negotiation commenced. The formation of a treaty on the footing desired by the United States, it soon, however appeared, was as distant as ever.

It is not intended here to review the progress of the affair; it is deemed sufficient to give the account rendered by the envoys, in a letter to Secretary Marshall, of Oct. 4th.

"The claim of indemnities brought forward by them, was, early in the negotiation, connected by the French ministers with that of a restoration of the treaties, for the infractions of which the indemnities were principally claimed. To obviate this embarrassment, which it had not been difficult to foresee, the American ministers urged, in the spirit of their instructions, that those treaties having been violated by one party and renounced by the other, a priority had attached in favour of the treaty with Great Britain, who had thereby acquired an exclusive right for the introduction of prizes; wherefore that right could not be restored to France. The argument was pressed, both by notes and in conferences, as long as there remained a hope of its utility, and until there appeared no alternative but to abandon indemnities, or, as a means of saving them, to renew, at least partially, the treaty of commerce. Whether, in fact, it could or could not be renewed consistently with good faith, then became a question for thorough investigation."

The reasoning upon which they arrived at the conclusions they did, to wit, that the treaties could be renewed, it is not necessary to mention, as the matter fell through. These considerations, such as they were, "induced them to be unanimously of opinion that any part of the former treaties might be renewed consistently with good faith."

"They then offered a renewal, with limitations of the seventeenth article of the commercial treaty, which, without compromiting the interests of the United States, would have given to France what her ministers had particularly insisted on as essential to her honour, and what they had given reason to expect would be deemed satisfactory. The overture, however, finally produced no other effect than to enlarge the demand of the French ministers, from a partial to a total renewal of the treaties; which brought the negotiation a second time to a stand. The American ministers, however, after a deliberation of some days, the progress of events in Europe continuing in the meantime to grow more unfavourable to their success, made an ulterior advance, going the whole length of what had last been insisted on. They offered an unlimited recognition of the former treaties, though accompanied with a provision to extinguish such privileges claimed under them, as were detrimental to the United States, by a pecuniary

equivalent, to be made out of the indemnities which should be awarded to American citizens, a compensation which, though it might have cancelled but a small portion of the indemnities, was nevertheless a liberal one for privileges which the French ministers had often admitted to be of little use to France, under the construction which the American government had given to the treaties.

This offer, though it covered the avowed objects of the French government, secured an engagement to pay indemnities, as well as the power to extinguish the obnoxious parts of the treaties. To avoid any engagement of this kind, the French ministers now made an entire departure from the principles upon which the negotiation had proceeded for some time, and resumed the simple unqualified ground of their overtures of the 23d Thermidor; declaring that it was indispensable to the granting of indemnities, not only that the treaties should have an unqualified recognition, but that their future operation should not be varied in any particular, for any consideration or compensation whatever. In short, they thought proper to add, what was quite unnecessary, that their real object was to avoid indemnities, and that it was not in the power of France to pay them.

No time was requisite for the American ministers to intimate that it had become useless to pursue the negotiation any farther.

It accorded as little with their views as with their instructions, to subject their country perpetually to the mischievous effects of these treaties, in order to obtain a promise of indemnity at a remote period; a promise which might as easily prove delusive as it would reluctantly be made; especially, as under the guaranty of the treaty of alliance, the United States might be immediately called upon for succours, which if not furnished, would of itself be a sufficient pretext to render abortive the hope of indemnity.

It only remained for the undersigned to quit France, leaving the United States involved in a contest, and according to appearances, soon alone in a contest, which it might be as difficult for them to relinquish with honour, as to pursue with a prospect of advantage; or else to propose a temporary settlement, reserving for a definite adjustment, points which could not then be satisfactorily settled, and providing, in the meantime, against a state of things of which neither party could profit. They elected the latter, and the result has been the signature of a convention."

Its provisions were thus defended:

"Of property not yet definitely condemned, which the fourth article respects, there are more than forty ships and cargoes, and a number of them of great value, at present pending for decision before the council of prizes, and many others are doubtless in a condition to be brought there, if the claimants shall think fit.

a 11th August. "Either the ancient treaties, carrying with them the privileges resulting from anteriority, together

with stipulations for reciprocal indemnity; or a new treaty, promising equality, unattended with indemnities."

Guards against future abuses, are perhaps as well provided for as they can be by stipulations.

The article respecting convoys may be of use in the West Indies, till it shall be more in the power of the French government than it is at present, to reduce the corsairs in that quarter to obedience.

