hour and a half or two hours. Sir Henry Bulwer, while thinking that a small fine ought to be exacted for this insult, pointed out that the engineer ought not to have been sent to make such an inspection at such a time, and that his behaviour "almost amounted to a culpable provocation." Sir Bartle Frere treated the incident. as an unprovoked and inexcusable outrage. The other outrage was committed by two sons of the chief Sirayo, two of whose wives had eloped from him and fled with their paramours into Natal. The young men pursued them with armed followers, dragged the women away, and murdered them.' Sir Henry Bulwer did not seek to palliate the grossness of this offence. He sent a message to Cetchwayo, demanding the surrender of the criminals. But he treated it as an individual offence, having no political significance. Sir Bartle Frere, on the contrary, made much of it in his despatches as a glaring instance of the hostile intentions of the Zulus. Cetchwayo temporised when asked to surrender the youths, and pleaded in extenuation of their crime that it was 66 the rash act of boys moved by too great zeal for their father's honour." This delay and apology were treated by Sir Bartle Frere as monstrous illustrations of Cetchwayo's insolent and hostile spirit.

In short, Sir Bartle Frere's view of the situation was that Cetchwayo, puffed up with military pride, was longing for war with the white man, was not unwilling to provoke war, and would assume the offensive unless he were intimidated. To secure the necessary means of intimidation, he detained in South Africa the troops on the list for relief, and sent urgent messages home for reinforcements in view of the critical state of affairs. On September 10 he applied for two more battalions, on September 17 he raised his application to two regiments. He moved troops from Cape Colony into Natal, and sent detachments forward towards the Zulu frontier. Sir Henry Bulwer deprecated these movements, and the talk which they excited in the colony as to their intention of fighting the Zulus. His belief was that Cetchwayo was too much afraid of the English to wish for war, but was suspicious of being attacked and annexed, as the Transvaal had been; and he argued that the movement of our troops and the bellicose talk of the colonists would confirm these suspicions, increase the Zulu excitement, and aggravate the crisis. Sir Henry Bulwer's views were shared by the Home Government. The following was part of Sir M. Hicks-Beach's reply to Sir Bartle Frere's first request for reinforcements, dated October 17, 1878:

"Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to comply with the request for a reinforcement of troops. All the information that has hitherto reached them with respect to the position of affairs in Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance and a reasonable compromise, it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of a war with Cetchwayo; and they can

1 See depositions of Natal Kaffirs, and reports of resident magistrates, Blue Book, C. 2220, December 1878, pp. 195-6, &c.

not but think that the forces now at your disposal in South Africa, together with the additional officers about to be sent, should suffice to meet any other emergency that may arise, without a further increase to the imperial troops."

On November 21 the Colonial Secretary, with reference to some of the alleged outrages committed by Zulus on the frontier, drew Sir Bartle Frere's attention somewhat sharply to the circumstance that "the facts when ascertained differed greatly from the alarming reports originally spread," and went on to say:

"I trust that, in accordance with the suggestion conveyed in your memorandum to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, Cetchwayo may have been informed that a decision regarding the disputed boundary would speedily be communicated to him. His complaint that the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal "is hiding from him the answer that has come from across the sea about the land boundary question, and is only making an excuse for taking time so as to surprise him," is not altogether an unnatural one for a native chief situated in his circumstances, who is necessarily ignorant of much that has passed on this subject, and of many of the causes to which the delay is attributable."

