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of the Opposition.' In other words, the Liberal League supports Imperialism in the abstract, but declines to support it in the concrete. Such an attitude undoubtedly avoids the necessity of taking any action which might commit the League definitely to the cause even of sane Imperialism. Nothing can be more comprehensive than Lord Rosebery's statement of the terms on which outsiders can obtain admission to the League. You' (the Liberal Leaguers) want everybody that you can rally to your standard-Liberal Leaguers or official Liberals, or the various other leagues that exist, and besides those let me say that you require, when you can secure them on anything like fair terms, all the support of those Tories who have fought for Free Trade under circumstances so difficult and dangerous to themselves.' We know what the standard is under which Liberals of all sorts are invited to enlist; we need no telling that the object of the campaign is to turn out the Government and to place the Liberals in office. But as for what ends and for what purposes their tenure of office is to be employed is a matter concerning which we are left in utter ignorance. We are furnished instead, by Lord Rosebery, with a series of prolix platitudes. We are assured that efficiency is to be the dominant feature of the coming Liberal Administration; that opportunism will not be excluded from consideration, and that 'Liberalism is no particular measure, but it is the frame and spirit of mind in which we approach great political questions. . . . Liberalism is the readiness to accept and to assimilate the best ideas of the time, and to apply them honestly in action.' As to this definition of Liberalism, I need only remark that it is a repetition of the stock phrases by which every Ministry, Whig or Tory, Liberal or Conservative, Unionist or antiUnionist, has heralded its accession to office. If the end and aim of the Liberal League is to furnish Lord Rosebery with an opportunity for uttering commonplace truisms in a graceful manner there is no more to be said, except that his Lordship has an unlimited flow of words, and that his followers have a still more unlimited store of patience. If, however, I am rightly informed, the real reason which justifies the existence of the Liberal League is the necessity of not allowing Lord Rosebery's claims to the next Liberal Premiership to drop out of sight. The League is, in fact, an agency for the advancement of Lord Rosebery's candidature in the event of the Premiership being thrown open to competition. Fortunately, perhaps, from a Conservative point of view, his Lordship has an invincible repugnance to putting himself forward as the leader of his party. He is eager to secure the apples of office, but he insists that the apples should fall into his mouth, and even declines to take any part in shaking the apple tree. This is the explanation of the revival of the Liberal League. The muster-roll has been called. Sir Edward Grey, Sir Henry Fowler, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Haldane, and some sixteen members of Parliament have responded to the call, and the Radical section of the Opposition

have been given to understand that if they want to see a Liberal administration in office they can only do so on condition that they are willing to accept Lord Rosebery as the future Premier. If we are to have a Liberal Ministry in office after the General Election I should prefer either Lord Rosebery or any of his squires to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. But at the best the choice between a Rosebery or a Campbell-Bannerman Ministry would only be a choice of evils. For my own part I distrust the good faith or the sagacity of a statesman who, while he acknowledges that the support of the Irish Nationalists is essential to the maintenance of the Liberal party in office, seriously informs his personal supporters that the policy of a Liberal administration with respect to Home Rule will not be affected by the necessity of conciliating the Home Rule vote. Hitherto, whenever any criticism has been made as to the qualifications of the various politicians who are destined in their own opinion, and in that of their followers, to occupy prominent positions in the Ministry which is to replace the Unionist Government, the critics were met with one stock rejoinder. If we doubted the special fitness of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to become once more Secretary of State for War; if we were not confident as to Mr. Asquith being competent to discharge the duties of the leader of the House of Commons; if we ventured to suggest that Mr. Lloyd George might cut a sorry figure as a Cabinet Minister, or if we raised some other equally frivolous objection, we were told that at all events Lord Rosebery was pointed out by the consensus of public opinion as the ideal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Even this consolation is no longer forthcoming. The ex-Premier went out of his way, while expatiating to the Liberal League upon the imminence of a great Liberal reaction, to denounce the Anglo-French compact by saying that no more one-sided agreement was ever concluded between two Powers at peace with each other.' In order to leave no doubt in the minds of the Liberal Leaguers as to which side had had the worst of the bargain, his Lordship proceeded to drive home his assertions by remarking: 'I hope and trust, but I hope and trust rather than I believe, that the Power which holds Gibraltar may never have cause to regret having handed Morocco over to a great military Power.' Now, if words have any meaning, these words mean that France purports to employ the free hand we have accorded to her in dealing with Morocco to deprive us of our naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. Even if this insinuation were based upon any serious foundation there was no possible good to be gained by throwing doubt on the good faith of France, and the very last man in the whole of the United Kingdom who could have been justified in making such an aspersion is the predecessor of Mr. Balfour in the Premiership and of Lord Lansdowne at the Foreign Office. Both as Prime Minister and as Foreign Secretary Lord Rosebery must have had ample opportunities of observing how seriously England was hampered in consolidating

