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MARCH, 1830.]

Marine Service.

[SENATE.

collision with each other, unless imperious | able seamen; you will thus obtain an annual necessity demands it. Those who are to act increase of seamen for your naval service, and with effect, can best do so by a union of feel- that of the very best materials too-a matter ings, and a similarity of habits. Experience of some consequence, I conceive, not only to has taught this lesson. Sailors and marines the interests of the navy, but of the country. cannot, or, at least, have not, heretofore, assimi- I have been led to these observations, sir, belated, either in feeling or habit. cause of the opposition to the inquiry proposed by me, and in justification of my views; whether wrong or right, I must leave for others to judge.

While I am up, I will say a few words with regard to the last branch of the inquiry: whether seamen cannot be employed in lieu of marines at our naval stations. The marine corps, as at present established, is both a naval and military body. When at sea, it is subject to the regulations made for the navy; when on land, it is subject to the rules and articles of war for the government of the army; so that its character depends on whether it performs duty on land or water. Now, sir, when on shore, at a naval depot, it is governed by army discipline; when on ship-board, by naval discipline. We know that our navy yards are in. trusted to the charge of a naval officer of rank, generally, I believe, if not always, a post-cap

As the materials are then so discordant, can the service of the marines be dispensed with without injury to the service? Cannot seamen be trained to the use of small arms? I see no difficulty. Instead of marines, take the like number of young landsmen from the country, any where, and they can load and fire with as much effect as the best-drilled marine. The Americans, generally, are accustomed from infancy to the use of fire-arms; very little training will therefore be required to make them expert gunmen. Besides, sir, I am informed that, by the present structure of our vessels of war, marines can render but little service on deck, and that musketry is used with most effect from the tops. If this is the case, is it not better to have seamen than marines? They will be ready to throw down the musket and spring to the yards | and rigging at any moment, when required by the exigencies of the ship. This may some-tain; marines are detailed to perform garrison times be of great importance. Nor do I conceive the objection urged by the Senator from Maryland as sufficient, that seamen will not keep their arms in order. It is well known that, besides muskets, there are pistols, pikes, cutlasses, and other arms, on board of every armed ship: how are these kept in order? Not by marines. Muskets can be kept in good condition in the same way, by the armorer, or whatever name is given to the person in charge of the arms. The objection raised, too, that the pay of sailors is greater than marines, loses part of its weight, when it is recollected that the marines are not only paid, but clothed by the Government, while the sailor purchases his own clothing from his pay.

There is another consideration which I think ought to have influence in determining upon this subject, and therefore it is that I am desirous of the information. It cannot be unknown to the Senate, that there is often a scarcity of seamen, and difficulty is experienced in promptly manning our vessels of war for sea: any measure calculated to remove or lessen this inconvenience, without injury to the service, ought therefore to receive the favorable regard of this body. One of our larger vessels of war, destined for a three years' cruise in the Mediterranean, Pacific, or elsewhere, will carry with her about a hundred marines; they will continue to serve as marines; and as marines, and nothing but marines, they will return to this country. Let, however, the same number of landsmen be sent instead of marines; let them be taught and exercised in the use of the musket, if necessary; but let them at the same time perform all the ordinary duties of sailors, and at the end of a three years' voyage they will return, not mere musket-men but expert and

duty, in guarding and protecting the public works and property. But, sir, in consequence of marines being soldiers on land, they are not, as I understand, subject to the orders of the commandant of the station, and details for duty are therefore made by request, not by command of this officer. Two separate and independent commands, then, exist at the same place, with no common superior. This is inconsistent with my ideas of military subordination and regulation. But why may not seamen, whose age or infirmities, from long and faithful service, have rendered them unqualified for active duty on ship-board, serve as guards at these naval depots, instead of marines? They have been accustomed to strict discipline, and it is conceived would be equally vigilant in the discharge of any duty imposed on them; their tried fidelity at sea would furnish a guarantee for their faithful conduct on shore. I wish to know from naval officers if they can be trusted with this duty? If they can, sir, it will furnish an asylum for these hardy veterans of the ocean, much better suited to their tastes and wishes than any naval asylum. They will be rendering service to the Government for their support, and will find a resting-place in their more advanced years, after the dangers and vicissitudes of an active sea-life.

It is known that there are now at the seat of Government many distinguished and experienced officers of the navy. I have availed myself of the circumstance to make the call at this time. The information, when received, will be valuable; no possible injury can grow out of obtaining it; we shall be possessed of light which we do not now possess, to guide us in any measures that may be deemed necessary, with respect to the marine corps. I trust,

SENATE.]

