light, what splendor hath accrued from this admirable work of our illustrious author, whose happy and sublime genius, resolving the most difficult problems, and reaching to discoveries of which the mind of man was thought incapable before, is deservedly admired by all those who are somewhat more than superficially versed in these matters. The gates are now set open, and by his means we may freely enter into the knowledge of the hidden secrets and wonders of natural things. He has so clearly laid open and set before our eyes the most beautiful frame of the system of the world, that if king Alphonsus were now alive he would not complain for want of the graces either of simplicity or of harmony in it. Therefore we may now more nearly behold the beauties of nature, and entertain ourselves with the delightful contemplation, and, which is the best and most valuable fruit of philosophy, be thence incited the more profoundly to reverence and adore the great Maker and Lord of all. He must be blind who from the most wise and excellent contrivances of things, cannot see the infinite wisdom and goodness of their Almighty Creator, and he must be mad and senseless who refuses to acknowledge them."

This edition of the Principia, and a paper in the Philoso phical Transactions containing a description of a meteor that was seen March 6, 1715-16, were the only works that he published; but after his death some other tracts of great merit were presented to the world by his relation Dr. Robert Smith. These were, 1. "Harmonia Mensurarum, sive Analysis et Synthesis per Rationum Angulorum Mensuras promotæ: accedunt alia Opuscula Mathematica." 2, "Hydrostatical and Pneumatical Lectures." Mr. Cotes died June 5, 1716, to the great regret of his friends, and his loss was particularly deplored by the mathematical world. His early death (being but in his 33d year) has ever been esteemed a public calamity. Newton himself asserted that had Mr. Cotes been spared, he would have proved one of the greatest men that ever lived.

We have in the preceding volume alluded to the contro

versy concerning the freedom of the human will, which during this period was carried to a very high pitch, and was connected with some of the most illustrious writers of the day. We shall here consider the subject more at large.

In behalf of the freedom of the mind, in opposition to the doctrine of necessity, Dr. Clarke, concerning whom we have spoken in our last, was the leading writer. Though he wrote Remarks upon Mr. Collins's "Inquiry," his chief antagonist on this subject was the acute and learned Leibnitz. Mr. Collins indeed refused to notice Dr. Clarke's remarks, inasmuch as the divine had represented the doctrines maintained in the "Inquiry" as of a most dangerous tendency.. Mr. Collins did not, therefore, think it prudent to enter into a controversy in support of a system that was said to be inimical to the best interests of society. Dr. Clarke, in his letters to Leibnitz, is said to have greatly excelled his antago nist in the argument, but never more so than when he was pressed with the strength wnich his learned adversary was master of this made him exert all his talents to set the subject in a clear light, to guard it against the evil of metaphysical obscurities, and to give the finishing stroke to what must ever be the foundation of morality in man, and is the sole ground of the accountableness of intelligent creatures for all their actions. Bishop Hoadley speaks of this work as the lastof Dr. Clarke's "relating to a subject which had been, by the writings of cloudy and artful men, rendered so intricate; I shall take the liberty to say with regard to all of the same tendency, from his first discourse about the being of God to these letters, that what he has written to clear and illustrate this cause does now stand, and will forever remain, belore the world a lasting monument of a genius which could throw in light where darkness used to reign, and force good sense and plain words into what was almost the privileged place of obscurity and unintelligible sounds."

The leading arguments made use of at the period to which our history refers, and which are still had recourse to by dis

