places by land and water, form their junction punctually, without the least retard by cross accidents of wind. or weather, or interruption from the enemy; and that the army, which was their object, should in the mean time have the goodness to quit a situation from whence it might have escaped, and place itself in another whence an escape was impossible.

General Greene has done wonders too in Carolina. I hear that a reinforcement was to be sent to him. from the army in Virginia, and that there are hopes of his reducing Charleston. You have probably in the enclosed packet the account of his last great action. Count de Grasse sailed on the 30th with the fleet and part of the land forces. His destination is not mentioned. I have the honor to be, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

FROM JOHN ADAMS TO B. FRANKLIN.

Proposed Treaty of Alliance between France, Holland, and the United States.

SIR,

Amsterdam, 26 November, 1781.

I presume you have a copy from Congress of their instructions to me of the 16th of August;* but, as it is possible it might be otherwise, I have enclosed one. I have communicated them to the Duke de la Vauguyon. I shall do nothing in the business without communicating it beforehand to him, with the most entire confidence, and receiving his approbation and advice. He informs me, that he has not yet received any instructions from his court respecting it. These instructions

Instructions for proposing a treaty of alliance between France, Holland, and the United States. See Secret Journal of Congress, Vol. II. p. 470.

have arrived at a very proper time to counteract another insidious trick of the British ministry, in agreeing to the mediation of Russia for a separate peace with Holland.

With unfeigned joy I congratulate your Excellency on the glorious news of the surrender of Cornwallis to the arms of the allies. How easy a thing would it be to bring this war to a happy conclusion, if Spain and Holland would adopt the system of France, and coöperate in it with the same honor and sincerity. There is nothing wanting but a constant naval superiority in the West Indies, and on the coast of the United States, to obtain triumphs upon triumphs over the English, in all quarters of the globe. The allies now carry on the war in America with an infinite advantage over the English, whose infatuation, nevertheless, will continue to make them exhaust themselves there, to the neglect of all their possessions in other parts of the world. I have the honor to be, &c. JOHN ADAMS.

FROM ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

Financial Difficulties of the United States. Necessity of further Assistance from France. - - Preparations for another Campaign.

DEAR SIR,

Philadelphia, 26 November, 1781.

The Marquis de Lafayette, who has obtained leave to revisit his family for the winter, does me the honor to be the bearer of this, and duplicates of two former letters to you. The degree of estimation in which he is held here, you will collect from the enclosed resolutions relative to him, so that you may converse free

ly with him, and I doubt not that he will be able to satisfy your inquiries on many important questions relative to this country; on which account I may confine myself more to general heads, than I would otherwise do. As to intelligence, there is little of importance, the army all having gone into winter quarters after the late glorious campaign, the enemy having been defeated on every hand. A party of about six hundred of them, who fell upon the western frontier of New York, were the last that quitted the stage; having been driven off by an inferior number of militia, with the loss of their leaders, and many privates killed, and about fifty, including the wounded, made prisoners. A body of troops is detached to the southward to reinforce General Greene, with orders to attempt Wilmington on their way, which the enemy occupy with about five hundred men, and keep up a connexion with the disaffected counties in North Carolina.

We have not in a long time heard either from you or Mr. Jay, so that we are much in the dark respecting the probable prospect of a negotiation this winter, or rather are led to conclude from your silence, that the prospect is extremely remote; in which case, all your objects will concentre in preparing for the ensuing campaign, and directing the operations as far as possible to this country. The success of the combined operations this summer will give great weight to your arguments, especially as they are such as would deserve, independent of that, the most serious attention. But, Sir, you will have a difficult card to play, to induce France to do what not only our but her interests essentially require. Never was there a time in which money was more necessary to us than at present. The total abolition of paper, the length of the war, the restricted commerce we have carried on for

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the first five years of it, the arrears of debts, and the slender thread by which public credit hangs, put it totally out of our power to make any great exertions without an immediate supply of money.

Taxation will be carried as far as it can go; but this will fall very far short of our wants. The richest nations in Europe, unable to carry on a war by taxation only, are compelled to borrow. How then will it be expected, that a nation, which has had every difficulty to struggle with, an enemy in the heart of its country, and all its considerable towns at one time or another in their possession, a superior navy on its coasts, and the consequential ruin of its agriculture and commerce, how, I say, can it be expected, that such a nation should find resources within itself for so long and bloody a war? And yet, in this situation, we are alarmed by our advices from you, by representations from the minister of France, by assurances from every quarter, that we must expect no further assistance in money. Surely it is not possible, that France, after having done so much for us, after having brought us within view of the desired haven, should oblige us to lose the advantage of all she has done; and yet be assured, that the most serious consequence may attend her stopping her hand at this critical time. Public credit, which is growing very fast, will drop to the ground. The contracts made for the ensuing campaign must be given up; the troops, who were made to expect pay in specie, will be dissatisfied; and, upon the least ill fortune, a failure in supplies will show their discontents; recruiting will be checked, and the conclusion of the war on those advantageous terms, which one vigorous exertion next spring in this country would secure, will be postponed to a later period, when in fact all we wish, to enable us to accomplish these great ob

jects, is less than one year's continuance of the war will cost France.

You will, therefore, show the necessity of setting our credit upon a firm basis, the prospect we have of accomplishing it, from the great confidence in the integrity and abilities of the financier, from the economy which is introduced into our departments, from the industry which money excites, and which a fluctuating medium had destroyed, and from the total debility which must attend another shock to public credit.

You are perfectly acquainted, Sir, with the natural resources of the country; you know the value of our exports, and the security they afford for any debt that we may contract; in short, there are a thousand arguments on this subject, which will suggest themselves to you, not one of which will you, upon this occasion, omit to urge, since you must be perfectly convinced of its importance in every view, both to France and to us. The Superintendent will write more fully upon this subject, which relates so particularly to his department.

I would beg leave to remind you of another want, which we depend on your representations, and the good dispositions of the court of Versailles, to remove. The chase here seems to be pretty well over, the enemy, tired of running across the country, have taken to their burrows, and the whole business, that remains to us, is to take measures for unearthing them next spring. In order to this, ships are absolutely necessary. The situation of New York and Charleston renders them untenable against a naval force, and extremely strong against an attack by land; besides that success in such an operation would not be decisive, since, after putting us to immense expense of men and ammunition of every kind, while they keep the com