eral doctrine is that special assessments and special taxation do not come under taxation for revenue; that property when thus assessed derives a benefit equivalent to the amount paid by the owner. Such improve

ments are local and for the benefit of the particular locality or for the convenience of a particular district, and such an assessment or taxation of contiguous property cannot be regarded as a burden or charge imposed upon property to raise money for public purposes, except that the public may indirectly be benefited by the use of a local improvement. So exemption from taxation of every kind as provided for in many charters does not exempt from special assessment and special taxation. But a late decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota does not seem to be in accord with this general doctrine.39 D. H. PINGREY.

Supreme Court of Iowa, January 29, 1890.

1. Minor Child-Necessaries-Liability of Parent. -It is the legal and moral duty of parents to furnish necessary support to their children during minority, and when a stranger furnishes necessaries for a minor child, a promise to pay therefor by the parent may be inferred from the legal duty imposed.

2. Emancipation of Child-Proof- Reassertion.— A parent may waive his right to the care, custody, control or service of his child during minority, or any one of such rights, and for the whole period of the minority or for a part thereof, but a waiver of one right is not a waiver of another, and he may reassert such right within the period of minority, subject to the rights of those who have contracted with the child on the strength of the waiver as to services. Such waiver may be proved directly or from circumstances.

3. Partial Emancipation-Necessaries-Liability.— When a father allows a minor daughter to go away and earn wages and provide herself with clothing, he not furnishing or agreeing to furnish her with any money, there has been but a partial emancipation, in the absence of other evidence, and the father is liable for necessaries furnished to her.

The district court certifies to this court the following question, upon which it is desirable to have the opinion of the supreme court: "Is a father legally liable to a physician for the latter's services in professionally treating the minor daughter of said father, dangerously attacked with typhoid fever, who at the date of said treatment, was seventeen years of age, and was then,

and had been, residing away from her father's house for three years prior to the rendition of said services, earning and controlling her own wages, and providing herself with clothing, at a place thirty miles distant from her father's place of residence, the father not furnishing, or agreeing with his daughter to furnish, her with any money, or means of support, but consenting to her absence from home; the said professional services being rendered at the request of the said minor daughter, but were rendered and furnished without the procurement, knowledge, or consent of the defendant, and without knowledge of the sickness, until demand was made for payment of said services by plainfiff the attendance of plaintiff being from day to day, for a period of twenty days?" Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

GIVEN, J.: 1. Appellant's contention is that the obligation of parents to support their minor children is only a moral one, and is not enforceable in the absence of statute or promise; that such promise is not to be implied from mere moral obligation, nor from the statute providing for the reimbursement of the public; and that an omission of duty, from which a jury may find a promise by implication of law, must be a legal duty, capable of enforcement by process of law. At first glance, this view of the law seems opposed to our natural sense of justice; yet it is not without support in the authorities. Such is held to be the law in New Hampshire and Vermont. See Kelley v. Davis, 49 N. H. 187; Farmington v. Jones, 36 N. H. 271; Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348. A different doctrine has long since been held in this State. In Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa, 513, this court held that "the duty of the parent to maintain his offspring until they attain the age of maturity is a perfect common-law duty." In Johnson v. Barnes, 69 Iowa, 641, 29 N. W. Rep. 759, which was an action by the mother, who had been divorced, against the father, for the support furnished their children, the court say: "As there was no promise, the question to be determined is whether one can be inferred in favor of a wife, who supports her child, as against her husband, who has without cause abandoned her and his child. The obligation of parents to support their children at common law is somewhat uncertain, ill defined, and doubtful. Indeed, it has been said that there is no such obligation. * * * But we are not prepared to say that this rule has been adopted in this country, and it should be conceded, we think, that, independent of any statute, parents are bound to contribute to the support of their minor children, and that such obligation rests mainly on the father, in the absence of a statute, if of sufficient ability; and that, in favor of a third person, who supports a child, a promise to pay may and should be inferred on the ground of the legal duty imposed." In Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns. 480, it is said. "A parent is under a natural obligation to furnish necessaries for his infant children; and, if the parent neglect that duty, any other person who supplies such

