the first five years of it, the arrears of debts, and the slender thread by which public credit hangs, put it totally out of our power to make any great exertions without an immediate supply of money.

Taxation will be carried as far as it can go; but this will fall very far short of our wants. The richest nations in Europe, unable to carry on a war by taxation only, are compelled to borrow. How then will it be expected, that a nation, which has had every difficulty to struggle with, an enemy in the heart of its country, and all its considerable towns at one time or another in their possession, a superior navy on its coasts, and the consequential ruin of its agriculture and commerce, how, I say, can it be expected, that such a nation should find resources within itself for so long and bloody a war? And yet, in this situation, we are alarmed by our advices from you, by representations from the minister of France, by assurances from every quarter, that we must expect no further assistance in money. Surely it is not possible, that France, after having done so much for us, after having brought us within view of the desired haven, should oblige us to lose the advantage of all she has done; and yet be assured, that the most serious consequence may attend her stopping her hand at this critical time. Public credit, which is growing very fast, will drop to the ground. The contracts made for the ensuing campaign must be given up; the troops, who were made to expect pay in specie, will be dissatisfied; and, upon the least ill fortune, a failure in supplies will show their discontents; recruiting will be checked, and the conclusion of the war on those advantageous terms, which one vigorous exertion next spring in this country would secure, will be postponed to a later period, when in fact all we wish, to enable us to accomplish these great ob

jects, is less than one year's continuance of the war will cost France.

You will, therefore, show the necessity of setting our credit upon a firm basis, the prospect we have of accomplishing it, from the great confidence in the integrity and abilities of the financier, from the economy which is introduced into our departments, from the industry which money excites, and which a fluctuating medium had destroyed, and from the total debility which must attend another shock to public credit.

You are perfectly acquainted, Sir, with the natural resources of the country; you know the value of our exports, and the security they afford for any debt that we may contract; in short, there are a thousand arguments on this subject, which will suggest themselves to you, not one of which will you, upon this occasion, omit to urge, since you must be perfectly convinced of its importance in every view, both to France and to us. The Superintendent will write more fully upon this subject, which relates so particularly to his department.

I would beg leave to remind you of another want, which we depend on your representations, and the good dispositions of the court of Versailles, to remove. The chase here seems to be pretty well over, the enemy, tired of running across the country, have taken to their burrows, and the whole business, that remains to us, is to take measures for unearthing them next spring. In order to this, ships are absolutely necessary. The situation of New York and Charleston renders them untenable against a naval force, and extremely strong against an attack by land; besides that success in such an operation would not be decisive, since, after putting us to immense expense of men and ammunition of every kind, while they keep the com

mand of the water, they might change their position and be as troublesome as ever. At any rate, the reduction of both these places, from their distance, and the difficulty of removing the men and stores, cannot be effected the same campaign without a naval force, and, with it, it will be the business of a few weeks. The advantage to France, independent of her interests as they stand connected with ours, in keeping a great naval force on this continent, is obvious.

1st. The expense to which they put the English, by obliging them to maintain an equal force at this distance from home, at four times the cost at which the French navy may be maintained in this country; which, with proper management, need not exceed what they expend even in France.

2dly. The number of seamen they employ in the transport service, being so many deducted from what might supply their navy, with the same expense as if so employed.

3dly. The protection afforded to the trade on this coast, and the prospect of capturing the enemy's victuallers, and the consequent ruin of their affairs.

4thly. But, above all, the decided advantage it will afford our combined operations, and the speedy termination of the war, by an advantageous peace. It is true, France may have other objects, which may interfere with these. To this we can say nothing; she must judge for herself. All we can do is, to point out what we conceive will be most useful to her as well as to us, and submit to her determination. It would be well, however, if we were apprized of it as soon as possible.

If a negotiation should open this winter, or there should be a probable prospect of it, you will do me the favor to give me the earliest advices of it. There

are many delicate points, on which you would like to know the sentiments of people on this side of the water, which I will endeavour to acquaint you with. I should inform you, that Congress have discharged the commission for negotiating a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, and taken that burden from Mr Adams's shoulders; that, in compliment to the Marquis de Lafayette, they have made him the bearer of a letter to the King of France, which I enclose; that, in answer to your favor of the 11th of June, they have passed the enclosed resolution.

Mr. Morris will write to you on this subject, and enable you to discharge the bills. Should France send a fleet next spring, it would be advantageous to have it unincumbered with such orders, as may prevent its taking advantage of circumstances. This has unhappily prevented this campaign from being absolutely decisive. But neither this, nor any other great objecs can escape your observation, bent as it is upon promoting the happiness of your country.

In order to enable you to meet the claim of the Tories to the property that has been confiscated, I am endeavouring to collect for you an accurate account of the damages wantonly done by the enemy in this country, which will at least serve to set against that claim. Congress are preparing for an active campaign. They have directed eight millions of dollars to be raised by tax. There is not, however, the least idea that this, or even one half of it, will be collected in the time specified; you will not, therefore, suffer the court to deceive themselves, by hopes of exertions founded on this measure, but urge again and again the absolute necessity of supplying money. I have conversed so freely with the Marquis de Lafayette on the general state of our politics, that I would rather

refer you to him, than trouble you with a longer letter on the subject.

I cannot, however, close this, without desiring you to inquire, whether any intercepted letters from Mr. Deane to persons in this country have been published in Europe. Rivington has given us many, which are generally believed to be his. The Marquis will satisfy your inquiries about them. I am, dear Sir, with sentiments of the highest respect and esteem, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FROM ROBERT MORRIS TO B. FRANKLIN.

Impolicy of the Purchases in Holland. Disposition of the American People towards the French.

SIR,

Philadelphia, 5 December, 1781.

I was yesterday morning favored with yours of the 12th of September, enclosing third copies of your two letters of the 26th of July, also a copy of Count de Vergennes's letter to you of the 23d of August. I find by these letters, that the idea I had entertained, as to the advances made by the court, was not so favorable as the truth, and that the ten millions of livres, or five millions of florins to be borrowed in Holland, will be over and above those advances. How much pleasure I receive from that circumstance, you will easily conceive. It is an additional pleasure, that the labor of adjusting the matters, mentioned in mine of the 27th of November, will be saved to you.

I am much surprised to find so large purchases made on account of the United States in Holland. If every thing else were equal, the generous conduct of France towards us has been such, that I cannot but think