these things, that no one of mankind, from the beginning of the world, can ever be justified by law, because every one transgresses it ?*

And here also we see, Dr. Taylor declares, that by the law, men are sentenced to everlasting ruin for one transgression. To the like purpose he often. expresses himself. So p. So p. 207, "The law requireth the most extensive obedience, discovering sin in all its branches. It gives sin a deadly force, subjecting every transgression to the penalty of death; and yet supplieth neither help nor hope to the sinner, but leaveth him under the power of sin and sentence of death." In p. 213, he speaks of the law as "extending to lust and irregular desires, and to every branch and principle of sin; and even to its latent principles, and minutest branches." Again (Note on Rom. vii. 6, p. 308), “ to every sin, how small soever." And when he speaks of the law subjecting every transgression to the penalty of death, he means eternal death, as he from time to time explains the matter. In p. 212, he speaks of the law " in the condemning power of it, as binding us in everlasting chains." In p. 120. S., he says, "that death which is the wages of sin, is the second death;" and this 78, he explains of "final perdition." In his Key, p. 107, § 296, he says, “ The curse of the law subjected men for every transgression to eternal death." So in Note on Rom. v. 20, p. 291, "The law of Moses subjected those who were under it to death, meaning by death eternal death." These are his words.

p.

He also supposes, that this sentence of the law, thus subjecting men for every, even the least sin, and every minutest branch and latent principle of sin, to so dreadful a punishment, is just and righteous, agreeable to truth and the nature of things, or to the natural demerits of sin. This he is very full in. Thus in p. 186, P., " It was sin (says he) which subjected us to death by the law, JUSTLY threatening sin with death. Which law was given us, that sin might appear; might be set forth IN ITS PROPER COLORS; when we saw it subjected us to death by a law perfectly holy, just and good; that sin by the commandment, by the law, might be represented what it really is, an exceeding great and deadly evil." So in note on Rom. v. 20, p. 299, "The law or ministration of death, as it subjects to death for every transgression, is still of use to show the natural and proper demerit of sin." Ibid. p. 292, "The language of the law, dying thou shalt die, is to be understood of the demerit of the transgression, that which it deserves." Ibid. p. 298, "The law was added," saith Mr. Locke, on the place," because the Israelites, the posterity of Abraham, were transgressors as well as other men, to show them their sins, and the punishment and death, which in strict justice they incurred by them. And this appears to be a true comment on Rom. vii. 13.-Sin, by virtue of the law, subjected you to death for this end, that sin, working death in us, by that which is holy, just, and good, perfectly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness.-Consequently every sin is in strict justice deserving of wrath and punishment; and the law in its rigor was given to the Jews, to set home this awful truth upon their consciences, to show them the evil and pernicious nature of sin; and that, being conscious they had broke the law of God, this might convince them of the great need they had of the favor of the lawgiver, and oblige them, by faith in his goodness, to fly to his mercy, for pardon and salvation."

If the law be holy, just, and good, a constitution perfectly agreeable to God's holiness, justice, and goodness; then he might have put it exactly in ex

* I am sensible, these things are quite inconsistent with what he says elsewhere, of "sufficient power in all mankind constantly to do the whole duty which God requires of them," without a necessity of breaking God's law in any degree. (p. 63-68, G.) But, I hope, the reader will not think me accountable for his inconsistences.

ecution, agreeably to all these his perfections. Our author himself says, p. 133, S.," How that constitution, which establishes a law, the making of which is inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God, and the executing of it inconsistent with his holiness, can be a righteous constitution, I confess, is quite beyond my comprehension."

Now the reader is left to judge, whether it be not most plainly and fully agreeable to Dr. Taylor's own doctrine, that there never was any one person from the beginning of the world, who came to act in the world as a moral agent, and that it is not to be hoped there ever will be any, but what is a sinner or transgressor of the law of God; and that therefore this proves to be the issue and event of things, with respect to all mankind in all ages, that, by the natural and proper demerit of their own sinfulness, and in the judgment of the law of God, which is perfectly consonant to truth, and exhibits things in their true colors, they are the proper subjects of the curse of God, eternal death, and everlasting ruin; which must be the actual consequence, unless the grace or favor of the lawgiver interpose, and mercy prevail for their pardon and salvation. The reader has seen also how agreeable this is to the doctrine of the holy Scripture.

And if so, and what has been observed concerning the interposition of divine grace be remembered, namely, that this alters not the nature of things as they are in themselves, and that it does not in the least affect the state of the controversy we are upon, concerning the true nature and tendency of the state that mankind come into the world in, whether grace prevents the fatal effect or no; I say, if these things are considered, I trust, none will deny, that the proposition that was laid down, is fully proved, as agreeable to the word of God, and Dr. Taylor's own words; viz., that mankind are all naturally in such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this consequence or issue, that they universally are the subjects of that guilt and sinfulness, which is, in effect, their utter and eternal ruin, being cast wholly out of the favor of God, and subjected to his everlasting wrath and curse.

SECTION II.

