IV.

PART the actions of the mind, except volition, or rather an inconsiderable part of volition; though 'tis easy to Of the perceive, that this exception is a mere pretext, to avoid other the dangerous consequences of that doctrine. If nophilosophy. thing be active but what has an apparent" power,

sceptical and

systems of

thought is in no case any more active than matter; and if this inactivity must make us have recourse to a Deity, the Supreme Being is the real cause of all our actions, bad as well as good, vicious as well as virtuous.

Thus we are necessarily reduced to the other side of the dilemma, viz. that all objects, which are found to be constantly conjoined, are upon that account only to be regarded as causes and effects. Now, as all objects which are not contrary, are susceptible of a constant conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary; it follows, that, for ought we can determine by the mere ideas, any thing may be the cause or ef fect of any thing; which evidently gives the advantage to the materialists above their antagonists.

To pronounce, then, the final decision upon the whole the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible: all our perceptions are not susceptible of a local union, either with what is extended or unextended; there being some of them of the one kind, and some of the other: and as the constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and effect, matter and motion may often be regarded as the causes of thought, as far as we have any notion of that relation.

'Tis certainly a kind of indignity to philosophy, whose sovereign authority ought every where to be acknowledged, to oblige her on every occasion to make apologies for her conclusions, and justify herself to every particular art and science, which may be offend

V.

Of the immateria

lity of the soul.

ed at her. This puts one in mind of a king arraign- SECT. ed for high treason against his subjects. There is only one occasion when philosophy will think it necessary and even honourable to justify herself; and that is, when religion may seem to be in the least offended; whose rights are as dear to her as her own, and are indeed the same. If any one, therefore, should imagine that the foregoing arguments are any ways dangerous to religion, I hope the following apology will remove his apprehensions.

There is no foundation for any conclusion a priori, either concerning the operations or duration of any object, of which 'tis possible for the human mind to form a conception. Any object may be imagined to become entirely inactive, or to be annihilated in a moment; and 'tis an evident principle, that whatever we can imagine is possible. Now this is no more true of matter, than of spirit; of an extended compounded substance, than of a simple and unextended. In both cases the metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the soul are equally inconclusive; and in both cases the moral arguments and those derived from the analogy of nature are equally strong and convincing. If my philosophy therefore makes no addition to the arguments for religion, I have at least the satisfaction to think it takes nothing from them, but that every thing remains precisely as before.

SECTION VI.

OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

THERE are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our

318

PART the actions of the mind, except vo'

IV.

sceptical and

inconsiderable part of volition: Of the perceive, that this exception is other the dangerous consequences philosophy. thing be active but whe

systems of

thought is in no case any
if this inactivity must r
the Supreme Being i

ontinuance in evidence of a ntity and simplimost violent pasting us from this view,

and make us consider er by their pain or pleasure. proof of this were to weaken its

bad as well as good proof can be derived from any fact
Thus we are
so intimately conscious; nor is there
of the dilemma which we can be certain, if we doubt of
to be constar

stant c

ry;

fer

f

et 'tis

any

to be regarly all these positive assertions are contrary
jects whi
ery experience which is pleaded for them; nor
idea of self, after the manner it is here
ned. For, from what impression could this idea
by erived? This question 'tis impossible to answer
hout a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and
'tis a question which must necessarily be answer-
d, if we would have the idea of self pass for clear and
intelligible. It must be some one impression that
gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not
any one impression, but that to which our several im-
pressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference.
If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that im-
pression must continue invariably the same, through
the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to
exist after that manner. But there is no impression
constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and
joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and
never all exist at the same time. It cannot therefore
be from any of these impressions, or from any other,
that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there
is no such idea.

must become of all our particular SECT. pothesis? All these are dif

e, and separable from each separately considered, and may and have no need of any thing to sup

stence.

After what manner therefore do

ong to self, and how are they connected with

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflec tion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me.

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without

VI.

Of

personal identity.

IV.

Of the sceptical and

systems of

PART self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simpliother city. The strongest sensation, the most violent pasphilosophy. sion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on self either by their pain or pleasure. To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can be derived from any fact of which we are so intimately conscious; nor is there any thing, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.

Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience which is pleaded for them; nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explained. For, from what impression could this idea be derived? This question 'tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet 'tis a question which must necessarily be answered, if we would have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible. It must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot therefore be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea.