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limits of a State. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212223. But this doctrine was denied in Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367. Whether the right of a State is or is not exclusive, or how far that of the general government extends, is, however, not material here; for there can be no doubt that the right dwells in the State. But whether the State can, by the exercise of this right, or by the denial of it, interfere with interstate commerce, is a question of no little difficulty and importance. Happily, we are spared the delicate and difficult task of determining whether a State can delegate the the right of eminent domain to persons who confine their business exclusively within the territorial limits of the State, and deny it to those engaged in a business extending from State to State. The language of the act forbids the conclusion, which counsel seek to establish, that the legislature meant to do no more than deny the right of eminent domain to persons desiring to transport natural gas from Indiana. The language of the section we have quoted leaves no room for construction; for, beyond controversy, its meaning is that no person shall be permitted to transport natural ges to another State. But, if there were doubt, it is entirely banished by other parts of the act. In the title is written: "An act to prohibit any person, firm, or corporation, company, or voluntary association, organized under the laws of this State or any other States, from piping or otherwise conveying, from any point or points in this State, to any point or points without the State of Indiana, any natural gas or petroleum." The third section of the act prescribes a penalty for violation of its provisions; and the provisions of this section apply to persons who acquire rights by purchase as well as those who secure rights by condemnation. The provisions of the act are therefore firmly interlaced. There is a complete and indivisible unity. The unification is so thorough that no separation can be effected; and nothing remains but to read the act as an entirety, and as it is written. Taking the act as it is written the only possible conclusion is that it was meant to prohibit the transportation of natural gas from the State by any person, natural or artificial, no matter whether the right to the gas and its transportation is acquired by contract or by condemnation.

We are not unmindful of the rule that statutes upon the same subject should be construed together, and we have given all the statutes relating to natural gas careful study. The only conclusion which can be maintained is, as an investigation has convinced us, that the act under immediate mention is not affected by any of the other acts; for it is complete in itself, and has clearly defined purpose, and that purpose is to prohibit gas from being transported out of the State.

It is not possible to sustain the act, as counsel endeavor to do upon the principal that the States may impose restrictions on foreign corporations. We have more than once enforced the rule that

the legislature may regulate or restrict the business of foreign corporations within this State. Insurance Co. v. Burdett, 112 Ind. 204, 13 N. E. Rep. 705; Insurance Co v. Brim, 111 Ind. 281, 12 N. E. Rep. 315; State v. Insurance Co. 115 Ind. 257, 17 N. E. Rep. 574; Blackmer v. Insurance Co., 115 Ind. 291, 17 N. E. Rep. 580. But we have not adjudged that the rule can be applied where it operates upon matters of interstate commerce, nor can we do so without coming in direct conflict with the law, as declared by the court invested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction of of such questions. The decisions of that court utterly demolish the theory of counsel, that under the power to restrict foreign corporations may be placed the right to legislate in matters respecting the commerce between the States. Those decisions are absolutely conclusive.

There may be, and doubtless there are, objections to the act not argued by counsel nor discussed by us. One objection occurs to us which we believe it proper to notice. That objection is this: It is not in the power of the legislature to prevent one citizen from buying or another from selling property? The rights of property are not subject to such absolute leglslative control. It is unnecessary to determine to what limitations the general rule we have stated is subject, for it is enough to assert the general rule, and affirm that it applies to such property of natural gas, petroleum, and coal. We can find no tenable ground upon which the act can be sustained, and we are compelled to adjudge it invalid. Judgment affirmed.

NOTE.-Experience has shown that the provision that congress should have power to regulate commerce between the States was wisely inserted in the United States constitution. Such interference by the States would speedily produce irritation, and would lead to retaliation, and might disrupt the American union. The boundary line between the police power of a State and a regulation of interstate commerce is so obscure that the decisions have been somewhatconflicting. As said in Fargo v. Michigan, with reference to the utterances of the supreme court, until within a very short time past, as to what constitutes commerce among the several States, and also as to what enactments by the State legislatures are in violation of the constitutional provision on that subject, it may be admitted that the court has not always employed the same language, and that all the judges of the court, who have written opinions for it, may not have meant precisely the same thing.

