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A Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences: Including the Vocabulary of ...
Charles Porterfield Krauth
Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2017
absolute abstract according acroamatic action affirmative animal applied Aristotle Atheism body called cause chap Cicero cognition common conception consciousness denote Descartes determined died distinct distinguished divine doctrine elements Essay on Hum essence Ethics existence external faculty feeling Fichte G. C. Lewis genus Hamilton Hegel Hence Hist human idea individual infinite Intell intellectual intuition J. G. Fichte J. S. Mill judgment Kant knowledge Laws of Thought Lect Leibnitz Logic matter means mental Metaphys Metaphysics mind mode moral nature necessity notion object Ontology operation opposed organ Pantheism perception phenomena Phil Philos philosophy Plato predicate principle priori proposition Psychology pure qualities rational reason Reid relation says sect sensation sense signifies soul species spirit Steudel substance syllogism term theory things thinking thought tion truth Ulrici understanding unity universal virtue Werke Whately word
Seite 903 - The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
Seite 17 - If I beheld the sun when it shined, Or the moon walking in brightness ; And my heart hath been secretly enticed, Or my mouth hath kissed my hand : This also were an iniquity to be punished by the judge : For I should have denied the God that is above.
Seite 235 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.
Seite 284 - ... as if there were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention; or a shop for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate.
Seite 558 - Sometimes it lieth in PAT ALLUSION to a known, story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale : sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound...
Seite 320 - A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
Seite 435 - These two, I say, viz., external material things as the objects of sensation, and the operations of our own minds within as the objects of reflection, are, to me, the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings.
Seite 559 - ... expression ; sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude; sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, in cunningly diverting or cleverly retorting an objection : sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of contradictions, or in acute nonsense: sometimes a scenical representation of persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a mimical...
Seite 12 - Is it true of the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones ? It is true also of a triangle, wherever it really exists.
Seite 81 - The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest.