ed on both sides to the present hour. Has the great Creek victory been equally beneficial to our country? On the 9th of August, 1814, General Jackson dictated to the surviving Creeks, or at least as many as would submit to his terms, "articles of capitulation," by which he demands of the prostrate warriors, as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, fifteen millions of acres of land, worth at least, at the present legal price, thirty millions of dollars, but in fact worth double that sum. One gentleman, no doubt to shew us the value of General Jackson's services, says, that this territory was the only acquisition made by us in the war with Great Britain, except renown. I am glad to hear the exception, and shall ever deem the high reputation of our military and naval heroes of far more actual value to the nation, than any quantity of territory extorted from the Indian natives. But was it right, sir, under the name of indemnity, to compel the cession of a quantity of land, amounting to ten times or twenty times the expense for which it was demanded? The land would not only pay for the Creek war, but, at a moderate estimate, would pay half the expense of the war with Great Britain. With potent England we make peace without any indemnity but "renown," but we compel the ignorant fugitives of the forest, who were enticed into the war by her, and who have nothing but their wilds and their huts, to cede us fifteen millions of acres. From these wide domains, those tribes which had before traversed them for a livelihood were compelled to retire. Destitute of homes, and of the hunting grounds where before they had gained a subsistence, the Red Sticks and other Creeks, not parties to the "capitulation" of Fort Jackson, are driven into exile, and branded as outlaws, and are only saved from total destruction by their neighbors in Florida, the Seminoles. The cession of land contained in this capitulation, since dignified by the name of treaty, was obtained by duress-by military coercion. The Executive and Senate evidently had great doubts concerning it. Congress convened on the 19th September, 1814, and no doubt this instrument was laid before the Senate, as was the duty of the President, without delay; yet almost five months elapsed without any ratification. We are left to infer the cause of the delay, and, for the honor of the treaty-making power, I will not doubt that the exorbitant terms of the instrument itself, so unjustly dictated to a feeble and prostrate enemy, were considered as incompatible with the honor and equity of a great and just nation. On the 15th of February, 1815, the Treaty of Ghent was received at Washington. By the ninth article of that treaty, all the Indians who should remain at war with either party, at the time of the ratification, were to receive all the lands which belonged to them in 1811. The Creek Treaty then came once more under consideration. If they ratified it, they seemed to sanction the unjust acquisition of territory; if they rejected it, the lands must be unconditionally restored, and a popular clamor might FEBRUARY, 1819. be raised by speculators and others, who considered the land as their prey. They determined to ratify the Treaty of Fort Jackson, which was done on the 16th February, and on the next day the Treaty of Ghent was ratified. Considering the responsibility of the Government, and the delicacy of their situation at that time, the ratification cannot be censured, because the Creeks could still look to Congress for redress, and to that source it would have been most prudent for them to have resorted. If they had, I cannot doubt that they would have had an impartial hearing, and that justice would have been done. It appears, however, that those who had fled into Florida, and were still supplied and encouraged by Nicholls, were only taught to expect redress from the Treaty of Ghent. Perhaps there is reason to believe that the British Commissioners at Ghent intended and expected to include the Creeks in the provision of the ninth article; as Jackson's capitulation, if known at all in Europe, must also have been considered of no validity, being unratified. If so, can the exiled Red Sticks, or even their British advisers, be severely censured for persisting in claiming a restoration of their lands under this treaty? Hence we trace one great cause of the Seminole war. Another train of facts demands our attention. Nicholls, during the war with Great Britain, had erected a fort on the Appalachicola river, within the limits of Florida. After the peace he supplied the exiled Red Sticks and other Creeks, together with the fugitive negroes, with a liberal amount of ammunition and cannon. He delivered this fort, thus supplied, into their possession, and taught them to consider it as their refuge and protection. Whatever right the Spanish authorities might have to dismantle or destroy this fort, it is manifest that we had no such right. We remonstrated, indeed, with the Governor of Pensacola, and he declared it was erected without his consent, and in violation of the jurisdiction of His Catholic Majesty. This remonstrance, however, could only have related to its erection during the war with