was carried on, almost exclusively, by foreign shipping. Under these circumstances, it became necessary that Congress should adopt some measure to give encouragement to our own shipping; and a law, proposing to give our commerce the necessary advantages over that of foreign nations, in our own ports, was passed. This law established a tonnage duty of six cents on the American vessel, and fifty cents on the foreign, and also an import duty of 10 per cent. in favor of the shipping of the United States. These two provisions, it was then believed, would operate so favorably as to induce American merchants to build vessels, and this expectation was abundantly realized. The commerce of the country made such rapid progress under the system, as to render it very little necessary. All the expected advantages were reaped from this law, so long as the principle remained untouched by foreign nations. But, their attention was finally turned towards it. England observed the great advantages that resulted from our discriminating duties; and, in a subsequent treaty with us, she reserved to herself the right to countervail these duties, which she afterwards did. At the time she instituted her countervailing duties, our then Minister in England wrote a letter to the Government, suggesting the propriety of taking some measures on the subjeet, before England had time to taste the sweets of this policy. About the year 1801, the subject was brought forward in Congress, and the necessity of doing away all countervailing duties, by admitting, on terms of reciprocity, the vessels of all nations who were willing to adopt the same policy in regard to us, was explained. But the attempt did not succeed; people could not be made to extend their views to the time when the European wars should cease, and the nations left free to retort upon us, for our discriminating system. But, at last, the peace of Amiens took place, and that event opened the eyes of our people. It showed us that British ships would get all the employment, while we retained our discriminating law. They could carry goods the whole amount of freight cheaper than our vessels. War again commenced; and, so long as it continued, our system did us no harm. But when peace again returned, it was soon found what would be the result of our policy. It was in 1815 that the act passed repealing all discriminating duties on the vessels of those nations which would admit curs on terms of reciprocity. Mr. S. enumerated subsequent laws which had passed, defining the operation of the act, in relation to our trade with the colonies of other countries, with the Hanse towns, &c. In the last act they had all been continued in operation till the 1st of January, 1624, and the law now before the Senate proposed still to continue them in force. The law which was passed, introducing the principle of reciprocity in regard to the Netherlands, was met by their Government with a corresponding spirit; but they have since made a law of a discriminating nature, from the supposition that we intended to give up the system of reciprocity. But, Mr. S. said, he had been informed by their chargé d'af SENATE. faires that the revival of this act on our part would produce the repeal of their late law. The importance of acting immediately on this subject, in consequence of the proximity of the period when the former acts in relation to it would expire, Mr. S. said, had induced him to present the objects of the bill to the Senate at this time. Mr. LLOYD, of Massachusetts, said he regretted extremely the necessity of acting with so much haste upon a subject of this importance. The acts proposed to be continued in force, he knew, provided for the admission of the commerce of foreign nations upon the same footing as they admit ours. But, the amendments which had been proposed to this act, by the committee to whom it was referred, Mr. L. had not seen until he found them on his table this morning. He did not know that they would go any further than had been stated by the honorable gentleman from Maryland. If they went no further than to continue in force the present acts of reciprocity, he would cheerfully vote for them; but, of one part of the proposed bill, he felt a little doubtful. Mr. L. read a clause of the bill, which he thought would require that the trade with the colonies of foreign nations should be placed on the same footing as the trade to the mother countries. This provision he was averse to, as the trade to the colonies had always been regulated by the Governments to which they belonged. The law of 1815, was a very just and proper law; that law only made it the duty of the Executive to ascertain upon what terms our commerce was admitted by other nations, and then to reciprocate those terms and abolish the discriminating system. The view which the gentleman from Maryland had taken was correct. It was true that, at the end of the Revolutionary war, our commerce was prostrated, or rather that it was non-existent. We had, with the utmost exertion, thrown off the trammels of the mother country; and we came out of that struggle in a state of exhaustion. In this state we were left to feel our own way-we were without experience. It was not wonderful, then, that our commerce was paralyzed-it could hardly be otherwise. Among other expedients to give it life, the system of discriminating duties was adopted. Our commerce began to flourish, and unrivalled success attended it. Very shortly after, indeed almost at the same moment, the French revolution took place, a revolution which convulsed the whole world. This event threw a very great proportion of trade immediately into our hands. Mr. L. thought this a greater cause of the prosperity of our commerce, than any dis criminating duties laid by us. Afterwards it had been thought proper to renounce the discriminating system and to adopt a fair and broad principle of reciprocity. The expediency of