the argument, however, said the court, was that Rep. Lederer had failed to show "any direct or specific harm resulting from the alleged lack of supervision." [Id. at 66] Moreover, the supervision of Mr. Weinberg, according to the court, was in fact "more than adequate to the circumstances of this investigation." [Id.] In this regard, the court stated: In an investigation that spanned many months and meet- Next, Judge Pratt addressed Rep. Lederer's contention that he was prejudiced at trial by the fact that many of the audiotapes made by Mr. Weinberg either contained gaps or were missing. The court disposed of these arguments by finding that no evidence had been introduced to support the assertion that the unrecorded or missing conversations were important. Rep. Lederer's third specific argument was that dismissal of the indictment was required because during the investigation Government officials violated numerous laws, regulations, and guidelines. Like its predecessors, this argument was rejected by the court. "It is clear", said Judge Pratt, "that for a court to dismiss an indictment there must be not only a constitutional violation, but also some resulting adverse effect or prejudice to the defendant." [Id. at 71-72 (citation omitted)] In the instant case, concluded Judge Pratt, Rep. Lederer had shown neither a constitutional violation nor any resulting prejudice. Another argument raised by Rep. Lederer was that the Government's use of middlemen such as Messrs. Criden, Errichetti, and Silvestri was an irresponsible attempt to insulate the Government from its responsibility to conduct a fair investigation. In effect, said Rep. Lederer, the Government had used these middlemen as its agents and was now responsible for the machinations of those middlemen. In discussing this assertion, Judge Pratt termed it "ludicrous. In the court's view, the Government's use of middlemen "was no more improper than an undercover agent's infiltration of a drug ring in order to gain the confidence of its members and obtain evidence necessary for conviction. U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432." [Id. at 83] The last major due process challenge concerned the conduct of Mr. Weinberg. It was the defendant's belief that "the government knew that Weinberg was untrustworthy and that defendant's due process rights were violated when the government permitted such a person to play a major role in Abscam." [Id. at 93] Judge Pratt addressed this contention by conceding that Mr. Weinberg had an “unsavory background.” [Id. at 94] But it was precisely because of this background, said Judge Pratt, that Mr. Weinberg was so valua ble: [Mr. Weinberg's] ability to lie convincingly, his under- Moreover, the government was not required to find With respect to the Defendant's additional argument-that Mr. Weinberg had been given an exorbitant salary by the Government, and that he was promised a bonus for each conviction-Judge Pratt found that in point of fact Mr. Weinberg's remuneration was neither exorbitant nor contingent in any way upon convictions. In addressing the alleged contingent fee agreement, Judge Pratt said: Here the court finds that Weinberg's payments in Abscam have not been contingent. Even if they were, however, that would be but one more fact to be weighed in determining the reliability of the results obtained. Payments to informants contingent upon successful prosecution of those with whom they deal have been judicially criticized, but such payments do not require dismissal of an indictment. See, e.g., U.S. v. Brown, 602 F.2d 1073 (CA 2 1979); U.S. v. Szycher, 585 F.2d 443 (CA 10 1978). [Id. at 96] In addressing the amount of Mr. Weinberg's salary, Judge Pratt said: Whether his contribution to law enforcement in these cases and the personal sacrifices [Mr. Weinberg] has endured, during both the investigation and the prosecutions, are worth the amount of money the government has conferred upon him, is perhaps a matter for serious consideration by the justice department and even by congress. It is not, however, a matter upon which this court will pass judgment for purposes of determining whether the fruits of his activities on behalf of the government should be dismissed. How much money is paid to a government informant is peculiarly a decision for the executive department, and not one for judicial review at the behest of a defend ant who was caught by the informant's activities. [Id. at On August 13, 1981, Rep. Lederer was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment on each of Counts I, II, and IV, and 2 years on Count III. However, all sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. In addition Rep. Lederer was fined $10,000 for his conviction under Count I and $10,000 for his conviction under Count II, for a total of $20,000. Execution of the prison sentence was stayed pending Rep. Lederer's appeal. The notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was filed on August 24, 1981. Status-The case is pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The complete text of the July 24, 1981 memorandum and order of Judge Pratt is printed in the "Decisions" section of this report at page 419. United States v. Williams Criminal Case No. 80-00575 (E.D.N.Y.) and Nos. 80-1474, 811097, 81-1022, and 81-1061 (2d Cir.) On October 30, 1980, U.S. Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. of New Jersey was indicted by a Federal grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Indicted with Senator Williams were Alexander Feinberg, a New Jersey attorney; George Katz, a New Jersey businessman; and Angelo J. Errichetti, the Mayor of Camden, New Jersey and a member of the New Jersey State Senate. Count I of the nine count indictment charged the defendants with conspiracy,1 contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 371.2 Specifically it was alleged that between January 1, 1979 and February 2, 1980 the defendants were involved in a scheme whereby Senator Williams promised to use his influence as a U.S. Senator to attempt to obtain U.S. Government contracts that would benefit a titanium mine and processing facility in Piney River, Virginia. It was alleged that Senator Williams, in return for his promise, received a $100 million loan from "Sheik Yassir Habib" who was, in reality, Richard Farhart, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Allegedly, the defendants, along with Habib, Melvin Weinberg (purportedly an agent of Habib but in reality a private citizen assisting the FBI), and "Tony DeVito" (purportedly another Habib agent, but in reality FBI Special Agent Anthony Amoroso, Jr.) formed three corporations into which the $100 million loan was channeled. According to the indictment, at that point Mr. Weinberg and De Vito, along with defendants Katz, Feinberg, and Errichetti, transferred shares of stock in these corporations to Senator Williams 1 Specifically, conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 201 (bribery and fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 203 (conflict of interest). 