*

*

* *

*

necessaries is deemed to have conferred a benefit on the delinquent parent, for which the law raises an implied promise to pay on the part of the parent." In 5 Wait, Act. & Def. 50, the author says: "The duty of parents to support, protect, and educate their offspring is founded upon the nature of the connection between them. It is not only a moral obligation, but it is one which is recognized and enforced by law. In order to hold the person liable in any case for goods furnished, either actual authority for the purchase must be shown, or circumstances from which such authority may be implied. * The legal obligation of parents in respect to support, extends only to those things which are necesary; and if a parent refuses or neglects to provide such things for his child, and they are supplied by a stranger, the law will imply a promise on the part of the parent to pay for them." Without further citation of authorities, we announce as our conclusions that it is the legal as well as moral duty of parents to furnish necessary support to their children during minority; that a parent cannot be charged for necessaries furnished by a stranger for his minor child, except upon an express or implied promise to pay for the same; and that such promise may be inferred on the grounds of the legal duty imposed.

2. It is further contended on behalf of appellant that the facts certifled show an emancipation of his daughter, such as to relieve him from liability for the services sued for; that support and services are reciprocal duties, and if one is withheld the other may be withdrawn. Parents are entitled to the care, custody, control, and services of their children during minority. To emancipate is to release; to set free. It need not be evidenced by any formal or required act. It may be proven by direct proof or by circumstances. To free a child, for all the period of minority, from care, custody and service would be a general emancipation; but to free him from only a part of the period of miniorty or from only a part of the parent's rights, would be limited. The parent, having the several rights of care, custody, control, and service during minority, may surely release from either without waiving his right to the other, or from a part of the time without waiving as to the whole. A father frees his son from service. That does not waive the right to care, custody, and control, so far as the same can be exercised consistently with the right waived. He frees his son of 18 from service for one year. That does not waive the right to his services after the year; and if the waiver has been for an indefinite period any parent may assert his right to the services of the child at any time within the period of minority, subject to the rights of those who have contracted with the child on the strength of the waiver as to services. In the law of contracts, where a father expressly or impliedly, by his condnct, waives his right generally to the services of a minor child, such child is said to be emancipated. The child may

sue, under such circumstances, on such contracts, as are made with him for his services. Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272; McCoy v. Huff man, 8 Cow. 84; Stiles v. Granville, 6 Cush. 458; Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 267. There is nothing in these authorities, nor any reason, against the view expressed, that emancipation may be general or limited. There is no direct evidence as to the purpose of the defendant with respect to his daughter; but we are to say, from the circumstances shown, whether they evidence either a general or limited emancipation. The case of Everett v. Sherfey, 1 Iowa, 358, is relied upon. That was an action to recover damages of the defendant for having harbored and retained the plaintiff's minor son in his employ. The issues and circumstances were quite different from those certified in this case. The court say: "There could be no such harboring as would render the defendant liable to the father in this action, if the son was in truth emancipated, and, if the son was not emancipated, it will still be a question whether there was such harboring as renders the defendant liable. By 'emancipation,' in this connection, we understand such act of the father as sets the son free from his subjection, and gives him the capacity of managing his own affairs as if he was of age." The following is given as a condensed statement of the facts: "In the spring or summer of 1852, plaintiff's son, a minor of the age of seventeen, went to reside at defendant's house, and was then and afterwards employed by him as a hired hand for over one year; the defendant paying the son full wages for his services. In February, 1853, plaintiff sued defendant to recover for the services, in which suit the judgment was for the defendant. The son was of a dissatisfied and roving disposition, careless and improvident in his habits, not under parental control, and, either through willfulness or negligence, had not received the education proper for a person of his age and condition. In December, 1851, a misunderstanding arose between the parent and the child, which resulted in the son's leaving home, and residing and working at various places, before he went into the defendant's service. After said December, 1851, the father did not, apparently have or exercise the proper and necessary control and authority over the said minor that a parent of a well-regulated family ought and should exercise, and permitted and sanctioned the hiring out of said minor at varions places, and at different employments, away from home; but who made the contracts, or received the pay, is not stated nor proven. The father had also stated that he had no control over his son, and had in some instances waived his authority over him. It also appears that on the 11th of September, 1852, the plaintiff, by publication in a newspaper, forewarned all persons from crediting his said son on his account, avowing, also, therein that he would pay no debts of his contracting, and that he would not fulfill any contracts, or pay debts, entered into by him." The court say:

"From these circumstances, to mention none others, we think the court might fairly conclude there was a manumission or emancipation up to the time above stated, and that there was no liability for giving the son shelter, residence, and a home. At least, we think it so fairly deducible from the facts that we should not disturb the conclusion."

