game of Russia, not even if, according to the visionary dreams of Mr. Urquhart, he had sold his soul and conscience for that end, than England does when in the wake of Austria she endeavours to suppress the rising Christian life of the provinces of Turkey, to narrow the lawful privileges of the Principalities, and forbid their development, for fear of their becoming too strong for the Sultan. Too strong for the Sultan! They are too strong for him already, and too strong for him they will be, weaken them as you may. There is not one the feeblest province of his Empire, not the little pocket-handkerchief of mountain and rock that we call Montenegro, which is not too strong for the Sultan. It is not the Sultan that keeps his provinces in subordination; it is the power, will, and interest of Europe. But though the Danubian Principalities, however we may dwarf and cripple them, must ever continue too strong for Turkey, they are not too strong for Russia; and the State or Government who makes them less strong than they might be, and but for it would be, is sealing the decree and hastening the day for Russia to absorb them. There is no policy, but one, which can effectually contain Russia within her limits. It is to give the people of the countries on her southward frontier an interest in refusing to be governed by

Of this interest they will become conscious in proportion as they are practically free. Nor is there anything in this practical freedom inconsistent with the interests of the Ottoman Power. The Sultan does not want to be charged with the cares of Government, he wants what will support his harem, his ministers, and his military establishments, and enable him to play in a corner of Europe the Asiatic sovereign. This part he may perchance yet play for many a day, but it can only be on one condition, which is that he, or that others for him, shall make easy the relation between him and his European and Christian subjects. What he wants is just what they can give. The terms of the compact ought to be tribute and title for him, self-government for them; local and provincial self-government, varying according to their rights, traditions, and comparative maturity, but in substance, or at least in aim, the same for all. These are terms which would give them contentment, prosperity, and strength: which would reduce to a minimum the evils connected with the existence of the Ottoman Power in Europe, if they could not make it fertile of good: which, without precipitating or even deciding the question of its continuance at Constantinople, or its transfer eastward, or its total downfall, would smooth the course of the future, whatever the direction of that course may be; finally and most of all, which would secure scope and shelter for the germs of life in the European provinces of Turkey, and,

in relaxing for them the doom that has so long hung heavily around them, would most effectually provide for the future security of Europe.

It would be impossible adequately to describe within the space at our command the dangers of the Ottoman Empire. Suffice it to say that for the present, perhaps even for the future, Russian ambition, formidable as it is, nevertheless must be reckoned among the least of them. Unwieldy size, ill-defined and disputable relations to her own members, administration radically corrupt, finances long embarrassed and rapidly moving towards exhaustion, classes widely severed from, and hopelessly exasperated with one another, the disproportionate distribution of the elements of power; all these would deserve a full consideration. But greater, perhaps, than any of them is the risk which the Ottoman Power now runs of seeing arrayed against it the whole mass of smouldering Mahometan fanaticism. The so-called reforms, little as they have done towards conciliating the Christians, have produced in the Mahometan mind a widely-spread conviction that the race of the Sultans is false to the Prophet and to his mission. Of this estrangement, and of the hatred arising out of it, traces may be found in the late proceedings in Arabia, where it is probable that actual want of power restrained the Turkish authorities from the prompt performance of their duty. Their hold on the country is nominal: were it otherwise our own occupation of Aden could not be justified for a moment. Mecca is the great focus of Mahometan enthusiasm: and it would take little to excite such a revulsion in the Peninsula as would at once put an end to the shadow of Turkish rule by which it is at present overhung.

To all this it would appear that France is thoroughly alive. The Convention relating to the Principalities, which has recently appeared, contains the elements and principle of an union between the provinces without giving it full effect. It may afford a standing ground for future operations in the sense of freedom, if the joint Commission of Legislation shall prove efficient: it promises little, we apprehend, in the way of permanent settlement. To France, there can be no doubt, is mainly due whatever has been gained for these unhappy countries. She has been acting in the Levant upon principles which will earn for her influence and favour with all that lives and grows in the Turkish Empire. She has been resisted at every point by Austria. But what Austria, as we have said, has done naturally and perhaps excusably, England has also done neither naturally nor excusably. England, at least until within the last few months, has been the really powerful and effective foe, in recent diplomacy, of provincial

vincial freedom and of Christian progress in the Turkish Empire: and, incredible as it may seem, she has, by doing the work of Russia, given to that Power the double advantage, first of gaining the affections of the Christians of Turkey by supporting the union of the Principalities; and secondly, of having the ground made ready, through their discontent, by other hands for her, when the time comes to enter and to occupy. But it is clear that, had the late Ministry continued to regulate our foreign affairs, the Principalities would not have obtained even the modified and rather stingy acknowledgment of their rights, which is offered them by the Convention. In this case therefore, as in others, much has been gained through the change of Ministry in England both for liberty and for peace.

We long, however, for the day, which must surely come, when Lord Malmesbury and the Government of Lord Derby must throw off the last rags of the Clarendon livery; when, as in the affair of France, as in the affair of the 'Cagliari,' as in their correspondence with America, so in the great question of the Levant, be it at Suez, be it on the Danube, be it where it may, they shall, by entirely departing from the wayward courses of the late Government, earn the gratitude of the country and of Europe. But the time is short: and the portents come thick beyond all expectation on one another. Everywhere there are the signs of an agitation in the Mahometan mind, which, if it come to ripeness, can only end in the utter and speedy downfal of the Turk. The insult to the British consul at Belgrade, the disturbances of Montenegro, the Candian rebellion, the Lynch law administered in the same island by the Mussulmans on a Christian culprit, the agitation in the Libanus, the conspiracy at Smyrna, and the lamentable massacre at Jeddah, would each of them, as isolated events, be of secondary importance. But it is impossible not to suspect that they are vitally connected by underground chains of sympathy: or rather that they are based in causes of profound influence, which make the whole soil of the Turkish Empire heave convulsively with a volcanic movement. They serve to show that, while the strong are without doubt becoming ready, the weak are certainly growing eager, for the conflict. The end of the struggle will, we trust, be for the happiness of man. But the passage to it may be a dreadful one; and our desire is that, when the crisis comes, it may find England strong, through wise policy, in credit and in character, and thereby qualified to exercise an influence alike powerful and disinterested in directing the course of events to a favourable issue.

INDEX

TO THE

HUNDRED AND FOURTH VOLUME OF THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.