Great Britain, and after the termination of that war it was no more a subject of just complaint on our part, than Pensacola itself, or any other fortress in the Spanish territory. Our military commander in that quarter, however, as early as April or May, 1816, seems to have meditated its destruction. Fort Scott is hastily erected, at the junction of the Chatahoochee and Flint rivers, just within our own boundary; and a naval force from New Orleans ordered to ascend the Appalachicola river, to pass by the Indian fort beforementioned, and to meet a military detachment under Colonel Clinch, which was to march to Fort Scott, and to destroy the Indian fort if it opposed the passage of the river. The gunboats from New Orleans, under Sailingmaster Loomis, accordingly ascended the Appalachicola without asking permission from Spain or from the Indian fort, or giving any notice whatever of their designs, whether pacific or hostile. Nothing is more clear than that we had no right to ascend or navigate the Appalachicola FEBRUARY, 1819. Seminole War. H. of R. himself, in his letter of the 14th December, communicated with the President's Message of the 25th of March last, that the Indians of Fowltown were inclined to be friendly, and had offered to unite with the other friendly tribes. Ten days after this most infamous transaction, on the 30th of November, 1817, the boat sent by Major Muhlenburg, under Lieutenant Scott, with forty persons, including sick, and women, and children, was attacked, and all on board were killed but six. The fate of these hapless and innocent persons is truly lamentable-it was the inevitable consequence of the recent massacre and pillage of Fowltown. Let us pause a moment, and retrace the facts. Is it not manifest that we have been the aggressors in this war-very much the aggressors? That the Indians have been assailed, and, even when assailed, have fallen short of their invaders in acts of savage cruelty? That all the petty depredations and murders, except these which have now been more particularly detailed, would easily but for these, have been adjusted by our agent, and reciprocal justice rendered? Another consideration of no small moment here presents itself. We have called loudly on Spain for the fulfilment of her treaty stipulation, to restrain the Indians within her limits from engaging in hostilities against us. This however can only mean offensive hostilities. It can never be pretended that Spain is bound by treaty to disarm the Indians in Florida, and preclude them from the common privilege of all nations and all beings-the right of defending themselves when attacked-much less can Spain in such a war be obliged to join the assailants in the sanguinary work of Indian extermination. river, where the territory on both sides belongs to another nation, without its consent. The right to navigate all rivers, bays, and inland seas, belongs only to the nation whose territories encompass them. Some gentlemen have taken great pains to reconcile the conflicting sovereignties of the Indian tribes, and that of the nations within whose nominal jurisdiction they are situated. In the present case it is immaterial whether the Sovereignty of the river belonged to Spain, or to the Seminoles who inhabited its borders. It did not belong to the United States. If a mere unarmed or American boat or vessel had passed up the river, it could have been no cause of war on the part of the Indians, even though no leave had been asked. It would in that case have been a mere trespass. But no one can pretend that the garrison in the fort, and the Indian towns, and the exiles depending on it for protection, had not good reason to consider the simultaneous approach of these two armaments as hostile to themselves. They did so consider it, and one of the watering parties from the gunboats was fired on, three men were killed, and one was taken prisoner, and most cruelly put to death, according to the savage mode of warfare. Shortly after, the detachment by land and the gunboats approached the Indian fort, with the evident intention to attack it. They are fired on, and in return they attack and blow up the fort. Of three hundred persons, including women and children, two hundred and seventy perished in this terrible explosion, and most of the others are mortally wounded. Terrible revenge! If we had been the aggrieved party instead of being manifestly the aggressors, surely this awful sacrifice would have been sufficient to atone for our four seamen slain. Not so thought the man who commanded the expedition. The attack and destruction of Scott's party, Of the three wretches who had miraculously es- and the perilous situation of Major Muhlencaped the explosion, he delivered two over to burgh, excited universal apprehension for the instant butchery. Who can read this deed of safety of the latter. Few were informed of the cruelty without shame and horror? The savages origin of the Indian hostility; few made inquiry, themselves would scarce have done the savage or, if they did, could obtain any satisfactory andeed. The most hardened chief of them all swer. It is but candid to presume, that the Govwould have relented. This was in July, 1816. ernment