The following conclusions may be deduced from the decisions heretofore made on the subject:

1. Power to pass laws, which directly regulate foreign commerce or interstate commerce, is vested in congress exclusively, except that in particular instances, where it would be impracticable to enforce rules uniform throughout the country, the individual States may pass such laws, provided they be not inconsistent with the acts of congress. Of this exceptional character have been considered laws relating to pilots, railroad engineers, ferries, bridges over navigable waters, liens upon vessels, improvement of harbors, bays and rivers, wharfage and quarantine.

1 121 U. S. 230.

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2. Laws passed by the individual States, in pursuance of their general authority over internal concerns, may incidentally affect foreign and interstate com. merce, provided they do not discriminate against such commerce and are not inconsistent with the acts of congress.2 Whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another, commerce in that commodity between the States has commenced. It is not sufficient that such articles have been collected at an entrepot, river or railroad, preparatory to their shipment, but they must have actually started in the course of transportation to another State, or must have been delivered to a carrier for transportation. The police power of a State cannot be set up to control the inhibitions of the federal constitution or the process of the United States government created thereby. The powers granted to congress relative to the regulation of commerce are not confined to such instrumentalities as were in use at the time of the adoption of the constitution, but they embrace all instrumentalities that may from time to time be adopted. They extend from the rider to the stage-coach, from the stage-coach to the vessel, from the vessel to the steamer, from the steamer to the railroad, from the railroad to the telegraph, and from the telegraph to the telephone.5 To this list might be added pipe-lines for conveying oil or natural gas.

It is not denied that the States may pass inspection laws relative to articles of commerce. Such laws are designed to improve the articles and to prevent fraud, and are an exercise of the police power of a State.6

The State of Maryland passed a law requiring an inspection of tobacco grown in the State before it was inspected. Such regulations affect the article before it has become an article of commerce. A State may impose a tax or duty of inspection which, so far as it acts upon articles for exportation, is an exception to the prohibition on States against laying duties on articles for exportation. In this case it was shown that such laws were very numerous in the various States. Of course, such laws cannot be a mere cover for laying revenue duty upon exports, and all such laws are subject to the paramount right of congress to regulate commerce between the States. A State law, imposing a tax of one and a half cents on all iron ore exported from the State before being smelted, but not imposing a tax on iron ore smelted within the State, was considered to be very clearly a tax on interstate com. merce, and was declared to be void.8 The decision in the principal case is, no doubt, thoroughly in harmony with the rulings of the highest court, for commerce consists of interchange and traffic, including the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities.9

2 Waterbury v. Newton, 50 N. J. L. 534.

3 Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517.

4 Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446.

5 Pensacola L. Co. v. Western U. T. Co., 96 U. S. 1; Ratterman v. W. U. T. Co., 127 U. S. 411.

6 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.

7 Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38.

8 Jackson M. Co. v. Auditor Gen., 32 Mich. 488.

9 Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1. For a further consideration of this subject, see 16 Cent. L. J. 31, 449; 18 Id. 472; 19 Id. 369; 27 Id. 119; 28 Id. 64.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

THE CENTENARY OF THE JUDICIARY.-It would be impossible within our limits to give more than a general impression of the characteristics of the speakers and their addresses. The introductory address by Mr. Cleveland, prefaced by an appropriate aud sympathetic allusion to the tragedy at Washingtou which had saddened all hearts and deprived the occasion of its chief expeeted guest, was quite admirable in scope, in diction and delivery. Mr. Cleveland has an agreeable and effective voice, and the reception of his short and well-conceived address was very hearty.

Judge Arnoux, retiring president of the State Bar Association, and chairman of the general committee, made a brief and remarkable tactful address of welcome to the court on behalf of the association. Judge Arnoux was warmly received by the audience, few of whom probably had any idea how much time and labor he had spent in organizing the celebration. His allusion to the fact that a century ago that day the court had adjourned for want of business caused an audible general smile, and made the gigantic frames of Justices Gray and Harlan to heave unmistakable sighs.

