Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Band 3Harvard University Press, 1892 |
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Seite 24
... define with any certainty . The Scholia on Ar . Eq . 445 , in the three versions , go back to Didymus , ultimately to Herodotus and Thucydides , and to some writer on Attic history whom we cannot certainly identify in par- ticular ...
... define with any certainty . The Scholia on Ar . Eq . 445 , in the three versions , go back to Didymus , ultimately to Herodotus and Thucydides , and to some writer on Attic history whom we cannot certainly identify in par- ticular ...
Seite 139
... definition is put forward , so that the dialogue closes without coming to any definition of Sophrosyne which Socrates can approve . Laches . In the dialogue Laches , the question whether Courage 1 Charmides 157 A. 8 Gorgias 526 C. 6 ...
... definition is put forward , so that the dialogue closes without coming to any definition of Sophrosyne which Socrates can approve . Laches . In the dialogue Laches , the question whether Courage 1 Charmides 157 A. 8 Gorgias 526 C. 6 ...
Seite 140
... define what Courage is outside of battle . Laches then broadens his definitions and declares Courage to be a kind of steadfastness of soul . This Socrates sees to have the opposite fault of the former definition . The former was too ...
... define what Courage is outside of battle . Laches then broadens his definitions and declares Courage to be a kind of steadfastness of soul . This Socrates sees to have the opposite fault of the former definition . The former was too ...
Seite 144
... definition of Meno . This definition must therefore be abandoned as defective . Whether virtue is teachable or not , depends on whether or not virtue is knowl- edge . If it is knowledge , then it can be taught . Socrates proves that it ...
... definition of Meno . This definition must therefore be abandoned as defective . Whether virtue is teachable or not , depends on whether or not virtue is knowl- edge . If it is knowledge , then it can be taught . Socrates proves that it ...
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Beliebte Passagen
Seite 77 - ubi iste post phasellus antea fuit comata silua; nam Cytorio in iugo loquente saepe sibilum edidit coma. Amastri Pontica et Cytore buxifer, tibi haec fuisse et esse cognitissima 15 ait phasellus; ultima ex origine tuo stetisse dicit in cacumine, tuo imbuisse palmulas in aequore, et inde tot per impotentia freta
Seite 77 - Amastri Pontica et Cytore buxifer, tibi haec fuisse et esse cognitissima 15 ait phasellus; ultima ex origine tuo stetisse dicit in cacumine, tuo imbuisse palmulas in aequore, et inde tot per impotentia freta erum tulisse, laeua siue dextera 20
Seite 168 - further notices, is to be found in Comte's Altruism and in Fichte's Ethics, the latter of whom says: " Es gibt nur eine Tugend, die — sich selber als Person zu vergessen, und nur ein Laster, das — an sich selbst zu denken.
Seite 191 - Inde ad negotia urbana animum conuertit; quorum erat primum, ut louis templum in monte Tarpeio monumentum regni sui nominisque relinqueret: Tarquinios reges ambos, patrem uouisse, filium perfecisse.
Seite 79 - (XXXI.) : — Paene insularum Sirmio insularumque ocelle, quascumque in liquentibus stagnis marique vasto fert uterque Neptunus, quam te libenter quamque laetus
Seite 77 - nouissimo hunc ad usque limpidum lacum. 25 Sed haec prius fuere: nunc recondita senet quiete seque dedicat tibi, gemelle Castor et gemelle Castoris.
Seite 82 - Catullus represents himself as pointing out and praising to some guests, who were with him at his villa in Sirmio, the phaselus, now laid up beside the Benacus or Lago di Garda, which had carried him from Bithynia to Italy.
Seite 195 - I smell a rat; I see him floating in the air; but I will nip him in the bud.
Seite 91 - ON THE HOMERIC CAESURA AND THE CLOSE OF THE VERSE AS RELATED TO THE EXPRESSION OF THOUGHT. BY THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.
Seite 159 - well as the Greek Ethics in general is eudaemonistic. Virtue was regarded by Socrates and the Socratic Plato not only as an end in itself, but also as a means; the end at which all virtue aims is happiness. All conduct accordingly is good only in so far as it is useful to the attainment of this end. Further, that the ethical teaching of the historical Socrates 1 Kostlin: Die Ethik des