was very imperfectly apprized of the Notwithstanding this invasion of the Indian true state of the late most wanton destruction of territory, and destruction of their only strong the Indian village, or of the friendly or neutral hold, we hear of no considerable Indian írruption disposition of its suffering inhabitants. Unconinto our territory for more than a year. Several nected with this previous provocation, the depredatory incursions, and one or two murders, struction of Scott's party must have been deemed were committed within our frontiers; and, on the the signal for decisive measures. Accordingly, other hand, the Indians complained that a party General Jackson, commanding the division of the of Americans had murdered several Indians, and South, was summoned to the field, and invested driven off many of their cattle. Our worthy In- with the supreme command. The letter from dian agent, Governor Mitchell, was diligently the Department of War, dated the 25th Decemexerting himself to give and obtain satisfaction, ber, 1817, is cited by the advocates of his subseand had actually convened the chiefs of the In- quent measures, as containing unlimited power dian towns, with a fair prospect of having peace to manage the war at his discretion. He accordand harmony restored by mutual justice; when, ingly ordered out the militia of Tennessee, to on the 20th of November, 1817, a party, under meet those of Georgia and the regular forces; Major Twiggs, surprised the Indian village of repaired himself to the theatre of action; took Fowltown, killed four or five men and one wo- the necessary measures to provide supplies; and man, drove all the inhabitants from their houses, by the latter part of March he was prepared, with and destroyed the village. The atrocity of this a powerful force, to enter Florida. Nothing deed deserves our utmost indignation, especially could resist his march. The Indians filed before when we are informed by Governor Mitchell | him; their villages, the Mickasukian towns, were ravaged and destroyed, and their population dispersed through the swamps and morasses to perish with hunger, unless they were so fortunate as to find a speedier death under the tomahawk of General McIntosh and his friendly Indians. From these scenes of devastation our army marched rapidly on St. Marks, a Spanish fortress; and General Jackson was informed that the Indians had frequently resorted there; had been protected; furnished with ammunition; and their consultations held with the knowledge of the commandant, who had confessed his fears that the Indians would take advantage of his weakness, and occupy the post in defiance of his authority. He therefore demanded the surrender of the post to himself. The commander denied most of the allegations against him, and utterly refused to surrender. Our General therefore with very little delay, entered the fort "by violence," lowered the Spanish ensign, and erected ours in its place. Previous to this however Suwanee, another Indian village on the river of that name, had been plundered and burnt in the same manner with those of Mickasuky, and their fields desolated. Arbuthnot, an English trader, was captured in the family and under the protection of the Spanish commandant; and Ambrister, an English lieutenant of marines in or near Suwanee, where he had led a body of negroes and Indians. The General now appeared to think the war at an end, and professed to intend shortly to return to Nashville. Early in May however he was informed that from four to five hundred Indians were in Pensacola or its neighborhood. He immediately despatched a detachment under Major Young, to whom after some explanations eighty-seven Indians, including women and children, were surrendered to be escorted to a safe distance. Not satisfied with this humiliating concession, and the assurances of the Governor of Pensacola that no Indians were or had been harbored there, except such as had long been and then were employed in furnishing wood and other supplies to the garrison and inhabitants, General Jackson resolutely demands the surrender of the town and the fortress of St. Carlos de Barancas. This demand was peremptorily refused by the Governor, who protested against the occupation of Florida by our army, and threatened, if General Jackson persisted, to repel force by force. This threat was disregarded; our army shortly after entered the city, and prepared to attack the fort, which was at last surrendered by capitulation, and the Governor and garrison sent out of the province. The execution of the two Indian chiefs who had been decoyed into our power, and the trial by court martial and execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, had taken place several weeks previous to the seizure of Pensacola. This concise narrative of the prominent events of the campaign was necessary, before considering the points in controversy. Let us now advance from the origin of the war to its progress and conduct under General Jackson. It is proper to remark here, that he was not authorized by a FEBRUARY, 1819. strict adherence to his orders, including those previously given to General Gaines, to enter the Spanish or Indian territory. By