Mr. Foot's Resolution Nullification.

[MARCH, 1830.

therefore, the Senate will adopt the resolu- | judgment of her own self-constituted tribunals,

tion.

Mr. B. concluded by saying he wished it to be understood that he had no unkind or unfriendly feeling to the corps in making this inquiry; very far from it. He was actuated by different motives. I have the pleasure, said he, to be acquainted with several of its officers, who have heretofore signalized themselves in the service of their country, and will do so again, whenever their country needs their services. But if they are necessary to the navy, let them be subject to naval control, whether at sea or on shore.

Mr. JOHNSTON suggested that the resolution was unnecessary, as the Committee on Naval Affairs had the same power to call on the Secretary of the Navy for this information, through their chairman, that the Senate had. If every committee were to pursue this course, and come to the Senate with resolutions to obtain information which could be as well obtained without any reference to the Senate, it would be constantly engaged in long debates, and the necessary business of the Senate would be obstructed; and a discussion is got up, which shows that gentlemen possess the very information required. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. BARNARD) had convinced the Senate that he is already in possession of all the information required in his resolution.

After a few observations from Messrs. WOODBURY, and SMITH, of Maryland,

Mr. BARNARD observed that, when he offered this resolution, he did not apprehend that any circumstances would arise which could possibly lead to a discussion; and, therefore, the remarks of the gentleman from Louisiana were not applicable to him. Farther, as the President of the United States had recommended the reorganization of the marine corps, it being of a mixed character, we may naturally presume that all the facts on which this paragraph was predicated were in his possession, and may now be obtained from the Secretary of the Navy.

upon the validity of an act of Congress in opposition to the solemn decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: and my remarks upon it will be chiefly in reply to gentlemen who have gone before me. I confess I do not discover why the power of deciding any, and every question, growing out of any circumstances in which a State may conceive her sovereignty impugned, is not translated to her own tribunals by the same train of argument which induces the conclusion that she may nullify an act of the Federal Legislature without the aid of the Federal Judiciary. We know we are so taught by memorials on our files-that the doctrine is very current in some States of the West, that the public territory within their limits is their own; and we have been threatened that, when the population flowing westward has transferred the balance of power beyond the Alleghany, or when, as one in this debate has phrased it, "the sceptre has departed from the old thirteen forever," we shall find the rights of the new States asserted and maintained, if not by the force of numbers here, at least by the force of arms at home. In that case, too, it is said, that to us distance will be defeat. State sovereignty and State rights constitute the very war cry of a new party in this country. I would myself be among the last to infringe upon the constitutional powers of the States. But how far will the new doctrines on the subject carry us? Some who have engaged in this discussion have avowed the opinion that our claim to the public lands is inconsistent with the paramount rights of the Western States, and that, upon the fundamental principles of Government, the domain within their chartered limits is the property of these new grantees. Others, who stand among the boldest champions of the principle that a sovereign State may constitutionally and lawfully enforce her declarations against the validity of an act of Congress, and nullify it whenever by her judgment it is "deliberately, plainly, and palpably unconstitutional," repudiate the whole doctrine of State supremacy, and State title, when we touch these claims to the public lands. The rule works badly then. The two positions assumed by the same reasoner are repugnant to each other. You cannot claim by virtue of your State sovereignty to nullify an act of Congress, and yet deny to another State the right, by a similar operation, to tear out of your statute book the leaf containing the Virginia grant, as well as that which bears upon it the act of Congress declaring the uses of that grant. By the grant and the act, the estate ceded is "for the common benefit." The new sovereigns, within whose dominions the estate is situated, asserting their power to decide all questions which, in their judgment, touch their sovIereignty, may nullify both, and make the land theirs; or, if they cannot, how can any other of these sovereigns nullify a tariff law, or an act for internal improvement, which the Fed

Mr. HAYNE suggested that, as the subject had relation to two committees-those on military and naval affairs, he thought it proper that the gentleman would designate the one to which he would refer the answer, when received. If left between two committees, it might fall through.

Mr. BARNARD said he had no hesitation in naming the committee to which he would refer the answer to his resolution. He was willing to refer it to the Committee on Naval Affairs. The resolution was then agreed to.

THURSDAY, March 4.

Mr. Foot's Resolution-Nullification. Mr. JOHN M. CLAYTON, of Delaware, said: come now, sir, to consider a subject which has been discussed in connection with this-the right of a State to regulate her conduct by the

MARCH, 1830.]

Mr. Foot's Resolution—Nullification.

