though the owner of the land was not misled thereby. -Cannon v. Williams, Colo., 23 Pac. Rep. 456.

73. MINING CLAIMS-Survey.-Code Civil Proc. Mont. § 376, giving district courts power to make an order for an inspection or survey of a mining claim whenever any person shall have any right to or interest in any lead, lode or mining claim which is in the possession of another, and an inspection or survey shall be necessary for the protection of such rights or interest, is not unconstitutional, as being unjust and oppressive, though the interest of petitioner is not defined, and though the order may be issued without requiring bond, and before suit, and no provision is made for appeal, as the order may be reviewed on certiorari.—St Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Co., Mont., 23 Pac. Rep. 510.

74. MORTGAGES.-Failure to present against a dece. dent's estate a claim secured by a mortgage on his land, within a year after notice to present their claims is given to creditors of the estate, under Code Wash. T. § 1467, cannot effect the mortgagee's right to subject the mortgaged land to payment of his debt, though it will bar his right to have decedent's other estate applied on any deficiency that remains after exhausting the land. -Scammon v. Ward, Wash., 23 Pac. Rep. 439.

75. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Void Bonds.-Bonds of a city being void because issued under an act violating Const Mo. 1865, art. 11 § 14, declaring that the general assembly shall not authorize any city to loan its credit to any corporation unless two thirds of the qualfied voters assent thereto, the purchaser cannot maintain an action for money had and received to recover the amount paid to the city for such bonds, as, the city having no power to create the debt, no implied promise can arise for its payment, notwithstanding Gen. St. Mo. 1865 ch. 41, § 7.-Morton v. City of Nevada, U. S. C. C. (Mo.), 41 Fed. Rep. 582.

76. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Markets.-Where a city, by its charter, is given full power to establish and control market places and privileges, one who spends money in fitting up a private market, under a license pursuant to an ordinance limiting the duration of the privilege to one year, acquires no vested right to exercise his business therein, and cannot complain of the refusal to renew his license pursuant to a subsequent ordinance prohibiting private markets within a given area.-Newson v. City of Galveston, Tex., 13 S. W. Rep. 368. 77. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.-Defective Sidewalks.A city is required to use all reasonable care and supervision to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel in the ordinary modes of travel and if it fail to do so, is liable for injuries sustained in consequence of such failure, provided the party injured was exercising reasonable care.-City of Lincoln v. Smith, Neb., 45 N. W. Rep. 41.

78. NOTE OF INDIAN.-A promissory note made by an Indian, a member of a tribe residing on a reservation, and maintaining its relations, in favor of another member of the tribal relations, in favor of another member of the tribe, is valid, when it was not given under a contract prohibited by Rev. St. U. S. 1878, p. 367, in relation to their lands or annuities.-Ke-tuc-e-mun guah v. McClure, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 1080.

79. OFFICE AND OFFICER-Removal -Under How. St. Mich. § 653, giving the governor power to remove a county officer from office for certain causes therein set forth, and providing that the charges must be made in writing, verified by affidavit and exhibited to the governor, and a copy served on the officer the charge must distinctly state the specific acts of misconduct or neglect relied on.-People v. Therrien, Mich., 45. N. W. Rep. 78.

80. PARENT AND CHILD-Support.-When a mother is unable to support and educate her son, and the income of his estate is insufficient to do so, the amount expended by her for his support and education, though without a special order of a probate court, is a charge on the corpus of his estate.-Freybe v. Tiernan, Tex., 13 S. W. Rep. 370.

81. PARTNERSHIP-Surviving Partner. A surviving partner is not incapacitated from purchasing the interest of his decea ed partner in the firm property from the executors.-Valentine v. Wysor, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 1076.

82. PARTNERSHIP-Firm and Private Credito rs.-Under Rev. St. Mo. 1879, § 658, providing that "all contracts which, by the common law, are joint only, shall be con strued to be joint and several;" demands against a partnership are several as well as joint; and under sections 184, 212, providing for the classification of all demands against the estate of a decedent, and the pay. ment of the demands so classified "pro rata," according to classification, a demand against a partnership is en. titled to share equally with the the individual debts of one of the partners, in the administration of his estate. -Hundley v. Farris, Mo., 13 S. W. Rep. 392.

83. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY- Subrogation. - Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 1214, which provides that where a judgment defendant who is a surety pays the judgment he is subrogated to all the rights of judgment plaintiff, does not apply where the judgment is against two obligors on a promissory note which fails to show any suretyship, and the judgment is paid by one of them without raising any issue as to which was surety.-De Witt v. Boring, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 1085.

