CHAP. V. Political Views of Buonaparte, after a Pacification with Austria.-The Character now assumed by France.-Buonaparte cajoles Paul I,-and revives the Armed Neutrality of 1780 against Great Britain.-Convention on the Principles of that Confederation between France and America. -Ambassador sent to the United American States from Denmark.-Disputes between Sweden and Great Britain.-Capture and Condemnation of a Swedish Convoy.-A Swedish Vessel pressed into the Naval Service of England.-Complaints of this made by Spain and Holland.-Dignified Conduct on that Occasion of the King of Sweden.-Reflections on the Question concerning the Liberty of the Seas.-History of this Question.Sweden and Denmark hostile to England. HE chief consul of France, Thaving made peace with Aus tria, was now at liberty to bend his undivided attention to England. The leading features of his policy, with respect to this country, appear to have been these: to excite a confederacy, against this country, among all the maritime powers; to exclude her from all the ports of Europe; to attack, and, if necessary, to subdue her only remaining ally, Portugal; and exhaust her finances, and weary out the patience of the British nation, by the continued threats and alarms of invasion. France, now in the ninth year of the war, assumed the character which England had taken at its commencement. The word, or, according to the new phraseology, the order of the day in France, was, "The liberty of the seas, and the pacification of Europe." The chief consul was congratulated, of course, by all the constituted bodies, on the peace which he had so happily accomplished with Austria. In his answer to the legislative body, he said, "France will not reap all the blessings of peace, until she shall have a peace with England: but a sort of delirium has seized on that government, which now holds nothing sacred. Its conduct is unjust, not only towards the French people, but also towards all the powers of the continent: and when governments are not just, their authority is but short-lived. All the powers of the continent must force England to fall back into the track of moderation, of equity, and reason." " Buonaparte, ever since the failure of his attempt, after his elevation to the consulate, to negotiate a peace with England, continued, with increased earnestness, to represent to all maritime nations the overbearing haughtiness and insolence of this country. By his ministers and other other agents at the courts of Petersburgh, Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Berlin, he insinuated how encouraging the present posture of Europe was for a revival of the armed neutrality of 1780, founded on the principle, that free and neutral bottoms make free and neutral goods, and how great the advantages of compelling the English to make peace on reasonable terms. The desultory and frantic mind of the emperor, Paul, had been irritated, by various accidents, against the courts of both Vienna and London, but especially against the latter. Disputes had arisen, even to the height of action, between the Russians and Austrians, after the reduction of the Ex-Venetian isles, in 1799, at Ancona. The Austrians had not duly supported the Russians, in the campaign of that year, against France and it appeared, not indeed without reason, that a neighbouring and rival empire was not actuated by the principles which had drawn the Russian potentate into the confederation against the French republic, but by views of individual aggrandizement. Whatever was the cause, certain it is, that the emperor of Russia had conceived great disgust at the emperor of Germany: insomuch, that when the latter announced his intention of sending an extraordinary ambassador to Petersburgh, to offer excuses for what had happened at Ancona, Paul refused to receive him: and, the more fully to give vent to his passion, he gave orders that no answer should be given to the notification from Francis. As to England, mutual accusations had taken place between the Russian and the English generals, after the unsuccessful and disastrous expedition, in 1799, to Holland. After the first ebullitions of the emperor's rage against his own officers, his jealousy and resentment was awakened against the English. The beginning resentment of Paul against the British nation, as well as the court of St. James's, was inflamed by the failure of his schemes in the Mediterranean. The genius of the Russian government, amidst the caprices and singularities of individual characters, preserves, on the whole, the impulse and determination that was given to it by the Great Peter. It was his aim to have a firm footing in the Mediterranean, as well as on the Northern ocean and the Baltic. In pursuance of this general aim, Paul had been led, by a concurrence of circumstances, which need not to be here enumerated, to fix his eyes and heart on Malta. Though no absolute promise was made to that prince by the other allies; yet, it would appear, that some hopes had been held out to him, or, at least, that he was allowed, without being undeceived, to entertain a sanguine expectation of being presented with it*. A fleet, with troops, * General sir Charles Stuart, in stating the reasons which induced him to resign the command of