But many commentators have supposed that the first Christians privately cherished an opinion, that their conversion to Christianity entitled them to an exemption from the civil authority of the Roman power. And therefore to refute this error, St. Paul teaches the Christian convert to obey the magistrate "for the Lord's sake;"-"not only for wrath, but for conscience' sake;"-" that there is no power but of God:" that the powers that are in possession of the actual and necessary authority of civil government," are ordained of God," and, consequently, entitled to receive obedience from those who profess themselves the peculiar servants of God. St. Peter, likewise, briefly describing the office of "civil governors, the punishment of evil-doers, and the praise of them that do well," justly infers, from the use of government, the duty of subjection; which duty, being as extensive as the reason on which it is founded, belongs to Christians no less than to the heathen members of the community. If, then, the two apostles wrote with a view to this particular question, their words cannot fairly be transferred to a question totally different; nor can the arguments which were used in teaching a primitive convert, who disputed the jurisdiction of the Roman government over a disciple of Christianity, be applied to him who acknowledges the general authority of the state over all its subjects, but doubts whether that authority be not, in some important branch of it, so ill constituted or abused, as to warrant the endeavors of the people to bring about a reformation by force. It is true, that neither the Scriptures, nor any history of the early ages of the church, furnish direct proof of the existence of such disaffected sentiments amongst the primitive converts. They, however, supply some circumstances, which render probable the opinion, that extravagant notions of the political rights of Christians were entertained by many early proselytes to the religion. From the question proposed to Christ,

90 What was probable the reason for St. Paul's giving any instructions on this subject?

91 What would follow if the two apostles were shown to have written with a view to this particular question?

92 From what application would it debar the argument?

93 Are we certain that the primitive Christians had the opinions which were just now ascribed to them?

94 What circumstances render it probable ?

"Is it lawful to give tribute unto Cæsar?" it may be presumed, that doubts had been started by the Jews concerning the lawfulness of submission to the Roman yoke; and the accounts delivered by Josephus, of various insurrections of the Jews, excited on this pretence, confirm this presumption. Now, as the Christians were at first taken chiefly from the Jews, it is not to be wondered at, that a tenet, so flattering to the self-importance of those who embraced it, should have been communicated to the new institution. Again, the teachers of Christianity were wont to extol, amongst other privileges which their religion conferred on its professors, the " liberty, in which Christ had made them free." This liberty, by which was merely intended a deliverance from the dominion of sinful passions, the superstition of the Gentile idolatry, and the encumbered ritual of the Jewish dispensation, might be interpreted by some to signify an emancipation from all restraint, imposed by any authority merely human. At least, they might be represented by their enemies as maintaining notions of this dangerous tendency. To some error or calumny of this kind, the words of St. Peter seem to allude :-" For so is the will of God, that with well-doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men: as free, and not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, (that is, sedition,) but as the servants of God."

After so full an account of what seems to be the general design and doctrine of these much-agitated passages, little need be added in explanation of particular clauses. St. Paul has said, "Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." This has been considered as an authority for the most superstitious views of the regal character. But surely by such opinions, truth has been sacrificed to adulation; for, 1. The expression is just as applicable to the elective magistrates of a pure republic as to an absolute hereditary monarch; and, 2. It is not the supreme magistrate individually; but the officer, be he high or low, to whom

95 What was extolled by the first teachers of Christianity?

96 How might this have been interpreted?

97 What passage renders this probable?

98 What has been said of the passage, "resisteth the ordinance of God?"

99 What two reasons prove this view to be wrong?

obedience is due. The divine right of kings is, like the divine right of constables, a right ratified by the Divine approbation, so long as obedience to their authority appears to be conducive to the common welfare. Princes are ordained of God only so far as his will sanctions every law of society which promotes the happiness of man; and thus, without any repugnancy to the words of St. Paul, they are by St. Peter denominated the "ordinance of man.'

CHAP. V.-CIVIL LIBERTY.

Civil liberty is the not being restrained by any law, but what conduces in a greater degree to the public welfare. To do what we will is natural liberty; to do what we will, consistently with the interests of the community, is civil liberty, and the only liberty desirable in civil society.

To do what one likes is certainly pleasant; but if all could indulge in this pleasure, (and if one may, all may ;) the liberty of each person would receive so many checks and obstacles from the liberty of others, that it would be much less than if all together with himself were subjected to equal laws.