this measure had been fully proved-there could be no doubt of it-experience had tested it. Into that system Great Britain had reluctantly entered. Notwithstanding the equal terms upon which her ships were admitted to our ports, not one in twenty of the vessels which arrive with foreign goods are foreign vessels. She would not have adopted it, SENATE. Amendment to the Constitution. DECEMBER, 1823 wisdom or invention in the amendment he wa about to propose; but had resorted to the unite wisdom of that illustrious band of patriots an statesmen, who devised and framed the excellen form of Government, under which we have en joyed so much prosperity and happiness; an which, by a wise and prudent administration o our rulers, and intelligence and integrity amon the people, was calculated to continue and per unless she had gained corresponding advantages in her trade with us. Mr. L. said he would agree to the bill now proposed, if it only went so far as to continue the former acts of reciprocity; but he feared it went further; that it required not only the trade to the European, but to the colonial ports also, to accord with its principles. To this requisition neither Great Britain nor France would submit; and it would only have a tendency to bring upon us a vexatious war of dis-petuate those blessings. He wished then, to re criminating duties. Mr. SMITH briefly replied. He did not think the words of the bill would warrant the conclusion drawn by the gentleman from Massachusetts. Mr. KING, of New York, made some few remarks on the subject, which were not heard distinctly. Mr. HAYNE returned his thanks to the gentleman from Maryland for his able remarks upon the commercial history of the country; but confessed that he felt unprepared to act on this subject at this moment. He had only seen the bill for the first time this morning. He moved, therefore, that the subject should be postponed until to-morrow; and, in the meantime, the honorable member from Massachusetts would have an opportunity to satisfy his doubts upon the tendency of the bill, and he himself would have time for further inquiry. Mr. HAYNE's motion prevailed, and the further consideration of the subject was postponed till to morrow. AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. Mr. MILLS, of Massachusetts, rose to ask leave, in pursuance of notice which he had given on Friday last, to introduce a joint resolution, proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in regard to the election of President and Vice President. Previously, however, to the question, on granting leave being put, Mr. M. said he would, by the indulgence of the Senate, state the substance of his proposition, and, very briefly, some of the reasons which had induced him to offer it. The Constitution should be approached with great caution. He deprecated too frequent attempts to amend it, as calculated to derange its nicely adjusted powers, and to lessen the respect and veneration which all should cherish for that instrument. It was the work of men's hands, and therefore not perfect; but still ought not to be subjected to all the varying changes which temporary inconvenience may suggest, nor should alterations be made as an expedient to effect a momentary and perhaps imaginary good. For several successive sessions of Congress, Mr. M. said, efforts had been made to procure amendments in relation to this subject, and at the present session, those efforts had been renewed with increased zeal, and multiplied beyond all former example. After the various propositions which have been submitted to the Senate, it would be almost impossible to present any project which should bear the stamp of novelty, or which had not before occurred to others. He had, therefore, not attempted it, nor had he relied upon his own turn to the good old ways of our political father and to reinstate in the Constitution its origina provision for the choice of President and Vic President of the United States. This, Mr. M said, was the whole of his proposition. It ha met the sanction of the enlightened assembly t which he had alluded, and the conventions of th several States; it had been tested by experience and seemed better calculated in time to come t to effect a choice by the Electors appointed fo that purpose, and above all, to secure for the se ond office in the Government those qualification and endowments, which, in a good degree, fit hi for the first. The illustrious body of men wh framed our Constitution, had difficulties of n small magnitude to encounter; local prejudice were to be removed; conflicting interests to b reconciled; the jealousy of the small States as suaged, and the power and influence of the larg States restrained, and it was only by mutua sacrifices for the common good, that a system o compromise and concession was at length effected Among those difficulties, the organization of th Executive department, the powers with which i should be invested, the number of which it should be composed, and the manner which it should be appointed, were not the least formidable Upon this subject, they moved in a new and un tried path, and were to be guided only by the light of their own minds, and a knowledge of the institutions of their country. The history of othe republics, ancient or modern, afforded them no aid; for, although confederacies of free States had existed in different ages of the world, both in ancient and modern times, yet, in none of them had there existed a common permanent head, vested with Executive powers only, for the administra tion of the civil as well as military part of the Gov. ernment, and appointed in any manner adapted to the genius of our people. This part of their duty. therefore, had called forth the most minute inves tigation and full discussion in that body. A recurrence to the history of those times, and to the journals of that Convention, would show that the plan adopted was not the