Before this despatch reached Pietermaritzburg, the decision on the boundary question had been made known to Cetchwayo, and with it a list of demands concerning which the High Commissioner had said nothing whatever to the Home Government till it was too late for them to interfere. A curt announcement, dated November 11, that he "proposed to request his Excellency (Sir H. Bulwer) to follow up the award in the Boundary case with a statement of the guarantees which we consider necessary in order to ensure peace hereafter in our relations with the Zulus," reached the Colonial Office on December 11. On that very day a special commission appointed by Sir Bartle Frere met a body of Zulu delegates who had come to receive the Boundary award, and to hear further communications. The award was explained to them in the forenoon, and at a second meeting in the afternoon, the terms embodied in Sir Bartle Frere's ultimatum were disclosed. These terms were in effect as follows. First, Cetchwayo was reminded that he had broken his coronation promises, by putting people to death without trial and permitting indiscriminate shedding of blood; and he was required to give guarantees to the Great Council of the Zulu nation and the British Government for the future observance of these promises. Second, as a guarantee for this, he was required to abolish his present military system, and substitute for it a system of tribal quotas which should be approved of by the Great Council and the British Government. Third, he was to accept the presence and advice of a British Resident. Fourth, to permit the return to Zululand and engage for the future protection of missionaries and their converts. Lastly, a demand was made for the surrender of certain criminals and the payment of certain fines. Sir Bartle Frere's original intention was to allow a period of fifteen

days for compliance with these demands, but at the instance of Sir Henry Bulwer the time of grace was extended to thirty days.

When Sir Bartle Frere decided upon presenting an ultimatum to Cetchwayo he was not aware whether the Government intended to send him any reinforcements. He had remonstrated warmly against their first refusal, representing that there was and for twelve months had been every symptom that Cetchwayo would not keep the peace. His conviction that war was unavoidable seemed to gain strength in every successive despatch. When at last he made the demands from Cetchwayo, which he did not expect to be conceded without a struggle, he wrote that "the force we have now at our disposal is not as large as we thought necessary, though we have called up every available company in South Africa." "But," he added, " in the absence of reinforcements we must do our best with such means as we have." The Government yielded in the end to his representations, though still under the impression that the reinforcements were asked only for the protection of Natal from urgent danger. On November 21 they announced that it was their intention to send him reinforcements, but warned him that they must not be used for aggressive purposes. These reinforcements were sent out on December 14, and four days later another despatch was addressed to Sir Bartle Frere, urging upon him the expediency of confining his action to the protection of the colonies. Just as the reinforcements reached Natal, the thirty days' grace had expired.

The prospect of a war with the Zulus excited very languid interest in this country. Towards the end of January the intelligence came that Cetchwayo showed no sign of yielding to Sir Bartle Frere's demands, and that in consequence, on January 4, our relations with the Zulus had been placed in the hands of Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-chief of the forces in South Africa, who had proceeded to the front, and held himself in readiness to invade Zululand. But very few people had any idea of the nature of the demands, and still fewer anticipated any difficulty in the enforcing of them. January 11 was the limit fixed for Cetchwayo's submission, and early in February news came that our troops under Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Pearson had crossed the frontier on the 12th, and that the Zulus were retreating.

The news that reached England on February 11, of the terrible disaster at Isandhlwana, was a shock for which the nation was totally unprepared. It was as complete and almost as horrifying a surprise as the Indian Mutiny, and nothing had occurred since then to stir public feeling about imperial affairs so profoundly. It was not indeed felt that there was any danger of a province being lost to the Crown, but there were the same fears for the safety of English colonists, an unarmed population exposed to the fury of overwhelming numbers of savage enemies. Were the victorious Zulus likely to overrun Natal? Could the troops still in the colony hold their own till reinforcements from England could reach them? The gallant defence of Rorke's Drift, by a handful of men under Chard

and Bromhead, went far to reassure public feeling on these points, and also to intensify a very general impression that "some one must have blundered" before such a disaster could have befallen our arms. Next mail was anxiously expected, and meantime attention was fixed upon the preparations for the despatch of reinforcements, which were pushed forward with admirable energy. The 91st Highlanders and the 60th Rifles sailed from Southampton and Gravesend on the 19th, eight days after the receipt of the disastrous news; and fifteen days' intense energy in office, dockyard, camp, depôt, and arsenal, got under way for the Cape a force of 8,500 men, including four regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry.