the British forces in the Mediterranean, wrote to Mr. Dundas, on the 2d of April, 1800, the following: "Although I have freely submitted these professional remarks to you on the difficulty of reducing Valette, by siege, I trust you will do me the justice to believe, that neither the circumstances I have stated, the reduction of the force first proposed, or the inferiority of the objects now in contemplation, comparatively with those originally designed (among which the chief troops, had sailed from the Black Sea, in August, 1800, for the express purpose of taking possession of the place when it should surrender. No remonstrances were made when Paul assumed, ridiculously, the title of grand master of Malta: and when he pretended to make captain Home Popham a knight of that order, his right to do so was recognized in the London Gazette. When the original destination of that fleet was frustrated by the surrender of Malta, and its occupation by the English, it remained long at anchor in the canal of Constantinople, waiting for orders how to act. The resentment of the emperor was, in the first instance, as usual in such cases, wreaked on a weak party, presenting itself as a ready object for the gratification of his passion. He demanded from the grand seignior, the ally of England, a large sum, stipulated, he alledged, to be paid by the Turks for the maritime aid of the Russians. A sharp dispute arose on this subject. The Russian admiral refused to return to the Crimea till the money should be paid, and even threatened hostile measures against Constantinople. The Porte was obliged to yield to the menaces of the enraged czar of Muscovy. Nor is it by any means unimportant, however ludicrous, on the present head, to mention, that Paul was highly offended by the caricatures of his person and character, published in the streets of London; and which Buonaparte took special care to have transmitted to Petersburgh. On the irritable and irritated temper of the emperor, disgusted with Austria, and much more with England, but as prone to sentiments of gratitude and generosity as to those of resentment, Buonaparte operated with consummate address and complete success. The world was not a little surprised at the arrival of an embassy in Paris from Paul I, not more than a year after his famous proclamation for restoring the throne of the Bourbons. This embassy consisted of the general baron de Sprengporten, an old Swedish refugee at the court of Russia, prince Joseph Dolgorowki, the count de Tissenhaveen, a captain in the Russian army, Mr. de Scheping, son of the grand mareshal of Courland, and other gentlemen. This stately company was met by general Clarke, at Brussels, and by him conducted to Paris on the 18th of December. The ostensible object of the embassy was, to treat for the release of the Russian prisoners is known to have been the expulsion of the French from Egypt,) make me for one instant wish to relinquish the danger or honour of the undertaking: but the same point of honour, the good of this country, and, I may add, the humanity which gives rise to these feelings; rendered it impossible for me to obey the particular instruction concerning the introduction of a Russian force into Malta." Mr. Dundas, having read this extract, said, "I cannot, on this occasion, avoid remarking, that whilst we are accused of acting with insincerity towards Russia, the circumstance which led to this resignation is a strong proof how anxious his majesty felt to offer to that power, though bound to it by no positive engagement whatever, a participation in the advantages of that conquest, in case Russia had remained faithful to her alliance, and to the bonds of amity then subsisting between her and this country."-Parliamentary Register, House of Commons, March 25, 1801. It is difficult to conceive, how the possession of Malta could have been shared, with any tolerable prospect of continued harmony, between the English and the Russians. But the present question is, whether Paul had any reason to look for either the whole or a share of it? that that had fallen into the hands of the French, to the number of 7,000. For this body of Russians the British government had refused to exchange an equal number of French prisoners. The chief consul, in compliment to Paul, gave orders that all the Russian prisoners should be newly clothed and accoutred in the uniforms of their respective regiments, and restored freely without exchange or ransom. Each man was presented with a fusil of French manufacture. The baron de Spengporten bore the title only of envoy. He was followed, in February, 1801, by an ambassador, accompanied by a retinue equally splendid. The envoy with his train was treated with very marked respect: but still greater marks of respect and reverence were in reserve for the ambassador. When it was made known in France, that an ambassador from Russia was on his way to Paris, his arrival was expected in that city with the utmost eagerness, and every preparation possible was made to gratify the vanity of Paul, in the person of his ambassador. This was the count Kalitcheff, a man of modest, unassuming, and courtly manners, who had before sustained the character of Russian ambassador at Berlin and other courts. The count must