It follows from the Proposition proved in the foregoing Section, that all Mankind are under the influence of a prevailing effectual Tendency in their Nature, to that Sin and Wickedness, which implies their utter and eternal ruin.

THE proposition laid down being proved, the consequence of it remains to be made out, viz., that the mind of man has a natural tendency or propensity to that event, which has been shown universally and infallibly to take place (if this be not sufficiently evident of itself, without proof), and that this is a corrupt or depraved propensity.

I shall here consider the former part of this consequence, namely, whether such a universal, constant, infallible event is truly a proof of the being of any tendency or propensity to that event; leaving the evil and corrupt nature of such a propensity to be considered afterwards.

If any should say, they do not think that its being a thing universal and infallible in event, that mankind commit some sin, is a proof of a prevailing tendency to sin; because they do not only sin, but also do good, and perhaps more good than evil; let them remember, that the question at present is not, how much sin there is a tendency to; but whether there be a prevailing pro

pensity to that issue, which it is allowed all men do actually come to, that all fail of keeping the law perfectly; whether there be not a tendency to such imperfection of obedience, as always without fail comes to pass; to that degree of sinfulness, at least, which all fall into; and so to that utter ruin, which that sinfulness implies and infers. Whether an effectual propensity to this be worth the name of depravity, because of the good that may be supposed to balance it, shall be considered by and by. If it were so, that all mankind, in all nations and ages, were at least one day in their lives deprived of the use of their reason, and run raving mad; or that all, even every individual person, once cut their own throats, or put out their own eyes; it might be an evidence of some tendency in the nature or natural state of mankind to such an event; though they might exercise reason many more days than they were distracted, and were kind to, and tender of themselves oftener than they mortally and cruelly wounded themselves.

To determine whether the unfailing constancy of the above named event be an evident of tendency, let it be considered, what can be meant by tendency, but a prevailing liableness or exposedness to such or such an event. Wherein consists the notion of any such thing, but some stated prevalence or preponderation in the nature or state of causes or occasions, that is followed by, and so proves to be effectual to, a stated prevalence or commonness of any particular kind of effect? Or, something in the permanent state of things, concerned in bringing a certain sort of event to pass, which is a foundation for the constancy, or strongly prevailing probability of such an event? If we mean this by tendency (as I know not what else can be meant by it, but this, or something like this), then it is manifest, that where we see a stated prevalence of any kind of effect or event, there is a tendency to that effect in the nature and state of its causes. A common and steady effect shows, that there is somewhere a preponderation, a prevailing exposedness or liableness in the state of things, to what comes so steadily to pass. The natural dictate of reason shows, that where there is an effect, there is a cause, and a cause sufficient for the effect; because, if it were not sufficient, it would not be effectual; and that therefore, where there is a stated prevalence of the effect, there is a stated prevalence in the cause: a steady effect argues a steady cause. We obtain a notion of such a thing as tendency, no other way than by observation; and we can observe nothing but events; and it is the commonness or constancy of events that gives us a notion of tendency in all cases. Thus we judge of tendencies in the natural world. Thus we judge of the tendencies or propensities of nature in minerals, vegetables, animals, rational and irrational creatures. A notion of a stated tendency, or fixed propensity, is not obtained by observing only a single event. A stated preponderation in the cause or occasion, is argued only by a stated prevalence of the effect. If a die be once thrown, and it falls on a particular side, we do not argue from hence, that that side is the heaviest but if it be thrown without skill or care, many thousands or millions of times going, and constantly falls on the same side, we have not the least doubt in our minds, but that there is something of propensity in the case, by superior weight of that side, or in some other respect. How ridiculous would he make himself, who should earnestly dispute against any tendency in the state of things to cold in the winter, or heat in the summer; or should stand to it, that although it often happened that water quenched fire, yet there was no tendency in it to such an effect.

In the case we are upon, the human nature, as existing in such an immense diversity of persons and circumstances, and never failing in any one instance, of coming to that issue, viz., that sinfulness, which implies extreme misery and

eternal ruin, is as the die often cast. For it alters not the case in the least, as to the evidence of tendency, whether the subject of the constant event be an individual, or a nature and kind. Thus, if there be a succession of trees of the same sort, proceeding one from another, from the beginning of the world, growing in all countries, soils, and climates, and otherwise in (as it were) an infinite variety of circumstances, all bearing ill fruit; it as much proves the nature and tendency of the kind, as if it were only one individual tree, that had remained from the beginning of the world, had often been transplanted into different soils, &c., and had continued to bear only bad fruit. So, if there were a particular family, which, from generation to generation, and through every remove to innumerable different countries, and places of abode, all died of a consumption, or all run distracted, or all murdered themselves, it would be as much an evidence of the tendency of something in the nature or constitution of that race, as it would be of the tendency of something in the nature or state of an individual, if some one person had lived all that time, and some remarkable event had often appeared in him, which he had been the agent or subject of from year to year, and from age to age, continually and without fail.

