thorized boundaries of Acadia National Park. Such property would be acquired in exchange for approximately 5 acres of federally owned land within the park adjacent to the Jackson Memorial Laboratory at Bar Harbor, Maine.

We recommend the enactment of this proposed legislation.

This proposed exchange would be of mutual benefit to the Federal Government, in the administration of Acadia National Park, and to the Jackson Memorial Laboratory, in connection with its work on cancer research. The value of the land to be acquired by the Federal Government is greater than the land that would be conveyed in exchange for such property. We are advised, also, that the officials of the town of Bar Harbor, Maine, are agreeable to the exchange. Any additional expense to the Federal Government in effectuating the exchange and as a result thereof would be nominal.

The enactment of H. R. 4026 is unanimously recommended by the Committee on Public Lands.

O

The proposed code is presented in 14 sections and is further subdivided into 11 parts. Part 1 contains general provisions. Part 2 contains all of the provisions relating to apprehension and restraint. Part 3 pertains to nonjudicial punishment. Part 4 sets forth the jurisdiction of courts martial. Part 5 prescribes the manner of appointment and composition of courts martial. Part 6 prescribes pretrial procedure. Part 7 prescribes trial procedure. Part 8 relates to sentences by courts martial. Part 9 prescribes the provisions for appellate review. Part 10 sets forth and defines the punitive articles. Part 11 contains miscellaneous provisions. Section 1 of the bill contains 140 articles. These articles embrace all of the provisions of the proposed Uniform Code of Military Justice. The 13 remaining sections relate to the subject of military justice but are not germane to a Uniform Code of Military Justice and are, therefore, excluded from section 1 of the bill.

The proposed code is uniformly applicable in all of its parts to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard in time of war and peace. It covers both the substantive and the procedural law governing military justice and its administration in all of the armed forces of the United States. If adopted, it will supersede the Articles of War, the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard and will be the sole statutory authority for:

(1) The infliction of limited disciplinary penalties for minor offenses without judicial action;

(2) The establishment of pretrial and trial procedure;

(3) The creation and constitution of three classes of courts martial corresponding to those now in existence;

(4) The eligibility of members of each of the courts and the qualifications of its officers and counsel;

(5) The review of findings and sentence and the creation and constitution of the reviewing tribunals; and

(6) The listing and definition of offenses, redrafted and rephrased in modern legislative language.

The code, while based on the Revised Articles of War and the Articles for the Government of the Navy, is a consolidation and a complete recodification of the present statutes. Under it, personnel of the armed forces, regardless of the Department in which they serve, will be subject to the same law and will be tried in accordance with the same procedures. The provisions of section 1 of the bill will provide, for the first time in the history of this Nation, a single law for the administration of military justice in the armed forces. Among the provisions designed to secure uniformity are the following:

(1) The offenses made punishable by the code are identical for all the armed forces;

(2) The same system of courts with the same limits of jurisdiction of each court is set up in all the armed forces;

(3) The procedure for general courts martial is identical as to institution of charges, pretrial investigation, action by the convening authority, review by the Board of Review, and review by the Court of Military Appeals in all the armed forces;

(4) The rules of procedure at the trial including modes of proof are equally applicable to all the armed forces;

(5) The Judge Advocates General of the three Departments are required to make uniform rules of procedure for the Boards of Review in each Department;

(6) The required qualifications for members of the court, law officer, and counsel are identical for all of the armed forces;

(7) The Court of Military Appeals, which finally decides questions of law, is the court of last resort for each of the armed forces and also acts with the Judge Advocates General of the three Departments as an advisory body with a view to securing uniformity in policy and in sentences and in discovering and remedying defects in the system and its administration. Among the provisions designed to insure a fair trial are the following: General courts martial

(1) A pretrial investigation is provided, at which the accused is entitled to be present with counsel to cross-examine available witnesses against him and to present evidence in his own behalf.

(2) A prohibition against referring any charge for trial which does not state an offense or is not shown to be supported by sufficient evidence.

(3) A mandatory provision for a competent, legally trained counsel at the trial for both the prosecution and the defense.

(4) A prohibition against compelling self-incrimination.

(5) Provision for equal process to accused and prosecution for obtaining witnesses and depositions and a provision allowing only the accused to use depositions in a capital case.

(6) A provision giving an accused enlisted man the privilege of having enlisted men as members of the court trying his case.

(7) A provision whereby voting on challenges, findings, and sentences is by secret ballot of the members of the court.

(8) A provision requiring the law officer to instruct the court on the record concerning the elements of the offense, presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof.

(9) A provision for an automatic review of the trial record for errors of law and of fact by a board of review with the right of the accused to be represented by legally competent counsel.

(10) A prohibition against receiving pleas of guilty in capital cases. (11) A provision for the review of the record for errors of law by the Court of Military Appeals. This review is automatic in cases where the sentence is death or involves a general or flag rank officer. A review may be requested by petition on the part of the accused in any sentence involving confinement of 1 year or more.

Special and summary courts martial

Under present law and procedure there is great variation in the nomenclature, composition, procedure, and powers of the intermediate military courts. This bill completely eradicates all of those differences and establishes complete uniformity.

