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the multitudes that art has employed, from the refiner who sweats at the furnace to the fedentary artificer who grows pale at the loom, and perhaps none can be found in which life is not in fome degree facrificed to the artificial neceffities of civil fociety. But will it therefore be faid, that civil fociety, to which this facrifice is made, is for that reason a combination contrary to the great original principles of morality, which are the bafis of all duty? Will it be faid, that to exercise the faculties which are the distinguishing characteristics of our nature is unnatural? and that being endowed with the various powers which in civil focieties only can be brought into action, it was incongruous to the will of our Creator that any fuch fociety fhould be formed, and that it would be pleafing to him if, ftill continuing in a favage ftate, these powers fhould lie torpid in our nature, like life in an embrio, during the whole of our exiftence? This furely muft appear extravagant and abfurd in the highest degree, especially as it must be allowed, that although commerce and arts in fome instances expofe life, in others they preferve it; they fupply the wants of Nature, without rapine and violence, and by producing a common intereft, they prevent the inhabitants of the fame country from being divided into different clans, which among favages are almoft perpetually committing hostilities against each other, with a ferocious cruelty which is not to be found where civil government and literary knowledge have meliorated

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meliorated the manners of mankind. Upon the whole, therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude, that the increase of knowledge and commerce are ultimately common benefits; and that the lofs of life which happens in the attempt, is among the partial evils which terminate in general good.

I have now only to request of fuch of my Readers as may be difpofed to cenfure me for not having attributed any of the critical escapes from danger that I have recorded, to the particular interpofition of Providence, that they would, in this particular, allow me the right of private judgment, which I claim with the greater confidence, as the very fame principle which would have determined them to have done it, has determined me to the contrary. As I firmly believe the divine precept delivered by the Author of Christianity," there is not a fparrow falls to the ground without my Father," and cannot admit the agency of chance in the government of the world, I must neceffarily refer every event to one cause, as well the danger as the escape, as well the fufferings as the enjoyments of life and for this opinion, I have, among other refpectable authorities that of the Bible. "Shall we," fays Job, "receive good from the hand of God and fhall we not receive evil?" The Supreme Being is equally wife and benevolent in the difpenfation of both evil and good, as means of effecting ultimate purpofes worthy of his ineffable perfections; so that whether we confider ourselves as chriftians or philofophers,

GENERAL INTRODUCTION. philofophers, we must acknowledge that he deferves bleffing not more when he gives than when he takes away. If the fall of a sparrow, as well as its preservation, is imputed to Providence, why not the fall as well as the preservation of a man? and why should we attribute to Providence only what appears to be good in its immediate effect, when we suppose that the whole concatenation of events, whether the prefervation or deftruction of particular parts, tends ultimately to the good of the whole? The fame voice commiffions the winds to plough up the deep, which at the appointed time rebukes them, faying, " Peace, be "ftill." If the adorable Author and Preferver of Nature was fuch a being as Baal is reprefented to have been by the prophet, when he derided his worshippers; if he was sometimes on a journey, and fometimes afleep, we might with propriety say that a fire happened to break out, or a ftorm to rife, but that by the interpofition of Providence life was preferved, expreffions which imply that the mischief had one origin, and the remedy another; but fuch language certainly derogates from the honour of the great Univerfal Caufe, who, acting through all duration, and fubfifting in all space, fills immensity with his prefence, and eternity with his power.

It will perhaps be faid, that in particular instances evil neceffarily refults from that conftitution of things which is beft upon the whole, and

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that Providence occafionally interferes, and fupplies the defects of the conftitution in these par ticulars but this notion will appear not to be fup. ported by thofe facts which are faid to be provi dential; it will always be found that Providence interposes too late, and only moderates the mif chief which it might have prevented. But who can suppose an extraordinary interpofition of Providence to fupply particular defects in the conftitution of nature, who fees thofe defects fupplied but in part? It is true that when the Endeavour was upon the rock off the coaft of New Holland, the wind ceased, and that otherwife fhe must have been beaten to pieces; but either the fubfiding of the wind was a mere natural event or not; if it was a natural event, providence is out of the question, at leaft we can with no more propriety fay that providentially the wind ceafed, than that providentially the fun rofe in the morning. If it was not a mere natural event, but produced by an extraordinary interpofition, correcting a defect in the conftitution of nature, tending to mifchief, it will lie upon thofe who maintain the position, to fhew, why an extraordinary interpofition did not take place rather to prevent the fhip's ftriking, than to prevent her being beaten to pieces after she had ftruck: a very flight impulfe upon the fhip's courfe would have caufed her to steer clear of the rock, and if all things were not equally eafy to Omnipotence, we fhould fay that this

might have been done with lefs difficulty than a calm could be produced by fufpending the general laws of Nature which had brought on the gale.

I have, however, paid my homage to the Supreme Being, confonant to my own ideas of his agency and perfections; and thofe who are of opinion that my notions are erroneous, muft allow, that he who does what he thinks to be right, and abftains from what he thinks to be wrong, acquits himfelf equally of moral obligation, whether his opinions are false or true.