the letter of the Secretary of War of the 9th of December, 1817, General Gaines was ordered to enter Florida, only if the Indians persevered in committing hostilities" within the limits of the United States." No such hostilities were committed. Even the attack on Scott's party, provoked, as has been stated, by the previous destruction of Fowltown, was within the boundary of Florida. By the letter of the Secretary, dated the 16th December, General Gaines is authorized to march across the Florida line, should the Indians still refuse reparation for depredations "on our citizens; and to attack them, unless sheltered under a Spanish fort," and in the last event to notify the War Department. The documents sent us give us no information what depredations are intended by this expression in the letter, nor does it appear that any reparation was demanded of the Indians or refused by them; unless the efforts of our Indian agent for mutual reparation is referred to, which we have already mentioned, and which were in a fair train, till the wanton attack on their town put an end to pacific overtures. Where, then, is found the authority of General Jackson to march into Florida? His advocates find it in the unlimited power, conferred on him by the letter of the Secretary of the 26th of December, before mentioned. Suppose, then, the order was broad enough to warrant him in marching to Florida, and attacking the Indians, without regarding the conditions to which General Jackson had been restricted; in other words, without the necessity of pursuing invaders or punishing depredation. This is conceding much to a liberal construction of the General's military powers. But it now becomes necessary to inquire into the validity of the ground assumed for the seizure of the Spanish posts. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. HOPKINSON) has drawn a very nice and attenuated distinction between the capture of St. Marks and that of Pensacola. He thinks the former may be justified on the ground of necessity, while he admits that no sufficient justification is shown for the occupation of the latter. It requires great confidence in the rectitude of my principles to encourage me in differing from that gentleman. In the present case, I hope such a disagreement will be pardoned. He denies the validity of all General Jackson's reasons for seizing St. Marks, except the imminent danger of its falling into the hands of the Indians, and of its guns and bulwarks being thus employed against our army. Suppose, says he, two combatants see a man approaching them with a drawn sword-either of them has a right to seize it by force, if he perceives that his antagonist is about to do so. The trespass on this stranger by forcibly taking the sword, is justified by extreme necessity, as his life must be sacrificed if his antagonist should obtain possession of it. This example shows that only extreme necessity ought to be alleged to excuse the trespass; but, when it is compared with the case of St. Marks, the FEBRUARY, 1819. Seminole War. H. or R. To analogy wholly fails. Two circumstances must spect conducive to the end, is palpably absurd. concur to justify the seizure, on the ground of So sensible are the advocates of the measure of necessity-a moral certainty that the enemy this, that a gentleman from Virginia (Mr. H. would seize the fort, in case we did not; and an NELSON) had declared, that if he would withhold equal certainty, that in the enemy's possession it his thanks from General Jackson, it should be, would be fatal or extremely injurious to us. In because he had not also occupied St. Augustine! both these points, the gentleman's case is a fair And this, sir, on the principles assumed by the illustration of his argument; but in neither of General and his friends, is a just view of his conthem does the occupation of St. Marks coincide. duct; if the seizure of St. Marks and Pensacola The Indians were, indeed, admitted freely into were necessary, that of St. Augustine was at least the place, and even supplied with ammunition equally so. By leaving the strongest Spanish occasionally, in the same manner, for aught fortress untouched, all advantage was lost, which which appears, and as is alleged by the com- would have resulted from taking the other posts. mandant, as had been customary in time of peace; The Indians escaped, and, if protected by the but there is no indication of any intention on their Spanish authorities, they still have shelter under part to seize the guns and turn out the garrison, a strong post occupied by their friends. All this notwithstanding the commandant had expressed reasoning, however, goes to prove merely that no some fears of that sort long before. But, on the advantage was gained, and that anything like other hand, will it be asserted that such a seizure necessity was altogether out of the question. But by such an enemy could have been fatal, or even the gentleman last mentioned has found in his a serious annoyance to our army? In the pos- learned researches in the pages of Grotius and session of a Spanish garrison, who well under- Puffendorf, a very ingenious escape from the stood the management of its defences, it was