ly juft and expedient to raise a revenue in America. For even then, even before the fplendid orb was entirely fet, and while the weltern horizon was in a blaze with his defcending glory, on the oppofite quarter of the heavens arofe another luminary (Charles Townshend) and for his hour became lord of the afcendant, who was officially the reproducer of the fatal fcheme, the unfortunate act to tax America for a revenue. Edm. Burke.

In confequence of this arrangement having put fo much the larger part of his enemies and oppofers into power, the confuLon was fuch that his own principles could rot poffibly have any effect or influence in the conduct of affairs. If ever he fell into a fit of the gout, or if any other caufe withdrew him from public cares, principles directly contrary were fure to predominate. When he had executed his plan, he had not an inch of ground to stand upon: when he had accomplished his fcheme of administration, he was no longer a minifter.

When his face was hid but for a moment, his whole fyftem was on a wide fea, without chart or compafs. The gentlemen, his particular friends, in various departments of ministry, with a confidence in him which was juftified, even in its extravagance, by his fuperior abilities, had never in any inftance prefumed on any opinion of their own; deprived of his guiding influence, they were whirled about, the fport of every guft, and eafily driven into any port; and as thofe who joined with them in manning the veffel were the moft directly oppofite to his opinions, measures, and character, and far the most artful and most powerful of the fet, they eafily prevailed, fo as to feize upon the moft vacant, unoccupied, and derelict minds of his friends, and inftantly they turned the veffel wholly out of the courfe of his policy. As if it were to infult as well as to betray him, even long before the close of the firft feffion of his adminiftration, when every thing was publicly transacted, and with great parade, in his name, they made an act, declaring it high4

Sir,

We have heard a great deal about parliamentary armies, and about an army continued from year to year; I have always been, Sir, and always fhall be, againft a standing army of any kind. To me it is a terrible thing; whether under that of parliamentary or any other defignation, a ftanding army is ftill a ftanding army, whatever name it be called by: they are a body of men diftinct from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws; and blind obedience, and an entire fubmiffion to the orders of their commanding officer, is their only principle. The nations around us, Sir, are already enflaved, and have been enslaved by thofe very means: by means of their ftanding armies they have every one loft their liberties; it is indeed impossible that the liberties of the people can be preserved in any country where a numerous standing army is kept up. Shall we then take any of our meatures from the examples of our neighbours? No, Sir; on the contrary, from their misfortunes we ought to learn to avoid those rocks upon which they have split.

It fignifies nothing to tell me, that our army is commanded by fuch gentlemen as cannot be supposed to join in any measures for enflaving their country. It may be fo; I hope it is fo; I have a very good opinion of many gentlemen now in the army; I believe they would not join in any fuch measures; but their lives are uncertain, nor can we be fure how long they may be continued in command; they may be all difmiffed in a moment, and proper tools of power put in their room. Befides, Sir, we know the paffions of men, we know how dangerous it is to truft the best of men with too much power. Where was there a

braver

braver army than that under Julius Cæfar? Where was there ever any army that had ferved their country more faithfully? That army was commanded generally by the beft citizens of Rome, by men of great fortune and figure in their country, yet that army enflived their country. The affections of the foldiers towards their country, the honour and integrity of the underofficers, are not to be depended on: by the military law the administration of justice is fo quick, and the punishment fo fevere, that neither officer nor foldier dares offer to difpute the orders of his fupreme commander; he must not confult his own inclinations: if an officer were commanded to pull his own father out of this house, he muft do it; he dares not disobey; immediate death would be the fure confequence of the leaft grumbling. And if an officer were fent into the court of requefts, accompanied by a body of mufketeers with fcrewed bayonets, and with orders to tell us what we ought to do, and how we were to vote, I know what would be the duty of this houfe; I know it would be our duty to order the officer to be taken and hanged up at the door of the lobby; but, Sir, I doubt much it fuch a fpirit could be found in the house, or in any houfe of commons that will ever be in England.

Sir, I talk not of imaginary things: I talk of what has happened to an English houfe of commons, and from an English army: not only from an English army, but an army that was raifed by that very houfe of commons, an army that was paid by them, and an army that was commanded by generals appointed by them. Therefore do not let us vainly imagine, that an army raised and maintained by authority of parliament will always be fubmiffive to them; if any army be fo numerous as to have it in their power to over-awe the parliament, they will be fubmiflive as long as the parliament does nothing to difoblige their favourite general; but when that cafe happens, I am afraid that in place of the parliament's difmifling the army, the army will difmifs the parliament, as they have done heretofore. Nor does the legality or illegality of that parliament, or of that army alter the cafe; for, with refpect to that army, and according to their way of thinking, the parliament difmiffed by them was a legal parliament; they were an army raifed and maintained according to law, and at firft they were raised, as they imagined, for the prefervation of

thofe liberties which they afterwards destroyed.