84. PROCESS-Non-resident Defendant.-A judgment rendered on a promissory note by a State court, on service by publication only, against a non-resident defendant, who has no property within the State, and who does not appear voluntarily, is void.-Paxton v. Daniel, Wash., 23 Pac. Rep. 441.

85. PUBLIC LAND-Town site Lots.-Act Mont. Dec., 12, 1867, §§ 11, 12, passed to carry out Act Cong. March 2, 1867, (relating to grants of town-sites to probate judges in trust for the inhabitants), requiring the judge to hear testimony and adjudicate between contestants, and allowing an appeal from his decision by the district court, vests him with quasi judicial powers, and a deed from him cannot be collaterally assailed in ejectment by showing that the preliminary steps required to give au. thority to convey a lot were not taken though the act of congress provides that any act of the trustee not in conformity to the rules made by the State or Territory shall be void.-Ming v. Foote, Mont., 23 Pac. Rep. 515.

86. RAILROAD COMPANY-Accident at Crossing.-Liability of railroad company for injuries to one crossing track, the flagman being intoxicated.-International & Gt. Northern R. Co. v. Dyer, Tex., 13 S. W. Rep. 377 87. RAILROAD COMPANIES Consolidation. Under Code Ala. 1886 § 1583, the power of a railroad company to acquire land in aid of the construction of its road will not pass to a consolidated corporation of which it forms a part, unless its line, when completed according to its charter, will form a continuous track with those of the other constituents of the consolidated corporation so as to admit of the passage of trains without break or interruption.-Georgia etc. Ry. Co. v. Gains Ala. 7 South Rep. 382.

88. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railroad.-Legal distinction between railroads for general traffic and street railroads.-Williams v. City Electric St. Ry. Co., U. S. C. C Ark., 41 Fed. Rep. 556.

89. REAL-ESTATE AGENTS-Commissions.-An intimation by a real-estate broker of the amount his employer was willing to pay for land, made to the owner, in good faith, to obtain a reduction in the price, is not an act of disloyalty to his employer which will defeat his rerovery for services.-Hinton v. Coleman, Wis., 45 N. W. Rep. 26.

90. RECEIVER-Actions-State Courts.-When a State court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subjectmatter, its judgment against the receiver of a United States court is as final and conclusive as it is against any other suitor.-Central Trust Co. v. St. L. etc. Ry. Co., U. S. C. C. (Ark.), 41 Fed. Rep. 551.

91. REFORMATION OF CONTRACT.-To authorize a court

to rectify a contract, and insert other and additional terms and conditions therein, the proof must be full, strong, clear, and the fact shown beyond reasonable controversy.-Brundige v. Blair, Kan., 23 Pac. Rep. 482. 92. REFORMATION OF DEED In an action by the vendor to reform a deed for mistake, the fact that it is made out in the name of the purchaser's wife will not render incompetent parol evidence of the nature and extent of his examination of the premises before making the bargain, though he was not authorized, in writing, to act for her.-Conlin v. Masecar, Mich., 45 N. W. Rep. 67.

93. RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS -Expiration of Charter. -The property of a religious corporation, dissolved by reason of the expiration of its charter, vests in its members, who may reincorporate; and the new corporation may sue for breach of a condition relating to the premises, especially where it has been in possession and managed the property without objection for many years.- Congregation v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., U. S. C. C. (La.), 41 Fed. Rep. 564.

94. REMOVAL OF CAUSES.-Though the law of congress relating to the removal of causes provides that the removing party shall file a bond to enter the case in the circuit court on the first day of the next session, and that the record being so entered, the cause shall proceed as if begun in the circuit court, the other party may file a transcript of the record at an earlier day, and have the case remanded, if it appears upon the face of the record that it was not one authorized to be removed. -Mills v. Newell, U. S. C. C. Minn., 41 Fed. Rep. 529.

95. RES ADJUDICATA - Ejectment. A judgment in ejectment, by a landlord against his tenant for breach of the conditions of the lease, will not bar a subsequent action against the landlord by an heir of the tenant to recover the land, on the ground that a patent therefor was issued to the tenant during his tenancy, as in the former action the tenant was estopped to deny his landlord's title.-Arnold v. Woodward, Colo., 23 Pac. Rep. 441. 96. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-A letter to the owner of a building proposing to accept a lease of it, specifying the term and rental, upon conditions of alteratons in aceordance with "plans to be mutually agreed upon," and a letter from the owner accepting the offer, do not, in the absence of any agreement on the plans for alterations, constitute a contract for a lease, of which specific performance will be enforced.-Mayer v. McCreery, N. Y., 23 N. E. Rep. 1045.