ta- difficulty under which his hero labors, in a defiken, and taken "by violence," almost as soon as nition of the term, necessity. Besides the ordisummoned. If, therefore, the untaught savages nary meaning of the word, he finds that there is had actually obtained exclusive possession, it also mentioned a necessity of safety and a neceswould not have delayed the march of our army sity of convenience. There was, indeed, an "exa single day, scarcely an hour, in its reduction. treme necessity" for the advocates of the General Where, then, is the extreme necessity, on which to make this most convenient discovery. In this the gentleman has thought proper to justify the sense the "necessity," so often resorted to as an unwarrantable aggression on a neutral nation? excuse for outrage and injustice, will always be The capture of Pensacola and the Barancas, the most convenient talisman imaginable. No and the expulsion of the Governor and His Ca- possible violation of the Constitution, no violence, tholic Majesty's garrison, are placed on a basis no crime, will ever want a justification. still more tottering and untenable. The harbor-state the gentleman's argument fairly, however, ing, and even supplying the Indians, cannot, with he thinks the "necessity of safety" is the ground any shadow of sound argument, be alleged as a to be assumed in General Jackson's vindication pretext for immediate attack on our part. If all in the present case. It is easy to show that this which was asserted by our commander, and much phrase is as flexible in its application as the nemore, were admitted to be true, for the sake of cessity of convenience. What is safety? While the argument, though it is in a great measure Indians exist, while Spain holds fortresses on this denied or explained by Don Masot, it ought to continent, we can never be properly safe. Spain have been reported by the General to the War must be dispossessed, the savages exterminated Department, agreeably to the tenor of General from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, to the Stony Gaines's orders. The Executive could then have Mountains, to Columbia river, from the Isthmus decided what course comported with the alleged of Darien to the Yellow Stone river, and the necessity of seizure, as well as with our relations northern extreme of the polar region. The newith Spain, and, above all, with its own Consti- cessity of safety, therefore, will vie the necessity tutional powers. Since necessity and self-defence of convenience in affording a broad canopy for are the alleged ground of seizure, let us see how the shelter of every assailant of liberty, or of the far "defence," or any other useful purpose, has rights of peaceful nations on our frontiers. been effected by it. No Indians were captured Let us examine, however, the grounds on which in Pensacola or the Barancas, the aged Alabama the General himself has thought proper to justify chief only excepted; none were killed or destroyed the captures. "The immutable principle of selfin consequence of the occupation of those places. defence" is again and again resorted to; in his The four or five hundred, mentioned in the Gen-letters to the Governor and commander of the eral's letter, made their escape, and cannot be the less hostile, by seeing Pensacola in possession of the American forces. Their expulsion from the place had been completely effected by Major Young, to whom all that remained had been sur rendered. What advantage, then, was gained in the war by capturing the place? None, certainly. To say that a measure was dictated by the necessity of self-defence, when so far from being necessary, it was not even useful, or in any re15th CoN. 2d SESS.-32 A fortresses; in his official letters to the Department of War; in the general orders to the army. The immutable principle of self-defence! powerful army pursuing a fugitive race of half armed and unresisting savages; not once encountered by those timid foes, whose half-starved families were unable even to escape by the most precipitate flight. Such an army seizes the posts and garrisons of a nation with whom we are at peace, to enable itself to make a "defence" against such an enemy or phantom of an enemy. Oh, strange perversion of language! Never let us listen to such a subterfuge. Far better is it to speak out and exhibit to the world the true reasons, which in those same documents sufficiently appear. Whilst the miserable subterfuge of self-defence is so often repeated, we see by its side the real motives, by which the commander was evidently actuated in the whole campaign. In his letter to the Secretary of the 5th of May, 1818, the General states, that while Spain has not the power or will to preserve her Indians at peace with us, "no security can be given to our southern frontier without occupying a cordon of posts along the seashore." This must mean Pensacola, St. Marks, St. Augustine, and any other convenient places for forts. In his letter of the 8th of April preceding, besides the other reasons, he says, "St. Marks was necessary as a depot to 'insure success to my operations; these consid'erations determined me to occupy it with an 'American force." After the occupation