putants

putants in this cause, may be enumerated and stated in short for the satisfaction, of the general reader, who, though desirous of knowing the nature of the controversy, may have neither time nor inclination to pursue it through all its ramifications. Those who contend with Dr. Clarke in favour of philosophical liberty, or the freedom of the human will, maintain that man possesses "an independent, self-govern ing, self-determining power, which he may at his own discretion exert, by acting either according to motives, or in opposition to motives, or without any motives at all." In other words, that a man may choose differently, the previous circumstances remaining the same. To prove the existence of this self-determining power, which is capable of choosing and acting independently of motives, they appeal first to consciousness, which proves, they say, that we do choose without any motive, or where motives are equal, or even in opposition to the influence of motive. Secondly, Free-will is argued from common sense, that is, from the irresistible conviction and universal consent of mankind. Thirdly, The existence of a self-determining power is argued from the absurd, immoral, impious, and dangerous consequences of philosophical necessity. To act, say the advocates of freewill, upon the principles of necessity, would expose a person to universal ridicule and contempt:-the doctrine is said also to subvert the argument for the divine existence; to destroy the distinction between natural and moral qualities; to be inconsistent with all moral discipline and moral government; and to be contrary to all the declarations in Scripture respecting the recompense of the virtuous and the punishment of the wicked. It is also added that upon the system of necessity, God is the only agent in the universe, and the proper efficient cause of evil natural and moral. Such were the arguments maintained by the learned Dr. Clarke and others of the same school; whereas Mr. Anthony Collins, who flourished at this period, considered the ground on which he stood, as the advocate of the doctrine of philosophical necessity, not only tenable but impregnable.

The

The tract published by this gentleman in 1713, in vindi cation of his principles, entitled, "A Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty," is still regarded as the best piece on that side of the question, being concise-but weighty and luminous. He lays it down as a kind of axiom, "that man is a necessary agent, if all his actions are so determined by the causes preceding each action that not one past action could possibly not have come to pass, or have been otherwise than it was; nor one future action can possibly not come to pass or be otherwise than it shall be.-He is a free agent if he is able at any time under the circumstances and causes he then is to do different things: or, in other words, if he is not ever unavoidably determined in point of time by the circumstances he is in, and causes he is under, to do that one thing he does, and not possibly to do any other."

The first argument adduced by Mr. Collins in favour of philosophical necessity is derived from experience or consciousness; for he says, We know that we can never form a volition, nor perform a voluntary action, without an assignable motive; that the vigour of the action is uniformly proportioned to the vigour of the motive, and that in proportion as motives approach to equality the choice becomes more diffi cult; of course if motives were perfectly equal, no choice could be made. Another argument is that derived from cause and effect; but a still stronger is taken from the consideration of the prescience of the Deity. The foreknowledge of God supposes that all things future will certainly exist in such time, such order, and with such circumstances, and not otherwise. For if any things future were contingent, or uncertain, or depended on the liberty of man, that is, might or might not happen, their certain existence could not be the object of the divine prescience; it being a contradiction to know that to be certain which is not certain, and God himself could only guess at the existence of such things; and if the divine prescience supposes the certain existence of all things future, it supposes also the necessary existence of all

things future; because God can foreknow their certain ex. istence only either as that existence is the effect of his decree, or as it depends on its own causes. Mr. Collins, and the other advocates for the doctrine of necessity of that day, were charged by their opponents with infidelity, but as it should. seem without sufficient ground; for the ablest abettors of the system have ranked with the best informed and most pious believers in Christianity. As a man, the moral conduct of Mr. Collins was exemplary for the virtues of temperance, humanity, benevolence, and patient industry. In the exercise of his magisterial functions he was active, upright, and impartial; and in domestic life he was a tender husband, a kind parent, a good master, and a true friend. In the cause of rational liberty he was an ardent votary; and whatever his particular sentiments might be on certain topics, he appears to have been sincerely attached to the investigation of truth, so that on his dying bed he could appeal to his Maker for the rectitude of his intentions, declaring that he had always endeavoured, to the best of his ability, to serve his God, his country, and his sovereign.

Mr. Collins, however, rendered himself obnoxious on other accounts besides that to which we have referred. Early in the reign of the queen he published an "Essay concerning the Use of Reason," &c. a work containing many valuable observations, but which was thought to discover strong prejudices against revealed religion. He engaged also in the controversy carried on by Mr. Dodwell and Dr. Clarke concerning the natural immortality of the soul; and in 1709 he published "Priestcraft in Perfection," &c. "A Vindication of the Divine Attributes ;" and in 1713 he published "A Discourse on Free-Thinking," in which he vindicated the universal right of unlimited freedom of inquiry, and exposed the tyranny exercised by the abettors of priestcraft. Though this was the avowed object of the piece, it was gene rally and perhaps justly believed that the author's secret intention was to attack revealed religion, which he probably identified with its prevailing corruptions. It created a con

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siderable