The circumstances disclosed in this case are these: The defendant's daughter, at the age of 14, went to reside away from her father's house, at a place 30 miles distant, where for three years she contracted for, earned, and controlled her own wages, and provided herself with clothing, her father consenting thereto; he not furnishing, or agreeing to furnish her with any money, or means of support. That, while thus absent she was dangerously attacked with typhoid fever, and at her request was attended by the plaintiff, as her physician, from day to day, for the period of 21 days, which services were rendered without the procurement, knowledge, or consent of the defendant. These circumstances are widely different from those in Everett v. Sherfey. Here there was no disagreement that resulted in the daughter leaving home; no want or waiver of parental authority; no dissatisfied and roving disposition; no statement by the father that he had no control over his daughter; and no publication by the father notifying persons not to credit her on his account. The circumstances disclosed in this case are such as are of frequent occurrence in this country. Parents, either from necessity or from a desire to teach their children to be industrious and self-supporting, emancipate them from service for a definite or indefinite time without any intention of thereby releasing their right to exercise care, custody, and control over the child. The obligation of parents to support their minor children does not arise alone out of the duty of the child to serve. If so, those who are unable to render service because of infancy sickness, or accident-who, most of all others, need support— would not be entitled to it. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, (volume 1, p. 446,) says: "The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law,-an obligation, says Puffendorf, laid on them, not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act in bringing them into the world for they would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue if they only gave their children life that they might afterwards see them perish. By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have the perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents." This obligation to support is not grounded on the duty of the child to serve, but rather upon the inability of the child to care for itself. It is not only a duty to the child, but to the public. The duties extend only to the furnishing of necessaries. What are

necessaries must be determined by the facts in each case. The law has fixed the age of majority; and it is until that age is attained that the law presumes the child incapable of taking care of itself, and has conferred upon the parent the right care, custody, control and services, with the duty to support.

3. There being no direct evidence as to the purposes of the defendant with respect to his daughter, we are to say with what intention he consented to his daughter's going and remaining away from his home as she did. That he intended she should control her own earnings, at least until such time as he should declare other

wise, is evident; but that it was ever his intention that if, by sickness or accident, she should be rendered unable to support herself, he would not be responsible to those who might minister to her actual necessities we do not believe. Such an inference from these facts would be a discredit to any father. In our view, there was, at most, but a partial emancipation,-an emancipation from service for an indefinite time. The father had a right at any time to require the daughter to return to his home and service; and she had a right at any time to return to his service and to claim his care, custody, control, and support. There was no such an emancipation as exempted the father from liability for actual necessaries furnished to his daughter. In view of the legal as well as the moral duty of appellant to furnish necessary support to his daughter during minority, and especially when unable, from infancy, disease or accident, to earn her own necessary support, we think he may well be understood as promising payment to any third person for actual necessaries furnished to her. As already stated, what are necessaries must be determined from the facts of each case. What would be necessary support to a child in sickness would not be necessary in health. The services sued for were evidently necessary for the support and wellbeing of the defendant's daughter. As we have seen, he had not relieved himself from the duty to furnish her such support, and, from his obligation to do so, may be presumed to have promised payment to any one who did furnish it in his absence. Our conclusion is that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. Beck J. dissents.

NOTE. All the authorities agree that there is a moral obligation on parents to provide for the wants and necessities of their children during their minority. Whether this moral obligation is also an obligation imposed by common law, is a matter much questioned. The English courts have vascillated, but now hold that the common law imposed no such obligation, but that parents could, under certain circumstances, be compelled to support minor children under the statute of 43 Eliz. A number of the American Decisions have adopted the English rule.2

1 Mortimore v. Wright, 6 Mee. & W. 481.

2 Raymond v. Loyl, 10 Barb. 483; Hunt v. Thompson, 3 Scam. 179; Varney v. Young, 11 Vt. 258; Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 318; Kelley v. Davis, 49 N. H. 187.