[SENATE.

eral Judiciary adjudges to be valid? The gen- | ferred to the brief enumeration contained in tleman from Tennessee says that he will admit this letter, of the specific objects which made that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter in it necessary to establish this Government. I all cases in law and equity arising under the refer to the same authority to overthrow the constitution, and the laws of the United States | doctrine which regards all the rights of indemade in pursuance of it. But I am not satis- pendent sovereignty in each of the States, and fied with this limitation. The words of the to prove that some of those rights were, in the constitution are, "The judicial power of the view of the convention, ceded to provide for United States shall be vested in one supreme the general welfare. States are not self-existcourt, and in such inferior courts as the Con- ent; they are created by the people for their gress may, from time to time, ordain and estab- benefit. Those who have conferred State power lish." Then this general transfer of power is can take it away; and for their own good they explained by the second section of the same have transferred a portion of this mysterious article: "The judicial power shall extend to all principle of sovereignty, which troubles gencases in law and equity arising under this con- tlemen so much, to another place. They have stitution, the laws of the United States, and transferred a portion of the judicial power to treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Supreme Court, which acts as an impartial their authority; to all cases affecting ambassa- umpire, and not as an adversary party deciding dors, other public ministers, and consuls; to his own cause, as is erroneously supposed by all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic- some reasoners here. The gentleman from tion; to controversies to which the United Tennessee says the Federal Judiciary is, when States shall be a party; to controversies be- a question of State rights is before it, a portion tween two or more States, between a State and or part of one of the parties, created by the citizens of another State, between citizens of Legislative and Executive branches of the Gendifferent States, between citizens of the same eral Government, responsible to that GovernState claiming lands under grants of different ment alone, and liable to the imposition of deStates, and between a State, or the citizens structive burthens by that party. Even if all thereof, and foreign States, citizens or sub- this were correct, it would be a sufficient anjects." All these words of the deed are in full swer to it, when discussing this question, to force, except so far as it has been altered by reply that the States had agreed that the arbithe single amendatory article to prevent suits ter should be thus created and thus responsible, against one of the United States by citizens of having signed the arbitration bond deliberately, another State, or by citizens or subjects of any and with a full knowledge of the consequences. foreign State. The instrument then contains But when we look into the instrument, we find no qualification of the judicial power restrict- that the States, by their Representatives in the ing its exercise to cases arising out of laws Senate, must first consent to the appointment made in pursuance of the constitution. The of the arbiter, or he is not lawfully chosen. reservation is an inadvertent interpolation in They can challenge for cause, and they can the instrument, and the power granted extends challenge peremptorily. By refusing to conto laws of the United States, whether constitu- sent to appointments, they might in time vationally or unconstitutionally enacted. It will cate every seat on the whole tribunal. By the be seen, too, that the United States must "be Legislative power of their immediate Representa party to controversies" concerning a tariff atives in the Senate, responsible to the States law, as well as to those which affect the right as their only masters, they can always prevent to the public domain, or any other question the imposition of oppressive burthens on their touching State sovereignty; and that, if there common arbiters. They alone can try these be no authority in the instrument by which the arbiters on impeachment for misbehavior, and judicial power can be extended to the former without impeachment those arbiters cannot be class of controversies, there is none to extend removed from office. The Senator from Kenit to the latter class, or any case which a single tucky objects to the Federal Judiciary, that a State may consider as presenting an infraction majority in Congress may by law increase the of her own powers. The gentleman from Ken- number of judges, and thus oppress the mitucky, (Mr. RowAN,) and other Senators, have nority when they please. It has been said, contended that a State cannot surrender any too, that large States, with a great representaportion of her sovereignty, and we have been tion in Congress, such as New York and Pennasked to produce an instance in which sover-sylvania, combining with others, may, by their eignty has submitted itself to any judicial tri- superior vote, so far increase the number on bunal. Those who formed the constitution, in the bench as to oppress and destroy the sovtheir recommendatory letter, signed by Wash-ereignty of the lesser States. If the objection ington, on the 17th of September, 1787, inform us that "it is obviously impracticable in the Federal Government of these States to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all." The gentleman from Tennessee, in order to explain and construe the constitution, re

has any weight, it is one which could be made to our whole system of republican Government. We are ruled by majorities; and if the majority of this nation should become radically corrupt, I admit that the Government will soon fall. But I have sufficient reliance on the virtue and good sense of the people, whether

SENATE.]

Mr. Foot's Resolution-Nullification.