only one submitted to their consideration; that various projects were offered, both in relation to the organization and duration of the office; that, at one time, it was proposed he should be elected by the Governors of the States, and that, for a long time after the first draught of the Constitution was submitted, it seemed to be determined that the Executive should be chosen by the Legislative branch of the Government; and this plan remained unaltered until about the time the Constitution was reported in its final shape. Until near this time, too, it was un DECEMBER, 1823. Amendment to the Constitution. SENATE. decided by what number of individuals the Execu-person filling the office of Vice President was, intive power should be exercised-whether by one or variably, at a subsequent election, elevated to the more; whether such an office as that of Vice Presi- Executive chair. But, since that provision has dent should be created, or what should be his du- been altered, and the Electors have been called ties. From the various projects which were before upon to designate, by their votes, a person for a them, and surrounded as they were with such nu- secondary and inferior office, other views and merous difficulties, the authors of the Constitution other considerations, have influenced his selection devised a plan for the election of President and without the hope or expectation of any further Vice President, which secured the hearty concur- advancement. rence of the people. For, although almost every other part of that instrument met with the warmest opposition, and particularly the powers vested in the Executive, yet it is believed that his mode of appointment escaped even the animadversion of its enemies. For what purpose, asked Mr. M., was the office of Vice President created? Was it that he might preside over the meetings of this House? No sir. If that had been the case, we should be left, like most other legislative bodies, to appoint our own presiding officer. The Constitution had in view that he might be called upon, in certain events, to exercise the high and important functions of the chief Executive Magistrate. Hence, it provided that he should be voted for as President of the United States, from among the candidates for that high office. This mode of election clearly shows that his business in the Government, and the chief reason of his appointment, was not merely to conduct the deliberations of the Senate. The first officer in the Government might be arrested in the midst of his career, by the arm of death; sickness might destroy his faculties; the visitation of Providence might prostrate in ruins his intellectual powers; he might be removed by impeachment, or voluntarily retire from his arduous duties. In either of these events, the Executive authority must be administered by some individual, and the mode of election pointed out by the Constitution, as it originally stood, would always secure to the country, in the second office of the Government, the services of an enlightened citizen, elected with a view to his qualifications for the first office, and presumed to be capable of discharging its high and important duties. If this was the object for which he was elected, Mr. M. contended, that, reasoning a priori, that object would be much more likely to be effected, and with greater facility and security, in the mode originally pointed out in the Constitution. To accomplish the end in view, the Convention had provided, that the Electors should meet in their respective States, and vote for two persons, one of whom, at least, should not be an taabitant of the same State with themselves; that the person having a majority of the votes of the Electors should be the President, and the person having the next highest number of votes should be the Vice President; presuming, that, as both would be voted for, without designation, as President, both would be worthy of the office, and competent to perform its duties. Experience has sanctioned the correctness of this theory, and proved the conclusion of their reasoning to be well founded. So long as that provision remained a part of the Constitution, and two persons were voted for, without designation or distinction, the But, Mr. M. said, the propriety of the original mode of election was not only evident from the deductions of reasoning, and the voice of experience, but it was fully confirmed by the prospect of the future, and especially by the prospect immediately before the nation. An election is rapidly approaching; and, although a constellation of worthies have been for months, and, he might say, for years, presented to the people, as candidates for the Presidential chair, what single individual has yet been seriously named to fill the office of Vice President? While no small excitement exists in the public mind in relation to the one, there was, as far as he knew, an utter apathy and indifference in relation to the other. What, then, Mr. M. asked, would be the probable result of the two modes, at the approaching election? Suppose all these distinguished personages should be candidates, one only could be chosen to office; because, the friends of neither, under the present system, would probably consent that their favorite candiate for the Presidency should be held up, eo nomine, for the Vice Presidency. But, if the Constitution had remained in its original form, in all probability, two of them might be elected-one to the first, and another to the second office. You would then have a person for Vice President, capable, at least in the opinion of a plurality of the Electors, of discharging the duties incumbent on the President, and who had received their suffrages as such. The leading object avowed by gentlemen who now propose amendments to the Constitution, is to prevent the election of President from devolving on the House of Representatives. Mr. M. said that, if the view he had just