The foregoing constitutes a general summary of the provisions of this bill. However, there are a few provisions which gave the committee much concern and to which the witnesses devoted a majority of their testimony, an explanation of those provisions being as follows: Article 2, subdivision (2), of the bill, as introduced, apparently conferred very wide jurisdiction over Reserve personnel. Technically speaking, Reserve personnel in uniform or even when taking a

correspondence course would have been subject to the jurisdiction of this code. While we do not feel that the armed forces desired such wide latitude, we were unanimous in the decision that the jurisdiction should be limited by statute and not left to regulations. Therefore, we substituted an entirely new subdivision which we feel is entirely proper. You will note that Reserve personnel do not become subject to this code when on inactive duty training unless such training is pursuant to written orders which are voluntarily accepted and which specifically state that the acceptance of such orders will subject that particular Reserve to the provisions of this code.

The original provisions of article 3 (a) provided for a continuing jurisdiction by the military over persons who had returned to an inactive-duty status but had committed an offense against military law while on an active-duty status. The Reserve components voiced strenuous objection to such proposals and it is admitted that those proposals went much further than existing law. As a matter of fact, the military authorities have been most reluctant to prosecute the average offender who succeeds in returning to a civilian status before the discovery of his crime. On the other hand, the military authorities have found themselves confronted with a lack of jurisdiction to try certain aggravated cases of this character. You will recall the Durant jewel case. That case involved the theft of the crown jewels. of Hesse. At the time Mrs. Durant, one of the accused, was apprehended, she was in a terminal-leave status. The point was raised by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that the Army had ceased to have jurisdiction over the accused since her active service was terminated and she was only completing the unexpired portion of her terminal leave. A writ of habeas corpus was granted in district court but ultimately reversed on the theory that the terminal-leave status is a service status and subjects one to the Articles of War. If charges and specifications had not been served on the accused until after the expiration of her terminal leave, neither the military nor our Federal courts would have had any jurisdiction over the case. You will also recall the more recent Hershberg case. Hershberg was a Navy enlisted man who allegedly abused other American military personnel who were under his supervision while they were all prisoners of war of the Japanese. Hershberg's term of enlistment expired and after 1 day he reenlisted. The Navy then attempted to prosecute him for the alleged abuse of American persons. A writ of habeas corpus was granted in that case, not because it would be unconstitutional to provide for a continuing jurisdiction in such cases, but because the present Navy statute confers no such continuing jurisdiction.

We felt that there was a solution to this problem and our proposed solution is offered in article 3 (a) which is a committee amendment to H. R. 2498. It provides for a continuing jurisdiction provided the offense against this code is punishable by confinement of 5 years or more and provided further that the offense is not triable in a State or Federal court of the United States. We feel that this will provide ample protection against any capricious action on the part of military authorities, will limit military jurisdiction to serious offenses that could not otherwise be tried by military or Federal courts and will likewise correct the absurd situation of permitting an honorable discharge to operate as a bar to a prosecution for murder or other serious offenses.

Article 15 replaces the present provisions of the Navy for Navy and Coast Guard mast punishment and the present provisions of the Army and Air Force for disciplinary punishment by commanding officers. We were of the opinion that a 50-percent pay forfeiture for 3 months was an excessive penalty for disciplinary infractions by officers. Therefore, we reduced the maximum forfeiture from 3 months to 1 month. We likewise disagreed with the original provisions of this article which permitted a forfeiture of one-half of an enlisted person's pay for 1 month. Enlisted persons are in a far different pay status than officers, and we do not feel that a pay forfeiture is appropriate as punishment for disciplinary infractions by enlisted persons.

This article also provided for confinement for not to exceed seven. consecutive days and confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for a period not to exceed five consecutive days. The Army and the Air Force have never used confinement, with or without bread and water, as a disciplinary punishment. On the contrary, it is a provision of long standing in the Navy and Coast Guard. We are of the opinion that this type of disciplinary punishment should not be used ashore. However, we recognize that disciplinary matters aboard ship present an entirely different problem. Accordingly, we have authorized confinement for 7 days or confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for not to exceed 5 days when imposed upon a person attached to or embarked in a vessel. In view of the fact that Army and Air Force personnel are stationed throughout the world and must necessarily spend a portion of their time aboard ship in reaching or returning from such stations, it is intended that the present provisions for confinement on bread and water shall not be restricted to Navy enlisted personnel but shall be equally applicable to all other enlisted personnel of the armed forces when attached to or embarked in a vessel. As a result of our amendments we have achieved uniformity in the types of disciplinary punishments which may be adjudged.

Article 26 provides the authority for a law officer of a general courtmartial. Under existing law the Navy has no law officer. The Army and Air Force do have a law officer for general courts martial who, in addition to ruling upon points of evidence, retires, deliberates, and votes with the court on the findings and sentence. Officers of equal experience on this subject are sharply divided in their opinion as to whether or not the law officer should retire with the court and vote as a member. In view of the fact that the law officer is empowered to make final rulings on all interlocutory questions of law, except on a motion to dismiss and a motion relating to the accused's sanity, and in view of the fact that the law officer will now instruct the court upon the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and elements of the offense, we feel that he should not retire with the court with the voting privileges of a member of the court. Article 26, in our opinion, contains the appropriate provisions on this matter.

Article 67 contains the most revolutionary changes which have ever been incorporated in our military law. Under existing law all appellate review is conducted solely within the military departments. This has resulted in widespread criticism by the general public, who, with or without cause, look with suspicion upon all things military and particularly on matters involving military justice. Every Member of