97. TAXATION - - Constitutional Law. The tax ordinance of the city of Savannah, imposing a tax of two and one half per cent, on real estate, 3-10 per cent. on bank stock, and one half per cent. on all other personal property, is void, as under Const. Ga. art. 7, § 2, par. 1, providing that all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and ad valorem on all prop erty subject to be taxed, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax," all real and personal property within the corporate limits must be taxes ac cording to its value.-City of Savannah v. Weed, Ga., 11 S. E. Rep. 235.

98. TAXATION.-Taxable Property.-Live-stock driven from the home ranch of the owners into another county to be herded therein temporarily, and then returned to the ranch in the home county, is not assessable for taxes in the former county.-Ford v. McGregor, Nev., 23 Pac. Rep. 508.

99. TAXATION-Taxes-Forfeiture.-Act Ark. March 14, 1879, which revises the whole subject of donation of farm lands forfeited to the State for non payment of taxes, and which permits the State to donate such lands to any adult citizen of the United States, "subject to the conditions hereinafter mentioned," but which mentions no condition obliging the donee to pay for improvements on the land, repeals Act Ark. Dec. 23, 1840, § 3 (Mansf. Dig. § 4250), which provides that the donee of improved land forfeited to the State shall pay the person owning the improvement double its value.- Thomas v. Joyner, Ark., 13 S. W. Rep. 391.

100. TRADE-MARK-Assignment.-Where the proprietor of a medicine transfers the right to use his trademark and formula without transferring the place of manufacture, or plant used, or the good-will of the business, and there is no exclusive right to manufacture the medicine in any one, and there is nothing in the trade-mark to indicate that the medicine comes from a particular manufactory, the grantee cannot restrain another person from using it.-Chadwick v. Covell, Mass., 23 N. E. Rep. 1068.

101. VENDOR'S LIEN-Foreclosure.-A judgment foreclosing a vendor's lien on land as described in the petition, but including 50 acres which were excepted from the conveyance to the vendee, is in no wise prejudicial to the latter.-Nass v. Chadwick, Tex., 13 S. W. Rep. 383.

102. VENUE-Sale of Decedent's Estate.-Under Civil Code Ky. § 66, an action by a ward against the administrator and heirs of his guardian, to subject lands which desended from such guardian to the heirs to the pay. ment of the amount of the ward's estate in the hands of the guardian, is properly brought in the county where the heirs reside and the property is located.Willis' Adm'r. v. Roberts' Adm'r., Ky., 13 S. W. Rep. 358.

103. WATERS AND WATER-courses-Surface Water.— A drain commissioner has no right to maintain a drain whereby water is thrown upon a person's land, without providing a proper outlet therefor.-Chapel v. Smith, Mich., 45 N. W. Rep. 69.

4. WATERS AND WATER-COURSES - Riparian Rights.The State holds the title to the soil in navigable waters to low-water mark in trust for the people, and chiefly for the protection of the right of navigation. The riparian owner is entitled to fill in and make improvements in the shallow waters in front of his land to the line of navigability, and such improvements in aid of navigation are recognized as a public as well as private benefit. These rights pertain to the use and occupancy of the soil below-water mark, and are valuable property rights, and the exercise thereof, though subject to State regulation, can only be interferred with by the State for public purposes.-Mitler v. Mendenhall, Minn., 44 N. W. Rep. 1141.

105. WILLS-Insurance.- The title to an insurance policy on the life of a husband, payable to his wife, "her executors, administrators, or assigns," does not pass under a bequest by her to him of all her personal property in certain houses, and her interest in the community acquired during the marriage.-Evans v. Opperman, Tex., 13. S. W. Rep. 312.

106. WILLS-Revocation- Adoption of Child.-Under Rev. St. Ind. 1881, §§ 2559, 2560, a will is not revoked by the adoption of a child, though such child is entitied to receive "all the rights and interests in the estate" of the adopting parent, "by descent or otherwise, that such child would if the natural heir" of such parent.Daris v. Fogle, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 860.

