lence, happiness, and general affections, are all contained in himself, and would belong to him if he stood alone in the creation. Now if perfection consists in that which wants nothing, there is not such a thing as perfection in existence; and if a perfect being be he who contains in himself, independent of all other beings, every thing which can be desired-who would be equally happy had there been no other being in existence, and who consequently owes all his happiness to himself—who could exert all his attributes, and exercise all his powers, if he stood alone in the creationI have no hesitation to say that the Creator is not such a being, and that it is not possible for the mind of man to conceive the existence of such a being. If this can be shown, it is idle and absurd to make perfection consist in that in which it cannot consist; and if, after putting off the incumbrance of mortality, we should discover that the perfection of the Deity is independent of all other beings, yet, as it is impossible for us to conceive the nature of this perfection, it is obvious that it is not the perfection of which we treat at present, because we must mean by perfection something that we understand, or otherwise we mean nothing. All our ideas of perfection, then, are mere ideas of relation; and if so, absolute inherent perfection can have no existence, and the term, applied to God himself, will be found to have only a relative meaning. We have no idea of perfection but what consists in qualities, properties, attributes, or powers; nor have we any idea of a perfect being, abstracted from the possession of attributes or powSo far, however, as we can conceive the subject, it is not the being that confers perfection on the attributes, but the attributes that confer it on the being; so that, in all cases, perfection can belong to attributes alone. Render a tyrant charitable and benevolent, and he is no longer a tyrant, but a charitable and benevolent man. So far then as he becomes more perfect than he was before, this perfection is produced by the attributes of charity and benevolence: they communicate their virtues to him, but he has nothing to communicate in return, as he cannot change the nature of the things by which he is changed. If it should be said that his acquiring the attributes of charity and benevolence depended intirely on himself—that he might have rejected them if he chose, and not suffered himself to yield to their influence-and that, consequently, the merit of becoming more perfect is intirely his own; I reply, that the ers. very power which he exercises in repelling the blandishments of vice and embracing the asperities of virtue, is not only one of his attributes, but that one which enables him to approach nearest to perfection. We can, therefore, form no idea of perfection, but what consists in attributes; and therefore, when we pronounce any thing perfect, we can only mean that it is in possession of attributes which render it perfect. But though perfection can belong only to attributes, yet our ideas of perfection are not acquired from the relation that exists between certain attributes and the being to which they belong, or the subject in which they inhere, but from the relation that exists between them and subjects to which they do not belong. This may appear paradoxical, but it is not the less evident. Attributes or qualities are only the powers of acting, or of yielding to action, which belong to any being. But power can be exercised by no being, not even by God himself, without a subject on which it may be exercised; nor can it even exist, suppose it to remain unemployed, without the existence of this subject. When I say that a subject which may be acted on, is as necessary to the existence of power, as the subject to which the power belongs-I mean that it is as necessary to every mode of power of which man can form any idea; and it would be absurd to suppose the existence of a power of which he can form no idea; because this would not be power, but something else, as power only means that attribute of being which the term conveys to our minds. We can form no idea of power or effect, unless there be something in which the effect may be produced. To say that an effect might be produced in nothing, is to say something to which we attach no idea; because we cannot form an idea of an effect existing by itself, or produced in nothing; as the very term, effect, implies a change produced in something. All the powers, energies, faculties, attributes, qualities, affections, properties, &c. which belong to any being, depend, therefore, as much for their existence on other beings, as on the being in which they are found; as they could never be exercised, and consequently could not exist, if these other beings did not exist at the same time. Man enjoys the power of doing good or evil; but does not the existence of this power depend as much on the existence of good and evil, as on him? If good and evil did not exist, he could no longer enjoy free-will. So of all his other powers and attributes. His perception would become extinct, if there were nothing to be perceived; his hearing, if there were nothing to emit a sound; his smelling, if there were nothing to affect the olfactory nerves; his passions, if there were not corresponding qualities in other beings, fitted to produce pleasing or disagreable emotions, to soothe, irritate, or impel.. If, then, the perfection of any being depend on the powers or faculties which he possesses, it must depend as much on other beings as on himself; as he would not possess these faculties were it not for these other beings. Destroy these beings, and all his powers become extinct, and consequently his perfection. The idea of perfection then is derived from our idea of the relation that exists between attributes and subjects; namely, the subjects to which they belong, and those on which they act, or which act on them. The perfection of God is made known to us in the same manner, and appears to be as much of a relative nature, as that of man. All our ideas of perfection, as I have already shown, are derived, not from the being whom we call perfect, but from such powers or faculties as are calculated to render him so. Now take any attribute of the Deity and form an idea of it, as