The boasted liberty of a state of nature is found only in solitude. In a state of society the liberty of each is increased by the restraint thrown on all; because each gains more from the limitation of the freedom of others, than he loses from the diminution of his own. Natural liberty is like the right of common upon a waste; civil liberty is like the right of the enjoyment of an enclosure.

Since, then, the greater happiness of the many is the only ground for restraining the liberty of the individual, and as restraint is a positive evil; it will be necesssary for the legislature, before it inflicts that evil, to show that the private injury will be outweighed by some public good. And, if no such good is likely to result, the restraint ought not to be

100 What is the divine right of kings?

101 In what sense are princes ordained of God?

102 What is civil liberty?

103 How does civil liberty differ from natural liberty?

104 Is it expedient that we should always do as we please?

105 Where is found the liberty of the state of nature?

106 What effect has restraint on a community in a state of society? 107 How is this proved and illustrated?

108 What duty of the legislature follows from the preceding remarks?

imposed; or, if it has been imposed, it ought immediately to be withdrawn as soon as it is found that no actual good has been the result. Nor is it necessary that the subject should prove that there has evil actually resulted from it.

And also, because the amount of actual liberty is greater as the number and severity of restrictions either useless or partially useful are less, and vice versâ; it follows, that some liberty is possessed by every people; perfect liberty, by none. And that, as it may be enjoyed under every form of government, and is never entirely lost under any; all those phrases about a free people, or a nation of slaves, are intelligible only when taken in a comparative sense.

Hence, also, we are enabled to apprehend the distinction between personal and civil liberty. A citizen of the freest republic in the world may be imprisoned for his crimes; and, though his personal freedom be restrained by bolts and fetters, yet so long as his confinement is the effect of a beneficial public law, his civil liberty is not invaded. If, then, the coercion of a prison be compatible with a state of civil freedom, there must be the same compatibility in those more moderate constraints which government imposes on the will of the individual. It is not the rigor, but the inexpediency, of laws, which makes the execution of them tyrannical.

There is another idea of civil liberty, which though neither so simple nor so accurate as the former, agrees better with the common signification affixed to the term.

This idea makes liberty to consist, not merely in an actual exemption from the constraint of useless and noxious laws, but in the security from the danger of having such hereafter imposed or exercised. Thus, in England, the act of parliament, in the reign of Henry VIII., which gave to the king's proclamation the force of law, has properly been called a complete surrender of the liberty of the nation; and would have been equally so, even if no proclamation had been issued in pursuance of these new powers. The security was gone. Were it probable that the interests of the people would be as

109 What facts follow from this account?

110 Explain the difference between personal and civil liberty. 111 What is justified by the example here cited?

112 What is tyranny in government?

113 What is the more general idea of civil liberty?

114 Give an example.

115 What would render despotism a free government ?

studiously consulted by a despotic prince as by a popular assembly, absolute despotism would be as free as the purest democracy.

Various as appear to be the definitions given of civil liberty, yet do they in fact all agree; for, as they all relate only to the different guards by which civil liberty is to be protected, they only present different views of an object really one and the same.

Thus, liberty is defined by one writer to consist in the right of the subject to be governed by no laws but those he has actually or virtually assented to; another places liberty in the separation of the legislative and executive powers of the state; a third, in being governed by laws, known, positive, and inflexible; a fourth, in taxation and representation being co-existent; a fifth, in the freedom and purity of election; and a sixth, in the control of the people over the military.

To these and similar definitions, however, it may fairly be objected, that they do not so much define civil liberty, as describe the preservatives of it.

Truth cannot be destroyed by an incorrect definition, but propriety may be offended at it; hence, any definition ought to be rejected, which makes essential to the idea of civil freedom, what is unattainable in reality; because it gives rise to expectations that cannot be gratified, and to complaints that no government can remove.

That state is, in fact, the most free, where the best provision is made for the ready enactment of salutary laws.

CHAP. VI. DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.

["From the preceding chapters, we learn, that government of some sort springs out of society; and that society cannot exist without it. It is the only security against foreign foes, and against the wrongs which the members of a society may do against each other; and the only agency by which jus

116 Is there actually any disagreement in the various definitions of civil liberty? Why?

117 Mention six different definitions.

118 What fault have they all?

119 What definitions of it should we reject? Why?

120 Where in fact is the most liberty?

121 What have we learned from the preceding chapters!

122 What is the use of civil government?