It has been urged, Sir, that whoever is for the Proteftant fucceffion, must be for continuing the army: for that very reafon, Sir, I am against continuing the army. I know that neither the Proteftant fucceffion in his majefty's moft illustrious houfe, nor any fucceffion, can ever be safe, as long as there is a ftanding army in the country. Armies, Sir, have no regard to hereditary fucceflions. The first two Cafars at Rome did pretty well, and found means to keep their armies in tolerable fubjection, because the generals and offcers were all their own creatures. But how did it fare with their fucceflors? Was not every ore of them named by the army without any regard to hereditary right, or to any right? A cobler, a gardener, or any man who happened to raise himself in the army, and could gain their affections, was made emperor of the world. Was not every fucceeding emperor raifed to the throne, or tumbled headlong into the duft, according to the mere whim or mad frenzy of the foldiers?

We are told this army is defired to be continued but for one year longer, or for a limited term of years. How abfurd is this diftinction? Is there any army in the world continued for any term of years? Does the most abfolute monarch tell his army, that he is to continue them for any number of years, or any number of months? How long have we already continued our army from year to year? And if it thus continues, wherein will it differ from the ftanding armies of thofe countries which have already fubmitted their necks to the yoke? We are now come to the Rubicon; our army is now to be reduced, or it never will; from his majesty's own mouth we are affured of a profound tranquillity abroad, we know there is one at home. If this is not a proper time, if these circumftances do not afford us a fafe opportunity for reducing at leaft a part of our regular forces, we never can expect to fee any reduction; and this nation, already overburdened with debts and taxes, muft be loaded with the heavy charge of perpetually fupporting a numerous ftanding army; and remain for ever expofed to the danger of having its liberties and privileges trampled upon by any future king or miniftry, who fhall take it in their heads to do fo, and fhall take a proper care to model the army for that purpofe.

a furfeit of parliaments in his father's time,

repealing the Septennial Act.

Mr. Speaker,

The fubject matter of this debate is of fuch importance, that I should be afhamed to return to my electors, without endeavouring, in the beft manner I am able, to declare publicly the reafons which induced me to give my moft ready affent to this question.

The people have an unquestionable right to frequent new parliaments by ancient afage; and this ufage has been confirmed by leveral laws which have been progref fively made by our ancestors, as often as they found it neceffary to infift on this effential privilege.

Parliaments were generally annual, but never continued longer than three years, till the remarkable reign of Henry VIII. He, Sir, was a prince of unruly appetites, and of an arbitrary will; he was impatient of every restraint; the laws of God and man fell equally a facrifice, as they ftood in the way of his avarice, or difappointed his ambition: he therefore introduced long parliaments, because he very well knew that they would become the proper inftruments of both; and what a flavih obedience they paid to all his measures is fufficiently known.

If we come to the reign of King Charles the First, we must acknowledge him to be a prince of a contrary temper: he had certainly an innate love for religion and virtue. But here lay the misfortune; he was led from his natural difpofition by fycophants and flatterers; they advised him to neglect the calling of frequent new parliaments, and therefore, by not taking the constant sense of his people in what he did, he was worked up into fo high a notion of prerogative, that the commons, in order to reftrain it, obtained that independent fatal power, which at laft unhappily brought him to his moft tragical end, and at the fame time fubverted the whole conftitution; and I hope we shall learn this leffon from it, never to compliment the crown with any new or extravagant powers, nor to deny the people thofe rights which by ancient ufage they are entitled to; but to preferve the juft and equal balance, from which they will both derive mutual fecurity, and which, if duly obferved, will render our conftitution the envy and admiration of all the world.

King Charles the Second naturally took

lay them afide: but this was a scheme impracticable. However, in effect, he did fo; for he obtained a parliament which, by its long duration, like an army of veterans, became fo exactly disciplined to his own measures, that they knew no other command but from that perfon who gave them their pay.

