cessity whatever, agree to the motion, assuring them that, in three or four weeks, possibly in less time, he might himself be a friend to it, and would promote it.

Mr. PINCKNEY, in reply, contended, that if the measures pursuing by Massachusetts were such as had been stated, he did not think the United States bound to give them countenance. He thought them impolitic, and not to be reconciled with the genius of free governments; and if fresh commotions should spring from them, that the state of Massachusetts alone should be at the charge, and abide by the consequences of their own misconduct.

Mr. MADISON would not examine whether the original views of Congress, in the enlargement of their military force, were proper or not; nor whether it were so, to mask their views with an ostensible preparation against the Indians. He admitted, indeed, that it appeared rather difficult to reconcile an interference of Congress in the internal controversies of a state with the tenor of the Confederation, which does not authorize it expressly, and leaves to the states all powers not expressly delegated, or with the principles of republican governments, which, as they rest on the sense of the majority, necessarily suppose power and right always to be on the same side. He observed, however, that, in one point of view, military precautions on the part of Congress might have a different aspect. Whenever danger was apprehended from any foreign quarter, which of necessity extended itself to the federal concerns, Congress were bound to guard against it; and although there might be no particular evidence in this case of such a meditated interference, yet there was sufficient ground for a general suspicion of readiness in Great Britain to take advantage of events in this country, to warrant precautions against her. But, waiving the question as to the original propriety of the measure adopted, and attending merely to the question whether at this moment the measure ought, from a change of circumstances, to be rescinded, he was inclined to think it would be more advisable to suspend than to go instantly into the rescision. The considerations which led to this opinion were — First. That, though it appeared pretty certain that the main body of the insurgents had been dispersed, it was by no means certain that the spirit of insurrection was subdued. The leaders, too, of the insurgents had not been apprehended, and parties of them were still in arms in disaffected places.

Secondly. That great respect is due on such occasions to the wishes and representations of the suffering member of the federal body, both of which must be judged of by what comes from her representatives on the floor. These tell us that the measures taken by Congress have given great satisfaction and spirits to their constituents, and have coöperated much in baffling the views of their internal enemies; that they are pursuing very critical precautions at this moment for their future safety and tranquillity; and that the construction which will be put on the proposed resolution, if agreed to by Congress, cannot fail to make very unhappy impressions, and may have very serious consequences. The propriety of these precautions depends on so many circumstances better known to the government of Massachusetts than to Congress, that it would be premature in Congress to be governed by a disapprobation.

Thirdly. That every state ought to bear in mind the consequences of popular commotions, if not thoroughly subdued, on the tranquillity of the Union, and the possibility of being itself the scene of them. Every state ought, therefore, to submit with cheerfulness to such indulgences to others as itself may, in a little time, be in need of. He had been a witness of the temper of his own state (Virginia) on this occasion. It was understood by the legislature that the real object of the military preparations on foot was the disturbances in Massachusetts, and that very consideration inspired the ardor which voted, towards their quota, a tax on tobacco, which would not have been granted for scarce any other purpose whatever, being a tax operating very partially, in the opinion of the people of that state who cultivate that article; yet this class of the legislature were almost unanimous in making the sacrifice, because the fund was considered as the most certain that could be provided.

Fourthly. That it was probable the enlistments, for the reasons given, would be suspended without an order from Congress; in which case, the inconvenience suggested would be saved to the United States, and the wishes of Massachusetts satisfied, at the same time.

Fifthly. That as no bounty was given for the troops, and they could be dismissed at any time, the objections drawn from the consideration of expense would have but little force.

Sixthly. That it was contended for a continuance of the apparent aid of Congress for only three or four weeks, the members from Massachusetts themselves considering that as a sufficient time.

After the rejection of the motion, as stated on the Journal, a dispute arose whether the vote should be entered among the secret or public proceedings. Mr. PINCKNEY insisted that, in the former case, his view, which was to justify himself to his constituents, would be frustrated. Most of those who voted with him were opposed to an immediate publication. The expedient of a temporary concealment was proposed as answering all purposes.51

Nothing of consequence was done.

TUESDAY, February 20.

WEDNESDAY, February 21.