107. WILLS-Construction.- Testator devised all his real estate to his wife for life with power to convey one undivided half thereof in fee-simple absolute. The will then provided that the other undivided one-half should go in equal parts to certain devisees, to have and to hold in said parts unto them as tenants in common, to them and their heirs, forever; but the said devisees are not to take possession of their said parts until the death of [the wife] and upon her death [the devisees] shall take said parts so devised; and, in case either of them shall die befere [the wife], then the heirs of such person so dying shall take his or her portion so devised:" Held, that the devisees took a remainder in fee free from any condition, and in event of the death of one of them before the wife, his heirs took his portion by descent, and not as purchasers.-Chew v. Keller, Mo., 13 S. W. Rep. 395.

ST. LOUIS, JUNE 6, 1890.

Our readers will find on page 480 of this issue the full opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Leisy v. Hardin, the "original package" case. It will be found worth the reading. We regret that we have not the space to publish the dissenting opinion of Justice Gray, concurred in by Justices Harlan and Brewer. Though lacking the force of an authority, it can at least be said that it is an exceptionally able and complete presentation of the questions surrounding the interstate commerce clause. We have little doubt that nine out of ten readers of both opinions will agree with the minority of the court.

It

To meet the emergency created by the above decision, a bill has been reported from the judiciary committee of the senate. provides, in effect, that no State shall be held to be limited or restrained in its power to prohibit, regulate, control or tax the sale, keeping for sale or transportation as an article of commerce or otherwise, to be delivered within its own limits, or in fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquid or liquors, by reason of the fact that the same have been imported into such State from beyond its limits, whether there shall or shall not have been paid thereon any tax, duty, impost or excise to the United States. The bill provoked considerable discussion, quite a number of the senators taking the position that it was unconstitutional, as being an attempt by congress to delegate to the States a power exclusively vested in itself. The constitution of the United States says that congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with Indian tribes. A long line of the decisions of the federal courts sustain the proposition that a State has the inherent power to protect its people against epidemic, disease and those things which may endanger their lives and health. This is known as the police power of a State, and which exists by virtue of the constitution. VOL. 30-No. 23.

gress can act under its commercial power is local in its nature, such as harbor pilotage, construction of bridges over navigable rivers, piers, wharves and the like, the State can act until congress interferes and supersedes its authority. None of these cases are strictly regulations of commerce, in the sense in which the constitution speaks of the regulation of commerce, which means the regulation of trade and transportation between the States. But where the subject is national in character, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the States, such as transportation between the States, including the importation of goods from one State into another, congress can alone act upon it and provide the needed regulation. Now, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the "original package" case, held, whether rightly or wrongly it makes no difference for the purpose of this argument, that "original packages" shipped from one State into another are, until broken and mingled with the mass of property in the State to which sent, articles of interstate commerce, upon which congress alone has authority to act, and that no State prohibitory law can affect the right to own or sell such "original packages. If such "original packages" are articles of interstate commerce, the trade in and transportation of which congress alone has the power, given by the constitution, to regulate, it is difficult. to conceive how it is possible for congress to declare such articles not articles

of interstate commerce, and, therefore, subject to State prohibitory laws, in the absence of a constitutional amendment giving such right. In other words, may the provisions, requirements and prohibitions of an organic law be violated and set at naught by a mere act of congress? Does the right to "regulate commerce" include also the right to declare that not to be an article of com

merce, which is in fact so? Does it carry with it the right to delegate that regulation of commerce to the States? The arguments indulged in by eminent senators in behalf of this bill seem to have been more in the direction of expediency than of strict constitutional right, and it seems to us that the difficulties and embarrassments which have resulted from the decision of the "original

package" case will not be effectively removed by a bill which, no matter how meritorious in other respects, is of doubtful constitutionality.

A late decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts will probably occasion more grief in the editorial rooms of the Chicago Legal News than anywhere else. We refer to the decision where it is held that, in the absence of a statute, the governor of the State of Massachusetts has no power to appoint women to be notaries public. The court goes into an interesting discussion of the history of the office and the practice and usage in reference to the appointment of women. They say that they do not find that a woman has ever held the office of notary public in Massachusetts, and are not aware that a woman has ever been appointed to that office in England. We know of no reason why a 'woman should not be allowed to hold such an office, provided she can sign her name, manipulate a seal and swear-parties. haps it is the doubt as to the scope of the latter qualification which has heretofore kept women aloof from seeking the office. At any rate, if the Chicago Legal News, which is understood to be the constitutional champion of women in the United States, desires our aid in the premises, we should be glad to assist.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

