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CHAP. VII. and Woodhull, by him named Udell. He 1776. computes the loss of the Americans at three

thousand three hundred men, but this computation is probably excessive. He supposes too, that the troops engaged on the heights, amounted to ten thousand; but it is impossible they could have much exceeded half that number. The loss of the enemy is stated by general Howe at twenty-one officers, and three hundred and forty-six privates killed, wounded, and taken.

As the action became warm, general Washington passed over to the camp at Brooklyn, where he saw with inexpressible anguish the destruction in which his best troops were involved, and from which it was impossible to extricate them. Should he attempt any thing in their favour with the men remaining within the lines of Brooklyn, it was probable from the superiority of the enemy, that the camp itself would be lost, and that whole division of his army destroyed. Should he bring over the remaining battalions from New York, he would still have been unequal to the enemy, and his whole army with perhaps the fate of his country might be staked on the issue of a single battle, so inauspiciously commenced. He was therefore compelled to behold the carnage of his troops, without being able to assist them, and to direct all his efforts to the preservation of those which remained.

The enemy believing the Americans to be CHAP. VIL much stronger than they were in reality, and 1776. seeming unwilling to commit any thing to hazard, fortunately made no immediate attempt to force the lines. They encamped in front of them, and on the twenty-eighth at night, broke July 28. ground in form, within six hundred yards of a redoubt on the left.

The situation of the army on Long island had now become extremely critical. In front, was a victorious enemy, from whom much was to be apprehended in case of assault, but whose numbers and formidable train of artillery rendered the destruction of their works, by regular approaches, inevitable. The movements of the fleet too, indicated an intention to make some attempt on New York, and, so soon as the wind should be favourable, to force a passage into the East river. Should they succeed in this attempt, and attack him by water, while the army might assault him by land, they would render his retreat extremely difficult, if not absolutely impracticable. The troops too being obliged to lie in the lines without shelter from the heavy rains which fell, were excessively fatigued and dispirited. Under these circumstances, it was determined to withdraw from Long island, and this difficult movement was effected on the night of the twenty-eighth, with such silence and dispatch, that all the troops and military stores, with the greater part of the

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CHAP. VII. provisions, and all the artillery, except such heavy pieces as, in the deep roads made by the excessive heavy rains which had fallen, could not possibly be drawn, were carried over in safety. Early the next morning, the enemy perceived the rear guard crossing the East river, out of reach of their fire. From the commencement of the action on the morning of the twenty-seventh, until the troops had crossed the East river on the morning of the twentyninth, and were freed from the immediate perils to which their situation had exposed them; the exertions and fatigues of the commander in chief, who personally inspected almost every thing, were incessant. Throughout that time he never closed his eyes, and was almost constantly on horseback.

The attempt to defend Long island was so disastrous in its issue, and believed to have been so perilous in itself, that persons were not wanting who condemned it; and it is yet represented as a great error in the commander in chief. But in deciding on the wisdom of measures, the event will not always lead to a - correct judgment. Before a just opinion can be formed, it is necessary to consider the previous state of things; to weigh the motives which led to the decision, and to compare value of the object and the probability of securing it, with the hazards attending the attempt.

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The importance of the town of New York, CHAP. VII. and of Long island, to either party, has been 1776. already stated, and was, throughout the war, very clearly demonstrated. It was extremely desirable to maintain the possession of them if practicable, or if that could not be done, to consume the campaign in the struggle for them. The abandonment of Long island, besides giving the enemy secure and immediate possession of an extensive and fertile country, would certainly very much facilitate the success of their attempt upon New York. It was therefore to be avoided, if possible.

The impossibility of avoiding it was not evident, until the battle had been fought. It was true that the American force on the island could not be rendered equal, even in point of numbers, to the enemy; but with the advantage of the defensible country, through which it was necessary to pass, and of a fortified camp which could only be attacked on one side, considerable hopes might be entertained, without being over sanguine, of at least maintaining the position for a considerable time; and of selling it, ultimately, at a high price. That such an opinion was not ill founded seems to be evidenced by the cautious movement of general Howe, who, even after the victory of the 27th, was not disposed to attack it without the co-operation of the fleet, but chose rather to carry it by regular approaches. Nor would

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CHAP. VII. the situation of the troops on Long island have 1776. been desperate, even in the event of a conjoint

attack both by land and water, before their strength and spirits were broken by the action of the twenty-seventh. The East river was guarded by very strong batteries on both sides, and the entrance into it, from the bay, was defended by Governor's island which was fortified, and in which two regiments were placed. The ships could not lie in that river, without first silencing those batteries, which would have been found extremely difficult, and therefore their aid could only be given, when a storm of the works should be intended; and when that should appear practicable, the troops might be withdrawn from the island.

There was then, certainly, in the plan of maintaining Long island, considerable hazard; but not so much as to demonstrate the propriety of relinquishing a post of so much importance, without a struggle to preserve it.

With much more appearance of reason, the general has been condemned for not having guarded the road which leads over the hills from Jamaica to Bedford. An attention to this object was more particularly the duty of the officer commanding at the post, whose general written instructions, given two days previous to the action, had directed that the woods should be well guarded, and the approach of the enemy through them rendered as difficult

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