The report of the convention at Annapolis, in September, 1786, had been long under the consideration of a committee of Congress for the last year, and was referred over to a grand committee of the present year. The latter committee, after considerable difficulty and discussion, agreed on a report, by a majority of one only, (see the Journal,) 52 which was made a few days ago to Congress, and set down as the order for this day. The report coincided with the opinion, held at Annapolis, that the Confederation needed amendments, and that the proposed convention was the most eligible means of effecting them. The objections which seemed to prevail against the recommendation of the convention by Congress were, with some, that it tended to weaken the federal authority by lending its sanction to an extra-constitutional mode of proceeding; with others, that the interposition of Congress would be considered by the jealous as betraying an ambitious wish to get power into their hands by any plan whatever that might present itself. Subsequent to the report, the delegates from New York received instructions from its legislature to move in Congress for a recommendation of a convention; and those from Massachusetts had, it appeared, received information which led them to suppose it was becoming the disposition of the legislature of that state to send deputies to the proposed convention, in case Congress should give their sanction to it. There was reason to believe, however, from the language of the instruction from New York, that her object was to obtain a new convention, under the sanction of Congress, rather than to accede to the one on foot; or, perhaps, by dividing the plans of the states in their appointments, to frustrate all of them. The latter suspicion is in some degree countenanced by their refusal of the impost a few days before the instruction passed, and by their other marks of an unfederal disposition. The delegates from New York, in consequence of their instructions, made the motion on the Journal to postpone the report of the committee, in order to substitute their own proposition. Those who voted against it considered it as liable to the objection above mentioned. Some who voted for it, particularly Mr. MADISON, considered it susceptible of amendment when brought before Congress; and that if Congress interposed in the matter at all, it would be well for them to do it at the instance of a state, rather than spontaneously. This motion being lost, Mr. DANE, from Massachusetts, who was at bottom unfriendly to the plan of a convention, and had dissuaded his state from coming into it, brought forward a proposition, in a different form, but liable to the same objection with that from New York. After some little discussion, it was agreed on all sides, except by Connecticut, who opposed the measure in every form, that the resolution should pass as it stands on the Journal, sanctioning the proceedings and appointments already made by the states, as well as recommending further appointments from other states, but in such terms as do not point directly to the former appointments.

It appeared from the debates, and still more from the conversation among the members, that many of them considered this resolution as a deadly blow to the existing Confederation. Dr. JOHNSON, who voted against it, particularly declared himself to that effect. Others viewed it in the same light, but were pleased with it as the harbinger of a better Confederation.

The reserve of many of the members made it difficult to decide their real wishes and expectations from the present crisis of our affairs. All agreed and owned that the federal government, in its existing shape, was inefficient, and could not last long. The members from the Southern and Middle States seemed generally anxious for some republican organization of the system which would preserve the Union, and give due energy to the government of it. Mr. BINGHAM alone avowed his wishes

that the Confederacy might be divided into several distinct confederacies, its great extent and various interests being incompatible with a single government. The eastern members were suspected by some of leaning towards some anti-republican establishment, (the effect of their late confusions,) or of being less desirous or hopeful of preserving the unity of the empire. For the first time, the idea of separate confederacies had got into the newspapers. It appeared to-day under the Boston head. Whatever the views of the leading men in the Eastern States may be, it would seem that the great body of the people, particularly in Connecticut, are equally indisposed either to dissolve or divide the Confederacy, or to submit to any anti-republican innovations,53

Nothing noted till

TUESDAY, March 13.

Colonel GRAYSON and Mr. CLARK having lately moved to have the military stores at Springfield, in Massachusetts, removed to some place of greater security, the motion was referred to the secretary at war, who this day reported against the same, as his report will show. No opposition was made to the report, and it seemed to be the general sense of Congress that his reasons were satisfactory. The movers of the proposition, however, might suppose the thinness of Congress (eight states only being present) to bar any hope of successful opposition.

