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BATTLE OF TIPPECANOE.

nest for war, voted an increase of the regular army to 35,000 men; augmented the navy, and empowered the president to accept of the services of volunteers, call out the militia, as occasion might require, and borrow eleven millions of dollars.

In his message to congress, the president adverted to a new spirit of hostility displayed among the north-western Indians. This was attributed to the influence of the British. It was also stimulated by the exertions of an Indian prophet, a reformer, who preached to his red brethren, that all their disasters had been owing to their having forsaken the wise and simple habits of their ancestors; and that he had been prompted by the Great Spirit to warn them from mingling with the whites, from eating hogs and bullocks in lieu of the game that used to give them the warrior's and the hunter's spirit; and, above all, from the use of ardent spirits. This last wise injunction gave force and plausibility to all that the savage uttered. His fanatic advice, however salutary, in one respect, necessarily produced hatred towards the whites, and outrages upon them. Many affirmed that the hostile spirit thus excited was directed by the British against the Americans.

In the autumn of 1811, General Harrison was sent into the country of these hostile Indians, to treat or fight with them, as occasion might require. On the 6th of November, being arrived at Tippecanoe, their chief settlement, he was met by a deputation from the chiefs, who stipulated that no attack should be made before the next day, when they would be ready for a friendly conference.

In the night the American camp was suddenly and furiously assaulted by the Indians; but the Americans, having suspected treachery and slept on their arms, made a gallant resistance, defeated and dispersed the enemy, and burnt their town, not, however, without a severe loss in killed and wounded.

In the month of February, 1812, Captain John Henry, formerly of the United States army, and afterwards resident in Canada, gave information to the president, that in 1809 he had been employed by Sir James Craig, the governor of Canada, upon a secret mission to the New England states, for the purpose of gaining information of the state of parties, and inducing those who were opposed to the restrictions of the American government on commerce, to effect a separation of the northern states from the Union, and form a poli

tical connection between those states and Great Britain. For this information Henry was paid 50,000 dollars, from the contingent fund for foreign intercourse. He furnished ample documentary evidence of the truth of his disclosures, which was afterwards fully corroborated by developements made in the British parliament. But his mission had entirely failed, and it did not appear that he had succeeded in bringing any individual in this country to adopt his views. His motive for disclosure was the failure of his employers to compensate him for his services. This affair proved the hostile disposition of the government of Great Britain towards the United States, and served to increase the irritation already created in this country, by the injuries inflicted on our commerce, and the impressment of our seamen.

Preparations for war were still actively continued by congress until the 20th of May, 1812, when the arrival of the Hornet from London, bringing information that no reasonable prospect existed of a change in the measures of the British government, served to bring matters to a crisis. On the 1st of June the president transmitted to congress a message enumerating the injuries received from Great Britain, and submitting the question, whether they should be longer endured, or immediate recourse had to the ultimate resort of injured nations, a declaration of war.

After deliberating on this measure with closed doors, an act was passed by congress, on the 18th, declaring war against Great Britain. The immediate effect of this measure was a violent exasperation of parties, the friends of government applauding the act, as spirited and patriotic, and the opposition condemning it as unnecessary, unjustifiable, and impolitic. In the New England states particularly, where the revolutionary war found its most active supporters, the most decisive opposition was manifested, and every effort was used on the part of the political leaders to render the war unpopular, and to embarrass the government in its prosecution.

Some of those who opposed the war, held that it was both unjustifiable and inexpedient; while others allowed that abundant provocation had been given, but denied that the nation was sufficiently prepared for the conflict. The minority of congress, the legislatures of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey, and several of the commercial cities, protested against the war in public addresses. But a majority

of the people of the United States was undoubtedly in favour of the measure. In some places the act declaring it was received with illuminations and rejoicings, and the cities of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, passed resolutions approving of the conduct of government, and pledging themselves to support it.

The popular voice was so strongly in favour of war, in the city of Baltimore, that an editor who had ventured to indulge in some severe strictures on the conduct of the government, had his press and printing-office destroyed by the populace; and when he persisted in publishing the paper, printing it in a neighbouring town, he and a party of his friends, who had volunteered in forcibly defending his house, were very severely handled. Several lives were lost in this affair, and among the rest that of General Lingan, a veteran officer, who had served with dstinction in the revolution.