[MARCH, 1830. living in large or small States, to believe that | versies. We are warned, however, that if, by no attempt will ever be deliberately made by the constitution, there be not some express a majority in either, to destroy the independ-grant of power for this purpose, the States and ence and legitimate powers of the other. And the people still reserve it. On the other hand, I feel no apprehensions on this subject, for oth- if the grant to the Federal Judiciary be exer reasons. Let us inquire into the mode of press, the States have not reserved it, and can operating. Supposing now, (to make out the create no other without forming a new constigentleman's case,) that the large States wick-tution or violating this. Sir, I listened with edly conspire to ruin the small ones. New York, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina, being (as would be so probable!) united for this end, carry a bill through the other House to double the number of judges. Suppose, too, that they had by their votes elected a President who would second their views. When the bill comes before the Senate, if the small States understand your object, they, having an equal representation here, secured by the only provision in the constitution which numbers can never change, vote you down at once; and your combination (as other combinations may be) is consigned to "that same ancient vault,

"Where all the kindred of the Capulets lie." But suppose the Senators representing the small States here, not suspecting mischief, but relying on your integrity, suffer the bill to pass. Your President being in the plot, as we will, for the sake of argument, suppose, it becomes a law. What then? The bench is not yet filled. The modus operandi requires that he should nominate, and we should consent, to the appointment of the men who are to adjudge away our independence. We might be slow to suspect our old friends of dishonest purposes, but we can learn some things if you give us time. When you bring out your nominations, we cannot fail to understand your plan. You are caught at once, flagrante delicto, and we check you in the Senate, by rejecting all nominations which do not please us. We have two chances to put an effectual veto on your plot, and our veto is a very different affair from your State veto on an act of Congress. However thankful, therefore, we may be for the kindly apprehensions expressed for our welfare, we say that we are not yet alarmed. We cannot see, with the honorable gentleman from Tennessee, that the States have been guilty of either folly or weakness in creating such a tribunal as we conceive the Supreme Court of the United States to be-nor do we think with him, that, by the easiest operations imaginable, this creature is so competent to the destruction of its creators.

But whatever may have been the opinion of honorable gentlemen, the folly of the people of these States in creating such a tribunal, or however incompetent it may appear to decide these matters, the question still recurs, Is there any other forum established with co-extensive or with appellate powers? If so, what is it? There ought not to be a wrong without a remedy; and the interest and safety of all require the existence of some arbiter to decide contro

That

deep interest to the development of what I
thought was announced as a new discovery on
this subject. I will consider that adverted to,
and recommended, by the gentleman from Ten-
nessee, (Mr. GRUNDY.) After conceding to the
Federal Judiciary the powers of a common um-
pire, to decide on the constitutionality of all
Congressional enactments made in pursuance of
the constitution, he informed us that there was
another tribunal to which a State might resort,
when oppressed by what she considered to be
a plain, palpable, and dangerous violation of
the constitution, without throwing herself out
of the Union. He admitted that the Legisla-
ture of the State was not this tribunal.
might be misled. He beats the ground, then,
which was occupied by the gentleman from
South Carolina, (Mr. HAYNE,) but himself takes
a new position, not less dangerous. For he in-
formed us that a State convention might be
called, and that might nullify the oppressive
law; after which, he thought Congress must
acquiesce by abandoning the power. The
amount of this is, that one State is to govern
all the rest, whenever she may choose to de-
clare, by convention, that a law is unconstitu-
tional. The end of this, we say, is war-civil
war. We admit that a State convention may
pronounce any law to be unconstitutional, as
the Legislature of Virginia did in '98. But
the mere declaration comes to nothing, unless
it can be enforced. You may declare a law un-
constitutional, and so can I. But what of
that? It amounts only to this: we have full
freedom of speech in this country, may advo-
cate what opinions we please, and peaceably
endeavor to impress them upon others. But
the gentleman says this doctrine does not lead
to war. If Congress will not submit to the
State, he thinks there is still a complete politi-
cal salvo in another tribunal, and that is a
convention of the States, to be called under the
provisions of the constitution.
The State,
then, must exert herself until Congress, two-
thirds deeming it necessary, under the fifth arti-
cle, shall propose amendments to the constitu-
tion; or, on the application of the Legislatures
of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a
convention for proposing amendments, which,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three-
fourths of the several States, or by conventions
in three-fourths of them, shall be valid to all
intents and purposes, as part of the constitu-
tion. So far this does not contravene the doc-
trine which we advocate, and which the Sena-
tor from New Hampshire, if I rightly under-
stood him, after much preface, and with some
slips of prolixity," finally settled down upon

66

MARCH, 1830.]

Mr. Foot's Resolution—Nullification.

