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anticompetitive harm antitrust analysis antitrust concerns B2B Electronic Marketplaces B2B marketplaces Baker & McKenzie Bloch & Perlman business-to-business buyers and sellers catalog commerce companies competitive concerns Competitor Collaboration Guidelines computer reservation systems consortium coordination Dean Witter Stmt discussed downstream e-commerce efficiencies English auction entry example exclusionary exclusivity practices facilitate Federal Trade Commission fees firm’s firms Gray Harting Stmt Heckman Stmt Horizontal incentives industry information-sharing agreements inputs Internet interoperability issues Kafka Keller & Heckman Kinney Stmt Krattenmaker legacy systems market for marketplaces market power McKenzie Stmt Mirek monopsony Morgan Stanley Dean network effects OESA Stmt operating rules owners panelist noted panelists suggested Perlman Stmt potential raise requirements reverse auction rivals Salomon Smith Barney sharing information Sherman Act Shridharani Stanley Dean Witter supply chain tacit collusion transaction Verloop volume workshop panelists workshop participant WorldWide Retail Exchange
Seite 25 - To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition, taking into account the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the *- Ibid., 865-866. probable immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the market might have on effective competition therein.
Seite 13 - Market power also encompasses the ability of a single buyer (a «monopsonist»), a coordinating group of buyers, or a single buyer, not a monopsonist, to depress the price paid for a product to a level that is below the competitive price and thereby depress output. The exercise of market power by buyers («monopsony power») has adverse effects comparable to those associated with the exercise of market power by sellers.
Seite iii - The views expressed in this statement represent the views of the Commission. My oral presentation and responses to any questions you have are my own, however, and do not necessarily reflect the Commission's views or the views of any individual Commissioner.
Seite 25 - In determining whether an exclusive-dealing contract is unreasonable, the proper focus is on the structure of the market for the products or services in question — the number of sellers and buyers in the market, the volume of their business, and the ease with which buyers and sellers can redirect their purchases or sales to others.
Seite 29 - ... licensing or in the sense of exclusive dealing) may nonetheless give rise to the same concerns posed by formal exclusivity. A non-exclusive license may have the effect of exclusive licensing if it is structured so that the licensor is unlikely to license others or to practice the technology itself. A license that does not explicitly require exclusive dealing may have the effect of exclusive dealing if it is structured to increase significantly a licensee's cost when it uses competing technologies....
Seite 14 - Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Agencies will not challenge a restraint in an intellectual property licensing arrangement if (1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive30 and (2) the licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the restraint. This "safety zone" does not apply to those transfers of intellectual property rights to which a merger analysis is applied.
Seite 8 - The competitive concern depends on the nature of the information shared. Other things being equal, the sharing of information relating to price, output, costs, or strategic planning is more likely to raise competitive concern than the sharing of information relating to less competitively sensitive variables.
Seite 25 - US 320 (1961) (evaluating legality of exclusive dealing under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act...
Seite 29 - ... technologies. See section 5.4. Exclusivity may be achieved by an explicit exclusive dealing term in the license or by other provisions such as compensation terms or other economic incentives. Such restraints may anticompetitively foreclose access to, or increase competitors...
Seite 18 - In addition, the practices were generally not justified by plausible arguments that they were intended to enhance overall efficiency and make markets more competitive. Under such circumstances the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is clear and the possibility of countervailing procompetitive effects is remote.