Memorandum.-Called with Mr. Bingham to-day on Mr. Guardoqui, and had a long conversation touching the western country, the navigation of the Mississippi, and commerce, as these objects relate to Spain and the United States, Mr. Bingham opened the conversation with intimating, that there was reason to believe the western people were exceedingly alarmed at the idea of the projected treaty which was to shut up the Mississippi, and were forming committees of correspondence, &c., for uniting their councils and interests. Mr. Guardoqui, with some perturbation, replied, that, as a friend to the United States, he was sorry for it, for they mistook their interest; but that, as the minister of Spain, he had no reason to be so. The result of what fell in the course of the conversation from Mr. Madison and Mr. Bingham was, that it was the interest of the two nations to live in harmony; that if Congress were disposed to treat with Spain on the ground of a cession of the Mississippi, it would be out of their power to enforce the treaty; that an attempt would be the means of populating the western country with additional rapidity; that the British had their eye upon that field, would countenance the separation of the western from the eastern part of North America, promote the settlement of it, and hereafter be able to turn the force springing up in that quarter against Spanish America, in cooperation with their naval armaments; that Spain offered nothing in fact to the United States in the commercial scale which she did not grant to all the other nations from motives of interest.

Mr. Guardoqui would not listen to the idea of a right to the navigation of the Mississippi by the United States, contending, that the possession of the two banks at the mouth shut the door against any such pretension. Spain never would give up this point. He lamented that he had been here so long without effecting any thing, and foresaw that the consequences would be very disagreeable.

What would those consequences be? He evaded an answer by repeating general expressions. Spain could make her own terms, he said, with Great Britain. He considered the commercial connection proposed as entirely in favor of the United States, and that in a little time the ports of Spain would be shut against fish. He was asked, whether against all fish, or only against fish from the United States. From all places not in treaty, he said, with Spain. Spain would act according to her own ideas. She would not be governed by other people's ideas of her interest.

He was very sorry for the instructions passed by Virginia; he foresaw bad consequences from them. He had written to soften the matter as well as he could, but that troops and stores would certainly reinforce New Orleans in consequence of the resolutions.

He had not conferred at all with the minister of foreign affairs since October, and did not expect to confer again. He did not expect to remain much longer in America. He wished he might not be a true prophet; but it would be found that we mistook our interest, and that Spain would make us feel the vulnerable side of our commerce by abridging it in her ports.

With an air of ostensible jocoseness, he hinted that the people of Kentucky would 9

VOL. V.

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make good Spanish subjects, and that they would become such for the sake of the privilege annexed to that character.

He seemed to be disposed to make us believe that Spain and Britain understood one another; that he knew the views of Great Britain in holding the western posts; and that Spain had it in her power to make Great Britain bend to her views. He affected a mysterious air on this point, which only proved that he was at a loss what to say to the probability and tendency of a connection between Great Britain and the western settlements, in case the Mississippi should be given up by Congress.

He intimated that Spain could not grant any inlet of the American trade by treaty; but that, in case of a treaty, trade through the Mississippi, as well as other channels, would be winked at.

In speaking of the Mississippi and the right of Spain, he alluded to the case of the Tagus, which Spain had never pretended to a right of navigating through Portugal. It was observed to him, that, in estimating the rights of nations in such cases, regard must be had to their respective proportions of territory on the river. Suppose Spain held only five acres on each side at the mouth of the Mississippi; would she pretend to an exclusive right in such case? He said, that was not the case: Spain had a great proportion. How much? After some confusion and hesitation, he said, she claimed at least as far as the Ohio. We smiled, and asked how far eastwardly from the Mississippi? He became still more at a loss for an answer, and turned it off by insinuating that he had conversed on that matter with the secretary of foreign affairs. He was reminded of the doctrine maintained by Spain, in 1608, as to the Scheldt. He seemed not to have known the fact, and resolved it into some political consideration of the times.

He was asked, whether the partition of the British empire could deprive this part of it of the rights appertaining to the king of Great Britain as king of this country; and even whether the rupture of Great Britain and Spain could deprive, in justice, the United States of rights which they held under the treaty of 1763, whilst they remained a part of the British empire; whether, in case no such rupture had happened, the treaty between Spain and that part of the empire would have been dissolved by the revolution; &c. &c. He did not seem well to understand the principles into which such questions resolved themselves, and gave them the go-by, referring the claim of Spain principally to her conquests of the British possessions in North America.

He betrayed strongly the anxiety of Spain to retard the population of the western country; observing, that whenever sufficient force should arise therein, it would be impossible for it to be controlled; that any conciliating measures that might be taken now would have little effect on their temper and views fifty or a hundred years hence, when they should be in force.

