What measures will be proper to take with Spain? What with Holland? What with Portugal? But above all, what will policy dictate to be said to England, and how shall it be said? by Mr. King or to Mr. Liston? and how shall it be conveyed to Mr. King? by packet, or any ordinary conveyance; or by some special, trusty, and confidential messenger? Will it not be the soundest policy, even in case of a declaration of war on both sides, between France and the United States, for us to be totally silent to England, and wait for her overtures? Will it not be imprudent in us to connect ourselves with Britain, in any manner that may impede us in embracing the first favourable moment or opportunity to make a separate peace? What aids or benefits can we expect from England by any stipulations with her, which her interest will not impel her to extend to us without any? On the brink of the dangerous precipice on which she stands, will not shaking hands with her necessitate us to fall with her, if she falls? On the other hand, what aid could we stipulate to afford her, which our own interest would not oblige us to give without any other obligation? In case of a revolution in England, a wild democracy will probably prevail for as long a time as it did in France; in such case, will not the danger of reviving and extending that delirium in America, be increased in proportion to the intimacy of our connection with that nation?

JOHN ADAMS.

In regard to an alliance with England, the views of the President may be gathered from the form of the question. His opinion is, moreover, distinctly stated to have been against it, in a letter from Col. Pickering to Mr. King, of April 2d; and it is believed that in this, the cabinet were unanimous, thinking that stipulations that neither of the contracting parties would make peace without the other, had, in experience, proved of little efficacy amidst the vicissitudes of war; and that, if once earnestly engaged in war against the same enemy, agreements for coöperation, from time to time, would be preferable. From the same letter, it seems that the government were satisfied that Spain should hold Louisiana, but not that it should be transferred to France, (as it was supposed had already been done secretly); and that, as the treaty of alliance between those two countries would, in case of war with the latter, necessarily involve us with the former also, it might become necessary to seize on Louisiana and West Florida, to prevent France from having them.

TO GEORGE WASHINGTON.

PHILADELPHIA, January 30th, 1798.

No letters have been received by the government from the envoys. It is certain that they were not received at the beginning of November, and it was then General Pinckney's opinion that they would not be. I suspect that their despatches have been intercepted. The merchants here believe that an embargo has been laid on all American vessels. Mr. Monroe's book is a wicked misrepresentation of facts; his conduct is detested by all good men, though I am sorry to say that many applaud it. I have good grounds for believing Mr. Tracy to be author of "Scipio;" but this is not, and I believe will not be, generally known. As respects your character, and the merits of your administration of the government, Mr. Monroe's book will make no impression beyond the circle of Tom Paine's admirers.

The opposition in the House have made a formal attack on the Executive; but I think they will be defeated with loss. Lately there have been indications that the spirit of the friends of government, in and out of the Legislature, is rising.

Dear Sir,

FROM FISHER AMES.

DEDHAM, February 2d, 1798.

I entertain too just a sense of the duty and respect that I owe to the President and to the government, to delay communicating the result of my reflections, on the question of accepting the appointment to the Cherokee mission. I confess my first sentiments were favourable to it. With my habits and sentiments, the first thought was, of course, to obey. Since, however, I cannot but anticipate embarrassment and difficulty in arranging my affairs so as to leave them; an absence from my professional engagements, only for a few months, would render me a very uncertain man, in the opinion of clients, to employ. Thus some immediate sacrifice, and more in anticipation, combine to detain me in a situation which affords me a moderate provision for my family. The allowance heretofore made to Indian commissioners will be, and I perceive is a rule, in this case. It is very probable many persons, more competent to the duty than I can pretend to be, will be found, whose situations will permit them to serve. But I will not conceal from you my opinion, that it would be attended with a greater pecuniary sacrifice than I conceive I ought to make. Indeed, what would remain of the compensation would not maintain my family in my absence, unless I make very erroneous calculations. I know that more important offices are holden under the government, notwithstanding similar discouragements exist.

My motive for an early suggestion of my probable decision, is grounded on

a "A View of the Conduct of the Executive in the Foreign Affairs of the United States, connected with the Mission to

the French Republic during the years 1794, 5 and 6, by James Monroe," &c. &c. 8vo. Phila., 1797.

the importance of an early and punctual attendance of the Commissioners. This letter will call the attendance of the heads of departments to the selection of some other person in my stead. It is, however, intended as confidential. While you are engaged in the ardua regni, I am sensible my reasons for declining wear an ill face. If I had good health and no family, I might be liable to be called upon as a patriot, however feeble my pretentions to that character may be. I am very sincerely yours,

FISHER AMES.

TO FREDERICK WOLCOTT.

PHILADELPHIA, February 27th, 1798.