Per

DOWER-FOREIGN DIVORCE. The recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals of Van Cleaf v. Burns, 23 N. E. Rep. 881, is of importance on the question of the effect of a foreign divorce on the right of dower. It was there held that as nothing except adultery is, in New York, regarded as misconduct with reference to the subject of absolute divorce, no other misconduct will deprive a wife of dower, even if it is the basis of a judgment of divorce lawfully rendered in another State, unless it expressly appears that such judgment has that effect in the jurisdiction where it was rendered. Vann, J., says: Our revised statutes provide that "a widow shall be endowed of the third part of all the lands whereof her husband was seised of an estate of inheritance at any

time during the marriage," (1 Rev. St. p. 740, § 1); but that, "in case of divorce dissolving the marriage contract for the misconduct of the wife, she shall not be endowed," (Id. p. 741, § 8). It is further provided by the Code of Civil Procedure that, where final judgment is rendered dissolving the marriage in an action brought by the wife, her inchoate right of dower in any real property of which her husband then was, or was theretofore, seised, shall not be affected by the judgment; but, that, when the action is brought by the husband, the wife shall not be entitled to dower in any of his real property, or to a distributive share in his personal property. Sections 1759, 1760. These provisions of the Code replaced a section of the revised statutes which provided that "a wife, being a defendant in a suit for a divorce brought by her husband, and convicted of adultery, shall not be entitled to dower in her husband's real estate, or any part thereof, nor to any distributive share of his personal estate." 3 Rev. St. (6th ed.) p. 157, § 61, repealed Laws 1880, ch. 245, § 1, subd. 4. An absolute divorce could be granted only on account of adultery, either under the revised statutes or the Code. 3 Rev. St. (6th. ed.) p. 155, §§ 38-42; Code Civil Proc. §§ 1756, 1761. According to either, an action could be brought to annul, to dissolve, or to partially suspend the operation of the marriage contract. A marriage may be annulled for causes existing before or at the time it was entered into; and the decree, in such cases, destroys the conjugal relation ab initio, and operates as a sentence of nullity. Id. §§ 1742, 1754. A marriage contract may be dissolved, and an absolute divorce, or a divorce proper, granted for the single cause already mentioned. Such a judgment operates from the date of the decree by relieving the parties from the obligations of the marriage, although the party adjudged to be guilty is forbidden to remarry until the death of the other. It has no retroactive effect, except as expressly provided by statute. Wait v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 95. An action for a separation, which is sometimes called a "limited divorce," neither annuls nor dissolves the marriage contract, but simply separates the parties from bed and board, either permanently or for a limited time. Code Civil Prac. §§ 1762-1767. Neither the nature nor effect of the judgment of divorce granted by the court in Illinois in favor of David Van Cleaf against the plaintiff appears in the record before us, except that the bond of marriage between them is stated to have been dissolved upon the ground that she had wilfully deserted and absented herself from her husband, without reasonable cause, for the space of more than two years prior to the commencement of the action. It does not even appear that the decree would have the effect upon her right to dower in the State where it was rendered that is claimed for it here. Apparently, it simply dissolved the marriage relation; and whether it had any effect, by retroaction, upon property rights existing at its date, is not disclosed. A judgment of a sister State can have no greater effect here than belongs to it in the State where it was rendered. Suydam v. Barber, 18 N. Y. 468. There is no presumption that the statutes of the State of Illinois agree with our own in relation to this subject. Cutler v. Wright, 22 N. Y. 472; McCulloch v. Norwood, 58 N. Y. 562. If they do, the fact should have been proved, as our courts will not take judicial notice of statutes of another State. Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige, 220; Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173; Sheldon v. Hopkins, 7 Wend. 435; Whart. Ev. §§ 288, 300. Adequate force can be given to the Illinois judgment, by recognizing its effect upon the status of the parties thereto, without giving it the effect contended for by the re

spondent. Barrett v. Failing, 111 U. S. 523, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 598; Mansfield v. McIntyre, 10 Ohio, 27.

