company put in good and sufficient cattle-guards at the point where its line of railroad entered and left the improved and fenced land of the plaintiff; but that the latter, after he had planted his crop, removed his fence from that point to another, and left his field open in many places, and by his own negligence exposed his field to stock, and by his own carelessness his crops were destroyed. The case was tried before a justice of the peace. The plaintiff recovered, and the company took an appeal to the district court. The case was tried in that court and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The company excepted. The objections made to the rulings of the trial court are not tenable. It is insisted on the part of the railway company that as it put in cattle-guards where the road entered and left the land of the plaintiff, as it was originally fenced, it complied fully with the requirements of the statute. Sections 37-39, c. 84, Comp. Laws 1879. It is further insisted that as the company had once put in cattle-guards at the points designated by the statute, it was not required to take them up and follow to such other or different place as the plaintiff afterwards removed his fence to. It appears from the evidence that, after the cattle-guards were first built by the company, the plaintiff tore down his fence on the east side of his inclosed land, and removed it away from the cattle-guard, as then constructed, about 40 rods. In the first place there was testimony before the trial court tending to show that the cattle-guards, as erected, were not sufficient or proper cattleguards. Further than this, there was evidence tending to prove that before the plaintiff tore down his fence on the east side of his inclosed land and removed the same to another point, he saw the road-master of the railway company and made an agreement with him that the company would erect a cattle-guard at the place where the fence was to be rebuilt. This the company failed to do within a reasonable time, therefore the railway company was liable for all damages sustained by the plaintiff by its negligence in the premises. The judgment of the district court must therefore be affirmed. (All the justices concurring.) (7 Colo. 244) SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO. PEOPLE ex rel. ELLIOTT v. GREEN. Filed March 14, 1884. The purpose of proceedings for contempt and those for disbarment, and the powers of the court therein, are very different. The first are in the nature of a po- lice power to protect the court from interference in a trial before it; they are generally summary, and largely ex parte, and the punishment is fine or imprisonment. The proceedings for disbarment are to protect generally the administration of justice and the standard of the profession. A full hearing upon the charges preferred must be had, and all legitimate testimony allowed and considered. The only penalty is the prohibition from practicing in courts of record. A contempt may be a ground for disbarment; but a cause of disbarment need by no means constitute a contempt. A lawyer who upon the streets insults a judge, and makes violent threats concerning the performance of his past and future official duties, is guilty of official misconduct, that, according to the circumstances of each case, may warrant his disbarment; ordinary criminal or civil remedies are entirely inadequate. Upon the rehearing, the acts of the respondent are still considered official misconduct, and designed and calculated to influence the judge judicially in the discharge of his duties. In view of the unyielding attitude of the respondent, the punishment of disbarment is not excessive. Upon a petition for a rehearing. See S. C. ante, 65. HELM, J. The importance of this case, and novelty of at least one question presented, must be my excuse for restating, upon this application, our views somewhat in detail. The complaints embodied in respondent's petition concerning his treatment in this court are, in our judgment, groundless. He was given full notice of the charges. preferred, and ample time to prepare his pleadings; the process of the court for procuring the attendance of witnesses was placed at his disposal; he was awarded a trial in open court; and the time was fixed to suit his convenience as well as that of relator. At the trial he was represented by able counsel, who managed his case with consummate ability; he was given the privilege of conducting the same in person; and, after electing to leave the general management to his lawyers, he was permitted to address the court himself upon the argument. Evidence supporting his allegations as to relator's oppressive treatment of third parties was excluded, but all proofs that were deemed proper, either in mitigation or in justification, were received and considered, and every doubt concerning the admission or rejection of testimony was resolved in his favor. Upon this petition for rehearing, though an adjournment of the court for two weeks had taken place, he was, at his request, accorded the privilege of being heard by the judges at chambers, in oral argument, both in person and by counsel. Throughout these entire proceedings the court has adhered to its resolution that errors committed, if any, should be in his favor and not against him. And now, upon a candid and careful review of the case, we cannot see where a single right has been abridged, a courtesy omitted, or a reasonable request denied him. The relator in this case is judge of the Second judicial district of the state. His petition, among other things, contains the following averments: That "about nine o'clock A. M. of said December 1st, your petitioner and his daughter, a young girl about sixteen years of age, were riding along Curtis street, in the city of Denver, when they met Mr. Green, to whom your petitioner spoke and bowed politely, and, at Mr. Green's request, stopped, when the following colloquy, in substance, took place. Mr. Green said: Did you have that article published in the paper about me?' To which your petitioner answered, No, sir; I did not.' Mr. Green replied: If you did, an explanation has got to be made. I will not stand it. Perhaps your clerks caused it to be published at your instigation,'-or words to that effect. Your petitioner again said, 'I have told you that I had nothing to do with causing that publication, and that is all I can say.' Your petitioner then started to drive on, when Mr. Green said, Wait a minute; I was going up to your house.' Your petitioner again stopped, and Mr. Green continued addressing your petitioner, and intending thereby to embarrass and intimidate your petitioner in the discharge of his official duties, saying in substance: I shall publish the whole affair; how you got angry upon the bench; how you imprisoned those poor men, and took money out of their pockets. You ought to have given us an honest judge to try the case; you are a tyrant upon the bench, but when you are attacked upon the street you are a coward, and dare not defend yourself. I will make it hot for you, you cowardly puppy.' Mr. Green said much more to the same effect, using and repeating the most offensive and insulting epithets to your petitioner, concerning your petitioner's official conduct. During this abusive tirade your petitioner did not reply, except remarking once or twice, in