presented was correct, the event, so much and so justly deprecated, would be much less likely to occur, under the Constitution as originally adopted, than in its present shape. In the various combinations of ballots which would result from voting for two persons for the same office, it would be almost certain that one of them would be elected President, and as the person having the next highest number, though not a majority, would be deemed to have a sufficient support to entitle him to the second office, as standing second in the confidence of the people, the election of both would be secured. Surely this would be a much better arrangement than that half a dozen candidates should be contending for the first office alone, neither of whom could have the second, and that, too, with very little prospect of either succeeding by the Electoral vote. Mr. M. put it to the Senate, whether this was not a fair view of the prospect immediately before us. Should the approaching election be conducted in the mode pointed out by the amendment which he was about to submit, very little doubt would be entertained that a choice would be effected, without the intervention of the House of Representatives. But, under the present mode, there was not, he said, probably, an honorable gentleman in the Senate who indulged a reasonable hope that this would be the result. To those, therefore, who wish to avoid so disastrous event, Mr. M. appealed for their support of the proposition he was about to submit, and to unite with him in restoring the Constitution to its original form. Mr. M. said, that the object which he mainly had in view, was to reinstate in the Constitution the mode originally prescribed for the Electors to give in their votes. If this object should meet the countenance of the Senate, some of the amendments which have been proposed by other gentleman, may, nevertheless, be engrafted upon it. He did not intend, nor perhaps would it be proper, to go into an argument respecting other propositions which had been offered, and which were now before the Senate. He begged leave, however, to submit a few remarks upon those parts of other plans which might be connected with or are hostile to his own proposition. The districting system, if approved, might be incorporated with the plan he was about to propose. But Mr. M. thought there were strong arguments against the amendment which proposed to district the whole country for the choice of Electors. One of its professed objects is, to secure the choice of Electors to the people, without any control of the States. If the election of the Federal Executive is to be made by the popular will, it is obvious that justice requires that the people in every part of the Union should be placed upon the basis of equality, so that the citizens of one State should enjoy as great a share of this privilege, as the citizens of another. Widely different, however, would be the operation of this system. Great inequality would be produced. The State of Rhode Island, for instance, with a population of a little over eighty thousand, is entitled to four Electors, and would, therefore, be divided into four districts, each district containing about twenty thousand; while the State of New York, entitled to thirty-six Electors, and divided into thirty-six Electoral districts, would have a population of forty thousand in each district. The argument, therefore, is fallacious and delusive, which holds this system as one of equality. There would, in fact, be as much inequality in this mode, as in an election by the House of Representatives; or, at least, a proportional inequality; for, it is obvious that a majority of the Electors might be chosen by a minority of the people. So in regard to the amendment proposed by the honorable member from Missouri, (Mr. BENTON,) giving the election of President and Vice President immediately to the people, by which each State is to be divided into districts, and each district to have one vote, and that vote to be decided by a majority of the people, in their primary assemblies. By this plan, too, a minority of the people may not only govern the votes of a State, but determine the election of a President. Mr. DECEMBER, 1823 M. said that, to illustrate the truth of this position the more familiarly, he would again take the ex ample of a small State. The State of Delawar would be divided into three districts, each distric having one vote. Suppose that each of these dis tricts should contain one thousand voters; that i one district they should be unanimous for A; tha in the two other districts A should have four hun dred and fifty votes, and B five hundred and fifty Here, then, the people of the State of Delawar would cast nineteen hundred votes for A, an eleven hundred only for B; and yet, B woul count two votes for President, in Delaware, an A only one. In addition to this objection, would always be productive of great public ex citement, if the election should be given immedi ately to the people, without the intervention Electors. Experience has proved the truth of thi remark. In those large States of the Union where the Executive is elected by the people, an especially if his term is of more than one year duration, there is much more public excitemen animosity, and bitterness produced, than in smal States, where the office is of less importance. The proposition of the honorable gentlema from South Carolina, (Mr. HAYNE,) Mr. M. said had many reasons to recommend it. But ther was one provision in that amendment, to whic he could not yield his assent. It provides tha when the choice is not effected by the Elector at their first balloting in their respective State the power of electing shall again return to them all of whom, for this purpose, shall be convene in one place. Here would be the same opportu nity for intrigue, cabal, and corruption, and th same inconveniences which attend an election b the House of