But the weight of American authority agrees with the decision in the principal case, that this obligation is imposed by the common law.3 The statute of 43 Eliz. has been regarded as a recognition of the principles of the common law. As an outgrowth of this principle, when the parent has failed to provide for the necessities of the child, and other parties have supplied such wants, the parent has been held liable therefor on his presumed consent to such action. Such liability only accrues when an absolute necessity for such assistance exists.5 If a father forces his child abroad to seek a sustenance, under such circumstances he sends a credit with him, and is liable for necessaries furnished. If a father sends a son away to school and fails to provide the clothing required by the climate and the child's growth, the child may procure them on his credit. Generally a parent is liable when he places his minor child in a situation to require necessaries without providing the means for obtaining them.8

Emancipation of Child.-Whether the duty of the parent to support his minor child arises from the common law or statutory law, or is a mere moral obligation, yet it is always conceded that the parent is entitled to and owns all the earnings of his minor children. Such right the parent may waive or relinquish in favor of the child, which is called emancipating the child. Such emancipation may be evidenced by gift, agreement, inference or conduct.9 It exists: If the father waives his rights and permits his son to make contracts and acquisitions for himself;10 if the father drives his son from his home; if he compels his minor child to go abroad to earn his livelihood, or consents thereto, and neglects to support him;12 if he permits the child to work for himself and claim and enjoy his own wages; 13 or it may arise from the misfortune of the parent, as where the parent is an insane pauper and is supported at public expense.14 The emancipation of a child requires no token or ceremonial 15 and no consideration.16 It may be a mere matter of inference from the conduct, acts and transactions of the parent and of the child.17 Such emancipation may be for a part or for all of the minority,18 or it may be confined to the specific earnings in a particular case.19 Since a father holds his rights over his children as a personal trust, which he cannot alienate,20 he may emancipate his minor child,

3 Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281; Hillsborough v. Deering, 4 N. H. 95; Benson v. Remington, 2 Mass. 113; 2 Kent's Com. 191; 15 Cent. L. J. 23; Girls' Industrial Home v. Fritchey, 10 Mo. App. 344.

4 Guion v. Guion, 16 Mo. 48.

5 Poock v. Miller, 1 Hilt. 108.

6 Stanton v. Willson, 3 Day, 37.

7 Parker v. Tillinghast, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 510.

8 Huntoon v. Hazelton, 20 N. H. 388.

918 Cent. L. J. 95.

10 Cloud v. Hamilton, 11 Humph. 104.

11 U. S. v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 71.

12 Lind v. Sullenstadt, 21 Hun, 364.

13 Dierker v. Hess, 54 Mo. 246.

14 Jenness v. Emerson, 15 N. H. 486.

15 Dierker v. Hess, supra.

16 Fort v. Gooding, 9 Barb. 371; Jenness v. Emerson, supra; Stanley v. National U. Bank, 115 N. Y. 122.

17 Bener v. Edgington, 76 Iowa, 105; Holliday v. Miller, 29 W. Va. 424; Monaghan v. School Dist., 29 Wis. 100; Huntoon v. Hazelton, 20 N. H. 388; Canovar v. Cooper, 3 Barb. 115; Stiles v. Granville, 6 Cush. 458; Corey v. Corey, 19 Pick. 29; Lackman v. Wood, 25 Cal. 147. 18 Tillottson v. McCrillis, 11 Vt. 477.

19 Stiles v. Granville, 6 Cush. 458.

20 People v. Mercein, & Hill, 399; Hall v. Hall, 44 N. H. 293.

though he himself be insolvent.21 His creditors cannot demand that the children be required to work for their benefit;22 in fact, they cannot prevent the debtor from giving away his own labor by laboring for no wages.23 Though the son is emancipated, he may continue to reside with the family, and such residence is no evidence of fraud as against the father's creditors.24 Whether such emancipation or such waiver of the minor's wages can be revoked, may be still considered to be unsettled. It has been held to be a mere license, which can be revoked at will,25 and that it may become the parent's duty so to do,26 but no creditor of the latter can interfere and demand such revocation.27 Other courts have held, that there can be no revocation and no reclamation, and that the emancipation operates as a release of the father's right.28 The decisions all agree that a revocation of the emancipation cannot invalidate prior payment of wages made to the minor under contract with him. If the minor gave a valuable consideration to his parent for his emancipation, no doubt the contract would be irrevocable by the parent alone, but such cases are probably quite rare.

