would form a total of 6,419,000l. applicable to the establishments of the country. It was, therefore, clear, that at the close of a war of the most expensive description, they were possessed of a disposable fund considerably larger than that which they had at its commencement. With this addition also, that they now had a sinking fund of 11,300,000l.; whereas, when the war broke out, the sinking fund amounted only to 1,300,000l. It was true, they now had a debt of 650,000,000l., and, at the time he before adverted to, it was only 230,000,000l. But, comparing the sinking fund with the debt, it would be evident that we had at least augmented our means of meeting it, in a fourfold proportion. He should also remind the House (if he did not, he was sure some other gentleman would,) that, in addition to this funded debt, there was also a large unfunded debt to provide for; and which must necessarily be added to the account. But, looking to the clear surplus of war taxes which was amply sufficient to discharge this latter debt in the course of a few years, or to provide for the charge of funding that debt by pledging a part of those taxes, he thought the property tax might be safely given up. If the expenses of the country were brought down, he would not say to what they were previous to the war, but if they were fixed at a considerably higher amount, the nation had means fully capable of meeting them. At the same time, referring to the great change of circumstances which had taken place, he was perfectly aware that very considerable exertions would be necessary to defray the different claims on the establishment.

To what sum the expense of our peace establishment would amount must depend on the determination of parlia ment, which determination he would not anticipate. All that he desired was, that gentlemen would consider the question deliberately, and with a reference to existing circum

stances, rather than to former arrangements. They must be aware of the necessity of a greater extension than at any former period of peace, of our military force. They would recollect, that we had to provide for the garrisons of Malta, Ceylon, the Cape, and Mauritius, besides the extension of our West Indian possessions. Some augmentation might also be expedient in Canada. For these, and other indispensable expenses of the same nature, provision must necessarily be made. The committee would also recollect, that after an actual service of near twenty years, our navy must be in a state to require very extensive repairs. Independent of the augmentation which might be required in our efficient establishments, an immense increase had taken place in those, which, however dear to the justice and liberality. of the nation, added nothing to its actual strength. The amount of the half-pay, widows' pensions, and other pensionary establishments of the army would extend to a sum little short of its total expense in 1792. He trusted, therefore, that they would not be surprised when he said, that on the best view which he could take of the subject, it appeared to him that our peace establishment for the first three or four years could not be less (including that for Ireland) than 18 or 19 millions. Supposing that it were 19 millions for the next year (and it would afford him the greatest pleasure could it in another year be reduced,) deducting 2 millions for Ireland (which was about the proportion,) there would be left 17 millions as a charge on Great Britain. To meet this sum, they had, as he before stated, nearly 6,500,000l. of permanent income arising from the annual taxes and consolidated fund. In addition to this, he would propose to continue, for a time to be limited, the war taxes of customs and excise; and he would also propose additional taxes to the extent of 5,000,000l. The total of these sums, viz.

pro

from the surplus of the consolidated fund and the usual annual taxes, 6,500,000l.-something more than 6,000,000l., by the war taxes—and 5,000,000l. of new taxes-would produce about 17,500,000l.-which would defray the charge of a peace establishment, according to his calculation. It was, however, to be considered, that the charges of the loan for the present year, and of the unfunded debt, must be likewise defrayed; so that if it were possible (which he conceived it was not) to reduce the peace establishment to 13 or 14 millions a year, still it would be necessary to impose these additional taxes. It would be found on a retrospective view of our history, that all long and expensive wars had entailed on the country a winding up of expense of great amount and duration. After the close of the American war the arrears were not paid until 1786: indeed a remainder of the expense beyond the ordinary peace establishment was still undefrayed in 1791, so gradually had it been vided for. After the war also which ended in 1763, the winding-up was very gradual, and did not terminate until 1768. Therefore he thought he spoke within compass, when he said that it would scarcely be practicable to settle completely the peace establishment in less than four years from the present time. Until the year 1819, therefore, it would be necessary to have recourse to funding exchequer bills, when favorable opportunities occurred, and occasionally to loans, which he however hoped would after the present year be of small amount, and to meet the charges which those would from time to time occasion, by the new taxes which he was about to propose. In this he had the example of Mr. Pitt, who, as early as 1784 proposed, by anticipa tion to form a fund to liquidate the floating debt then outstanding, although it was not converted into stock till the following year.

The first resource by which he proposed to meet this expenditure would be the continuance of the war taxes of customs and excise, which would have expired last Christmas, had they not then been renewed till July next. There were some that had actually expired at that time, such as those on the tonnage of ships, on the export of British manufactures, and on goods carried coastways. These he did not intend to renew, and if he did, their amount would not have been very considerable. Neither did he propose to continue the duty on the importation of cotton wool, if imported in British ships. This would be a protection to our navigation, and he would be happy if it should occasion a preference to be given to the cotton of our own plantations. He did not mean to state the nature and extent of the war taxes, individually; they were well known to every gentleman. Their gross produce on the 5th of January 1815, was 9,827,000%. from this deduct 2,706,000l. pledged for the charges and interest of loans, and 638,000l.the amount of the war taxes he had stated his determination not to continue, making 3,344,000l. the residue of the war taxes would then be 6,513,000l. which, for the sake of round numbers, and to avoid any danger of disappointment, he would take at 6,000,000l. It now became his duty to state the new taxes which it was his intention to propose. He was anxious to gratify the curiosity which was so evidently, so strongly, and so naturally excited; and he should therefore not pursue the usual order, which was to give to a statement of the customs and excise duties the precedence of a statement of the assessed taxes, but would commence with the latter. He should begin with observing that it was not his intention to propose any additional window duty on inhabited houses, as, in his opinion, there already existed a sufficient pressure on the community in that respect. But although he did not

mean to propose any additional duty on the windows of inhabited houses, he meant to propose a tax which had often been talked of, but never introduced-a tax on green-houses, hot-houses, and conservatories, operating on the superficial contents of their glass. He would propose that 48 square feet of glass (including the frames) should be considered as a window, and that the windows should not be charged at a progressive rate, but that each window so calculated, should pay 3s. 6d. For instance, if a green-house were 60 feet in front, and 12 feet high, it would measure into what would be termed 15 windows, and would consequently pay a duty of 31. 7s. 6d. This was a proposition which he trusted no one could deem objectionable. Considering how much the trading part of the community would be relieved by the abandonment of the property tax, he meant also to propose that shops and warehouses and manufactories (hitherto exempted from the window tax) should pay in the same way -not a progressive rate, but 3s. 6d. on each window which they might contain. As these taxes were new, it was not practicable to estimate their probable produce very accurately. He would take them, however, at about 50,000l. a year. The next head was one of the assessed taxes-that on inhabited houses; on which he should propose an augmentation of about 30 per cent. on the existing tax. He said this generally, meaning in the detail to recommend a larger rate on higher rents than on lower. It was also his intention to propose, that the rents of warehouses and manufactories (which had hitherto been exempt from duty) should be subject to the same duty as the rents of houses. The increase of the assessment on inhabited houses he conjectured might produce about 396,500l.; the new utỷ on warehouses about 150,000l.-The next class of the assessed taxes on which he should touch, was the duty on NO. XI. VOL. VI.

Pam.

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