Indians carried their hospitality so far as to offer to strangers their wives and daughters. Was this a proper model for us? He would admit them to his house, he would invite them to his table, would provide for them comfortable lodgings, but would not carry the complaisance so far as to bed them with his wife. He would let them worship at the same altar, but did not choose to make priests of them. He ran over the privileges which emigrants would enjoy among us, though they should be deprived of that of being eligible to the great offices of government; observing that they exceeded the privileges allowed to foreigners in any part of the world; and that as every society, from a great nation down to a club, had the right of declaring the conditions on which new members should be admitted, there could be no room for complaint. As to those philosophical gentlemen, those citizens of the world, as they called themselves, he owned, he did not wish to see any of them in our public councils. He would not trust them. The men who can shake off their attachments to their own country can never love any other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices which uphold all governments. Admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to increase the commerce of France: an Englishman, and he will feel an equal bias in favor of that of England. It has been said that the legislatures will not choose foreigners, at least improper ones. There was no knowing what legislatures would do. Some appointments made by them proved that every thing ought to be apprehended from the cabals practised on such occasions. He mentioned the case of a foreigner who left this state in disgrace, and worked himself into an appointment from another to Congress. On the question, on the motion of Mr. Gouverneur Morris to insert fourteen in place of four years, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no, 7. On the question for thirteen years, moved by Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, it was negatived, as above. On ten years, moved by Gen. PINCKNEY, the votes were the same. Dr. FRANKLIN reminded the Convention, that it did not follow, from an omission to insert the restriction in the Constitution, that the persons in question would be actually chosen into the legislature. Mr. RUTLEDGE. Seven years of citizenship have been required for the House of Representatives. Surely a longer time is requisite for the Senate, which will have more power. Mr. WILLIAMSON. It is more necessary to guard the Senate in this case, than the other House. Bribery and cabal can be more easily practised in the choice of the Senate, which is to be made by the legislatures, composed of a few men, than of the House of Representatives, who will be chosen by the people. Mr. RANDOLPH will agree to nine years, with the expectation that it will be reduced to seven, if Mr. Wilson's motion to recon 1 sider the vote fixing seven years for the House of Representatives should produce a reduction of that period. On the question for nine years, — New Hampshire, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 6; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, no, 4; North Carolina, divided. The term "resident" was struck out, and "inhabitant" inserted, nem. con. Article 5, sect. 3, as amended, was then agreed to, nem. con.198 Article 6, sect. 1, was then taken up. Mr. MADISON and Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved to strike out "each House," and to insert "the House of Representatives;" the right of the legislatures to regulate the times and places, &c., in the election of senators, being involved in the right of appointing them; which was disagreed to. A division of the question being called for, it was taken on the first part down to "but their provisions concerning," &c. The first part was agreed to, nem. con. Mr. PINCKNEY and Mr. RUTLEDGE moved to strike out the remaining part, viz., "but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the legislature of the United States." The states, they contended, could and must be relied on in such cases. Mr. GORHAM. It would be as improper to take this power from the national legislature, as to restrain the British Parliament from regulating the circumstances of elections, leaving this business to the counties themselves. Mr. MADISON. The necessity of a general government supposes that the state legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expense of their local convenience or prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives to the people, and not to the legislatures of the states, supposes that the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the legislatures of the states ought not to have the uncontrolled right of regulating the times, places, and manner, of holding elections. These were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot, or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place, should be divided into districts, or all meet at one place, should all vote for all the representatives, or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district, these, and many other points, would depend on the legislatures, and might materially affect the appointments. Whenever the state legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the representation in the legislatures of particular states would produce a like inequality in their representation in the national legislature, as it was presumable that the counties having the power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter. What danger could there be in giving a controlling power to the national legislature? Of whom was it to consist? First, of a Senate to be chosen by the state legislatures. If the latter, therefore, could be trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. Secondly, of representatives elected by the same people who elect the state legislatures. Surely, then, if confidence is due to the latter, it must be due to the former. It seems as improper in principle, though it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the state legislatures this great authority over the election of the representatives of the people in the general legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their representatives in the state. legislatures. Mr. KING. If this power be not given to the national legislature, their right of judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated. No probability has been suggested of its being abused by them. Although this scheme of erecting the general government on the authority of the state legislatures has been fatal to the federal establishment, it would seem as if many gentlemen still foster the dangerous idea. Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS observed, that the states might make false returns, and then make no provisions for new elections. Mr. SHERMAN did not know but it might be best to retain the clause, though he had himself sufficient confidence in the state legislatures. The motion of Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge did not prevail. The word "respectively" was inserted after the word "state." On the motion of Mr. READ, the word "their" was struck out, and "regulations in such cases," inserted, in place of "provisions concerning them," the clause then reading, "but regulations, in each of the foregoing cases, may, at any time, be made or altered by the legislature of the United States." This was meant to give the national legislature a power not only to alter the provisions of the states, but to make regulations, in case the states should fail or refuse altogether. Article 6, sect. 1, as thus amended, was agreed to, nem. con. Adjourned. 199 FRIDAY, August 10. In Convention. Article 6, sect. 2, was taken up. Mr. PINCKNEY. The committee, as he had conceived, were instructed to report the proper qualifications of property for the members of the national legislature; instead of which they have referred the task to the national legislature itself. Should it be left on this footing, the first legislature will meet without any particular qualifications of property; and, if it should happen to consist of rich men, they might fix such qualifications as may be too favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run into. He was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristrocratic influence in the Constitution, but he thought it essential that the members of the legislature, the executive, and the judges, should be possessed of compe tent property to make them independent and respectable. It was prudent, when such great powers were to be trusted, to connect the tie of property with that of reputation in securing a faithful administration. The legislature would have the fate of the nation put into their hands. The President would also have a very great influence on it. The judges would not only have important causes between citizen and citizen, but also where foreigners are concerned. They will even be the umpires between the United States and individual states, as well as between one state and another. Were he to fix the quantum of property which should be required, he should not think of less than one hundred thousand dollars for the President, half of that sum for each of the judges, and in like proportion for the members of the national legislature. He would, however, leave the sums blank. His motion was, that the President of the United States, the judges, and members of the legislature, should be required to swear that they were respectively possessed of a clear unincumbered estate, to the amount of in the case of the President, &c., &c. Mr. RUTLEDGE seconded the motion; observing, that the committee had reported no qualifications, because they could not agree on any among themselves, being embarrassed by the danger, on one side, of displeasing the people, by making them high, and, on the other, of rendering them nugatory, by making them low. Mr. ELLSWORTH. The different circumstances of different parts of the United States, and the probable difference between the present and future circumstances of the whole, render it improper to have either uniform or fixed qualifications. Make them so high as to be useful in the Southern States, and they will be inapplicable to the Eastern States. Suit them to the latter, and they will serve no purpose in the former. In like manner, what may be accommodated to the existing state of things among us may be very inconvenient in some future state of them. He thought, for these reasons, that it was better to leave this matter to the legislative discretion, than to attempt a provision for it in the Constitution. Dr. FRANKLIN expressed his dislike to every thing that tended to debase the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the companion of wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation, it was not less true that the possession of property increased the desire of more property. Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with were the richest rogues. We should remember the character which the Scripture requires in rulers, that they should be men hating covetousness. This Constitution will be much read and attended to in Europe; and, if it should betray a great partiality to the rich, will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most liberal and enlightened men there, but discourage the common people from removing to this country. The motion, of Mr. Pinckney was rejected by so general a no, that the states were not called. Mr. MADISON was opposed to the section, as vesting an improper and dangerous power in the legislature. The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a republican government, and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy, as well by limiting the number capable of being elected as the number authorized to elect. In all cases where the representatives of the people will have a personal interest distinct from that of their constituents, there was the same reason for being jealous of them as there was for relying on them with full confidence, when they had a common interest. This was one of the former cases. It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own privileges. It was a power, also, which might be made subservient to the views of one faction against another. Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised by the stronger in order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction. Mr. ELLSWORTH admitted that the power was not unexceptionable, but he could not view it as dangerous. Such a power with regard to the electors would be dangerous, because it would be much more liable to abuse. Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved to strike out "with regard to property," in order to leave the legislature entirely at large. Mr. WILLIAMSON. This would surely never be admitted. Should a majority of the legislature be composed of any particular description of men, of lawyers, for example, which is no improbable supposition, the future elections might be secured to their own body. Mr. MADISON observed that the British Parliament possessed the power of regulating the qualifications, both of the electors and the elected; and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had inade the changes, in both cases, subservient to their own views, or to the views of political or religious parties. On the question on the motion to strike out "with regard to property," Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, ay, 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no, 7. (In the printed Journal, Delaware did not vote.) Mr. RUTLEDGE was opposed to leaving the power to the legislature. He proposed that the qualifications should be the same as for members of the state legislatures. Mr. WILSON thought it would be best, on the whole, to let the section go out. A uniform rule would probably never be fixed by the legislature; and this particular power would constructively exclude every other power of regulating qualifications. On the question for agreeing to article 6, sect. 2, — New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Georgia, ay, 3; Connecticut, New Jersey, Penn sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no, 7.200 |