a few days after, of the arrête of which mention has already been made, as having been received with the despatches.

Subsequent messages of the 4th May, the 5th and 18th of June, transmitted to Congress the despatches afterwards received. Towards the close of January, after waiting in vain for an official reply to their previous communication, the envoys had addressed a letter to M. Talleyrand, in which the relations between the United States and the French republic were reviewed at large. This document, understood to be from the pen of Mr. Marshall, is a monument in the diplomacy of America. Its conclusion may properly be extracted.

"Perceiving no probability of being allowed to enter, in the usual forms, on those discussions which might tend to restore harmony between the two republics, they have deemed it most advisable, even under the circumstances of informality which attend the measure, to address to your government, through you, this candid review of the conduct, and this true representation of the sentiments and wishes of the government of the United States. They pray that it may be received in the temper with which it is written, and considered as an additional effort, growing out of a disposition common to the government and people of America, to cultivate and restore, if it be possible, harmony between the two republics. If, Citizen Minister, there remains a hope that these desirable objects can be effected by any means which the United States have authorized, the undersigned will still solicit, and will still respectfully attend the developement of those means.

If, on the contrary, no such hope remains, they have only to pray that their return to their own country may be facilitated; and they will leave France with the most deep felt regret, that neither the real and sincere friendship which the government of the United States has so uniformly and unequivocally displayed for this great republic; nor its continued efforts to demonstrate the purity of its conduct and intentions, can protect its citizens, or preserve them from the calamities which they have sought, by a just and upright conduct, to avert."

To this letter no answer was for some time returned. The envoys thereupon prepared another, remonstrating against the decree of January 18th, and which concluded with the observation "that under existing circumstances they could no longer resist the conviction, that the demands of France rendered it entirely impracticable to ef

fect the objects of their mission; and that, not being permanent ministers, but envoys extraordinary with full power for particular purposes, they deemed it improper to remain longer in France after the impossibility of effecting those purposes had been demonstrated." Before, however, they took this step, and explicitly demanded their passports, they made a last attempt to obtain a recognition. In two several interviews with M. Talleyrand they again, and as fruitlessly, urged the objects of their embassy. Money was still the only terms on which he would engage to commence negotiations-submission the only end of the proposed treaty.

These interviews took place in the beginning of March. At both conferences, the propositions received through M. Bellamy were distinctly mentioned; at the second, Talleyrand was told that his demands were substantially the same as those which had been made by that person and by M. Hottinguer. The intervention of those persons was therefore on every occasion in which the envoys had come in contact with the minister, brought home to him; a fact necessary to be observed, as he afterwards pretended ignorance of their communications. It was not until the 18th of March, that an answer could be obtained to their letter of January 31st, during which time they continued, to adopt Marshall's language in his history of these transactions, "with a passiveness which must search for its apology in their solicitude to demonstrate to the American people the real views of the French republic, to employ the only means in their power to avert the rupture which was threatened and which appeared to be inevitable. Meanwhile," he continues, "occasion was repeatedly taken to insult the American government; open war was continued to be waged by the cruisers of France on American commerce; and the flag of the United States

Vide letter of Envoys to Secretary of State of March 9th.

was a sufficient justification for the capture and condemnation of any vessel over which it waved." The reply of the French minister was so important in its consequences, and will be hereafter so often referred to, that a particular review of its contents is requisite.

Talleyrand commenced with the remark that the first thing which must excite attention in the memorial of the commissioners, was the method which they had thought proper to pursue in the exposition of the points which were in dispute between the two states. The Executive Directory, he said, animated with dispositions the most conciliatory, had reason to believe that the envoys would have brought, in the name of their government, a temper previously prepared with the same views and the same desires. Instead of this, "reversing the well known order of facts," they had in their memorial aimed to pass over the just complaints of France, and to disguise the true cause of the misunderstanding which was prolonged between the two nations. The priority of grievances, he insisted, had belonged to the French republic; the injuries which the envoys had exhibited, were the necessary consequence of measures which the previous conduct of the United States had justified on the part of France. The complaints of the latter as set forth in the note of M. Adet of November 15th, 1796, were briefly enumerated, with a distorted historical sketch of the manner in which they had been urged and received. The principal of them, was the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, which "filled the measure of the grievances of the republic." In this treaty, everything having been calculated to turn the neutrality of the United States to the disadvantage of France and to the advantage of England; the federal government having made to Great Britain concessions the most unheard of, and the most incom

a Life of Washington, V. 636.