This was a fafe and moft ingenious way of enflaving a nation. It was very well known, that arbitrary power, if it was open and avowed, would never prevail here; the people were amused with the fpecious form of their ancient conftitution: it exifted, indeed, in their fancy; but, like a mere phantom, had no fubftance nor reality in it: for the power, the authority, the dignity of parliaments were wholly loft. This was that remarkable parliament which fo juftly obtained the opprobrious name of the Penfion Parliament; and was the model from which, I believe, fome later parliaments have been exactly copied.

At the time of the Revolution, the people made a fresh claim of their ancient privileges; and as they had fo lately experienced the misfortune of long and fervile parliaments, it was then declared, that they fhould be held frequently. But, it feems, their full meaning was not underftood by this declaration; and, therefore, as in every new fettlement the intention of all parties should be fpecifically manifested, the parliament never ceafed struggling with the crown, till the triennial law was obtained: the preamble of it is extremely fall and strong; and in the body of the bill you will find the word declared before enacted, by which I apprehend, that though this law did not immediately take place at the time of the Revolution, it was certainly intended as declaratory of their first meaning, and therefore ftands a part of that original contract under which the conftitution was then fettled. His majefty's title to the crown is primarily derived from that contract; and if upon a review there fhall appear to be any deviations from it, we ought to treat them as fo many injuries done to that title. And I dare fay, that this house, which has gone through fo long a series of fervices to his majefty, will at la& be willing to revert to thofe original ftated meafures of government, to renew and ftrengthen that title.

But, Sir, I think the manner in which the feptennial law was first introduced, is a

very ftrong reafon why it should be repealed. People, in their fears, have very often recourfe to defperate expedients, which, if not cancelled in feafon, will themselves prove fatal to that conftitution which they were meant to fecure. Such is the nature of the feptennial law; it was intended only as a prefervative against a temporary inconvenience: the inconvenience is removed, but the mischievous effects ftill continue; for it not only altered the conflitution of parliaments, but it extended that fame parliament beyond its natural duration; and therefore carries this moft unjuft implication with it, That you may at any time ufurp the most indubitable, the most effential privilege of the people, I mean that of chufing their own reprefentatives: a precedent of fuch a dangerous confequence, of fo fatal a tendency, that I think it would be a reproach to our ftatute-book, if that law was any longer to fubfift, which might record it to pofterity.

This is a feafon of virtue and public fpirit; let us take advantage of it to repeal thofe laws which infringe our liberties, and introduce fuch as may reftore the vigour of our ancient conftitution.

Human nature is fo very corrupt, that all obligations lofe their force, unless they are frequently renewed: long parliaments become therefore independent of the people, and when they do fo, there always happens a mott dangerous dependence elfe

where.

Long parliaments give the minifter an opportunity of getting acquaintance with members, of practifing his feveral arts to win them into his fchemes. This muil be the work of time. Corruption is of fo bate a nature, that at first fight it is extremely fhocking; hardly any one has fubmitted to it all at once: his difpofition must be previously underflood, the particular bait must be found out with which he is to be allured, and after all, it is not without many tuggles that he furrenders his virtue. Indeed, there are fome who will at once plunge themfelves into any bafe action; but the generality of mankind are of a more cautious nature, and will proceed only by leifurely degrees; one or two perhaps have deferted their colours the first campaign, fome have done it a fecond; but a great many, who have not that eager difpofition to vice, will wait till a third.

For this reafon, fhort parliaments have been lefs corrupt than long ones; they are

observed, like streams of water, always to grow more impure the greater distance they run from the fountain-head.

I am aware it may be faid, that frequent new parliaments will produce frequent new expences; but I think quite the contrary: I am really of opinion, that it will be a proper remedy against the evil of bribery at elections, efpecially as you have provided fo whole fome a law to co-operate upon thefe occafions.

Bribery at elections, whence did it arise? rot from country gentlemen, for they are fure of being chofen without it; it was, Sir, the invention of wicked and corrupt minifters, who have from time to time led weak princes into fuch deftructive measures, that they did not dare to rely upon the natural reprefentation of the people. Long parliaments, Sir, firft introduced bribery, because they were worth purchasing at any rate. Country gentlemen, who have only their private fortunes to rely upon, and have no mercenary ends to ferve, are unable to oppofe it, especially if at any time the public treafure fhall be unfaithfully fquandered away to corrupt their boroughs. Country gentlemen, indeed, may make fome weak efforts, but as they generally prove unfuccefsful, and the time of a fresh ftruggle is at fo great a distance, they at laft grow faint in the difpute, give up their country for loft, and retire in defpair; defpair naturally produces indolence, and that is the proper difpofition for flavery. Minifters of flate understand this very well, and are therefore unwilling to awaken the nation out of its lethargy by frequent elections. They know that the fpirit of liberty, like every other virtue of the mind, is to be kept alive only by conftant action; that it is impoffible to enflave this nation, while it is perpetually upon its guard.-Let country gentlemen, then, by having fre quent opportunities of exerting themselves, be kept warm and active in their contention for the public good: this will raife that zeal and fpirit, which will at last get the better of thofe undue influences by which the officers of the crown, though unknown to the feveral boroughs, have been able to fupplant country gentlemen of great characters and fortune, who live in their neighbourhood.-I do not fay this upon idle fpeculation only: I live in a country where it is too well known, and I appeal to many gentlemen in the houfe, to more out of it, (and who are fo for this very reafon) for the truth of my affertion. Sir,