doubtless have been astonished to find himself treated, by so great and glorious a nation as the French, with a degree of magnificence and of adulation exceeding all the marks of honour and devotion that he had ever known to be paid to his own imperial master. On his entrance into Paris, he was saluted by a fire of all the cannon. A magnificent palace was appropriated to his residence, and he was entertained at the expense of the republic. He was honoured with a body-guard. It was artfully contrived that petitions should be presented to him from persons under the prosecution or the sentence of the law, imploring his interference in their behalf with the chief consul, and from others, soliciting favours. The protection of Kalitcheff was never extended to any one without effect: his applications to the consuls were never made in vain. But what was considered as the head and crown of all this climax of compliment to Paul, was, the affectation of granting, only through the intercession of the emperor of Russia, peace and independence to the king of Naples. The queen of Naples, judging rightly of the character of Paul, governed more by private humours and caprices, than by views of sound policy, or even of ambition,had gone to Petersburgh, in November, 1800, to persuade the emperor to continue the war, or if not, to continue, at least, his countenance to the royal family of Naples, and to exert his influence and authority for the safety of the kingdom. A lady in distress could not solicit in vain the protection of a knight errant, after so long a journey in suit of it. The emperor's zeal in the cause of the Neapolitans was increased. a The French government expressed disposition to grant to the intercession of Paul, what they would have granted without it. General Murat, on the 24th of January, 1801, wrote from Florence, to general de Damas, commander of the Neapo◄ litan troops, as follows: "It is almost a month, general, since the French ministry acquainted you that the interest which his majesty the emperor of Russia takes in the king of of Naples, had induced the first consul to bury in oblivion the inDumerable injuries of all-kinds, of which your government has been guilty towards the French people. After this opening towards a good understanding, we entertained the hope, that you would have remained a quiet spectator of a contest, in which you can be but of little consequence on one side or other. Yet the king of Naples, forgetting for the tenth time, the dictates of sound policy, and what was due to the generous conduct of the French government, dispatched his troops into Tuscany, where they came to be thrashed by general Miollis. But war is attended with so many calamities, that the French government studies all possible means of avoiding it. 1. Evacuate all the ecclesiastical states, and the castle of St. Angelo. 2. Make no farther claims of any benefits from the armistice of Treviso, in which you are not included, nor at all mentioned, or on the influence of a power which must no longer protect you. The only prince who has it now in his power to protect you, in consequence of the personal regard that is borne to him by the first consul, is, the emperor of all the Russias. Let it be the study, sir, of your government to merit a continuation of that prince's goodness; which cannot be done but by shutting all the ports of Sicily and Naples against the Navigation of the English, and laying an embargo on all the ships of that nation, which it is now high time to expel from all points of the continent.” But the grand point on which Buonaparte's intrigues with Paul turned, was Malta. Malta was to be Russia's whenever it could be wrested, by arms or negotiation, from the English. It is almost needless to mention, that, amidst so many acts of studied complaisance, orders were given by the French government for a cessation of all hostilities against Russia. On the 19th of January, 1801, the consuls issued a decree, by which, "All vessels of the republic, and all cruisers bearing the French flag, were forbidden to interrupt the ships of war, or the commerce of the emperor of all the Russias, or of his subjects; on the contrary, all French vessels were ordered to afford succour and aid to the ships of Russia. Next to Russia, the power of most importance, in the formation of a confederation against England for the purpose just mentioned, was Prussia. Without the concurrence of the king of Prussia, the hostility of the northern powers could not be attended with any bad effects to us, very lasting. But it was in the power of the king of Prussia, who commanded so extensive a maritime coast, and the navigation of all the great rivers, from the Rhine to the Eider on the north of Germany, to render it truly formidable, and, at a time when Great Britain was hard pressed by scarcity of provisions and Imenaced with famine, peculiarly dis tressing. No means, therefore, were neglected by Buonaparte to strengthen the confederacy by the accession of the Prussian monarch. For the accomplishment of this important object, he sent his brother Lewis to Berlin; and a very happy opportunity occurred of intriguing for the same end, in the mission of the marquis de Lucchesini to Paris, to take care of the interests of Prussia, |