The judgment appealed from, therefore, can be affirmed only upon the ground that a decree dissolving the marriage tie, rendered in another State, for a cause not regarded as adequate by our law, has the same effect upon dower rights in this State as if it had been rendered by our own courts adjudging the party proceeded against guilty of adultery. This would involve, as a result, that the expression, "misconduct of the wife," as used in the Revised Statutes, means any misconduct, however trifling, that by the law of any State is a ground for divorce. Thus it might happen that a wife who resided in this State, and lived in strict obedience to its laws, might be deprived of her right to dower in lands in this State by a foreign judgment of divorce, based upon an act that was not a violation of any law of the State of her residence. It is important, therefore, to determine whether the provision that a wife shall not be endowed in case of divorce dissolving the marriage contract for her misconduct refers only to that act which is misconduct authorizing a divorce in this State, or to any act which may be termed "misconduct," and converted into a cause of divorce by the legislature of any State. In Schiffer v. Pruden, 64 N. Y. 47, 49, this court, referring to said provision of the Revised Statutes, said that "misconduct there spoken of must be her adultery; for there is no other cause for a divorce dissolving the marriage contract." It had before said, in Pitts v. Pitts, 52 N. Y. 593, that "a wife can only be barred of dower by a conviction of adultery in an action for divorce, and by the judgment of the court in such action." While these remarks were not essential to the decision of the cases then under consideration, they suggest the real meaning and proper application of the word "misconduct," as used in the Revised Statutes, with reference to its effect upon dower. When the legislature said, in the chapter relating to dower, that a wife should not be endowed when divorced for her own misconduct; and, in the chapter relating to divorce, that she should not be entitled to dower when convicted of adultery,-the sole ground for a divorce, we think that, by misconduct, adultery only was meant, or that kind of misconduct which our laws recognize as sufficient to authorize a divorce. The sections relating to dower, and to the effect of divorce upon dower, are in pari materia, and should be construed together; and, when thus construed, they lead to the result already indicated. Beebe v. Estabrook, 79 N. Y. 246, 252. The repeal of section 48, which provided that the wife, if convicted of adultery, should not be entitled to dower, has not changed the result, as sections 1759 and 1760 of the Code have been substituted, leaving the law unchanged. They enact, in effect, that, when judgment is rendered at the suit of the husband dissolving the marriage for the adultery of the wife, she shall not be entitled to dower in any of his real property. There is no change in meaning; and the slight change in language, as the commissioners of revision reported, was to consolidate and harmonize the new statute with the existing system of "procedure. Throop, Anno. Code, § 1760, note. The repealed section was pronounced in the Ensign Case, 103 N. Y. 284, 8 N. E. Rep. 544, "an unnecessary and superfluous provision as respects dower." It was also held in that case that while the relation of husband and wife, both actual and legal, is utterly destroyed by a judgment of divorce so that no future rights can thereafter arise from it, still existing rights, already vested, are not thereby forfeited, and are taken away only by special enactment as a punishment for wrong. It follows that depriving a woman of her right to

dower is a punishment for a wrongful act perpetrated by her. Is it probable that the legislature intended to punish as a wrong that which it had not declared to be a wrong? If a divorce granted in another State for wilful desertions relates back so as to affect, by way of punishment, property rights previously acquired, must not a divorce for incompatibility of temper, or any other frivolous reason, be attended with the same result? Does the penalty inflicted upon the guilty party to a divorce granted in this State for a single and special reason attach to any judgment for divorce, granted in any State, for any cause whatever, including, as is said to be the law in one State, the mere discretion of the court? Our conclusion is that as nothing except adultery is, in this State, regarded as misconduct with reference to the subject of absolute divorce, no other misconduct is here permitted to deprive a wife of dower, even if it is the basis of a judgment of divorce lawfully rendered in another State, unless it expressly appears that such judgment has that effect in the jurisdiction where it was rendered, and as to that we express no opinion.

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY PREREQUISITES-CONTRACTS.-The case of Toledo Tile & Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 11 S. E. Rep. 37, decided by the Supreme Court of West Virginia, will be of interest in States where statutory provisions are adopted requiring foreign corporations to comply with certain regulations as a prerequisite to their right to do business. It was there held that a contract made by a foreign corporation before compliance with such regulations will not on that account be held absolutely void unless the statute expressly so declares; and if the statute imposes a penalty upon foreign corporations for such failure to comply, such penalty will be deemed exclusive of any others. The court says:

Among other provisions, the said statute declares in substance, that any corporation created by the laws of any State or foreign country "may, unless it be otherwise expressly provided, hold property and transact business in this State upon complying with the requirements of this section, and not otherwise." It then requires such corporation to file a copy of its charter with the secretary of State, and file in each county in which it does business a certificate of the secretary of State that it has so filed such copy of its charter in his office; and it further provides that "every such corporation which shall do business in this State without having complied with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 for each month its failure to to comply shall continue." In the absence of any statute limiting the right of a corporation to do so, it may, unless contrary to the public policy of the State, hold property and do business without as well as within the State or country by which it was created. Ang, & A. Corp. §§ 372-376; Field, Corp. § 363. This statute, being not only in derogation of common law, must be construed strictly. There is certainly no public policy of this State which is contravened by permitting corporations such as the plaintiff here to