it

it is a fore which has been long eating into the most vital part of our conftitution, and I hope the time will come when you will probe it to the bottom. For if a minifter fhould ever gain a corrupt familiarity with our boroughs; if he should keep a register of them in his clofet, and, by fending down his treafury mandates, fhould procure a fpurious reprefentation of the people, the offspring of his corruption, who will be at all times ready to reconcile and juftify the molt contradictory measures of his adminiftration, and even to vote every crude indigefted dream of their patron into a law; if the maintenance of his power thould become the fole object of their attention, and they fhould be guilty of the most violent breach of parliamentary truft, by giving the king a difcretionary liberty of taxing the people without limitation or controul; the laft fatal compliment they can pay to if this fhould ever be the unhappy condition of this nation, the people indeed may complain; but the doors of that place, where their complaints fhould be heard, will for ever be shut against them.

the crown;

Our disease, I fear, is of a complicated nature, and I think that this motion is wifely intended to remove the firft and principal diforder. Give the people their ancient right of frequent new elections; that will restore the decayed authority of parliaments, and will put our conftitution into a natural condition of working out her

own cure.

Sir, upon the whole, I am of opinion, that I cannot express a greater zeal for his majefty, for the liberties of the people, or the honour and dignity of this houfe, than by feconding the motion which the honourable gentleman has made you.

§ 136. Sir ROBERT WALPOLE's Reply. Mr. Speaker,

Though the question has been already fo fully oppofed, that there is no great occafion to fay any thing farther against it, yet I hope the house will indulge me the liberty of giving fome of thofe reasons which induce me to be against the motion. In general, I must take notice, that the nature of our conftitution feems to be very much mistaken by the gentlemen who have spoken in favour of this motion. It is certain, that ours is a mixed government, and the perfection of our conftitution confifts in this, that the monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical form of

The de

government, are mixt and interwoven in ours, fo as to give us all the advantages of each, without fubjecting us to the dangers and inconveniencies of either. mocratical form of government, which is the only one I have now occafion to take notice of, is liable to thefe inconveniencies; that they are generally too tedious in their coming to any refolution, and feldom brifk and expeditious enough in carrying their refolutions into execution: that they are always wavering in their refolutions, and never fteady in any of the measures they refolve to purfue; and that they are often involved in factions, feditions, and infurrections, which expofes them to be made the tools, if not the prey, of their neighbours: therefore, in all regulations we make with respect to our conftitution, we are to guard against running too much into that form of government, which is properly called democratical: this was, in my opinion, the effect of the triennial law, and will again be the effect, if ever it should be rettored.

That triennial elections would make our government too tedious in all their refolves, is evident; because, in fuch cafe, no prudent adminiftration would ever refolve upon any measure of confequence till they had felt not only the puife of the parliament, but the pulfe of the people; and the minifters of state would always labour under this disadvantage, that, as fecrets of ftate must not be immediately divulged, their enemies (and enemies they will always have) would have a handle for expofing their measures, and rendering them dif agreeable to the people, and thereby carrying perhaps a new election against them, before they could have an opportunity of justifying their measures, by divulging thofe facts and circumstances, from whence the justice and the wisdom of their measures would clearly appear.

Then, Sir, it is by experience well known, that what is called the populace of every country, are apt to be too much elated with fuccefs, and too much dejected with every misfortune: this makes them wavering in their opinions about affairs of flate, and never long of the fame mind; and as this houfe is chofen by the free and unbiaffed voice of the people in general, if this choice were fo often renewed, we might expect that this houfe would be as wavering, and as unsteady, as the people usually are: and it being impoffible to carry on the public affairs of the nation without the 3 E

concurrence