to find no indulgence except in the piety and partiality of children.

Since the chief points of difference between parents and children relate to marriage, or to the choice of a profession, it is necessary to define the respective duties of the parties.

A parent is bound to increase the happiness of his child. Hence, if it be the case that there is such an exclusive attachment between individuals of different sexes, that their union is necessary for their happiness; or if a child has an unconquerable aversion to a particular profession; the parent ought not to urge his authority against the will of the child, and the child is not bound to obey it. Nor is the parent justifiable in holding out any threats of present or future displeasure for a non-compliance with his caprice. All that he can fairly do, is to represent correctly his view of the step to be taken, and to require of the child to give himself such time for reflection as will enable him to see whether his present feelings are of a permanent nature or not; and should the result of such reflection be only a confirmation of the child's previous resolution, the parent is bound to yield. And on the other hand, the child is bound to act fairly with his parent; and to try faithfully whether time and reflection will not destroy his previous predilection; and not enter upon the experiment with the design of obtaining his end at last, by means of a temporary compliance.

A parent has no right to urge his child upon a marriage to which he is averse. This case differs from the other only in the intensity of the suffering, because it is easier to live without a person that we love than with one whom we hate. Add to this, such compulsion leads to prevarication in the promise of affection; and all authority ceases, when obedience becomes criminal.

In all contests between parents and children, the parent should represent to the child the consequences of his con

526 What are the most serious contentions between parents and children?

527 What is the duty of each party in case of exclusive attachment, on the part of the child, to a particular person; and of an aversion to a particular profession?

528 What should, and what should not a parent do in such cases? 529 And to what acts is the child bound?

530 May a parent urge his child to an unwilling marriage?

531 What may a parent do in such cases?

duct. And this should be done with fidelity, and not with exaggeration, as is usual with some parents, who defeat their own end by losing all credit with their children. If the child be competent to judge for itself, the parent's right to interference ceases with the necessity for its use. Hence, for instance, if a secret is confided to a child, the parent has no right to demand the disclosure of it. Neither can he require the violation of any trust reposed in him; for as the son was expected to pursue his own judgment, so is he bound to do so, without the interference of the parent in any way.

The duty of children to their parents, as ordained in the decalogue, is confirmed directly by Christ in many parts of the gospel. And it is recognised indirectly by his reproof of the casuistry of the Jews, who attempted to evade the positive duty of supporting their indigent parents, by pretending to devote to the service of God the sum which the parents were entitled to demand.

By the Jewish law, disobedience to parents was an offence which the magistrate could punish with death.* And under the Christian dispensation, St. Paul enjoins children to be obedient to their parents, because "it is right," or "wellpleasing unto the Lord."

532 Has a parent any right to interfere where a trust has been reposed in his child? Why?

533 Is a child bound to support his indigent parents?

534 How did the Jews punish disobedience to parents?

535 What is the New Testament injunction upon the subject?

* Deut. xxi. 18.

† Eph. vi. 1.

N

+ Col. iii. 20.

BOOK IV.

DUTIES TO OURSELVES.

STRICTLY speaking, there are few duties or crimes which begin and end with a man's self. We have reserved, however, to this head,-1. The rights of self-defence; 2. The crime of drunkenness; and, 3. The crime of suicide.

CHAP. I.-RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE.

It has been said, that in a state of nature, a man may defend a perfect right, however trifling, at any cost. But this is doubtful because, 1. No general rule is worth sustaining at such an expense; and, 2. It cannot tend to general happiness, that one man should lose a limb or his life, merely that another may save a little property. Still, as a perfect right depends on its value alone, and as it is impossible to ascertain when the value will justify the extremity of violence in its defence; the person attacked must decide, as he best may, between the general consequence of yielding, and the particular effect of resistance.

But in civil society this right is, at all events, suspended. For there, either the property is protected against attacks, or, if it is destroyed, the law is at hand to grant reparation; and as, in either case, the party receives the assistance of the law, so is he bound to receive from that alone, the kind, as well as the measure, of the satisfaction he is to obtain.