Of the four main addresses, by Messrs. Butler, Hitchcock, Semmes and Phelps, it may be said that they were admirable adapted to the occasion, were singularly different, considering the similarity of their theme, and generally fully answered public expectation. Mr. Butler, well known to and an established favorite of New York audiences, exhibited the advantages of his literary sense and culture, which are so unusual at the bar. His address was characterized by unfailing tact and discretion, illuminated by occasional flashes of pleasant wit, and filled with sound and patriotic sentiment. We thought we detected a look of satisfaction upon the countenances of the judges, so dependent on precedent, when he informed them that the court, a hundred years ago, accepted an invitation to dinner.

Mr. Hitchcock, one of the best known and ablest constitutional lawyers in this country, delivered a grave and dignified discourse, full of suggestion and affluent with striking and novel statistics. Several passages of rare rhetorical beauty lighted up the ordinarily arid field of his discussion and reflection. Mr. Hitchcock should have been on this occasion a listener in a robe-he would grace the garment.

Mr. Semmes' address was the longest of the day, and his subject was the most popular. He imparted considerable novel and interesting information about the personal characteristics and private lives of the deceased chiefs of the court and his address, although from its nature less oratorical than the others, will probably prove permanently the most interesting in perusal.

Mr. Phelps is a man of extreme personal elegance and mental culture, and an unostentatious and refined speaker. A more showy declamation however could hardly have produced greater effect than his simple and unpretentious delivery, his remarks being constantly interrupted by appreciative and discriminating plaudits, which at the close were prolonged to a remarkable length. Mr. Phillps is a rare and suggestive thinker on topics of law and State; his style is crystalline and felicitous; his calm philosophy and logical deductions are always informed and irradiated by a warm humanity and hearty patriotism. His address was a very noble, wise and precious production, which will give even more pleasure in the reading than on listening to it, as it fell so simply and unaffectedly from his lips.-Albany Law Journal.

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1. ADMIRALTY-Maritime Liens. - Contracts for supplies to a vessel at her home port are maritime in their nature, and liens therefor created by State statutes are within the admiralty jurisdiction, and enforceable by proceedings in rem only in the federal courts.- Merge v. The Madrid, U. S. C. C. (La.), 40 Fed. Rep. 677.

2. ADMIRALTY-Common Carrier.- A vessel chartered to transport a specific cargo only is not a common car. rier, and hence is not an insurer of the safe delivery of the cargo, and can be held for damage to cargo only on proof of negligence. The Dan, U. S. D. C. (N. Y.), 40 Fed. Rep. 691.

8. ADMIRALTY-Fellow servants.-Seamen and officers are fellow-servants, as respects the details of navigation on board ship. Each takes the risk of the other's negligence, and has no claim for damage against his own ship or her owners for collisions occasioned thereby. On collision by the faults of both vessels, when both are before the court, the damages must be apportioned between them; and the seamen on board one vessel can recover only half their damages against the other, because they are disabled by their relation to their own ship and her owners from any recovery against the latter, directly or indirectly.- The Queen, U. S. D. C. (N. Y.),

4. ADMIRALTY-Collision. In assessing damages on total loss by collision, though the cost of construction is competent evidence where no market value is ascertainable, the whole cost should not be given as damage where the vessel could be duplicated for a less sum, and the cost testified to includes various changes and improvements. The City of Alexandria, U. S. D. C. (N.

Y.), 40 Fed. Rep. 697.

5. ADMINISTRATORS-Bond.-Where a settlement of a deceased administrator's accounts, which is relied upon as a basis of the breach of his bond, is made before the appointment of his administrator, neither the principal nor his administrator is legally before the probate court at the time of the settlement, and the judgment of the court is not binding upon the sureties in the bond.-Hetch v. Drake, Ark., 12 S. W. Rep. 706. 6. ANIMALS-Vicious Dog. It is the clear duty of the

master, in loosing his dog for his own advantage, to see to it that he does not injure innocent passers on the public street; and to that end he is held to the exercise of the greatest possible care, and must repair the damage occasioned by his neglect.-McGuire v. Ringrose, La., 6 South. Rep. 896.