Here may be observed the weakness of that objection, made against the validity of the argument for a fixed propensity to sin, from the constancy and universality of the event, that Adam sinned in one instance, without a fixed propensity. Without doubt a single event is an evidence, that there was some cause or occasion of that event; but the thing we are speaking of, is a fixed cause. Propensity is a stated, continued thing. We justly argue, that a stated effect must have a stated cause; and truly observe, that we obtain the notion of tendency, or stated preponderation in causes, no other way than by observing a stated prevalence of a particular kind of effect. But who ever argues a fixed propensity from a single event? And is it not strange arguing, that because an event which once comes to pass, does not prove any stated tendency, therefore the unfailing constancy of an event is an evidence of no such thing? But because Dr. Taylor makes so much of this objection, from Adam's sinning without a propensity, I shall hereafter consider it more particularly, in the beginning of the 9th Section of this Chapter; where will also be considered what is objected from the fall of the angels.

Thus a propensity, attending the present nature or natural state of mankind, eternally to ruin themselves by sin, may certainly be inferred from apparent and acknowledged facts. And I would now observe further, that not only does this follow from facts that are acknowledged by Dr. Taylor, but the things he asserts, the expressions and words which he uses, do plainly imply that all mankind have such a propensity; yea, one of the highest kind, a propensity that is invincible, or a tendency which really amounts to a fixed, constant, unfailing necessity. There is a plain confession of a propensity or proneness to sin, p. 143: "Man, who drinketh in iniquity like water, who is attended with so many sensual appetites, and so apt to indulge them." And again, p. 228," we are very apt, in a world full of temptation, to be deceived, and drawn into sin by bodily appetites." If we are very apt or prone to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites, and sinfully to indulge them, and very apt or prone to yield to temptation to sin, then we are prone to sin; for to yield to temptation to sin is sinful. In the same page he represents, that on this account, and on account of the consequences of this, the case of those who are under a law, threatening death for every sin, must be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver. Which implies, that their case is hopeless, as to an escape from death, the punishment of sin, by any other means than God's mercy. And that

implies, that there is such an aptness to yield to temptation to sin, that it is hopeless that any of mankind should wholly avoid it. But he speaks of it elsewhere, over and over, as truly impossible, or what cannot be; as in the words which were cited in the last Section, from his note on Rom. v. 20, where he repeatedly speaks of the law, which subjects us to death for every transgression, as what cannot give life; and represents that "if God offered us no other way of salvation, no man from the beginning of the world could be saved." In the same place he, with approbation, cites Mr. Locke's words, in which, speaking of the İsraelites, he says, "all endeavors after righteousness were lost labor, since any one slip forfeited life, and it was impossible for them to expect aught but death." Our author speaks of it as impossible for the law requiring sinless obedience, to give life, not that the law was weak in itself, but through the weakness of our flesh. Therefore he says, he conceives the Law not to be a dispensation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in its present state. These things amount to a full confession, that the proneness in men to sin, and to a demerit of, and just exposedness to eternal ruin by sin, is universally invincible, or, which is the same thing, amounts to absolute, invincible necessity; which surely is the highest kind of tendency or propensity; and that not the less for his laying this propensity to our infirmity or weakness, which may seem to intimate some defect, rather than any thing positive: and it is agreeable to the sentiments of the best divines, that all sin originally comes from a defective or privative cause. But sin does not cease to be sin, or a thing not justly exposing to eternal ruin (as implied in Dr. Taylor's own words) for arising from infirmity or defect; nor does any invincible propensity to sin, cease to be a propensity to such demerit of eternal ruin, because the proneness arises from such a cause.

It is manifest, that this tendency which has been proved, does not consist in any particular external circumstances, that some or many are in, peculiarly tempting or influencing their minds; but is inherent, and is seated in that nature which is common to all mankind, which they carry with them wherever they go, and still remains the same, however circumstances may differ. For it is implied in what has been proved, and shown to be confessed, that the same event comes to pass in all circumstances, that any of mankind ever are, or can be under in the world. In God's sight no man living can be justified; but all are sinners, and exposed to condemnation. This is true of persons of all constitutions, capacities, conditions, manners, opinions and educations; in all countries, climates, nations and ages; and through all the mighty changes and revolutions, which have come to pass in the habitable world.

We have the same evidence, that the propensity in this case lies in the nature of the subject, and does not arise from any particular circumstances, as we have in any case whatsoever; which is only by the effects appearing to be the same in all changes of time and place, and under all varieties of circumstances. It is in this way only we judge, that any propensities, which we observe in mankind, are such as are seated in their nature, in all other cases. is thus we judge of the mutual propensity betwixt the sexes, or of the dispositions which are exercised in any of the natural passions or appetites, that they truly belong to the nature of man; because they are observed in mankind in general, through all countries, nations, and ages, and in all conditions.

It

If any should say, though it be evident that there is a tendency in the state of things to this general event, that all mankind should fail of perfect obedience, and should sin, and incur a demerit of eternal ruin; and also that this tendency does not lie in any distinguishing circumstances of any particular people, person, or age; yet it may not lie in man's nature, but in the general con