a cool and indifferent manner, Very well, Mr. Green, publish as much as you please, and put it all in the newspaper, if you think it will do you any good;' and then your petitioner drove on, leaving Mr. Green talking offensively and excitedly. * * *" In answer to the foregoing, respondent admits that his conduct and language upon the street were "in substance as reported by said Elliott in said petition." There is therefore no dispute whatever concerning the language used by both parties upon the occasion referred to; neither is there controversy about any of the attendant circumstances. Admitting all that is charged except as to his intention at the time, respondent declares that he was guilty of no official misconduct, and demands at the hands of this court vindication from the charge of malconduct in office. The purpose of proceedings for contempt and those for disbarment, and the powers and duties of courts in connection there with, must not be confused. The former may be termed a police regulation, or power for the protection of the court from present irect interference and annoyance in a trial or proceeding taking place before it; the latter is intended to protect generally the administration of justice, to save the legal profession from degradation by unworthy membership, and to guard the interest of litigants against injury from those intrusted with their legal business. The power to act in connection with the former is lodged in the court before or against whom the offense is committed. Authority to proceed in the latter is possessed exclusively by the tribunal authorized to grant licenses admitting to the profession. The former is punished by fine or imprisonment, and in many instances the proceeding is summary and largely ex parte; the sole penalty in connection with the latter is a prohibition from practicing in courts of record, and their judgment can only be entered upon notice of the charges preferred and a full hearing in defense; ample time for preparation being given, and all legitimate testimony being allowed and considered. A contempt may constitute ground for disbarment, but it by no means follows that the cause for disbarment must in all cases constitute a contempt. Upon some of the questions connected with the subject of disbarment there is conflict of opinion among the decisions. The tendency has been and is to exercise the power only in extreme cases, and upon the most careful and thorough consideration. A few of the authorities go so far as to denominate the attorney's right to practice his profession, property, and to treat the same according to the full significance of that term. Whether this position be correct or not, the disposition of the courts to afford him all reasonable protection in the proper exercise of this right deserves and receives the hearty commendation of all just and intelligent minds. But courts ought not to forget, in their anxiety to shield the attorney, the duty they owe themselves, to the legal profession in general, and to that portion of society with whom they directly deal. This case cannot be determined as a single controversy between two individuals; the questions are of general importance and application. Every other judge and every other lawyer is almost as much interested as are relator and respondent. Individuals are lost sight of; the issue tried bears directly upon the relations existing between the bench and bar of the entire state. Before admission to the bar in Colorado, applicants are required to present credentials of good moral character, and of intellectual fitness for the office. When admitted they become sworn officers of the law; each subscribes to an oath that he will "in all things faithfully execute the duties of an attorney and counselor at law according to the best of his understanding and ability." Their tenure of office is for life, or during good behavior. Every license is accepted with full knowledge of the unwritten condition annexed thereto, that for official misconduct it may be revoked at any time. The power of revocation is by statute lodged in this court, and if upon a proper case we should hesitate to assume the grave responsibility, and perform the unwelcome duty, we would be untrue to our official oath. Under this oath, can we grant Mr. Green's request and vindicate him from all blame as a lawyer? Are we prepared to declare to the world that in this state every attorney who may imagine himself aggrieved by a judicial ruling may, on account thereof, insult the judge upon the street, using the vilest epithets, and making the most violent threats concerning or affecting the past and future performance of his judicial duties? Nay, more: Are we willing to admit that he may couple with such assault physical violence, (for there is no distinction in principle between the two offenses, so far as this question is concerned;) that he may repeat such assaults, verbal or physical, upon each and every adverse decision; and that no power exists to interfere with or to prevent these offenses by disbarment? Ordinary civil or criminal actions are remedies utterly inadequate. Their official relations bring the parties into continual contact. The judge is compelled to make rulings from day to day upon questions presented by the attorney. His rulings in that capacity are judicial findings, for errors in which ample relief is provided. An insult or au injury inflicted upon him on account thereof is an insult or an in jury to the cause of justice, and, if by a lawyer, also to the legal profession. If a judge and attorney meet outside the court-room and en gage in an altercation about some matter in no way connected witb judicial action, they are, and ought to be, upon precisely the sam footing in all respects as other private citizens; but when the attor ney utters the threat or makes the assault on account of a ruling or decision in court, the situation is widely different. His action has direct influence upon the judicial mind; it is calculated to disturb and embarrass the proper administration of justice. The temple ir which the lawyer is sworn to minister is not bounded by the walls of a court-room; his official oath is not a cloak to be worn only in pres ence of the court; and when he proves recreant to that oath by such willful misconduct towards the judge, on account of his judicial acts, as interferes with or impedes the dignified and proper administration of the law, or tends to do so, whether in the court-room or upon the street, he is guilty of official misconduct. Whether such misconduct justifies disbarment, depends, of course, upon the facts and circumstances attending and surrounding each particular case. But in this country, and in England also, the utmost liberty of speech is guarantied by statute and enforced by the courts; the right to discuss all matters of public interest or importance is everywhere fully recognized. Judicial decisions and conduct constitute no exception to the rule. The judge's official character, and his acts in cases fully determined, are subject to examination and criticism. In most of the states the office is elective, and it is proper and right that the people should be informed of the occupant's mental and moral fitness. True, under the guise of criticism in the public press and oth erwise, judges are often compelled to endure the sting of misrepre |