her authority in Egypt by the constant hostility of France. Yet, knowing what he does, he has deliberately striven in his address to the Liberal League to depreciate the advantages England derives from having France with her, instead of against her, in her administration of Egyptian affairs. Since his retirement from office his Lordship has lost no opportunity of dilating on the arduousness of his labours in Downing Street. Possibly, if he had worked fewer hours and indited fewer despatches, he might have acquired a better knowledge of foreign affairs than he now seems to possess. The only explanation of the extraordinary indiscretion thus committed by Lord Rosebery is that he was led astray by his desire to disparage an agreement which he is shrewd enough to see has done much to influence popular opinion in favour of the Government under whose control a cordial understanding has been established between France and England. So long, however, as he could at last convey the impression how much better a bargain he could have made for this country, supposing he had been in command at Downing Street, he was apparently indifferent to minor considerations. Such at least is the best excuse I can suggest for a speech that never ought to have been spoken, and above all not by the speaker who gave it utterance.

Somehow or other neither the resuscitation of Cobden nor the reappearance of Lord Rosebery as a candidate for the Premiership seems to have got matters much forwarder in our home politics. The Opposition appears for the time to have lost heart, while the Ministry are sanguine as to their retention of power till after the close of the Session, and of their being able before Parliament is prorogued to show a satisfactory record of legislation. Personally I attribute the lull of public interest in political controversies to the fact that the fortunes of the war now waging in the Far East monopolise popular attention. The more protracted the war seems likely to become the more men's thoughts are turned to the effect the campaign, whichever way it may end, must necessarily produce on the fortunes of all non-belligerent States, and especially of the British Empire.

The war in the Far East seems to me likely, in the near future, to bring about indirect results of far graver importance than its direct effects on the fortunes of the two belligerents. Even if Russia, as now seems daily less probable, should come out victorious from the conflict the world will be confronted with the hard fact that an Oriental nation, with a code of religion and morality utterly different from, if not antagonistic to, our European ideas, has attained a standard of patriotic altruism far exceeding any ideal attained before or even conceived as possible in this old world of ours.

EDWARD DICEY.

The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake
to return unaccepted MSS.

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AMONG other questions raised by an article from the pen of Sir John Macdonell, in this Review for July, on The Present War,' there is one on which I should like to offer some observations from a Japanese point of view.

Sir John Macdonell appears to think that our attack came to Russia as a surprise, and was therefore unjustifiable; and whilst he makes reservations on account of his lack of accurate information concerning the actual state of affairs at the commencement of the war, he proceeds to argue that it was a nice point whether the negotiations had or had not, on the 8th or 9th of February last, reached a stage at which discussion had really been abandoned, and both sides had resolved to accept the arbitrament of battle. Sir John seems to consider that notice should be given to an adversary, before beginning a war, that hostilities have become inevitable.

I will not say anything about the fact that the first shot was fired by the Russians on the Japanese vessels at Schimulpo; nor is it my

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intention to enter upon any justification of Japan's course of action on the common theory of international law, or on the basis of the prevailing practice in such cases, or it could be shown that a formal declaration is not needed to constitute a state of war. On the contrary, I rather appreciate Sir John's contention that no blows should be struck without adequate warning, or while diplomatists are still debating the matters in dispute. And it is my desire to prove that Japan, far from taking her enemy unawares, did actually do precisely as Sir John Macdonell is anxious to show she ought to have done, and that, in the sense of his comment on the operations, there was no room for the Russians to be surprised in any degree whatever.

I will first endeavour to demonstrate the truth of this proposition by recalling the successive stages of those negotiations which culminated in hostilities; but it is unnecessary to dwell upon the earlier part of the diplomatic correspondence, nor is it worth while to enlarge either on the flagrant neglect of Russia to fulfil her own pledges, or on the persistency with which she sought to (the expression may be pardoned, since there is no other term that applies equally well) make a fool of Japan throughout the protracted negotiations. It may suffice to point out that, from the very nature of those negotiations, any failure to arrive at a satisfactory understanding was tantamount to an admission that war was inevitable.

The most acute phase was reached in November 1903, as was plainly indicated in the telegram despatched on the 21st of that month to Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, by Baron Komura, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of Tokio, in which the following passage occurs:

Baron Rosen added that he had not yet received any instructions on the subject of the counter-proposals, consequently you are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible, and after explaining to him Baron Rosen's statements, as above, you will say that the Japanese Government are anxious to proceed with the negotiations with all possible expedition, and you will urge him to exert his influence to secure the early despatch of instructions to Baron Rosen, in order that negotiations may be resumed and concluded without delay.

This view was, of course, communicated to the Russian Foreign Minister, and after further futile endeavours on Japan's part to elicit an early reply, Baron Komura telegraphed to Mr. Kurino on the 1st of December 1903, again urging the importance of a speedy solution of the question at issue, in yet more plain-spoken fashion; and he wound up his despatch thus:

In these circumstances the Japanese Government cannot but regard with grave concern the situation, for which the delays in the negotiations are largely responsible. You are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible, and place the foregoing considerations before him in such form and manner as to make your representations as impressive as possible. You will add that the Japanese Government believe they are rendering a service to the general interest in thus frankly explaining to the Russian Government the actual state of things.

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