7. APPEAL-Federal Courts.-The proceeding, being in its nature purely equitable, it could be reviewed only on appeal, though the court submitted issues to the jury, and though the Code of Idaho declares that there shall be but one form of civil action, in which either legal or equitable remedies may be administered, with or without a jury, according to the nature of the relief sought.-Idaho, etc. Land Co. v. Bradbury, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 177.

8. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. - A deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors "authorized and directed the assignees to take possession at once of all the property above conveyed, and convert the same into cash as soon and upon the best terms possible for the best interest of our creditors:" Held, that the assignees were not given discretionary power to sell on credit.-Muller v. Norton, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 147.

9. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. - In the absence of statutory requirement, the assignee of an insolvent debtor need not reside in the State where the debtor resides or the property is situated, and no such requirement will be implied from a statute providing that he shall execute a bond, which shall be "filed with the county clerk of the county." Bachrack v. Norton, U. S. S. C., 10 S. E. Rep. 106.

10. BAIL-BOND-Forfeiture.- A judgment of forfeiture of a bail-bond entered at a term subsequent to the entry of the default of the principal to appear is void.Me Guire v. State, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 85.

11. BONDS-Fraudulent Conveyances.- Under Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 280, providing that "when the action arises out of contract the plaintiff may join such other matters in his complaint as may be necessary for a complete remedy and a speedy satisfaction of his judgment," the joinder of several counts declaring on a bond, and asking that certain conveyances by the surety be set aside as fraudulent, with a count on the bond demanding judgment, is proper. Bowen v. State, Ind., 23. N. E. Rep. 75.

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12. CARRIERS-Passengers.-Negligence. A lady who was injured in getting off a street-car while it was being driven into the car barn may testify, in an action for the injuries received, as to what happened to her on a former occasion when driven into the barn, and that she feared a repetition of the insult and injury. Ashton v. Detroit City Ry. Co., Mich., 44 N. W. Rep. 141. 13. CARRIERS - Baggage. An illustrated catalogue, the individual property of a traveling salesman, prepared by himself, at his own expense, necessary for his convenience and use in his business, and carried with him on his trips, is personal baggage, and a recovery for it may be had against one engaged in transferring baggage from depots to hotels, through whose fault a valise containing the catalogue was lost.-Staub v. Kendrick, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 79.

14. CHATTEL MORTGAGOR-Damages.-A mortgagor of a chattel, retaining possession, has a right to sue a turnpike company for damages to the chattel by its defective road.-Gallatin & N. Turnpike Co. v. Fry, Tenn., 12 S. W. Rep. 720.

15. COMPROMISE-Partnership.- An offer by plaintiff, after an action has been commenced against the members of a firm, to release them all if one would turn over certain notes, which is accepted by that partner, who immediately procures the notes, and notifies plaintiff of his readiness to turn them over, may be pleaded by him in bar of the action, though it is never carried out, where plaintiff fails to notify him that it will not accept the notes. · Strobridge, etc. Co. v. Randall, Mich., 44 N. W. Rep. 134.

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a non-resident, the clerk shall address a notice to him requiring him to appear and answer at a specified time and place, and sending him a certified copy of the petition: Held, that as a judgment against a firm and against a resident partner individually bound the firm assets only, so far as it concerned a non-resident partner served with notice according to the statute, the statute was not unconstitutional, as not being "due process of law." Sugg v. Thornton, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 163.

17. CONTRACT-Board and Lodging.- Where brothersin-law reside together as one common family, the one furnishing board and lodging and the other rendering services, a presumption arises that neither intended to receive or pay a compensation; but this presumption may be rebutted by an express contract to pay, or by facts and circumstances excluding the inference that the services rendered or things furnished were gratuitous, from which the law will imply a promise to pay; and whether there is a contract to pay, express or implied, is for the jury.-Hill v. Hill, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 87. 18. CONTRACTS-Consideration.-Plaintiffs agreed with defendant exècutrix to purchase at public sale the personal property of her testator "for her account and risk," they to receive certain compensation for pur chasing and selling the same, she to give security against loss. For this purpose, she gave her note. The property was resold at a loss, and she then gave her note for the amount of the loss in place of the prior note: Held, that under Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 1676, and Civil Code, § 1667, the contract was unlawful and void, and recovery could not be had on the note. Jones v. Hanna, Cal., 22 Pac. Rep. 883.

