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States in the Committee in the clause vesting the exclusive origination of money bills in the House of Representatives.

Col. Mason moved to strike out the word “five," and insert the word “three," as the highest candidates for the Senate to choose out of.

Mr. GERRY seconded the motion.

Mr. Sherman would sooner give up the plan. He would prefer seven or thirteen.

On the question moved by Col. Mason and Mr. Gerry,–Virginia, North Carolina, aye; nine States, no.

Mr. Spaight and Mr. RUTLEDGE moved to strike out “five,” and insert “thirteen;" to which all the States disagreed, except North Carolina and South Carolina Mr. Madison and Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert,

Electors,” the words, “who shall have balloted;" so that the non-voting Electors, not being counted, might not increase the number necessary as a majority of the whole to decide the choice without the agency of the Senate.

On this question, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.

Mr. DICKINSON moved, in order to remove ambiguity from the intention of the clause, as explained by the vote, to add, after the words, “ if such number be a majority of the whole number of the Electors,” the word “ appointed.”

On this motion,-New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,

after

Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—9; Virginia, North Carolina, no—2.

Col. Mason. As the mode of appointment is now regulated, he could not forbear expressing his opinion that it is utterly inadmissible. He would prefer the Government of Prussia to one which will put all power into the hands of seven or eight men, and fix an aristocracy worse than absolute monarchy.

The words, “and of their giving their votes,” being inserted, on motion for that purpose, after the words, “The Legislature may determine the time of choosing and assembling the Electors,".

The House adjourned.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6TH.

In Convention,-Mr. King and Mr. GERRY moved to insert in the fourth clause of the Report (see the 4th of Sept., page 1486), after the words,“ may be entitled in the Legislature,” the words following: “But no person shall be appointed an Elector who is a member of the Legislature of the United States, or who holds any office of profit or trust under the United States;" which passed, nem. con.

Mr. GERRY proposed, as the President was to be elected by the Senate out of the five highest candidates, that if he should not at the end of his term be re-elected by a majority of the Electors, and no other candidate should have a majority, the eventual election should be made by the Legislature. This, he said, would relieve the President from his par

ticular dependence on the Senate, for his continuance in office.

Mr. King liked the idea, as calculated to satisfy particular members, and promote unanimity; and as likely to operate but seldom.

Mr. Read opposed it; remarking, that if individual members were to be indulged, alterations would be necessary to satisfy most of them.

Mr. WillIAMSON espoused it, as a reasonable precaution against the undue influence of the Senate.

Mr. Sherman liked the arrangement as it stood, though he should not be averse to some amendments. He thought, he said, that if the Legislature were to have the eventual appointment, instead of the Senate, it ought to vote in the case by States,-in favor of the small States, as the large States would have so great an advantage in nominating the candidates.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR Morris thought favorably of Mr. Gerry's proposition. It would free the President from being tempted, in naming to offices, to conform to the will of the Senate, and thereby virtually give the appointments to office to the Senate.

Mr. Wilson said, that he had weighed carefully the Report of the Committee for re-modelling the constitution of the Executive; and on combining it with other parts of the plan, he was obliged to consider the whole as having a dangerous tendency to aristocracy; as throwing a dangerous power into the hands of the Senate. They will have, in fact, the appointment of the President, and through his dependence on them, the virtual appointment to offices; among others, the officers of the Judiciary de

partment. They are to make treaties; and they are to try all impeachments. In allowing them thus to make the Executive and Judiciary appointments, to be the court of impeachments, and to make treaties which are to be laws of the land, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers are all blended in one branch of the Government.

The power of making treaties involves the case of subsidies, and here, as an additional evil, foreign influence is to be dreaded. According to the plan as it now stands, the President will not be the man of the people, as he ought to be; but the minion of the Senate. He cannot even appoint a tide-waiter without the Senate. He had always thought the Senate too numerous a body for making appointments to office. The Senate will, moreover, in all probability, be in constant session. They will have high salaries. And with all those powers, and the President in their interest, they will depress the other branch of the Legislature, and aggrandize themselves in proportion. Add to all this, that the Senate, sitting in conclave, can by holding up to their respective States various and improbable candidates, contrive so to scatter their votes, as to bring the appointment of the President ultimately before themselves. Upon the whole, he thought the new mode of appointing the President, with some amendments, a valuable improvement; but he could never agree to purchase it at the price of the ensuing parts of the Report, nor befriend a system of which they make a part.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR Morris expressed his wonder at the observations of Mr. Wilson, so far as they preferred the plan in the printed Report, to the new

modification of it before the House; and entered into a comparative view of the two, with an eye to the nature of Mr. Wilson's objections to the last. By the first, the Senate, he observed, had a voice in appointing the President out of all the citizens of the United States; by this they were limited to five candidates, previously nominated to them, with a probability of being barred altogether by the successful ballot of the Electors. Here surely was no increase of power. They are now to appoint Judges, nominated to them by the President. Before, they had the appointment without any agency whatever of the President. Here again was surely no additional power. If they are to make treaties, as the plan now stands, the power was the same in the printed plan. If they are to try impeachments, the Judges must have been triable by them before. Wherein, then, lay the dangerous tendency of the innovations to establish an aristocracy in the Senate? As to the appointment of officers, the weight of sentiment in the House was opposed to the exercise of it by the President alone; though it was not the case with himself. If the Senate would act as was suspected, in misleading the States into a fallacious disposition of their votes for a President, they would, if the appointment were withdrawn wholly from them, make such representations in their several States where they bave influence, as would favor the object of their partiality.

Mr. WILLIAMSON, replying to Mr. MORRIS, observed, that the aristocratic complexion proceeds from the change in the mode of appointing the President, which makes him dependent on the Senate.

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