Liability after Emancipation.-If the right on the part of the parent to the child's earnings and the right on the part of the child to a support from the father are correlative rights, one growing out of the other, then the emancipation of the child should release the parent from all further liability, and it has been so held.29 It has been considered that the right to receive a minor's earnings is simply incidental to the parent's duty to discipline and direct him, and the custody of the person is secured for that purposeand though the child is emancipated as to services, the duty of discipline remains.30 In such case it would not necessarily follow that the parent's liability for necessaries furnished should cease. Again, it has been held that the duty imposed by law upon the father, to maintain his minor child in case of his inability to maintain himself, rests on considerations of public policy, looking to the protection of the community, and it cannot be renounced at his pleasure, nor the burden transferred to one who is not deemed in law generally competent to contract, nor capable of performing such a duty.31 Nor can a father by abandoning his duty and trust, by putting his child out of his protection, thereby exonerate himself from its maintenance, education and support.32

S. S. MERRILL.

21 Beaver v. Bare, 104 Pa. St. 58; Atwood v. Holcomb, 39 Conn. 270; Shortel v. Young, 23 Neb. 408; Clemens v. Bullhart, 17 Neb. 335.

22 Chase v. Elkins, 2 Vt. 290; Wilson v. McMillan, 62 Ga. 16.

23 Wilson v. McMillan, supra.

24 McCloskey v. Cupert, 27 Pa. St. 220; Dierker v. Hess, 54 Mo. 246; Beaver v. Bare, 104 Pa. St. 58.

25 Soldanels v. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 23 Mo. App. 516; Agricultural & M. Assn. v. State (Md.), 29 Cent. L. J. 250. 26 Chase v. Elkins, 2 Vt. 290.

27 Chase v. Elkins, supra; Wilson v. McMillan, 62 Ga. 16. 28 Hall v. Hall, 44 N. H. 293; Lackman v. Wood, 25 Cal. 147.

29 Campbell v. Cooper, 34 N. H. 49; Johnson v. Gibson 4 E. D. Smith, 231; Hillsborough v. Deering, 4 N. H. 95; Jenness v. Emerson, 15 N. H. 486.

30 Beaver v. Bare, 104 Pa. St. 58. 31 Hall v. Hall, 44 N. H. 293.

32 Stanton v. Willson, 3 Day, 37.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

RIGHTS, REMEDIES AND PRACTICE at Law, in Equity and under the Codes. A Treatise on American Law in Civil Causes, with a Digest of Illustrative Cases. By John D. Lawson, Author of Works on Presumptive Evidence, Expert Evidence, Carriers, Usages and Customs, Defenses to Crimes, etc. In seven volumes. Vols. 1, 2, and 3. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Co. Law Publishers and Law Booksellers. 1889.

We know of no one better equipped, by experience, education and habits, than Mr. Lawson, to undertake the preparation of so formidable a work as this series on "Rights, Remedies and Practice." Its successful completion involved not only many years' labor, but also the greatest industry and care, and we are not guilty of idle flattery in saying that the volumes give proof on every page of careful and conscientious work. We do not need to be told that the author spent the greater part of five years in its preparation. The wonder is that even within that period of time seven volumes, as complete as these, containing the substantive law of this country, and the authorities carefully and thoroughly collated, can be made. The tendency on the part of law-book writers and publishers seems to be in the direction of compilations. "Encyclopedias" and "Series" are in some measure taking the place of separate text-books. Wait's Actions and Defenses gave impetus to this kind of work, and the Encyclopedia of the Law added fresh interest. And to some extent this is natural. The body of the law, by reason of the great number of decisions from day to day, and increasing in number each year, is becoming so bulky that the average country practitioner cannot afford to keep up with the increasing number of text-books. He, therefore, welcomes such a series as this which gives him a complete library in itself on all subjects liable to arise in his practice. He may not, as a matter of fact, be able to get as much out of them as if he bought complete text-books on all the subjects covered by the work, but for the money he pays he finds considerably more than in text-books involving the expenditure (of the same amount of money. Therefore, compilations are much in demand. Such as are carefully, accurately, and thoroughly prepared should be welcomed. But there is such a temptation on the part of the compilers to prepare them, so to speak, by machinery and by the liberal use of scissors, that each should be well examined before recom. mended to the profession.