19. COVENANTS-Highways.-As the rule that the existence and user of a part of the land as a highway at the time of the conveyance does not constitute a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, rests on the presumption that the grantee must have known of, and purchased with reference to, the public easement, where there is evidence, in an action for a breach of covenant, that plaintiff's grantor claimed to own the land; that, at the time of the conveyance, there was no indication of a street, but that the land was inclosed; and that the fence had the appearance of having been standing a long time, it is error to refuse to submit to the jury the question whether there was any indication of a street on the land in controversy, and whether plaintiff had notice of the public easement when he purchased.- Hymes v. Esty, N. Y., 22 N. E. Rep. 1087.

20. COUNTIES - Liabilities. While a county may be sued for indebtedness, the indebtedness must be such as it may legitimately incur under express or clearly implied power given by statute, else it will not be liable. -Payne v. Washington, Fla., 6 South. Rep. 881.

21. CRIMINAL LAW-Collateral Attack -County-seats. -One convicted on a trial held at a town which for more than twelve years had been regarded as the county seat, at which place the county buildings were located, the county records kept, and the county business, including that of the district and county courts, had been transacted, and which town had been recog. nized as the county-seat by the State departments and the people, cannot, in habeas corpus proceeedings, collaterally attack the location of the county-seat at that place. In re Allison, Colo., 22 Pac. Rep. 820.

22. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide.-Where the only ques tion in a murder trial is whether the defendant was the person who committed the murder, and three eye. witnesses who were previously acquainted with the defendant positively identify him as the murderer, and it is also proved that shortly before the murder defendant had had an altercation with the deceased, judgment of conviction will not be reversed on appeal, though the witness for the prosecution were uninteligent and illiterate.-People v. Stone, N. Y., 23 N. Rep. 13. 23. CRIMINAL LAW-Killing Dog.-An indictment under Elliott's Supp. Ind. § 449, for killing a dog which has been listed for taxation, sufficiently charges that it was

listed for taxation at the time it was killed where it is averred to have been listed in 1886, it being charged that it was killed in March, 1887, since, by § 444, it could only have been listed between April 1, and June 1, in 1886, and could not have been again listed until after March, 1887.-Hewitt v. State, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 83.

24. CRIMINAL LAW-Enticing Away Females. - An indictment under Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 1993, providing for the punishment of any person who "entices or takes away any female of previous chaste character, from wherever she may be, to a house of ill fame or else. where, for the purpose of prostitution," is insufficient, unless it avers that the place to which the female was taken was a house of ill fame or a place of like charac ter.-Miller v. State, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 94.

25. CORPORATIONS -Foreign Conveyances To.- Under Const. Colo. art. 15, § 10, and Gen. St. Colo. 1883, §§ 260 262, the failure of a foreign corporation to comply with the conditions entitling it to do business in the State does not render a conveyance to it void, so that it may be attacked collaterally by a private person.- Fritts v. Palmer, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 93.

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26. CORPORATIONS- Sale. Corporation property is held subject to corporate debts; and when a corporation sells its whole property and rights to a purchaser, knowing the fact, equity, in proper cases, will subject the property in the hands of the purchaser to the payment of the debts with which it is charged; but the purchaser of specific property, such as a steamboat, from a corporation, is not bound to follow the price paid into the hands of the selling corporation, and see to its distribution among the latter's stockholders, in the absence of fraudulent connivance between the purchaser and seller to wrong the stockholders. Leathers v. Jonney, La., 6 South. Rep. 884.

27. DECEIT-Conspiracy.

Though it is error to admit in evidence the acts and declarations of some of the alleged co-conspirators, made in furtherance of the project, in the absence of others, without sufficient evidence having been previously introduced to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy, the error is cured by an instruction that, as there was no evidence to prove a conspiracy, no consideration should be given to that part of the complaint charging the conspiracy. -Moore v. Shields, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 89.

28. EASEMENTS.-A grant of the right to maintain pipes for a water supply across a lot of land will not be im. plied from their long-continued maintenance, where it appears that the right to the water supply was a mere revocable license which has been revoked.-Johnson v. Knapp, Mass., 23 N. E. Rep. 40.

30. ELECTION CONTESTS Injunction. A court of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the issuing of a certificate of election to, and the assumption of office by, a newly elected city marshal, on petition of the present marshal, alleging disqualification under the city charter of the newly elected officer.-Neiser v. Thomas, Mo., 12 S. W. Rep. 725.

31. EQUITY JURISDICTION — -Executors. Equity has jurisdiction of a suit by a creditor at large of a decedent against his personal representatives for an accounting for the payment of complainant's claim and for general relief.-Beverly v. Rhodes, Va., 10 S. E. Rep. 572.

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32. EMINENT DOMAIN-Telegraph Poles. or telephone company is subject to the provisions of Const. Md. art. 3, § 40, which provides that private prop⚫ erty shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, and the averment, in a bill for injunction, that such a company is proceeding, or threatens to proceed, to construct its line of poles and wires over complainant's land, without his leave, and without paying or tendering him compensation, is sufficient to entitle him to an injunction. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Smith, Md., 18 Atl. Rep. 910.

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order to protect his testatrix's husband from creditors, and also for the benefit of the estate he represente, then the rule of law as to persons in pari delicto, should not be so applied as to aid defendant attorney in hold. ing property so acquired, and thus enable him to consumate a wrong and a fraud on the estate.-Place v. Hayward, N. Y. 23 N. E. Rep. 25.

Settlement.

34. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS When an estate has been administered pursuant to a business policy recommended by competent counsel, and approved at the outset by creditors and conservative business men, and no trace of fraud or bad faith appears on the part of the administrators, they are entitled to their commissions, though the estate suffered serlous loss by their management.-Appeal of Sunday, Penn., 18 Atl. Rep. 931.

35. EXECUTORS-Lien.-A testator directed his property, realty and personalty, to be sold, and, after the payment of certain legacies to his children, the residue to be divided equally among them: Held, in an action by a judgment creditor of one of the children, whose judgment had been filed for a lien after testator's death, to subject the debtor's in the proceeds of the sale to its payment, that the executor was entitled to set off the amount of notes executed by the debtor on which testator was surety, and which the executor had been compelled to pay, and also other debts due from a debtor to the testator, the debtor being insolvent. Koons v. Mellett, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 95.

36. EXECUTION-Supplementary Proceedings. Rev. Stat. Wis. 1878, § 3030, providing that, "when an execu. tion against property of the judgment debtor is returned unsatisfied, the judgment creditor, at any time after such return is made, is entitled to an order re quiring such judgment debtor to appear before him and answer concerning his property," requires that such proceedings be instituted within a reasonable time after the return of the unsatisfied execution, and proceedings begun after ten years are not within a rea sonable time.- Woodward v. Hall, Wis., 44 N. W. Rep. 114. 37. EXEMPTIONS Stock in Trade. Although the owner of a stock of millinery and fancy goods purchased from wholesale dealers is a milliner by trade, and a large share of her business consists in making up and finishing articles selected by her customers from said stock, the same cannot be declared exempt as "stock in trade," under the provisions of the statutes, when the articles composing said stock are kept indiscriminately for sale or for manufacture, as opportunity affords, in the condition in which they were bought, and are treated by their owner as merchandise.-Hillyer v. Remore, Minn., 44 N. W. Rep. 116.

38. FEDERAL COURTS-Supreme Court. Where the construction of a certain agreement involves no fed. eral question, and is decisive of the entire case, the Supreme Court of the United States will not entertain jurisdiction of a writ of error to the judgment of the State court, on the ground that there was also a federal question raised and decided adversely to plaintiffs in error.-Hale v. Akers, U. s. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 171.

