a line which we have never presented as an ultimatum; which we have often proposed gently, and which the British have as often gently shoved aside. . . . But now all this gentle and delusive work is done with. The joint use is to terminate — events advance — and the question must be settled now by reason and judgment, or it will soon settle itself by chance and arms. Fortynine is the right line with me; and acting upon the second half of the great maxim: Submit to nothing wrong! I shall submit to no invasion or encroachment upon that line. . . . It is the line of right, which gives to us the Olympic district and its invaluable waters, and secures to us the river and valley of the Columbia. It is the fighting line of the United States. The UNION can be rallied on that line! 78. Leaves from Polk's Diary": War, 1846 1848 [342] THE MEXICAN WAR On August 25, 1845, President Polk had a conversation in his cabinet with his Secretary of State, James Buchanan, the Mexican on the Oregon question. "This conversation," says Polk in his "Diary," just a year later, "was of so important a character, that I deemed it proper on the same evening to reduce the substance of it to writing. . . . It was this circumstance which first suggested to me the idea, if not the necessity, of keeping a journal or diary of events and transactions which might occur during my Presidency. I resolved to do so and accordingly procured a blank book for that purpose on the very next day, in which I have every day since noted whatever occurred that I deemed of interest." 1 The diary, filling twenty-five "blank books," and covering the period from August 26, 1845, to June 2, 1849, was kept in possession of the Polk family until 1901,2 when it 1 The Diary of James K. Polk, ed. M. M. Quaife, Vol. II, p. 101. 2 Mrs. Polk lent the manuscript to the historian George Bancroft, who had a typewritten transcript made of it, which has been quite widely used, and which, on Bancroft's death, went to the Lenox Library in was purchased by the Chicago Historical Society, by whom it was published, with notes by M. M. Quaife, in four volumes, in 1910. We select some passages touching the Mexican War: Friday, 29th August, 1845-The President called a special meeting of the Cabinet at 12 O'clock, all the members present except Mr. Mason. The President brought up for consideration our relations with Mexico, and the threatened invasion of Texas with [by] that power. He submitted the following propositions which were unanimously agreed to as follows, viz., If Mexico should declare War or actual hostilities should be commenced by that power, orders to be issued to Gen'l Taylor to attack and drive her back across the Del Norte [Rio Grande]. ... Gen'l Taylor to be vested with discretionary authority to pursue the Mexican army to the West of the Del Norte, and take Matamoras or any other Spanish Post West of that River, but not to penetrate any great distance into the interior of Mexican territory.... Tuesday, 16th September, 1845.- Despatches were read from D' Parrott, the confidential agent of the U.S. in Mexico, giving an account of another threatened Revolution. . . . He gives it as his opinion that there will be no declaration of war against the U.S. and no invasion of Texas.... He is also of the opinion that the Government is desirous to re-establish Diplomatic relations with the U. States, and that a Minister from the U.S. would be received.... The President, in consultation with the Cabinet, agreed that the Hon. John Slidell of New Orleans . . . should be tendered the mission.... One great object of the mission, as stated by the President, would be to adjust a permanent boundary between Mexico and the U. States, and that in doing this the Minister would be instructed to purchase for a pecuniary consideration Upper California and New Mexico. He said that a better boundary would be the Del Norte [Rio Grande] from its mouth to the Passo [El Paso] in latitude about 32° North, and New York. The diary is the most detailed record of a presidential administration in our history, exceeding in fullness even the " Memoirs " of John Quincy Adams during the years of his presidency. thence West to the Pacific Ocean.1. . . He supposed it might be had for fifteen or twenty millions, but he was ready to pay forty millions for it, if it could not be had for less. In these views the Cabinet agreed with the President unanimously. Monday, 10th November, 1845-... At ten O'clock P.M., ... I signed the Commission of the Hon. John Slidell as Envoy Extraordinary & Minister Plenipotentiary to Mexico. . . . ... Tuesday, 13th January, 1846— There was a regular meeting of the Cabinet today. . . . Despatches from Mexico which had been received last evening were read and considered. Some other public matters not important were also considered.2... Tuesday, 7th April, 1846- A despatch was received by last night's mail from our consul at Vera Cruz, which renders it 1 Let the student compare the actual southwestern boundary of the United States with this proposal of Polk's. The entry quoted is significant as showing the resolve of the administration to have California and New Mexico, even at the expense of $40,000,000, over six months before the Mexican War began. 