The distress occasioned among the people of New England by the suspension of their commerce and the cutting off of their usual supply of provisions from the south, served still further to heighten the exasperation felt in that portion of the country. A large proportion of the commercial interest in other parts of the Union participated in this feeling, so that, although a numerical majority of the people of the United States was in favour of the measure, it by no means united the various classes of society so strongly in support of the government as the attack on their liberties had done at the opening of the revolutionary contest. Whatever disagreement there might be, however, among the political parties of that period, time has afforded ample evidence that the war was not declared too soon for the national honour or welfare.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

WHEN the war of independence commenced, the United States contained less than four millions of inhabitants, and had neither an army, a treasury, nor a national existence. But it possessed a people united in purpose, and firmly resolved to vindicate their rights. At the opening of the war

MILITARY FORCE OF THE COUNTRY.

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of 1812, the country had eight millions of inhabitants, great resources of wealth, and all the elements of an efficient army and navy. But the people were divided in sentiment, indisposed for war by a long continuance of peace, and unfit for its successful prosecution by inexperience and irresolution. Their early movements in the new contest were marked by a character of indecision corresponding with this want of preparation. It was not till near the close of the conflict that the national spirit was fully roused; and the results at that period were such as to show that when fairly and heartily embarked in a contest, the people possess the same spirit and the same moral power which carried them so nobly through the struggle for independence,

In organising the army, Henry Dearborn, of Massachusetts, was appointed major-general and commander-in-chief. He had served in the revolutionary contest, and had subsequently borne the office of secretary of war. Thomas Pinckney, of South Carolina, also received a commission as major-general, and Wilkinson, Hampton, Bloomfield, and Hull were among the brigadier-generals.

The army, which until the year 1808 had numbered no more than 3,000 men, had then been augmented to 6,000. In January, 1812, congress had directed a force of upwards of 25,000 to be raised, so that the entire force authorised by law now exceeded 35,000, including officers; and consisted of seventeen regiments of infantry, three of artillery, one of light artillery, two of dragoons, and one rifle regiment. In addition to this, the president was authorised to accept the services of any number of volunteers, not exceeding 50,000, who were to be armed and equipped by the United States; and a similar authority was given to him to call upon the governors of states for detachments of militia, the whole of which was not to exceed 100,000.

Though apparently formidable, this force wanted many of the requisites of an efficient army. The act authorising the raising of 25,000 men, had been passed so short a time before the declaration of war, that scarcely one-fourth of that number was enlisted; and these were by no means in a high state of discipline. The volunteers and militia were yet to be called for, as occasion might require, and their services were considered of very doubtful utility. Even in the revolutionary war, they had been pronounced by high authority, a most inefficient species of force, and the long peace had

certainly not increased their efficiency. The officers, however, who had the direction of the military force, had served with distinction, and high hopes were entertained of a successful campaign.

The whole navy of the United States consisted of but 10 frigates, five of which were laid up in ordinary, 10 sloops and smaller vessels, and 165 gun-boats, only 60 of which were in commission. With this trifling force, war was commenced with a power that numbered a thousand ships afloat, and boasted herself the mistress of the ocean. The commerce and fisheries of the United States, however, had given her the elements of a navy; and if the Americans had not many ships, subsequent events proved that they had men; and that the efficiency of a navy depends more upon its discipline and courage than upon the size and number of its vessels.

The plan of operations at the commencement of the war, was to garrison and defend the sea-board principally by occasional calls on the militia, aided by a few of the regular troops, the whole to be under the direction of the generals of the regular army, stationed at the most important points. The remaining regular troops, with such volunteers as could be procured and a portion of the militia, were to attack the British posts in Upper Canada and subdue them, with the ultimate design of invading and conquering Lower Canada.

With these views, William Hull, the governor of Michigan territory, having been appointed a brigadier-general, on the 25th of May took command of the army destined for the invasion of Canada. On the 1st of June, he rendezvoused at Urbanna, in Ohio. His force consisted of 500 regular troops, and 1,200 Ohio volunteers, under the command of Colonels M'Arthur and Cass. Proceeding in a north-westerly direction, the army marched through a wilderness to Detroit, the capital of Michigan territory, situated on the west bank of Detroit river.

On his arrival at this place, General Hull was joined by the Michigan militia; and expecting the co-operation of General Dearborn on the Niagara frontier, he made his descent on Canada on the 12th of July. He crossed the river and established his head quarters at Sandwich, a village on the opposite bank. Here he issued a proclamation, offering peace and protection to the Canadians who would remain at home, and threatening extermination to such as should be found in arms associated with the Indians. He further de