A detailed account of the operations connected with the Zulu war will be found in another part of the Register. We are concerned here with the impression produced in this country by the incidents of the war and the policy of the Queen's Commissioner and the Government. It was more than two months after the tidings of the Isandhlwana disaster before anxiety was conclusively dispelled by the news of the relief of the Ekowe garrison. Long before this it had been generally accepted that the forces under the immediate direction of Lord Chelmsford were capable of holding their own, and protecting the colony against Zulu inroads. Each week's news strengthened this confidence. We heard of no attempt being made by the Zulus to cross the frontier, and we were told that the boundary river was closely watched, and our troops carefully disposed for purposes of defence. Confidence was also restored by news of raiding operations conducted by Colonel Evelyn Wood from his station on the Utrecht borders. Gradually uneasiness about the colony gave place to a feeling of impatience that nothing was being done for the relief of Colonel Pearson. More than once it was reported that a relieving expedition was being prepared, and a date fixed for its departure. Fears were entertained that the provisions of the garrison would not hold out till Lord Chelmsford, now suspected of exaggerated caution as he had before been suspected of exaggerated confidence, should deem it prudent to advance. These fears were increased by news which reached England early in April of the surprise and massacre of a small convoy on the Intombe river. This incident was held to prove that the lesson of Isandhlwana had not been taken to heart. But wherever there may have been a want of caution, there was no such want now on the part of Lord Chelmsford. He did not move to the relief of Ekowe till the first reinforcements to start from England had reached Natal. The operation was then easily and successfully accomplished. The relieving column was attacked in its camp at Gingihlovo near the Inyezane River, and the enemy were repulsed with prodigious slaughter. No further resistance was offered to the advance on Ekowe, and the withdrawal of the garrison was effected without molestation. The welcome news of the success of the relieving expedition reached England on April 22, and was

made the subject of congratulations in both Houses of Parliament. The same special mail brought details of Colonel Wood's triumphant repulse of a determined attack upon his camp at Kambula, which was accepted as a still further proof that the Zulus were powerless for offence. From that date all fears for the safety of the colony were abandoned: the interest thenceforth lay in the preparations for breaking up Cetchwayo's military power.

Meantime, before the arrival of the news that our military prestige in South Africa had been conclusively restored, Sir Bartle Frere's policy and Lord Chelmsford's conduct of the war were the subjects of eager discussion. Both in public and in private sides were warmly taken. A rapid succession of Blue-books placed the public in possession of the facts, and much astonishment was felt at the conflict of views revealed in the correspondence between the High Commissioner and the Government, and at the conduct of the former in rushing into war, not only without consulting the Government, but in direct defiance of their suggestions. Had the Government any alternative but to recall him was a question universally asked, and even in journals which were habitual supporters of the Ministry they were strongly urged to take this course. Lord Chelmsford also, as the details of the Isandhlwana disaster were brought to light, became the object of a storm of censure from all sides. The Standard was as emphatic as the Daily News in condemnation of his generalship, and both journals insisted equally on the urgent necessity of sending out a stronger general to take the command.

Parliament met on February 13, two days after the arrival of the news of Isandhlwana. The subject occupied the first place in the ministerial statements submitted to both Houses, but comment was deprecated and abstained from till fuller details of what had happened should have been received. Government promised to lose no time in laying before Parliament the papers that were necessary for forming an opinion as to the origin of the war. A report had got wind that the Government had refused to send Sir Bartle Frere, before the war broke out, the reinforcements which he had asked for, and there was a conversation on this point in the House of Lords, Lord Salisbury and Lord Cadogan simply maintaining that "troops had been sent," without any reference to the original refusal or its grounds. The pitched debate on the subject of the Zulu War did not take place for several weeks. During the interval several questions were asked relating to the production of despatches and to minor incidents, and one or two opportunities were seized for general comment which testified to the impatience with which the great days of debate were anticipated. When Colonel Stanley introduced the Army Estimates on March 3, the discussion was turned by Mr. Campbell-Bannerman on the Zulu War. It appeared from the estimates that it had been Colonel Stanley's intention to reduce the army by 4,000 men, but that that number had been again put on the establishment in consequence of