2 This brief, colorless entry was made on the evening of the day of Polk's most fateful move in connection with the Mexican affair. In his war message to Congress, May 11, 1846, Polk says, "On the 13th of January last, instructions were issued to the General (Taylor) in command of these troops to occupy the left bank of the Del Norte" (Richardson, Messages and Papers, Vol. IV, p. 440). This occupation in arms of the region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, which was in dispute between Texas and Mexico, was a cause of war in the eyes of Mexico. Polk maintained that the "despatches from Mexico" which rendered this move necessary were rumors of Mexican preparations for the invasion of Texas (see his war message); but the Whig opponents of armed intervention scouted the idea. Representative Alexander H. Stephens said in the House, June 16, 1846: "My first proposition is that the immediate cause of hostilities between our army and the Mexican forces was the advance movement from Corpus Christi on the Nueces River, to Matamoras on the Rio Grande or Del Norte.... The President had no right, no power, legally, to order the military occupation of the disputed territory on the Rio Grande without authority from Congress ... the question of boundary (was) to be settled and adjusted (by the resolution for annexing Texas) between this Government and Mexico, by negotiation, and not by arms.... Congress can alone constitutionally draw the sword for any purpose" (Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, pp. 304, 316). Stephens dubbed the President, for his specious arguments, "Polk the Mendacious." probable that Mr. Slidell, our Minister to Mexico will not be received by that Government, & will return to the U. States. The despatch was read & I stated that in the event Mr. Slidell was not accredited, and returned to the U.S., my opinion was that I should make a communication to Congress recommending that Legislative measures be adopted, to take the remedies for the injuries and wrongs we had suffered into our own hands.... Tuesday, 28th April, 1846-... The Mexican question was next discussed, & it was the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet that a message should be sent to Congress laying the whole subject before them and recommending that measures be adopted to take redress into our own hands for the aggravated wrongs done to our citizens in their persons and property by Mexico.1 I requested Mr. Buchanan to prepare from the archives of the Department of State a succinct history of these wrongs as the basis of a message to Congress, at his earliest convenience. ... Sunday, 3rd May, 1846 – Col. Benton called this evening. . . . He expressed a decided aversion to a war with Mexico if it could be avoided consistently with the honour of the country. I told him we had ample cause of War, but that I was anxious to avoid it if it could be done honourably and consistently with the interests of our injured citizens. I told him I would delay at all events until the arrival of Mr. Slidell, who was expected daily, but that I could not permit Congress to adjourn without bringing the subject before that body. Friday, 8th May, 1846-... the Hon. John Slidell, late U.S. Minister to Mexico, called in company with the Secretary of State. . . . Mr. Slidell's opinion was that but one course towards Mexico was left to the U.S. and that was to take the redress of the wrongs and injuries which we had so long borne from Mexico into our own hands, and to act with promptness and energy. Saturday, 9th May, 1846- The Cabinet held a regular meeting today; all the members present. I brought up the Mexican question. . . . The subject was very fully discussed. All agreed that if the Mexican forces at Matamoras committed any act of 1 Four days before this entry the Mexicans had attacked the Americans on the northern bank of the Rio Grande. See entry under May 9. hostility on Gen'l Taylor's forces I should immediately send a message to Congress recommending an immediate declaration of War. I stated to the Cabinet that up to this time, as they knew, we had heard of no open act of aggression by the Mexican army, but that the danger was imminent that such acts would be committed. . . . I then propounded the distinct question to the Cabinet and took their opinions individually, whether I should make a message to Congress on tuesday [!], and whether in that message I should recommend a declaration of War against Mexico. All except the Secretary of the Navy [Bancroft] gave their advice in the affirmative. Mr. Bancroft dissented, but said if any act of hostility should be committed by the Mexican forces he was then in favor of immediate war. Mr. Buchanan said he would feel better satisfied in his course if the Mexican forces had or should commit any act of hostility, but that as matters stood we had ample cause of war against Mexico, and he gave his assent to the measure. It was agreed that the Message should be prepared, and submitted to the Cabinet in their meeting on tuesday. . . . The Cabinet adjourned about 2 O'Clock P.M. . . . About 6 O'Clock P.M. Gen'l R. Jones, the Adjutant General of the army, called and handed to me despatches received from General Taylor by the Southern mail which had just arrived, giving information that a part of the Mexican army had crossed [to] the Del Norte and attacked and killed and captured two companies of dragoons of Gen'l Taylor's army, consisting of 63 officers & men. The despatch also stated that he had on that day [26th April]1 made a requisition on the Governors of Texas 1 This was two days after the Mexicans' attack which Polk reports in his war message to Congress as follows: "The Mexican forces at Matamoras assumed a belligerent attitude, and on the 12th of April General Ampudia, then in command, notified General Taylor to break up his camp within twenty-four hours and to retire beyond the Nueces River, and, in the event of his failure to comply with these demands, announced that arms, and arms alone, must decide the question. But no open act of hostility was committed until the 24th of April. On that day General Arista, who had succeeded to the command of the Mexican forces, communicated to General Taylor that he considered hostilities commenced, and should prosecute them." A party of dragoons of 63 men and officers were on the same day dispatched from the American camp |