A knowledge of this feeling led some of Cromwell's party to advise his assumption of the title and ensigns of royalty, with a view to satisfy those, who would otherwise be offended at the novel name of Protector; while a similar perception of the magic of a name led others to oppose the measure, through the fear that veneration paid to titles, would endanger the liberty of the commonwealth. 3. That the government may be too secure. Although the greatest tyrants have been those, whose titles were the least questioned; still, when they became too secure in the opinion of their rights, their lofty notions have received a check either by a partial deprivation of their power, or by an entire disruption of their authority. [The latter effect was seen in our revolution, which absolved us from all allegiance to Great Britain.] 4. That as a want of communication amongst the disaffected is one of the principal preservatives of civil authority, every state ought to prevent its subjects from congregating in masses. Because, as such bodies are influenced by a similarity of interests on questions of religion or polity, they are wont to offer the most desperate resistance to authority; since one and all feel, that subjected equally to oppression, they can break it only by united exertions. Hence, there is danger of collecting men into large towns or crowded districts, as is done for the purposes of trade in manufacturing countries. In such cases, the many soon learn the secret of their strength, and impart confidence to each other by assurances of mutual support; while the propinquity of habitation, and intercourse of employment, enable the passions and counsels of the combined parties to circulate with ease and rapidity; so that the most dreadful uproars frequently arise from the slightest provocations. Such means are like a train that is laid, which needs only a spark to produce an explosion. CHAP. III.DUTY OF SUBMISSION TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT. The last chapter touched on the motives which lead to civil obedience; the present relates to a different point, viz. the reasons which make that obedience a duty. 33 What is the third caution? Illustrate. 34 What is the fourth caution? Why? Illustrate. 35 What is the difference between the subject of this chapter, and that of the last? To prove civil obedience to be a moral duty, Locke and others have referred to a supposed compact between the citizen and the state, which, like other compacts, is binding on the parties; and as the citizen has in such compact promised fidelity, he is morally bound to keep his promise. This compact has been represented as twofold. 1. Express, and entered into by the founders of the state, convened for the purpose of settling the terms of their political union. At that time, the whole body agreed to be bound by the decisions of the majority; which, either then or subsequently fixed some fundamental regulations, and then constituted a standing legislature, composed of one or more persons who were appointed according to their primary rules. To this legislature they deputed the power of making laws, to which, all, according to the original compact, were bound to conform. This transaction is sometimes called the social compact; and the original resolutions compose what are called the fundamental laws of the constitution, which are appealed to as the ground for the prerogative of the rulers, and the birth-right of the people. 2. Tacit, and adopted by all who succeeded the founders ; and who, by accepting the protection of the society, virtually consented to abide by its laws; just as, at present, he who enters a private society, tacitly engages to conform to its rules, since he knows that he is admitted only on such terms. But this account of the matter is false in fact; and, if it were true, it would not be admissible, as it leads to dangerous conclusions. No such compact was ever made; for it could not have been made, without supposing, what is impossible, that savages could deliberate on topics which civil life alone suggested. But though no government began from this original, some imitation of a social compact might have taken place at a revolution. In these United States, for instance, the people 36 How have some proved that civil obedience is a moral duty? 37 What is the first kind of the supposed compact? 38 What are the conditions of this contract? 39 What is this transaction called? 40 What is the result of it? 41 What is the second kind of the compact? 42 Is this account true? 43 Why must it be false? 44 What may be a near imitation of such a compact? 45 Give an example. did assemble to elect deputies for the express purpose of forming a constitution; and the deputies so elected did frame a government, and erect a perpetual legislature, invested with the power of making laws, which should be binding on the very people by whom that legislature had been elected. Yet even here much was presumed to be already settled: for even the qualifications of voters, and the mode of electing the representatives, were modeled after the older forms of government. And as in our national origin, there was wanting that from which every social union should set off, and which alone makes the resolution of the society the act of each individual, viz. the willing consent of all to be bound by the decision of the majority; the compulsory obedience of the minority became an act of oppression on the part of the majority, and at variance with the equity requisite for a civil union. But, it is said, the existence of this original compact is merely assumed, with a view to explain the grounds of the relative duties of rulers and subjects. To this it is replied, that if the compact did not exist in reality, it can afford no foundation for real duties. But so far from this compact being considered as a fiction, it is constantly appealed to as a reality, whenever mention is made of the fundamental laws of the constitution, of the inherent rights of the prince or people, or of usages transcending the authority of the exist ing legislature. And the object of such appeal is to show, that as certain rules were established when the government was first settled, and as all subsequent assemblies derive their rights only from the primitive one; the former can in no wise exceed the limits which were prescribed to it by the latter. They say moreover, that the primitive members of the state differ from their successors in this alone, that the former bound themselves to obey the government by an express stipulation, whereas the allegiance of the latter, is tacitly confirmed by the performance of certain duties, in 46 Why was it not a complete instance of the social compact? 