patible with the interests of the United States, the French government was perfectly at liberty, in order to free itself from its inconveniences, to use the preservative means which the law of nature, the law of nations, and prior treaties furnished it. Such were the reasons which had produced the decrees of the Directory of which the United States complained, as well as the conduct of their agents in the West Indies. The subsequent conduct of the United States, it was said, had to these added fresh grievances; nor was the mission of the envoys calculated to remove them. The instructions under which they had acted had not been drawn up with the sincere intention of attaining pacific results, because, far from proceeding in their memorial upon some avowed principles or established facts, they had inverted and confounded both, so as to be enabled to impute to the republic all the misfortune of a rupture which they seemed willing to produce. It was "evident that the desire, plainly declared, of supporting at every hazard the treaty of London, which was the principal grievance of the republic," had dictated those instructions. The motive imputed to the United States for this course, was a design to prolong the misunderstanding with France, to throw the odium of it upon her, and finally "to seize the first favorable occasion to consummate an intimate union with a power, towards which a devotion and partiality was professed, which had long been the principle of the conduct of the federal government."

The intentions which Talleyrand thus attributed to the government of the United States, were, he said, so little. disguised, that nothing seemed to have been neglected at Philadelphia to manifest them to every eye. It was probably with that view, that it was thought proper to send to the French republic "persons whose opinions and connections were too well known to hope from them dispositions sincerely conciliatory;" a selection in painful

contrast with the course pursued towards the cabinet of St. James'. An eagerness, he asserted, was then felt to send there ministers well known for sentiments corresponding with the objects of their mission. The republic might have expected a like deference, and if it had not been observed, it was to be attributed to the views above mentioned. He continued:

"It is impossible to foresee whither such dispositions may lead. The undersigned does not hesitate to believe that the American nation, like the French nation, sees this state of things with regret, and does not consider its consequences without sorrow. He apprehends that the American people will not commit a mistake concerning the prejudices with which it has been desired to inspire them against an allied people, nor concerning the engagements which it seems to be wished to make them contract to the detriment of an alliance, which so powerfully contributed to place them in the rank of nations and to support them in it; and that they will see in these new combinations the only dangers their prosperity and importance can incur.

"Penetrated with the justice of these reflections, and their consequences, the Executive Directory has authorized the undersigned to express himself with all the frankness which becomes the French nation. It is indispensable that, in the NAME of the Directory, he should dissipate those illusions with which, for five years, the complaints of the ministers of the republic have been incessantly surrounded at Philadelphia, in order to weaken, calumniate, or distort them; it was essential, in fine, that, by exhibiting their sentiments in an unequivocal manner, he should clear up all the doubts and all the false interpretations of which they might be the object.

It is, therefore, only in order to smooth the way of discussions, that the undersigned has entered into the preceding explanations. It is with the same view that he declares to the Commissioners and Envoys Extraordinary, that notwithstanding the kind of prejudice which has been entertained, with respect to them, the Executive Directory IS DISPOSED TO TREAT WITH THAT ONE OF THE THREE, WHOSE OPINIONS, PRESUMED TO BE MORE IMPARTIAL, PROMISE, IN THE COURSE OF THE EXPLANATIONS, MORE OF THAT RECIPROCAL CONFIDENCE WHICH IS INDISPENSABLE."

Talleyrand concluded this extraordinary document. with the remark, that the envoys being empowered separately as well as jointly, "nothing but the desire of preventing any accommodation could present any objection against this measure," and requested to be soon informed of their determination. It is evident from the most cursory glance, that this paper was prepared to produce