When we rose to take leave, he begged us to remember what he had said as to the inflexibility of Spain on the point of the Mississippi, and the consequences to America of her adherence to her present pretensions.54

Nothing noted till

Mr. Jay's report on the treaty of peace taken up.

TUESDAY, March 20.

Mr. YATES objected to the first resolution, which declares the treaty to be a law of the land. He said the states, or at least his state, did not admit it to be such until clothed with legal sanction. At his request he was furnished with a copy of the resolution, for the purpose of consulting such as he might choose.

The subject of yesterday resumed.

WEDNESDAY, March 21

Mr. YATES was now satisfied with the resolutions as they stood. The words "constitutionally made," as applied to the treaty, seemed to him, on consideration, to qualify sufficiently the doctrine on which the resolution was founded.

The second and third resolutions, urging on the states a repeal of all laws contravening the treaty, (first, that they might not continue to operate as violations of it, secondly, that questions might be avoided touching their validity,) underwent some criticisms and discussions.

Mr. VARNUM and Mr. MITCHELL thought they did not consist with the first,

1787.]

99

which declared such laws to be void, in which case they could not operate as violations.

Mr. MADISON observed, that a repeal of those contravening laws was expedient, and even necessary, to free the courts from the bias of their oaths, which bound the judges more strongly to the state than to the federal authority. A distinction too, he said, might be started possibly between laws prior and laws subsequent to the treaty; a repealing effect of the treaty on the former not necessarily implying the nullity of the latter. Supposing the treaty to have the validity of a law only, it would repeal all antecedent laws. To render succeeding laws void, it must have more than the mere authority of a law. In case these succeeding laws, contrary to the treaty, should come into discussion before the courts, it would be necessary to examine the foundation of the federal authority, and to determine whether it had the validity of a constitution paramount to the legislative authority in each state. This was a delicate question, and studiously to be avoided, as it was notorious that, although in some of the states the Confederation was incorporated with, and had the sanction of, their respective constitutions, yet in others it received a legislative ratification only, and rested on no other basis. He admitted, however, that the word "operate" might be changed for the better, and proposed, in its place, the words which was agreed to without op"be regarded," as violations of the treaty,

position.

Mr. KING, in the course of the business, observed, that a question had been raised in New York whether stipulations, as they might affect citizens only, and not foreigners, could restrain the states from legislating with respect to the former; and supposed that such stipulations could not.

The resolutions passed unanimously. 55
Nothing till

FRIDAY, March 23.

The report for reducing salaries agreed to, as amended, unanimously. The proposition for reducing the salary of the secretary of foreign affairs to $3000 was opposed by Mr. KING and Mr. MADISON, who entered into the peculiar duties and qualifications required in that office, and its peculiar importance. Mr. MITCHELL and Mr. VARNUM contended, that it stood on a level with the secretaryship to Congress. The yeas and nays were called on the question, and it was lost. A motion was then made to reduce the salary of $4000 to $3500. Mr. CLARK, who had been an opponent to any reduction, acceded to this compromise. Mr. King suffered his colleague to vote in the affirmative. There being six states for reducing to $3500, and Mr. CARRINGTON being on the same side, in opposition to Mr. GRAYSON, Mr. MADISON gave up his opinion to so great a majority, and the resolution for $3500 passed. The preceding yeas and nays on the motions for reducing to $3000 were then withdrawn, and no entry made of them. It seemed to be the general opinion that the salary of the secretary at war was disproportionately low, and ought to be raised. The committee would have reported an augmentation, but conceived themselves restrained by their commission, which was to reduce, not to revise, the civil list.

Nothing of consequence till

WEDNESDAY, March 28.

Mr. KING reminded Congress of the motion on the 19th of February for discontinuing the enlistments, and intimated that the state of things in Massachusetts was at present such that no opposition would now be made by the delegation of that state. A committee was appointed, in general, to consider the military establishment, and particularly to report a proper resolution for stopping the enlist

ments.

The Virginia delegates laid before Congress sundry papers from the executive of that state relating to the seizure of Spanish property by General Clark, and the mcendiary efforts on foot in the western country against the Spaniards, &c. No comment was made on them, nor any vote taken.

THURSDAY, March 29.

The committee appointed to confer with the treasury board on the great business of a fiscal settlement of the accounts of the United States reported that they be discharged, and the board instructed to report an ordinance. Mr. KING, in ex