As to the article which places French privateers and prizes on the footing of those of the most favoured nations, it was inserted as drawn by the French ministers, without any discussion of the extent of its operation; the American ministers having, in former stages of the negotiation, repeatedly and uniformly declared, agreeably to the rule of construction settled by the law of nations, that no stipulation of that kind could have effect as against the British treaty, unless the stipulations were derived from the former treaties, which it is here expressly agreed shall have no operation whatever. This article, however, is less consequential, as it will soon be in the power of the United States; and doubtless, also within their wisdom, to refuse to the privateers and prizes of any nation, an asylum beyond what the rights of humanity require."

The envoys concluded:

"If with the simple plea of right, unaccompanied with the menaces of power, and unaided by events either in Europe or America, less is at present obtained than justice requires, or than the policy of France should have granted, the undersigned trust that the sincerity and patience of their efforts to obtain all that their country had a right to demand, will not be drawn in question."

The convention, though it contracted peace, and provided for a revival of commerce, secured few of the specific objects which had been the motive of the embassy. With regard to indemnities for the spoliations, and the questions growing out of the former treaties, it was merely agreed that the parties "would negotiate farther at a convenient time," and that until they had adjusted these points, the treaties should have no operation, and the relations of the two countries should be regulated according to forms prescribed in the new convention. The debts due by the government of France to citizens of the United States, were covenanted to be paid as if no misunderstanding had taken place between the two countries, but no provision was made for the time or mode of their set

a Art. II.

b Art. IX.

tlement. For the rest, it was agreed that public vessels, captured before the exchange of ratifications, should be restored, a provision to the advantage of France alone; private property not yet condemned, was also to be given up. Commerce between the two countries was placed on the footing of the most favored; contraband articles were limited and specified, and it was provided that the vessel, and not the rest of the cargo, should be affected by their presence. Free ships were, in other cases, to make free goods, though the property of an enemy; and goods laden on board enemy's ships, after the knowledge of the war, were to be confiscated without distinction. Merchant vessels, in time of war, were to be furnished with passports and certificates; but the want of a passport should not occasion condemnation, if other proofs existed. Ships examined under the right of search, were to be visited in boats, the armed vessel remaining out of cannon shot; and merchant ships under convoy, were not to be visited, but the verbal declaration of the commander of the convoy was to be deemed satisfactory. Prizes were to be condemned in the established courts alone. Armed vessels and their prizes were not to pay duty or be examined on entering ports; and privateers of a third power, at war with one of the parties, were not to be allowed to fit in the ports of the other.

Such were the principal provisions of the treaty as regarded commerce.

It will be seen that no advantages whatever were gained by the United States, beyond mere peace and the liberty of trading with security; or rather, beyond the promise of these things. And so far as maritime security was concerned, the utter annihilation of the French marine, and the arming of our vessels had provided that. With respect to peace, the commerce of almost the only con

These were only provided for in 1800, when the Louisiana cession was

made, and then by their assumption by the United States.

siderable neutral in the world was much more important to France than hers to the United States, which could find markets elsewhere. Persistance in our former policy, could therefore have risked but little, and might have gained much.

The principles of this treaty, as well as of the one negotiated the year before, between the United States and Prussia, as regarded neutral rights, formed the basis of a confederacy, offensive and defensive, entered into between France and the northern powers in December of this year, which was in fact the revival of the armed neutrality of 1780; and was in pursuance of the steadfast design, never after relinquished by Napoleon, of crushing the maritime supremacy of Great Britain. But the navy of France was already destroyed. Hardly even a privateer now ventured from her harbors. The other powers, quickly and successively struck down, were forced to abandoned an agreement which had been planned by its originator only for the advantage of France, without the power on her part to support them in its maintenance; and which, though beneficial to them as neutrals, if generally admitted, they could not enforce even by war. Between France and the United States, the treaty, as one of neutral concessions, nominally remained good; but experience proved to our cost that it was destined, during Napoleon's administration, to as slight an observance as the one which it had replaced. The Berlin and Milan decrees were but the counterpart of those of the Executive Directory.

Mr. Adams' complacent self gratulations upon it will be hereafter given. One extract only, requires place here.

The French have not as yet, gained any great and unjust advantages of us by all their policy. Our Envoys were precisely instructed. Every article was prescribed, that was to be insisted on as an ultimatum. In a treaty, they could not depart from a punctillio. A convention they might make, as they did, at

a See Alison's History of French Revolution, IV. ch. XXXIII.