of Pensacola and the expulsion of the Spanish garrison, he seems much gratified with the acquisitions he has made, and speaks of them as conquered territory. In his letter to the Secretary of the 2d of June, 1818, he says, "the articles," between himself and the Spanish Governor, "with but one condition, amount to a complete cession to 'the United States of that portion of the Floridas 'hitherto under the government of Don Jose 'Masot." Afterwards, in the same letter, he states that Captain Gadsden is instructed to report, among other things, "what new works should be erected to give permanent security to this important territorial addition to our Republic." Such open avowals lead us unavoidably to the conclusion, that the object of the General was conquest, and conquest alone; that he merely sought pretexts for acts of hostility in allegations of unfriendly acts or weakness on the part of the Spanish commanders. FEBRUARY, 1819. of our constant efforts for years past to acquire the Floridas. We have not attempted to conceal them. Our negotiations with Spain have been made public from time to time, and our construction of the treaty, by which Louisiana was ceded, our consequent occupation of a great part of West Florida, our recent seizure of Amelia Island, on its coast, and many other circumstances connected with this territory, have all been attentively watched by European sovereigns. They have seen in them, or have affected to see, no faint imitation of the ambitious and unprincipled cupidity, which characterizes the policy of monarchical Governments. They have scarcely abstained from reproach, though our diplomatists have most ably vindicated our principles in those measures. But now, when we have seized the remainder of West and East Florida, with the single exception of St. Augustine, with no other justification than such miserable pretexts as have been adverted to, what diplomatic skill, what eloquence, can interpose its brazen shield, and repel the bitter taunts and indignant reproaches of all the civilized world? Under such a load of contumely the proudest Republican must have sunk with shame. Mr. Chairman, I rejoice to say that our Executive was not insensible to the situation of our country's honor, to the imperative claim of principle, and the insignificance of any acquisition of territory, compared with national character. The places were ordered to be restored, and the restoration is a disavowal of the acts of the General in their seizure. As far as our national character is concerned, let us hope that the disavowal and restoration will be deemed a sufficient ablution from the stain of injustice. I am well aware, that it has been attempted to involve the Executive in the odium, and it is not without great satisfaction I am able to declare that I think the attempt has been unsuccessful. If it were otherwise, however, I trust I should not shrink from my duty, or labor to palliate a series of aggression on a neighboring nation, which the impartial world could not but condemn. Sir, I have perfect confidence in the integrity and magnanimous principles of the Executive and his Constitutional counsellors. I do not be- Those who would identify the Executive with lieve that any orders were given to the General, General Jackson, in the censurable acts of the except those which are disclosed to Congress and campaign, in their anxiety to prove their case are to the world-no others are mentioned or hinted scarcely discreet in some of their arguments. at by himself, or by those who undertake his They begin with the letter of the Secretary of defence. To my mind this is perfectly satisfac- War of the 26th December, 1817, to the General, tory. But, sir, let us remember that the eyes of in which he is first ordered to take the field. European nations are upon all our measures. They find unlimited power conveyed to him in Republican America must expect a strict scrutiny the closing sentence-" With this view, you may of her policy and her principles; she ought to be be prepared to concentrate your force, and to prepared for such a scrutiny; she ought to invite adopt the necessary measures to terminate a it. To pass this ordeal with honor to our Repub'conflict which it has ever been the desire of the lican character, for the sake of general freedom, President, from considerations of humanity to and to disappoint the calumniators of Republics, 'avoid." &c. "The necessary measures," are, should be pre-eminently the object of our enlight- by these reasoners, interpreted to mean all or any ened Government. In this view I cannot but measures, at the General's discretion, which think the Seminole campaign, and especially might have a tendency to terminate the war. the seizure of the Spanish posts, as peculiarly un- An honorable gentleman from New York (Mr. fortunate. Acquitting, as I do, our Government TALLMADGE) attributed the broad terms of this from all participation in the occupation of those order to the news then recently received at Washposts, I cannot expect foreign nations will viewington, of the destruction of Lieutenant Scott's it with the same eye. They are well apprized party by the Indians; but could an attack by 6 6 |