sufficient force could be raised and disciplined, or one having a secondary but still an important object, viz. the reduction of that part of Upper Canada lying between the town of Prescott and Lake Erie. The latter was the course determined on by the cabinet, and orders were accordingly issued for the collection of 4000 troops at Sackett's Harbour, and 3000 at Buffalo and its vicinity, which. were placed under the command of general Dearborn. His instructions were, to transport the troops at Sackett's Harbour under convoy of the fleet to Kingston, the capture of which was to form the first object of the campaign. York was to be the next object of attack, and then forts George and Erie, the corps at Buffalo co-operating in the latter. By the advice of commodore Chauncey and general Dearborn, however, an alteration in the order of this plan was finally adopted, by which York was to constitute the first object, and after the capture of forts George and Erie, the whole American force was to be collected for the attack on Kingston. The opening of the campaign was eminently successful. York fell an easy prey, the British stores and naval force there were captured or destroyed, and the whole line of the Niagara frontier surrendered to the American arms. This success, however, was but short-lived. The operations against York and Fort George had consumed much more time than was expected, owing to a long series of contrary winds and bad weather, which had rendered naval operations extremely tedious and uncertain, and considerably affected the health of the troops; and the enemy's fleet having meanwhile received an accession of strength, which gave it a decided superiority on the lake, Chauncey was compelled to remain at Sackett's Harbour until his new ship should be ready for sea. This of course rendered the proposed attack on Kingston impracticable for the present. The land forces of the enemy, too, though beaten, had been allowed to escape unbroken; and a series of consequent disasters in the neighbourhood of Fort George, with the ill health of the commanding general, produced an order from government that he should retire from the command. His successor was ordered to remain on the defensive until Chauncey could once more gain the command of the lake. The plan of operations laid down for the left division of the army, under general Harrison, was, to make occasional demonstrations against Malden, so as to keep up the enemy's alarm for the safety of that post, but to remain on the defensive until the command of the lake could be obtained by the naval force building at Presque Isle. The army was then to be transported by water to Malden. This plan was crowned with the most complete success, by the capture of the whole British force in this quarter, both naval and military. Meantime general Wilkinson was appointed to the command of the main body of the army, and general Hampton, under his orders, to the command of the right division, on Lake Champlain. Towards the end of July, Chauncey being again enabled to contend for the ascendancy on Lake Ontario, by the addition of the General Pike to his fleet, there was a considerable probability that Wilkinson would be soon enabled to resume offensive operations. A new plan of campaign was accordingly submitted to the president by the secretary of war, which was approved and adopted on the 23d of July. This was, to concentrate the forces on Lake Ontario at Sackett's Harbour, and thence either to make a direct attack upon Kingston; or, moving down the St. Lawrence, to secure a position upon that river which would cut off the communication between Montreal and the upper country, and then march against Montreal in concert with Hampton's army. General Wilkinson arrived at Sackett's Harbour on the 20th of August, and at Fort George on the 4th of September. From his correspondence at this time it appears, that his principal object was to draw the attention and force of the enemy as much as possible from Kingston and Montreal to the neighbourhood of Fort George, whence it was intended to make a rapid movement against one of the former places, by the assistance of the fleet. At this critical period, however, nearly a whole month was lost by the tantalizing manoeuvres of commodore Yeo, who by the superior sailing of his squadron, was enabled to avoid an action, while he kept Chauncey almost constantly in pursuit. By this means the embarkation of the troops at Fort George was delayed till the 30th of September, and owing to a series of contrary winds and calms, they did not arrive at Sackett's Harbour till the 18th of October. The army was then moved to Grenadier Island. Meantime the opportunity of attacking Kingston to advantage was lost. The dilatory movements of the American army had enabled the British to reinforce the garrison, and the fleet was now in the harbour. These with other unfavourable circumstances induced the determination to leave Kingston unmolested, and descend the St. Lawrence against Montreal. Meanwhile general Hampton, agreeably to his instructions, had put his army in motion against Montreal. On the evening of the 19th of September, he dropped down with the army from Cumberland Head, and landed them near Little Chazy at 12 committee regret that special order had not been taken by congress immediately after the receipt of the first present of this kind; we allude to the colours which were taken by general Montgomery from the 7th British regiment, at Chamblee, on the 18th of October, 1775. The French pride themselves on their ability to exhibit the two which they have taken from our present enemy for so lately as the year 1800 they had only two of the naval flags of Great Britain! Though the war and navy departments can immediately furnish but twenty or twenty-five of these flags, it is probable the place of deposit will be ascertained, so as to put within our power many of those which were gained during our revolution. Where are those which were won during our dispute with France in 1798? The same may be asked of those which the defeats of Derne and Tripoli should furnish? The only object which remains for consideration is, the place most proper for the exhibition. This should be public and easy of access, at the same time that it should be perfectly secure from villainous attempts. These flags should be placed so as to be seen by every citizen who might wish to observe them. It will be of advantage that they should be