I am really pained for the worthy and honourable men who now have any thing to do with public business, especially in Congress. Their situation is humiliating; they can do but little good, and doing nothing, in the present state of our country, is attended with almost as bad effects as would result from bad measures. My hopes respecting the present government are almost extinguished.

We hear nothing from France. I expect, however, that the ministers, after being treated with insult and indignity, will be received. The Directory know our situation. They are too wise and politic to do anything which would rouse and unite the country. They expect to subdue us by means of faction, and by operations upon the timid and avaricious.

TO GEORGE WASHINGTON.

PHILADELPHIA, March 9, 1798.

I have just received a letter for you from General Putnam, which he put under cover to me, in answer to one transmitted by the request of Mr. McHenry. Despatches have been received from the envoys, but the contents are yet but partially known; it is certain that no progress towards an accommodation has been made, and not a hope of success exists, while the present men shall continue at the helm of affairs. The system of France is the most insolent, presumptuous, and profligate, which the annals of mankind have disclosed; and no nation within the reach of their power, can expect any thing, either from their justice or moderation.

Mrs. Wolcott joins me in respects to Mrs. Washington and Miss Custis.

Congress were engaged in discussing the question of permitting merchant vessels to arm for their own defence, when these, the first despatches received since the arrival

of the envoys at Paris, reached Philadelphia. The earlier had been sent by a vessel of November 28th, but owing to the delays incident to a winter's passage, none reached the seat of government until March 4th. The one latest in date, that of the 8th of January, announced the passage of a decree, rendering prize all neutral vessels having on board merchandize and commodities, the production of England, and closing the ports of France, except in cases of distress, against such as in the course of their voyage should have touched at a British port. This despatch was, the next day, sent to Congress, and its publication excited, as may well be supposed, no small sensation in the mercantile community. The remaining papers which were in cypher, were destined, when made public, to rouse the nation at large.

The following note, in Wolcott's handwriting, appears to have been presented by him, as a draught of the message in which the failure of the negotiation should be announced to Congress.

"19 March, 1798. The despatches from the envoys of the United States to the republic of France, which were referred to in my message of the 5th instant, have been maturely considered. While I feel satisfaction in informing you that their exertions for the adjustment of the differences between the two nations, have been sincere and unremitted, it is incumbent on me to declare that I perceive no ground of expectation that the objects of their mission can be accomplished on terms compatible with the security, honour, and essential interests of the nation.

This undesirable result cannot, with justice, be attributed to a want of moderation on the part of this government, or a determination not to surrender secondary interests for the preservation of peace. Believing it to be a duty, and knowing it to be your wish, as well as that of the great body of the people, to avoid, by all reasonable and fair concessions, any participation with the contentions of Europe, the powers vested in our envoys were commensurate with a liberal and pacific policy, and that high confidence which might be justly reposed in the abilities, patriotism, and integrity of the characters to whom the negotiation was committed. After a careful review of the whole subject, with the aid of the information which I have received, I perceive nothing which could have ensured success that has been omitted on my part, and nothing further which can be attempted consistently with maxims for which our country has contended, and which constitute the basis of our national respectability and independence.

Under these circumstances, I cannot ferbear to reiterate the recommendations which have been made, and to exhort you to adopt promptly such measures, as are afforded by the ample resources of the country, for the protection of the persons and property of our seafaring and commercial citizens; for the defence of any vulnerable portions of our territory; and such efficient supplies of revenue as will be sufficient to defray extraordinary expenses, and supply the deficiency which may be occasioned by depredations on our commerce. In all your proceedings, it will be important to manifest a real vigour and concert in defence of the national rights, proportioned to the danger with which they are threatened."

The message, which was adopted, followed nearly the words of this paper; it concluded with the announcement that the existing state of things was so essentially different from that in which the instructions had been given, to restrain vessels of the United States from sailing armed, that the principle on which those orders were issued had ceased to exist, and the President no longer considered himself justified in continuing them except in particular

cases.

This, as Mr. Jefferson termed it, "insane message," produced a marked effect upon the House of Representatives. An attempt was made by the French party to parry its influence, by the introduction of a resolution, declaring "that it was inexpedient to go to war with France," but before they had obtained a vote upon the question, a call prevailed for the despatches, and the famous X. Y. Z. papers were transmitted to them. A review of these documents is essential to a just appreciation of the conduct of France, and of the patriotism of her American partisans.

The envoys had reached Paris on the 4th of October. They found the situation of affairs in France little calculated to ensure a fortunate result to their mission. Her unlimited success upon the continent, was in itself a most unfavorable circumstance. There her victories had been universal, and her whole force, directed by the genius of Buonaparte, was now to be turned against her last enemy-England. Such was not a moment for unarmed