The author states that the work is "an ambitious attempt to present a complete view of American case law on every species of right and remedy, of action and defense, both at law and in equity." It aims to cover the entire field of jurisprudence except criminal law. It combines the advantages at once of a treatise and digest. Preserving the scientific arrangement of a text-book, it adds to this a full collection of the actual results of decided cases on their facts, as illustratious of the principles of the text. The work is divided into four divisions, viz.

DIVISION I. PERSONS AND PERSONAL RIGHTS.Under this division are the subjects of principal and agent; attorney and client; auctioneers, brokers, and factors; master and servant; corporations in general; different classes of corporations; banks; railroads; gas companies; building and loan associations; voluntary associations; clubs and societies; religious societies and corporations; charitable associations; partnership; husband and wife; parent and child; guardian and ward; executors and administrators.

DIVISION II. PERSONAL RIGHTS AND REmedies.

-Under this division are personal wrongs and torts; conspiracy; assault and battery; false arrest and imprisonment; malicious prosecution; torts in domestic relations; seduction; crim. con.; negligence; slander and libel.

DIVISION III. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES. -Under this division are personal property; gifts; animals; copyright; trade-marks; patents; negotiable instruments; ships and shipping; bailments; pledges; innkeepers; carriers; railroads; telegraph companies; physicians and surgeons; contracts; liens; mortgages; insurance; real property; water and water-courses; easements; licenses; landlord and tenant; fixtures; trusts and trustees; nuisances.

DIVISION IV. PUBLIC RIGHTS AND REMEDIES.Under this division are constitutional law; taxation; eminent domain; municipal corporations; public offices and officers; schools; elections; conflict of laws. The first three volumes before us embrace the subjects within Divisions 1. and II., and a portion of Division III., viz: Property Rights and Remedies. A volume will be issued at the rate of about one in every three months until the seven volumes are completed. Each volume is to be provided with its own index and on the completion of the entire work a comprehensive index to the whole is promised.

There is one feature of this work which is not to be found in any other law book except some of Mr. Lawson's earlier works, viz: The addition at the end of each section of an illustration of the principle embodied in that section. This will be found of practical value, in throwing light upon abstract legal propositions. The author's style is concise, terse and vigorThe authorities are carefully and diligently collected and the notes very copious. We do not hesitate to say that the character of the work places it above anything of the kind ever before attempted in this country. The type used is clear and the mechan. ical execution of the work first class in every regard.

ous.

BOOKS RECeived.

LAWYERS' REPORTS, ANNOTATED. BOOK V. All current cases of General Value and Importance decided in The United States, State and Territorial Courts, with full Annotation, by Robert Desty, Editor. Burdett A. Rich, Reporter. Rochester, N. Y.: The Lawyers' Co-Operative Publishing Company. 1889.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

TOO MUCH FOR HIM.-His counsel announced to him that his motion for a new trial was refused and that he would have to hang.

"On the strength of it," added the lawyer, "the newspapers are publishing your picture."

"Merciful powers. It is too much," groaned the wretched prisoner. "What have I done to deserve this awful punishment?"

THOUGHT IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL-The Washington correspondent of the New York Tribune tells the following good anecdote:

"That must have been a near relative of Senator Call, of whom Colonel W-, of the Engineer Corps, told me the other day. The Colonel had been sent down to a certain Florida stream, the improvement of which was contemplated in one of the river and harbor bills, with instructions to guage its water. While engaged with his men in this operation, an old fellow came along with a cart drawn by a single ox, on which was a small quantity of wood. Halting his team as he came near, he said: