Governor Brown took his seat in the Senate on the 26th of January, 1854. His experience as a legislator, and familiarity with public affairs, acquired by his incumbency previously of high public stations, at once enabled him to become a leading member of the Senate, and to rank amongst its most attentive business members, as well as ablest debaters.

His speeches in this volume, delivered since he has been in the Senate, like all of his efforts, are characterized by that cogency, strength, and all of the other attributes which mark the perfect debater. He has just concluded his first term in the Senate, and is beginning a new one of six years, for which he has been chosen by the Legislature of his

state.

As a Senator, Governor Brown has been eminently national in his course. If to the casual observer he has sometimes appeared a little sectional, it must be borne in mind that he comes from the South, section against which abolition has directed its batteries-and that it was his duty, as it was his pleasure, to defend that section. His senatorial course is too recent and too fresh in the recollection of the country to need sketching, and we close this brief notice by directing the reader's attention to his speeches in the Senate, as embodied in the last half of this volume.

SPEECHES AND WRITINGS

OF

HON. ALBERT G. BROWN.

NATIONAL BANK.

Report of Hon. Albert G. Brown, in the House of Representatives of Mississippi, made January 24th, 1838, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the Governor's Message as relates to a National Bank.

MR. SPEAKER: The committee to whose consideration the foregoing resolution was referred, have given to the subject which it involves, the calm and dispassionate reflection which its vast magnitude and importance requires, and have instructed me to report, as follows:

Your committee believe from the manner in which his excellency the governor introduces the subject of a National Bank in his written communication to the two houses of the legislature, that he looks to it as part and parcel of the means of enabling "our citizens to anticipate another crop," and "to retain as a spring to industry a portion of the means now in their possession to operate upon." Such is the plain and palpable inference from the language employed in the message. If these were the only advantages or disadvantages incident to the establishment of such an institution, your committee would not conceive it their duty further to investigate the subject, since "an expression of this body," however early or emphatic, would not, in the course of human probability, effectuate in any particular, the object pointed out.

But looking beyond those immediate objects, your committee have thought it their duty to examine the subject more thoroughly. In doing this, they find it divisible into two parts, each of which they propose to examine in its order. First, as to the constitutional right of the general government, to exercise the power of erecting such an institution; Secondly, as to the expediency or propriety of establishing such an institution at this time, and its probable effects upon state banks and other local interests.

Your committee see no reason to depart from the long-settled and well-established republican principle, that the government of the United States is one of limited delegated powers, and that it can in no case, with propriety, exercise any other powers, than such as have been expressly delegated, and such others as spring incidentally out of those

substantively given. That within the sphere of its delegated powers, it is bound to revolve; and whenever it shoots beyond this orb, it becomes a trespasser upon the rights of the states, and produces a tendency to consolidation, and absolute anarchy, alarming to state sovereignty, and at once subversive of the best interest of the American people. Viewing the general government, then, as one of limited authority, entitled to exercise only such powers as are above specified, your committee have searched with an anxious solicitude every line in the Constitution, to find some warrant for the erection of a National Bank. It is not pretended by the most zealous friends of this great measure, that the authority for the establishment of a National Bank, is to be found among the enumerated powers. The only legitimate subject of inquiry then is, can it be made incidental to the exercise of any specific grant of power? It is proper, first, perhaps, to define the meaning of incidental powers, as applied to this inquiry. They are such powers alone as are absolutely essential and necessary to carry into effect the substantive enumerated powers; as for instance, the power is expressly and especially given to create post-offices and post-roads; the subject of legitimate inquiry then is, what are the incidental, or implied powers carried along with, and to be exercised by virtue of, the specific grant? The answer is clearly and emphatically, all powers necessary and proper, for carrying into full and complete effect this substantive power. As for instance, the power of appointing postmasters, letting out mail contracts, providing by law for the punishment of mail-robberies, and to do all other acts needful to be done, for the cheap, safe, and speedy transportation of the mail from one place to another. These are incidental powers, which, though not expressly enumerated, are absolutely "necessary for carrying into effect that express authority to create post-offices and post-roads," and without which that clause in the Constitution would ever remain a dead letter. Thus the power to create military schools and academies, though not expressly granted, is fairly incidental to the powers of declaring war, and providing for the common defence. If this be the correct rule for defining incidental powers, the next inquiry very properly is, to the exercise of what specific grant is the power to charter a bank incidental? Here your committee find themselves launched full upon the trackless ocean of visionary political speculation. Whilst one class of politicians find ample authority for the exercise of this power, in that clause of the Constitution which says, that "Congress shall provide for the common defence and general welfare of the people of the United States;" another class contend that it is incidental to the power "to regulate commerce amongst the several states, and with foreign nations," and another asserts that the obligatory clause, requiring Congress to see that the revenue is collected in a uniform manner, throughout the United States, carries along with it, by an irresistible rule of construction, the power to charter banks,—whilst another, less disposed to define and particularize, argue that it is necessary to carry into effect the delegated powers generally. It has occurred to your committee as a subject worthy of some remark, that of the many parties and factions which advocate the cause of a National Bank, there is not one which does not admit, that if the general government exercise such power, it must find a guarantee for so doing, in the Constitution, since that government can

do no act of sovereignty, other than is allowed by the terms of that instrument, and yet no two of them agree as to what clause affords that guarantee.

Your committee have also viewed with singular emotions the wonderful influence of this great question over the minds of political partisans. It has brought together and made to harmonize, all the elements of opposition. The lion and the lamb may well be said to have lain down together. The high-toned Nullifier, whose sword leaps quickly from its scabbard to protect his country, and to avenge even a look that threatens her with insult; he whose warm blood coursed quickly through his veins upon the very mention of "protective tariff," and whose choler drove him almost to madness, in resisting an unconstitutional act of the general government, is found greeting in this great conflict, with amazing cordiality, the cold calculating Federalist, who thought it exceedingly impious to rejoice at the success of our arms in war, and who thinks a tariff to protect northern manufactories, perfectly constitutional. Yes, sir, we find that those who believe a tariff constitutional, and those who believe it unconstitutional,-those who believe internal improvement by the general government, constitutional, and those who believe it unconstitutional, and last, though not least, those who believe a bank constitutional, and those who believe it unconstitutional, all uniting, with a few honorable exceptions, in advocating a bank of the United States. Is it for the cause of the bank that all this is done? No! It is for that other purpose of destroying the existing administration, and bringing it into disrepute among the people. It surely never can be said that a party who, but a little while ago, were ready to resist "peaceably if they could, forcibly if they must," an unconstitutional act on the part of the general government, are now, for the mere love of gold, ready to commit what most of them believe, or profess to believe, a still greater infraction upon that Constitution? No! We are unwilling to believe it; the fountain of this outpouring in favor of a National Bank will be found in an anxious longing after power-a power which can only be attained in the downfall of the present administration.

Your committee, with an anxious desire to arrive at correct conclusions upon this interesting subject, have made diligent inquiry into the reasons by which different politicians attempt to sustain themselves in deriving power from the Constitution to charter a National Bank. The result of their inquiries they respectfully submit to the consideration of this House.

First, As to those claiming under that broad power of providing for the common good, &c., which, like the mantle of charity, is found to cover a multitude of political sins, your committee have heard the opinion advanced by jurists, and sanctioned by politicians, that Congress, so long as it exercises no powers that have been expressly prohibited, and keeps in view the exercise of its delegated functions, is to be the exclusive judge of its own powers. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, in the celebrated case of McCullough against the state of Maryland, lays down the principle in broad terms, "That when the law is not prohibited, and is intended to carry into effect any power intrusted to the Government, Congress is to be the exclusive judges of the degree of its necessity. Suppose this to be the