39. FEDERAL COURTS-Territorial Officers.-In an action in a territorial court to oust an officer claiming title under a territorial act, and to compel the surrender of the office to one appointed by the gov. ernor, by virtue of the authority conferred by the act of congress creating the territory, where the territorial supreme court bases its decision for plaintiff on the power conferred on the governor by the act of congress, an "authority exercised under the United States" is "drawn in question," within the meaning of Act Cong. March 3, 1885 (23 U. S. Stat. at Large, 443), § 2, which provides for appeals and writs of error from the supreme courts of the territories in such cases.-Clayton v. People, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 190.

40. FEDERAL COURTS-Jurisdiction.-A federal court does not acquire jurisdiction of a suit removed from a State court by virtue of an attachment made in the State court, where there was no personal service of

process on defendant, a resident of another State.— Perkins v. Hendryx, U. S. C. C. (Mass.), 40 Fed. Rep. 657. 41. FEDERAL COURTS-Practice.-The rules of practice of a United States circuit court govern a cause brought there from a State court, under 25 Stat. at Large, 435, providing that "the cause shall then proceed in the same manner as if it had been originally commenced in said circuit court.”—Henning v. W. U. Tel Co., U. S. C. C. (S. Car.), 40 Fed. Rep. 659.

42. FEDERAL Offenses-Obscene Publications.-Prior to the recent act of congress, letters were not included in the inhibitions of Rev. St. § 3893, against the use of obscene language in matter deposited in the mails. United States v. Huggett, U. S. C. C. (Ohio), 40 Fed. Rep. 636.

43. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE- Attorney's Fee. The provision of the Massachussets insolvent law against transfers with a view to prevent property of the insolvent from coming to the hands of his assignee (Pub. St. ch. 157, § 98) does not invalidate a fair and honest mortgage by insolvent debtors to secure to their at torney reasonable compensation for services rendered by him, to obtain their discharge in insolvency. — In re Parsons, Mass., 23 N. E. Rep. 50.

44. INSURANCE-Reformation. In an action to reform a tontine insurance policy, brought after the tontine period had expired, the complaint averred that the defendant represented that the cash value of the policy would amount to a certain sum at the end of the tontine period: Held, that in the absence of any mutual mistake, such representation would not warrant a reformation of the policy, so as to make it contain an absolute covenant as to the amount of such cash value. — Avery v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., N. Y., 23 N. E. Rep. 3.

45. INSURANCE-Payments to Agent. When an insur. ance agent, who has authority to issue policies of insurance, issues and delivers a policy upon a building therein described, and agrees with the assured to deduct the premium out of money then in his possession belonging to the assured, and apply it on the payment of the premium, such an agreement is a receipt of the premium, and the company issuing the policy will be bound thereby.- Phonix Ins. Co. v. Meier, Neb., 44 N. W. Rep. 97.

46. INSURANCE-Occupancy.-A policy of insurance on a barn situated on a farm leased to a tenant who lived on another farm, a half mile away, was issued, on an oral application, by an agent knowing fully the facts. The tenant occasionally stored produce in the barn, and kept his tools there while working the farm. After the lease expired the owner's agent took charge and went occasionally to look after things: Held, that it was proper to charge, in an action on the policy, that, if the agent used and occupied the premises substantially as contemplated, the policy was not invalidated by reason of the vacancy.-Fritz v. Home Ins. Co., Mich., 44 N. W. Rep. 139.

47. INSURANCE- Conditions. Under a policy which does not forbid repairs per se, but imposes the condition on the insured to obtain the written consent of the company before doing any act which may increase the risk insured against, courts will not conclude that repairs, though very extensive, and bordering on recon. struction, operate an increase of risk, but will weigh the degree of care used by the insured while making such alterations, and all circumstances connected with the operation, and decide each case on the particular showing therein made. Meyer v. Queen Ins. Co., La., 6 South. Rep. 899.

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