negative, for, says he, "This is no more than one instance of one affirmative being destroyed by another, that infers a negative of the first." It cost me some time to find out the meaning of this superlative nonsense; and I think I have at last discovered it. What he understands by the first affirmative, is the instance of the man's being charged with killing another; the second affirmative is the man's being alive; which certainly infers, that the man was not killed; which is undoubtedly a negative of the first. But the remarker of Barbadoes blunders strangely. Mr. Hamilton's words are clear. He says, the party accused is on the negative, viz. that he did not kill; which he may prove by an affirmative, viz. that the man said to be killed is still alive.

Again. "At which rate," continues our Barbadoes author, "most negatives may be proved." There indeed the gentleman happened to stumble right; for every negative capable of proof can only be proved after the same manner, namely, by an affirmative. "But then," he adds, "a man will be put upon proving he did not kill, because such proof may be had sometimes, and so the old rule will be discarded." This is clearly a non sequitur (not an argument); for, though a man may prove a negative, if he finds it for his advantage, it does by no means follow that he shall be obliged to do it, and so that old rule will be preserved.

After such notable instances of a blundering, unlogical head, we are not to be surprised at the many absurdities and contradictions of this author, which occur in the sequel of his no-argument.

But I shall only cite those passages where there is a probability of guessing at his meaning; for he has so preposterously jumbled together his little stock of ideas,

that, even after the greatest efforts, I could find but very little sense or coherence in them. I should not, however, have discontinued my labor, had I not been apprehensive of the fate of poor Don Quixote, who ran distracted by endeavouring to unbowel the sense of the following passage; "The reason of your unreasonableness, which against my reason is wrought, doth so weaken my reason, as with all reason I do justly complain." There are several profound passages in the remarks, not a whit inferior to this. This dissertation on the negative and affirmative, I once thought to be an exact counterpart of it.

Our author labors to prove that a libel, whether true or false, is punishable. The first authority for this purpose is the case of John de Northampton, adjudged in the reign of Edward the Third. Northampton had wrote a libellous letter to one of the king's council, purporting that the judges would do no great things at the commandment of the king, &c.; the said John was called, and the court pronounced judgment against him on these grounds, that the letter contained no truth in it, and might incense the king against his judges. Mr. Hamilton says, that by this judgment it appears the libellous words were utterly false, and that the falsehood was the crine, and is the ground of the judgment. The remarker rejects this explanation, and gives us an ingenious comment of his own. First, he says, there is neither truth nor falsehood in the words, at the time they were wrote. Secondly, that they were the same as if John had said the roof of Westminster-hall would fall on the judges. Thirdly, that the words taken by themselves have no ill meaning. Fourthly, that the judges ought to do their duty, without any respect to the king's commandment (they are sworn so to do). Fifthly, he asks, Where then was the offence! He an

Seventhly, he says

an attorney of the

swers, sixthly, The record shows it. that the author of the letter was court, and, by the contents thereof, (meaning the contents of the letter, not the contents of the court,) he presumes to undertake for the behaviour of the judges. Eighthly, that the letter was addressed to a person of the king's council. Ninthly, that he might possibly communicate it to the king. Tenthly, that it might naturally incense the king against the court. Eleventhly, that great things were done in those days by the king's commandment, for the judges held their post at will and pleasure. Twelfthly, that it was therefore proper for the judges to assert, that the letter contained no truth, in order to acquit themselves to the king. Thirteenthly, that the judges asserted a falsehood, only to acquit themselves to his Majesty, because what they asserted was no ground of their judgment. Fourteenthly, and lastly, the commentator avers (with much modesty) that all this senseless stuff is a plain and natural construction of the case; but he would not have us take it wholly on his own word, and undertakes to show that the case was so understood by Noy, in whose mouth our author puts just such becoming nonsense as he entertained us with from himself.

It requires no great penetration to make this discussion in question appear reasonable and intelligible. But it ought first to be observed that Edward the Third was one of the best and wisest, as well as the bravest of our kings, and that the law had never a freer course than under his reign. Where the letter mentions, that the judges would do no great things (that is, illegal things) by the king's commandment, it was plainly insinuated, that the judges suspected that the king might command them to do illegal things. Now, by the means of that letter, the king being led to imagine that the judges

harboured a suspicion so unworthy of him, might be justly incensed against them. Therefore the record truly says, that the letter was utterly false, and that there was couched under it, an insinuation (certainly malicious), that might raise an indignation in this king against the court, &c., since it evidently appears, that not only the falsehood, but also the malice, was the ground of the judgment.

I agree with the remarker that Noy, citing this case, says, that the letter contained no ill, yet the writer was punished; but these words are absolutely as they stand in the remarks, detached from the context. Noy adduces Northampton's case, to prove that a man is punishable for contemplating without a cause, though the words of the complaint (simply considered) should contain no ill in them; it is not natural to inquire whether the application be just; it is only an expression of a counsel at the bar. The case was adjourned, and we hear no more of it. Yet these words of Noy, the remarker would pass on the reader as a good authority. "This book, therefore," quoth he, referring to Godbolt's Reports, "follows the record of Northampton's case, and says, that because it might incense the king against the judges he was punished; which is almost a translation of Prætextu cujus," &c. I could readily pardon our author's gibberish, and want of apprehension, but cannot so easily digest his insincerity.

The remarker in the next place proceeds to the trial of the seven bishops; I shall quote his own words, though I know they are so senseless and insipid, that I run the risk of trespassing on the reader's patience; however, here they be; "Mr. Justice Powell also does say, that, to make it a libel, it must be false, it must be malicious, and it must tend to sedition. Upon which words of this learned and worthy judge, I would not

presume to offer any comment, except that which other words of his own afford, that plainly show in what sense he then spoke. His subsequent words are these, "The bishops tell his Majesty, it is not out of averseness,' &c. So that the judge put the whole upon that single point, whether it be true that the king had a dispensing power or not; which is a question of law, and not of fact; and accordingly the judge appeals to his own reading in the law, not to witnesses or other testimonies, for a decision of it."

Now, the bishops had asserted in the libel they were charged with, that the dispensing power, claimed by the king in his declaration, was illegal. The remarker, by granting that the prelates might prove part of their assertion, viz. that the dispensing power was illegal, which is a question of law, necessarily allows them to prove the other part of their assertion, viz. that his Majesty had claimed such a power, which is a question of fact; for the former could not be decided without proving or admitting the latter, and so in all other cases, where a man publishes of a magistrate, that he has acted or commanded an illegal thing, if the defendant shall be admitted to prove the mode or illegality of the thing, it is evidently implied that he may prove the thing itself; so that, on the gentleman's own premises, it is a clear consequence, that a man prosecuted for a libel, shall be admitted to give the truth in evidence. The remarker has a method of reasoning peculiar to himself; he frequently advances arguments, which directly prove the very point he is laboring to confute.

But, in truth, Judge Powell's words would not have given the least color to such a ridiculous distinction, if they had been fairly quoted. He affirms, with the strongest emphasis, that, to make it a libel, it must be false, it must be malicious, and it must tend to sedition.