218 U.S.C. §371 provides: If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor. whose name was omitted from the stock certificates in order to conceal his interest. The indictment alleged that it was further a part of the conspiracy that the defendants agreed to sell the corporations to a second group of foreign investors for $70 million, and that, upon sale, Senator Williams would retain a concealed interest in the enterprise and would continue to try to obtain Government contracts for it. The indictment further charged that in addition to promising to exert influence to obtain government contracts Senator Williams also promised Habib that he would introduce in Congress a private immigration bill that would enable him to remain in the United States. Count II charged that Senator Williams, by soliciting and receiving the $100 million loan and the shares of corporate stock in return for his promise to be influenced in his consideration of matters involving the awarding of Government contracts, committed bribery, contrary to 18 U.S.Č. § 201(c).3 Count III repeated the allegations of Count II, and claimed that such actions and promises by Senator Williams violated the illegal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(g).4 Count IV repeated the allegations of Count II, and claimed that such actions and promises by Senator Williams placed him in a position of conflicting interests, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 203(a).5 Count V stated that on August 5, 1979, Senator Williams traveled interstate (from New Jersey to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York) with intent to promote unlawful activity, to wit, bribery. Such travel was said to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act).6 318 U.S.C. § 201(c) provides: Whoever, being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or entity, in return for: (1) being influenced in his performance of any official act; or (2) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or (3) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of his official duty shall be fined not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 201g) provides: Whoever, being a public offical, former public official, or person selected to be a public offical, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. 518 U.S.C. § 203(a) provides, in pertinent part: Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duties, directly or indirectly receives or agrees to receive, or asks, demands, solicits, or seeks any compensation for any services rendered or to be rendered either by himself or another (1) at a time when he is a Member of Congress, Member of Congress Elect, Delegate from the District of Columbia, Delegate Elect from the District of Columbia. Resident Commissioner, or Resident Commissioner Elect shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. 618 U.S.C. § 1952 provides, in pertinent part: (a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to (1) distribute the proveeds of any unlawful activity; or (2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or (3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. Count VI charged that by planning to solicit $70 million for the sale of the three corporations (in which he would retain an interest), and by agreeing to continue his efforts to influence government contract awards, Senator Williams committed bribery, contrary to 18 U.S.C. §201(c). Count VII repeated the claims of Count VI, and charged that such promises and actions by Senator Williams violated the illegal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(g). Count VIII repeated the allegations of Count VI, and charged that such actions and promises by Senator Williams violated the conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S.C. § 203(a). Count IX charged all defendants with traveling from Washington, D.C. to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York on September 11, 1979. Allegedly, this interstate travel was made for the purpose of carrying on an unlawful activity, to wit, bribery, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 1952. Each of Counts II through VIII charged the remaining named defendants with aiding and abetting Senator Williams in his illegal activities. Accordingly, the remaining defendants were charged with criminal liability under each of these counts, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2.7 On November 6, 1980, Senator Williams pled not guilty to all counts. On December 5, 1980, Senator Williams filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the grand jury considered material protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Specifically, he alleged that two of his Congressional staff members were subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury where one was questioned in detail about Senator Williams' prior and pending legislative acts regarding private immigration bills, and the other staff member was questioned on the same subject and also about Senator Williams' past legislative actions regarding strategic weapons. Senator Williams also_asserted that the grand jury improperly viewed a videotape of a January 15, 1980 meeting between him and Habib during which proposed immigration legislation for the benefit of Habib was discussed. The consideration by the grand jury of these legislative acts, said Senator Williams, tainted the grand jury process and mandated the dismissal of the indictment. On the same day, the Government filed a memorandum in opposition to Senator Williams' motion to dismiss on Speech or Debate Clause grounds. The Government claimed that Senator Williams' arguments were identical to those raised and rejected in United States v. Murphy, and United States v. Thompson. (These cases are discussed in the preceding pages of this report.) The Government argued that an indictment is not normally subject to dismissal on the ground that there was incompetent evidence before the grand jury. Moreover, said the Government, the defendant did not even 718 U.S.C. §2 provides: (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. The Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House [U.S. Senators and U.S. Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." [art. I, §6, cl. 1] |