it absolutely regards himself, abstracted from all other beings; and then you will have an idea of absolute, independent, inherent, or intrinsic perfection. To form such an idea, however, is impossible. Some effect must be produced before we can come to the idea of power; but as no effect can be produced without a subject to operate on, and as in this case, there would be no being in the creation but the Deity himself, he could produce no effect whatever, as he would have no subject to act on, much less could he effect every thing. Perhaps it may be said, that he could be supremely happy if he existed alone, as this attribute regards only himself; but I deny the possibility of his enjoying even this attribute in perfection, had he not created other beings. In the first place, it must be admitted, that universal benevolence is one of his attributes, for without it, he would be imperfect; and an imperfect being cannot be God. If, then, he be universally benevolent, he must have delighted in the happiness of created beings; and if he be omniscient, he must have known that he had the power of creating them. His not having created them, therefore, would prove that he felt no delight in imparting that happiness which he was capable of imparting, and consequently that he was not benevolent, and if not, he could not be God. The being, therefore, who could enjoy supreme felicity without having created other beings when he enjoyed the power, could not be the Supreme Being, because he would want one of the attributes of the Godhead-universal benevolence. The Creator then would not be perfect, if he did not stand in the midst of his own creation, because all the attributes of his perfection are made known to us by the manner in which they operate on created beings; and without these beings we could form no idea of their existence. Perfection, consequently, belongs to attributes alone, and the existence of these attributes or powers depends as much on the beings on which they act, or which act on them, as on the beings to which they belong. These attributes, however, are perfect only when they agree with the nature of the being in which they are found, and with the external beings on which they act, and by which they are acted on. We may therefore define perfection to be, the possession of such qualities, energies, attributes, or affections, as are suitable not only to the nature of the being to whom they belong, but also to the nature of the beings on which they act, or in which they produce any changes or effects. If the change which the attributes of any being produces in another or in itself, be hurtful or destructive to them, such a being is imperfect, and consequently ought to be avoided by all the other tribes of being to which its attributes are hurtful or destructive. The attributes or properties of light are hurtful to few beings, and therefore almost all animated beings delight in it. There are, however, a few to which it is hurtful, and these few, accordingly, avoid it, and seem to have existence only at night. Poisonous plants are destructive to many beings, and therefore they avoid them if they be acquainted with their properties. Nutritive plants and roots are beneficial to all the tribes of animated being, or, at least, each of them is beneficial to some being, and, accordingly, they are all sought after by those beings to which they are respectively useful. The most perfect being, therefore, is that whose properties are beneficial to most beings, and hurtful to least; or if it be not the most perfect, at least it stands highest in the order of creation. God, who is the Creator and Conservator of all beings, is therefore the most perfect, or the Most Highest. Of all other subordinate beings we can say nothing, till we come down to man, and him we find to be the most perfect of animated material beings. In a state of nature, man is scarcely hurtful to any being; and, accordingly, we find, that the savage nations of most countries where the productions of the earth are adequate to their support, have a natural dislike to the destruction of animals. On the contrary, they cherish and protect them, and even provide for their wants. The natural propensities of man powerfully incline him to be their guardian and protector; and the superior discrimination and intelligence which he possesses, enables him to indulge these natural propensities or attributes more than any other being. There are, it is true, many other animals as inoffensive as man, as the sheep, the horse, the dove, &c.; but though they are hurtful to few, they are beneficial to few, and consequently they rank much lower in the scale of being than man. All animals that are hurtful to a greater number of beings than those to whom they are beneficial, recede from perfection, or, more properly, from the middle rank of being; and those, in whom the beneficent qualities predominate, approach to perfection, or to the highest rank of being. Animals that are neither hurtful nor beneficial to others, are scarcely intitled to the name of animals: they are a sort of blank in the creation, because they serve to no purpose; but such animals perhaps do not exist, though some of them seem nearly to approach this state. In judging of the perfections of man, we must totally omit the commerce that exists between him and his Creator. The secrets of the heart are known only to God, and, therefore, God alone is qualified to take cognizance of them. We must judge of him only as he exists in society, and in the relation which he holds to all the other tribes of animated being. Here, we find him the most perfect of beings, because not only his intelligence directs him, but his natural propensities incline him to increase the happiness of all that surround him. Some of them, it is true, he sacrifices to his wants, or to his appetites; but he does so, only in proportion as he recedes from his native, or original pre-dispositions. All the domestic tribes of animals are rejoiced at his presence. The lamb frisks before him; the dog capers with joy, and seeks to embrace him; the horse seems to anticipate his wishes, and the moment he bestrides him, prances with eagerness and impatience to convey him to the place of his destination: Hills, vales and floods appear already crossed, |