[SENATE.

as a part of the true orthodox creed. The connection and form others; but in the end, right to amend the constitution has never been nearly all have been restored, by the dignified denied. This was a part of the political plat- and impartial conduct of our common umpire, form upon which my honorable friend from to perfect good humor. Should that umpire Missouri (Mr. BARTON) invited you to come ever lose its high character for justice and imand stand with us. If the convention of the partiality, we have a corrective in the form of States should assemble and decide by a major- our Government; but if it is to be had only by ity of three-fourths against the State, the gen- a calm and temperate appeal to the judgment tleman from Tennessee says the State must sub- and feelings of the whole American people, it mit. But if they decide otherwise, or do not can never be obtained by such addresses and decide at all, Congress must submit to the resolutions as those of Colleton or Abbeville. State. Without assenting to this last conclu- Reason receives not in place of argument viosion, which appears to be arbitrarily assumed, | lent denunciations or furious appeals to party I will only inquire, if this be so, how is this and passion. During a period of four or five tribunal to save us from civil war? The an- years past, the complaints of the South have, swer is, only by so amending the constitution, for this reason, met with a cold reception in as to warp it to suit the declarations of the almost every other section of the Union. They State convention. This is an excellent remedy have been loud and deep; but they have been for the complaint of the State, but rather diffi- | evidently regarded as the transient effusions of cult to procure. If this is the sovereign pana-party feeling, coming, as they too often did, cea which the honorable Senator from Tennes- couched in language of bitter vituperation, see has discovered for healing the diseases of with the now stale and despicable charges of the South, sir, I fancy she will agree with me "coalition, bargain, and corruption "—that vile in commending her physician for his ingenuity and putrescent stuff which has at length, as in finding out the ingredients of the bolus, but the Senator from Massachusetts truly stated, she will still think they are too hard to be ob- sloughed off and gone down into the kennel tained to render the prescription valuable to forever. The course pursued was exactly that ber. With less experience, I would recom- which was best calculated to make the whole mend to a State groaning under the operation | alleged grievances, if real, irremediable. Those of a law which she deems unconstitutional, to who loved and admired the character of the apply first to the Federal Judiciary, where she Statesman of the West, indignant at the calumwill generally obtain relief, if her complaint nies with which he, as they saw, was so unbe not hypochondria or imaginary ill. If she justly assailed, often regarded the complaints fail there, let her pour her complaints into the which came with them as mere secondary conears of her sisters, and use all constitutional siderations, brought in to aid a personal attack. means to procure a repeal of the obnoxious On the other hand, many of those who affected law. A bare majority of Congress will be suf- to accredit these calumnies for political effect, ficient to give her relief in this way. Do you in their hearts never sincerely believed any object that Congress will probably persevere in part of the story of Southern sufferings, thinktheir course, and refuse to repeal the law they ing perhaps that they knew best what weight have enacted? It may be so; and if so, their was to be attached to the political falsehoods constituents, being a majority of the people, which commonly accompanied them. must concur with them, that the law is not | ever different their objects, they were really on only constitutional, but salutary, or they would, the same chase; but to the Southern huntsman by the exercise of the elective franchise, re- the game taken has been of no benefit. From move such unworthy agents of their sovereign a recent demonstration, we perceive that the will. If they do concur with their Represent- Southern complaint is now not even deemed atives, and uphold them in their refusal to re-worthy of a hearing. Sir, when I witnessed peal the law, no matter how often by any other power than the Federal Judiciary declared to be unconstitutional, in my humble judgment you will hardly persuade three-fourths of them to assemble for the purpose of altering their constitution, and depriving their own agents of the power of acting on the subject.

How

the manly and candid manner in which the honorable Senator from South Carolina on my right (Mr. SMITH) spoke of the grievances of his constituents, when I saw him evidently soaring above mere party feeling, menacing none, denouncing none, and touching with all the delicacy which characterizes him, the subIt comes at last, then, to this-that we have jects in difference between us, the reflection no other direct resource, in the cases we have forced itself irresistibly on my mind, how difbeen considering, to save us from the horrors ferent might have been the reception of these of anarchy, than the Supreme Court of the complaints, had they always come thus recomUnited States. That tribunal has decided amended. South Carolina, though erring in a hundred such cases, and many under the most menacing circumstances. Several States have occasionally made great opposition to it. Indeed, it would seem that in their turn most of the sisters of this great family have fretted for a time, sometimes threatening to break the

controversy with her sisters, would by all have been believed to have been honestly wrong; and if, under such circumstances, she should ever throw herself out of the pale of the Union in consequence of such a misconception of the constitution as we have endeavored to

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