That so little progress has been made in the realization of true freedom is chiefly owing to a want of knowledge of what the true nature of liberty is. Modern civilization boasts of the progress it has initiated and pursued in behalf of civil and religious liberty, whilst the pretended advancement made concerned only two of the inferior branches of human freedom.

In order to arrive at a true appreciation of the word "liberty," it is necessary to recall to the mind of the reader the definitions given of it by various writers and philosophers. Robespierre says in the first article of his "Rights of Men: "-" The end of all political association is the maintenance of the natural and imprescriptable rights of man, and the development of all his faculties." In the fourth article he gives a more practical meaning to this definition:-"Liberty is the power which belongs to man, of doing all that which does not injure the rights of another: it has nature for its origin, justice for its rule, and the law for its protection; its moral bounds are defined in the maxim, 'Do not to another that which thou dost not wish he should do unto thee.''

Another article of his "Rights of Men" says:-" Liberty is the power which belongs to a man of exercising all his faculties at pleasure. It has the rights of others for its boundaries.

The first French Constitution of 1793, which was elaborated under the influence of Robespierre's ideas, defines liberty in these words: Liberty consists in the power to do anything that is not detrimental to others."

From these definitions we obtain a clear insight into the nature of freedom, and learn that its aim is—

1. To maintain man's natural rights, of which the right to a happy existence is the greatest.

2. To secure to every individual the means and power of developing and exercising all his faculties.

3. To protect everyone in the exercise of his freedom,—which negatively means, that freedom is not absolute, but loses its nature as soon as it infringes on the freedom of others. From this third element of the nature of liberty arises one important feature of freedom, which is, that liberty must rely on authority and power for the sake of its own protection. Whenever liberty, or the exercise of the natural rights of an individual, are interfered with, the law, or the authority of the Govern

ment, must step in and prevent such interference. The sphere and action of this protective authority is well defined by Stuart Mill, who says:-" The sole end for which mankind are warranted in individually or collectively interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection; the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others."

The various domains of human liberty are also admirably enumerated by the same author, who says, in his treatise on "Liberty : ""The appropriate region of human liberty comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought; feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, and theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people, but being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing our plan of life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow, without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual follows the liberty within the same limits of combination among individuals."

SECTION II.

THE SAFEGUARDS OF LIBERTY.

CHAPTER VII.-OF THE PROTECTION OF LIBERTY.

JOHN STUART

OHN STUART MILL'S dictum, that self-protection justifies restraint upon liberty, ought to read, "The advancement and protection of liberty alone warrant restraint." That this restraint must both be legal and moral, was clearly perceived by Robespierre, when he said:"Liberty has the law for its protection, and its moral bounds are defined in the maxim, 'Do not to another that which thou dost not wish he should do unto thee.'

The connection between power and liberty is also well defined by Mr. Stephen, who says:-"Liberty, from the very nature of things, is dependent upon power; power determines precisely how much and how little individual liberty is to be left to exist at any specific time and place; and it is only under the protection of a powerful, well organised, and intelligent government that any liberty can exist at all."

The protection of liberty, that is, of the free use by any individual of all the means by which he may secure to himself a happy existence, does not shrink from any means of coercion, when, as Mr. Stephen says, the object is good, and the means of compulsion are adequate. In this sense the great struggles for civil, political, and religious liberty in modern Europe seem to be but rightful cases of coercion for the protection and advancement of human liberty, and the rude means by which the object aimed at was secured were adequate and, in many instances, very inexpensive, as, for instance, in the easy overthrow of royalty in France in 1848, and the establishment of universal suffrage in lieu of a very limited

franchise. Mr. Stephen says the same in these words:-"It surely needs no argument to show that all the great political changes which have been the principal subject of European history for the last three centuries have been cases of coercion in the most severe form, although a large proportion of them have been described as struggles for liberty by those who were, in fact, the most vigorous wielders of power." Moreover, Mr. Stephen argues "that all organized religions, all moral systems, and all political institutions are so many forms of coercion, which, although limiting individual liberty, have yet done great good."

This is true; for inasmuch as all religious, moral, social, and political progress can achieve nothing without at the same time promoting the advancement of liberty, or its protection, these cases become legitimate means of coercion, and we rejoice in the liberation of the mind by the Reformation, in the interdiction of the suttee and of the sacrifices of human lives under the car of Juggernauth, and we glory in the standard of morality which permeates our laws and customs, and we respect the authority which protects our political liberty, as far as we have till now been able to secure it, although individual liberty may, in all these instances, have been powerfully interfered with.

The punishment and preventive treatment of vices and crimes becomes also a necessity; for one cannot imagine a single vice or crime that can be committed without being hurtful to the whole body of the community; and this must be the more so in a communistic state, when large masses of people are congregated in the Associated Home. Mr. Stephen says on this point- -" Men are so closely connected together, that it is quite impossible to say how far the influence of acts apparently of the most personal character may extend." It is surely a single matter of fact that every human creature is deeply interested not only in the conduct, but in the thoughts, feelings, and opinions of millions of persons who stand in no other assignable relation to him than that of being his fellow-creatures. The strong metaphor that we are all members one of another is little more than the expression of a fact. A man would no more be a man if he was alone in the world, than a hand would be a hand without the rest of the body."

Mr. Mill puts the same question to himself, saying:—“ How can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself without mischief reaching at least to his near connexions, and often far beyond them."

One might suppose that this question would have led him to the adoption of constraints against vices, but we find that, on the contrary, he argues against interference for punishing vices on the flimsy ground that compulsion in such cases will make people rebel, and, above all, that the moral prosecutor himself may, very probably, be mistaken.

The communistic state will, however, apprehend neither rebellion nor abuse of power, and will most assuredly interfere for the suppression of vices, especially of drunkenness, gluttony, luxury, and idleness. The fact that these vices entail surplus labour on every member of the community becomes only apparent in a communistic state, and being therefore detrimental to the liberty of every citizen, they are liable to punishment, prevention, and coercion. When the communistic state thus resorts to restraints for the purpose of establishing morality, it does so only for the sake of protecting the liberty of those who are not addicted to those vicious habits.

Mr. Mill argues" that if grown-up people are grossly vicious it is the fault of society, which therefore ought not to punish them."

In how far the existing organization of society offers direct and indirect inducements to many vices and crimes has been shown in nearly every chapter of this book, and the preventive means of restraint to be adopted by the communistic state have likewise been indicated. When the detection, prevention, and cure of vices and crimes have once been placed upon scientific bases, of which the late R. Owen laid down one, namely, the formation of man's character by circumstances, the total extirpation of all gross vices and crimes may ultimately become a reality, and the question about legitimate or arbitrary coercion may be put altogether to rest.

Mr. Stephen denies Mr. Mill's assertion that the removal of restraints tends to invigorate character, and maintains the