noticed by every foreigner who may visit the United States. Can any objection be made to the spacious national apartments which are devoted to legislative purposes? What ornaments can be more suitable? Go abroad, and you may see the walls of the British house of lords decorated with representations of some of the celebrated battles which were fought by the troops of Great Britain. At home we find the principle already established by one branch of the legislature of the United States: in the senate chamber we observe engravings of some of the battles of our revolution; and had time allowed the execution of the original design of the architect, the precedent would have had existence in the chamber of the representatives of the United States. It was contemplated that the frize, over the capitals of the Corinthian columns which sustain the dome, should present, in relievo, a regular series of the battles which secured our independence. Such decorations might gratify the artist, and afford an opportunity to display his talents; but in a national view little or no effect would be produced. It must be conceded, that much more will be communicated to the spectator by the display of the captured standards. No one can pretend that any difference exists between the representations which we have noticed and the standards which have been taken from the enemy, as will warrant the public exhibition of the one and preclude that of the other: these subjects are most intimately connected, and their tendency must be the same. The public exhibition of these trophies is a tribute due to the very superior skill and valour which achieved them; the sight of them will bring to recollection every circumstance of cause and effect; they will constitute valuable records of illustrious portions of our history; they will form a collection of the proudest monuments to commemorate the brilliant deeds of a rising nation. An act was accordingly passed on the 18th of April, directing the secretaries of the war and navy departments to cause to be collected and transmitted to them, at the seat of government, all such flags, standards, and colours as have or shall hereafter be taken by the army and navy of the United States from their enemies. These trophies are to be delivered to the president, for the purpose of being preserved and displayed in such public place as he shall judge proper. CHAPTER V. § 1. Enquiry into the failure of the campaign. §2. Report of the secretary of war. § 3. Motion for a committee of enquiry. 4. Enquiry respecting retaliation. §5. Report of the secretary of state. § 6. Resolution respecting the vacancy in the treasury department. §7. Vacancies in the departments. §8. Gore's resolutions. 59. Amendments to the constitution. § 10. Hanson's resolutions. §11. Roberts' resolution. §12. Webster's resolutions. 1. On the 31st of December, on motion of Mr. Bradley, a resolution was adopted by the house of representatives, 137 to 13, requesting the president to cause to be laid before the house any information in his possession, not improper to be communicated, tending to illustrate the causes of the failure of the arms of the United States on the northern frontier. 2. In answer to this resolution the president transmitted a mass of documents, containing the principal part of the correspondence of the military commanders with the secretary of war. From these documents it appears, that the principal object of the campaign was the capture of Montreal, on which the fate of Upper Canada was supposed to depend, and where the main force of the enemy was understood to be stationed. The smallness of the American force early in the spring, however, precluding every idea of a direct attack on this point, it only remained to chuse between a course of total inaction, until a E E VOL. III. sufficient force could be raised and disciplined, or one having a secondary but still an important object, viz. the reduction of that part of Upper Canada lying between the town of Prescott and Lake Erie. The latter was the course determined on by the cabinet, and orders were accordingly issued for the collection of 4000 troops at Sackett's Harbour, and 3000 at Buffalo and its vicinity, whichwere placed under the command of general Dearborn. His instructions were, to transport the troops at Sackett's Harbour under convoy of the fleet to Kingston, the capture of which was to form the first object of the campaign. York was to be the next object of attack, and then forts George and Erie, the corps at Buffalo co-operating in the latter. By the advice of commodore Chauncey and general Dearborn, however, an alteration in the order of this plan was finally adopted, by which York was to constitute the first object, and after the capture of forts George and Erie, the whole American force was to be collected for the attack on Kingston. The opening of the campaign was eminently successful. York fell an easy prey, the British stores and naval force there were captured or destroyed, and the whole line of the Niagara frontier surrendered to the American arms. This success, however, was but short-lived. The operations against York and Fort George had consumed much more time than was expected, owing to a long series of contrary winds and bad weather, which had rendered naval operations extremely tedious and uncertain, and considerably affected the health of the troops; and the enemy's fleet having meanwhile received an accession of strength, which gave it a decided superiority on the lake, Chauncey was compelled to remain at Sackett's Harbour until his new ship should be ready for sea. This of course rendered the proposed attack on Kingston impracticable for the present. The land forces of the enemy, too, though beaten, had been allowed to escape unbroken; and a series of consequent disasters in the neighbourhood of Fort George, with the ill health of the commanding general, produced an order from government that he should retire from the command. His successor was ordered to remain on the defensive until Chauncey could once more gain the command of the lake. The plan of operations laid down for the left division of the army, under general Harrison, was, to make occasional demonstrations against Malden, so as to keep up the enemy's alarm for the safety of that post, but to remain on the defensive until the command of the lake could be obtained by the naval force building at Presque Isle. The army was then to be transported |