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absolute abstract according activity actual appear Aristotle artist beauty become Boehme called causality cause character Christianity cognition conception consciousness Democritus determined distinction divine doctrine element Emile Acollas empirical essential existence expression external fact feeling finite Goethe Greek philosophy Hegel hence Heraclitus human idea ideal imagination individual infinite inner intellect intelligence Jacob Boehme Kant Kant's Kantian knowledge light logical manifestation material matter means merely Michael Angelo mind motion mutability of species nature necessity Negation negative object organic Pantheism Parmenides particular perceived perception Phantasy philosophy Plato position present principle Prof proof pure quod Raphael reality reason regard relation representation retina Romantic Art Saint Thomas Schopenhauer sensation sense sensible sensuous Socrates soul space spatial species spirit subjective substance succession synthesis things thought tion true truth unity universal Vasari whole words
Seite 415 - It is easy in the world to live after the world's opinion ; it is easy in solitude to live after our own ; but the great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude.
Seite 429 - The World's Progress. A Dictionary of Dates, being a Chronological and Alphabetical Record of all Essential Facts in the Progress of Society, from the beginning of History to August, 1877. With Chronological Tables, Biographical Index, and a Chart of History. By GP PUTNAM, AM Revised and continued by FB PERKINS.
Seite 410 - Socrates— in assigning to insight, to conviction, the determination of men's actions — posited the Individual as capable of a final moral decision, in contraposition to Country and to Customary Morality, and thus made himself an Oracle, in the Greek sense.
Seite 411 - ... injury, even the very slightest, to any one, whilst many and great were the benefits he conferred on all with whom he had any dealings ; so temperate and chaste, as not to indulge any appetite or inclination at the expense of whatever was modest and becoming...
Seite 218 - ... MATZNER (iii, 174) gives the same phrase: 'It likes us well,' from King John, II, i, 533, with the following explanation : ' The dative in Germanic verbs passes completely into the accusative where the consciousness of the language abandons the substitute for the dative by the periphrasis with to.
Seite 367 - ... inner contingency, in humour. Now, finally, still within the material indicated above, we may draw attention to a coalescence of these extremes of romantic art. In other words, just as in the advance from symbolic to classical art we considered the transitional forms of image, simile, epigram, etc., so here in romantic art we have to make mention of a similar transitional form.
Seite 72 - ... Now as this sensation is never used by ordinary persons as a means of perception, we may fairly assume that its felt quality, in those whose attention is called to it for the first time, belongs to it qua sensation, and owes nothing to educational suggestions. But this felt quality is most distinctly and unmistakably one of vague spatial vastness in three dimensions — quite as much so as is the felt quality of the retinal sensation when we lie on our back and fill the entire field of vision...
Seite 99 - Si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico; ubi, quaeso, id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me ; sed ambo in ipsa, quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili Veritate.
Seite 434 - ... the passage from the current to the needle, if not demonstrable, is thinkable, and that we entertain no doubt as to the final mechanical solution of the problem. But the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass by a process of...