But if, instead of property, life be endangered, every defence, even to the destruction of the assailant, is justifiable. For it cannot be shown that a man is bound by the law of nature to prefer another person's life to his own; a maxim which even the expression of "love thy neighbor as thyself,"

1 Do many duties and crimes belong exclusively to one's self?

2 What part of morals may, however, be classed under the head of duties to ourselves?

3 What has been the opinion of some on the defence of our rights?

4 Is there any doubt of this? Why?

5 How is this extremity of right suspended in civil society?

6 Is there any doubt of our having a right to defend our lives?

7 Why may we proceed to extremities in this case?

does not require. And our living in civil society does not alter the case; for the law, by the supposition, does not grant protection; and it surely cannot make us reparation. The rule is of course restrained to extreme cases; and when, after all other means of escape having been ineffectually tried, the question is at last whether ourselves or the other party must perish. This rule holds, whether the danger proceeds from an enemy, or from a maniac, or even from a drowning person dragging us after him into the water.

The case which, next to the defence of life, would justify acts of extremity, is the defence of chastity; for there the law can make no reparation. With the exception of these two cases, homicide is unjustifiable, unless when authorized by the law. A man may take upon himself the execution of the law, 1. To prevent the commission of a crime against himself, which, if committed, would be punishable with death; and, 2. To put down riots or similar acts of hostility to the government. But as, in both cases, the individual is merely an agent of the law, he is bound by the rules of the law; and, consequently, though he may kill a housebreaker at night, he must not do so in the day-time ;* nor can he fire on a mob till the riot act has first been read.

CHAP. II.-DRUNKENNESS.

By drunkenness is here meant habitual intemperance; although the guilt and danger is applicable in a certain degree to each specific act of intoxication, because habit is only a repetition of single instances.

The guilt of drunkenness is to be estimated from the tendency of its mischievous effects. 1. It leads to acts or words

8 Does living in civil society affect this right? Why? 9 In what cases only may we exercise this liberty?

10 To what other circumstances is this rule applicable?

11 What other defence may be pursued to the same extremity? 12 In all other cases how must we consider the taking of life?

13 When is homicide justifiable by the law?

14 In our inquiries, what shall we mean by drunkenness ?

15 In doing this, shall we say that any specific act of intemperance is

not blameable? Why?

16 Repeat the six mischievous effects of intemperance.

* This distinction, by a remarkable consent of legislation, is found in the laws of Judea, Greece, and Rome.

of anger or lewdness; 2. It disqualifies men for the performance of the duties of their station: 3. It leads to extravagance : 4. It produces unhappiness to the drunkard's family shortens life and, lastly, it corrupts by example,

5. It

But it may be said that the age and temperature of one drunkard may leave little to fear from the inflammation of anger or lust; that the fortune of a second may not be injured by the expense; a third may have no family; and the constitution of a fourth may even defy the effects of drinking. Still, drunkenness is a social vice, and if an effect be produced by the drunkard's example, which would not be produced without it, his guilt is to be estimated by the mischievous effect of that example operating on persons who are less able, either from their means or constitution, to guard themselves against those evils from which he himself may be secure.

Drunkenness is repeatedly forbidden by St. Paul,* as inconsistent with the Christian profession.

It has been asked, how far is a drunken man responsible for his acts?

The answer is, if the man be so drunk as to lose all consciousness, his guilt, as regards the mischief done, is no more than that of an insane man. He is, however, chargeable with the guilt of wilfully getting drunk; and as the unintentional mischief was the result of the wilful drunkenness, or at least of drunkenness not wilfully avoided, the guilt of the drunkard is to be measured by the probability that such mischief would be the result of his drunkenness. Hence, the guilt of a drunken man's act of mischief, bears the same proportion to that of a sober man's similar act, that the probability of such act's being the result of drunkenness bears to absolute certainty. All acts, which are the certain effects of drunkenness, attach nearly the same guilt when done by an intoxicated man, as when done by a man in his sober senses.

17 What expostulations may be used against our condemning drunkenness on account of these effects?

18 What answer may be given to such remarks?

19 Is drunkenness forbidden in the Scriptures?

20 What is an important question on this subject?

21 Has the drunkard any guilt as it regards the mischief itself? 22 Has he any guilt at all? How is it measured?

23 What results from this rule?

Rom. xiii. 13. 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10. Eph. v. 18. 1 Thess. v. 7, 8.