growth of the land, by virtue of the same title under which the land was claimed. 5th. Whenever the thing demanded by a second suit is so included in that which was decided by a former judgment, that the decree rendered must confirm or annul that which was given in the first, then, although the same thing be not nominally demanded, yet the first judgment shall be considered as resjudicata between the parties. For example-If, in one suit respecting a servitude of view, it has been determined that the party has no right to raise his wall ten feet, this judgment will bar a claim to raise his wall twenty feet; for, if the second judgment should be against the right claimed in the second suit, it affirms the judgment given in the first; if it allows the right, it annuls the first decision. 6th. In determining whether the same thing be demanded by a second action, courts must determine by the substance, not the form of the demand. Thus, if judgment be rendered on a written obligation for the payment of money, this judgment shall be a bar to a subsequent suit for money lent, founded on the same transaction, unless, in this case, the obligation be declared void for some reason not affecting the original cause of action. 7th. But if a plaintiff fails in a suit, because he has mistaken the manner in which it ought to have been brought, such judgment is no bar to a suit brought in the proper form for the same thing. Art. 225. A judgment on a claim of ownership, or for possession of property, is no bar to a suit for a usufruct or servitude, or use on the same land. Nor is a judgment on a claim for such usufruct, servitude, or use, any bar to a suit for the property or possession. Art. 226. A judgment in a suit for possession is no bar to a suit for the property; but a recovery in a suit, where both property and possession are claimed, is a bar to a subsequent suit for possession. Art. 227. A judgment in a suit for one species of servitude is not a bar to a suit for different servitude, although that which was first demanded, may include the last. Thus, a suit for a right of footway is not barred by a judgment that the party claiming it had no right to a servitude for the passage of cattle. Art. 228. Another requisite to the conclusiveness of a judgment is, that the thing demanded must, in both suits, be not only the same, but demanded under the same title. Art. 229. The last requisite to give effect to a decision as resjudicata is, that the parties should, in both suits, prosecute or defend in the same quality; if in the first suit, the party, against whom the judgment is opposed or defended, sued as executor, curator, tutor, attorney in fact, or garnishee, and in the second appeared in his own name, the judgment can neither be a bar, nor evidence for or against him, although the same thing be the object of the suit, and it be against the same party. Art. 230. Yet, if a quality be assumed or given in either suit which would make no alteration in the party's right, the judgment shall have its effect as a bar or as evidence. As if a man bring a suit, on a promise made to him personally by another, or for personal injury done to him, and in such suit call himself heir or executor of another, or give other of those qualities to the defendant, judgment in such suit would be conclusive in another, which might be brought for the same cause, unless the first judgment were given as an exception taken to the quality assumed, and not on the merits. CHAPTER III. Of confession. Art. 231. Confession in relation to the manner in which it is made is, either judicial or extra judicial. In relation to its nature, it is either full or partial only. Art. 232. A judicial confession is that which is made by a party in some writing forming part of the proceedings in a cause, or which is made before a person authorized by law to receive the same, and reduced to writing by him, or under his authority, in the manner prescribed by law. Extra judicial confessions are those which are made in any other manner. Art. 233. Full confession is that which acknowledges the fact alleged, with all its material circumstances, so as to leave nothing to be supplied by other evidence. Partial confession is that which acknowledges some circumstance from which an inference may be drawn to operate as presumptive evidence. Art. 234. In civil cases, every proceeding being usually made with due deliberation and a knowledge of facts, a judicial confession, whether full or partial, is conclusive evidence of what is so confessed, but with the following provisions to guard against error. 1. Whenever a judicial confession has been made by the party himself, which on reflection he deems to be erroneous, he may on application within a time which the judge shall deem reasonable, and on showing cause to his satisfaction, obtain leave to amend such confessory proceeding. 2. When the confession has been made by an attorney or agent, such amendment shall be of course, if the party shall without unnecessary delay, after the proceeding comes to his knowledge, state the error on oath, and apply to have the same amended. 3. The condition of such amendments shall always be, that the adverse party shall be paid all costs and expenses he may have incurred in consequence of the error, and have time allowed him, if he require it, to supply other evidence of the facts at first confessed. Art. 235. In criminal cases, no confession, whether full or partial, is conclusive evidence to the jury on a trial. The answer of "guilty" to the charge, if persevered in after the admonition and inquiry hereinafter directed, is such evidence as justifies the court in pronouncing sentence, without the intervention of a jury. Art. 236. When the accused, on his arraignment, shall plead "guilty," it shall be the duty of the court to admonish him of the consequences of such answer, and to inquire, as well from him as from others, and particularly if he be in custody from the officer having charge of him, whether his acknowledgment has been produced by any threat or promise; and also when there is any reason to suppose insanity or imbecility of mind, to inquire into that fact. Art. 237. In all other cases of a full or partial confession, whether judicial or extra judical, the accused may show, to avoid the effect of such confession, not only by other evidence that it was not true, but that it was produced by error, by threats, promises, false hopes, confusion of mind, or any other efficient cause. And in every such case, the confession is to have such weight as the judges of the fact shall, in their discretion, give to it, under a consideration of all the circumstances of the case. Art. 238. In all cases the whole confession must be taken together; that is to say, every thing said, done, or written, at the time of the confession, tending to enlarge, restrict, or modify it, must be received as part of the evidence. CHAPTER IV. Of estoppels. Art. 239. There being no other conclusive evidence than in the cases especially provided for by the legislative authority of this state, that species of conclusive evidence known in the English law of evidence by the name of "Estoppel," is abolished, and can operate as direct, or, according to its nature, presumptive, evidence only. GENERAL PROVISION. Art. 240. Nothing in this Code contained shall be so construed as to dispense with the proof required by the Civil Code, or other statutes, to give effect to certain contracts, or testamentary or other dispositions, or to enforce the registry or recording of certain acts, or to prove legitimacy or filiation, legitimation or civil condition. |