expected, let loose an avalanche of criticism, mostly ill-tempered. Some critics complained that it gave the