47 What was wanting in our national origin? 48 Is it contended that there ever was actually such a compact? 49 But what is the idea of its existence when it is appealed to ? 50 What is the object of the appeal? 51 How do those who appeal to it devolve its obligation upon the moderns? return for protection and the possession of certain privileges. But this argument crumbles under close examination. For in all stipulations, expressed or implied, the parties concerned must not only possess the liberty of assent or refusal, but be conscious also of possessing such liberty. Now, so far from possessing this liberty either in fact or in idea, the subjects of modern states are not conscious even of the existence of any such stipulation with the government, by virtue of which they are free to choose whether they will or will not be bound by the acts of the legislature; and while ignorant that a mutual promise of protection and obedience has been required and given, they do not, even for a moment, believe that the validity or authority of the law depends on their recognition or assent. Now, as no arguments can excuse or supply this defect of a consciousness of liberty, all suppositions built on such defective principles must be erroneous. Still less is it possible to reconcile, with any idea of stipulation, the practice of founding allegiance on the accidental circumstances of birth; that is, of claiming as subjects those who are born within the dominions of a parti cular state. And, further, if the subject be bound only by the express stipulation of his progenitors, or his own tacit consent as expressed by his act of residence in the country; how can we defend the right, which all sovereigns claim, of preventing their subjects from leaving the realm? But, in truth, the whole question about the supposed social compact would merit little discussion, and less opposition, did it not lead to conclusions unfavorable to the happiness of society, by starting questions that ought not to be mooted, by perpetuating evils that ought to be abolished, and by giving rise to constant changes of government.. 1. For if a subsisting legislature derives all its authority only from inheriting certain powers granted by the primitive convention, and if those powers are limited by certain resolutions, supposed to have been framed by such an assembly; not only may the deliberations of the legislature be embarrassed, but even its authority endangered. For as it is 52 Is this argument correct? Why? 53 What reasons against it may be shown by founding allegiance on circumstances of birth or residence? 54 Why is this theory worthy of discussion? 55 What is the first unfavorable conclusion that it would lead to ? 56 Why would that conclusion be injurious? impossible to determine the number or nature of such supposititious fundamentals, any point may be agitated as one of them, and thus become the pretext for disputing law, whenever it may suit our individual interest. 2. If the subject owes obedience by virtue of a compact, he is compelled to abide by that form of government which he finds established, however inconvenient or absurd it may be. Because, by the law of contracts, no one can retreat from an engagement on the ground of the inconvenience of its performance. But if the social compact is not to follow the general law of contracts, it is an abuse of terms to call the relation between the state and subject by such a name; and a mere waste of time to reason on such misnomers, which can lead only to misunderstanding. It is true that such a compact will justify the subject in resisting any encroachments made or designed by the state on his liberty; but he can have no right to resist the established form of the government, and still less can he attempt to alter it without the assent of the governors. And as governors are not likely to assent to any diminution of their power, he will be morally obliged to submit to the despot under whom he may be living, if that despot, in exacting the most rigorous servitude, still keeps within the terms of the agreement. When the state endeavors to step beyond the contract, the people may vindicate their rights by force; but to impose any new limitations on the reigning power, and in opposition to it, would be an infraction of the original compact. 3. If the duty of allegiance be founded on agreement, and if there be any analogy between the rules of the social compact and of contracts in general; every violation of such agreement on the part of the rulers, would dissolve the government, precisely as other contracts are dissolved by a similar violation on one side. Now, as the terms of the original compact exist nowhere positively, they can only be inferred; and as different inferences may be drawn by different parties from the same undefined view of the prerogatives of the government, and of the rights of the people; both eventually will, in vindication of their respective 57 What is the second unfavorable conclusion from it? 58 Why would that follow? 59 Why must the social compact follow the law of contracts? 60 Would this unfavorable conclusion follow in its full extent? 61 What would be the probable result? R |