Representatives. Mr. MILLS begge pardon of the Senate for any apparent transgre sion of Parliamentary rule, by even the sligh consideration which he had given to the forme propositions for amendment, which he had don only for reasons before stated. Believing, how ever, as he did, that the restoration of the Const tution to its original form, in regard to this in portant subject, would add to the stability of th Union, enhance the respectability of the Exec tive, by securing to the people the services of tw of her most respected citizens in the two highe officers of the Government, and have a stron tendency to prevent the necessity of an electio by the House of Representatives, he asked lea to introduce a joint resolution to that effect. Leave was accordingly granted, and Mr. MILL introduced the resolution as follows: Resolved, &c., That the following amendment the Constitution of the United States be proposed the Legislatures of the several States; which, whe ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of th States, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, part of said Constitution: The Electors shall meet in their respective State and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State wi themselves. And they shall make a list of all the pe sons voted for, and of the number of votes for each which list they shall sign and certify, and transm DECEMBER, 1823. Amendment to the Constitution. SENATE. sealed, to the Seat of Government of the United States, alter the present system as productive of much directed to the President of the Senate. The Presi- good, by strengthening and confirming the condent of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate fidence of the people in the wisdom of its proand House of Representatives, open all the certificates, vision, and by increasing and perpetuating our and the votes shall then be counted. The person gratitude for the services and respect for the memhaving the greatest number of votes shall be theories of those illustrious men who formed it. President, if such number be a majority of the whole That such had been their effect, he had no doubt. number of Electors appointed; and if there be more There are, said Mr. VAN BUREN, already before than one who have such majority, and have an equal the Senate, three distinct propositions on this subnumber of votes, then the House of Representatives ject, viz: One introduced by a Senator from Misshall immediately choose, by ballot, one of them for souri; one by a Senator from New Jersey; and President; and if no person have a majority, then, from the five highest on the list, the said House shall, one by a Senator from North Carolina: to which, in like manner, choose the President. But, in choos- one had, that moment, been added, by a Senator ing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, from Massachusetts-the three first of which he the representation from each State having one vote. would briefly notice. The last had, for its object, A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member a course entirely different, as well from the one or members from two-thirds of the States, and a ma- he intended to introduce, as those before it. The jority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. plan of the gentleman from Missouri proposes to In every case, after the choice of the President, the divide the different States into districts, not for person having the greatest number of votes of the the choice of Electors of President and Vice Electors, shall be the Vice President. But, if there President, but to take the votes of the people dishould remain two or more who have equal votes, the rectly for those officers, allowing to each State as Senate shall choose from them, by ballot, the Vice many votes as they are now entitled to, rendering President. a majority of all the votes necessary to a choice, Mr. VAN BUREN, of New York, rose and said, and in the event of no election, on the first vote, that pursuant to the notice he had heretofore by the people, the same to be made by the House given, he would now ask leave to introduce a res- of Representatives, each State having but one olution proposing an amendment of the Constitu- vote, as is now provided by the Constitution. The tion of the United States on the subject of the elec- only remark he would now make, on that feature tion of President and Vice President of the United of the resolution which dispenses with the agency States. Should the permission he asked be grant- of intermediate Electors, was, that inasmuch as, ed, it was his intention further to move that the with reference to the condition of the representaresolution he offered be referred to the select com- tion in particular States, secured to them by the mittee already appointed on similar propositions. Constitution, it does not profess to give the choice To enable that committee better to appreciate to a majority of the people, and, as it renders a his views, as well as to explain the motives which resort to the House of Representatives almost inhad induced him to add to the number of propo- dispensable, in the event of there being no choice sitions on the same subject already before them, in the first instance, he was not now prepared to he would, in the remarks he intended to make, give his assent to it. To judge of the propriety refer to those propositions, and notice their respec- of so much of the different propositions as provide tive contents. He would do this, not for the pur- for a division of the several States into districts, pose of full discussion, but only so far as was a very brief inquiry into their operation and monecessary to mark the difference between them tive becomes both necessary and proper. It has and the one he designed to offer, and for a brief been said, that that mode would effect the double explanation of the principles upon which that dif- purpose of bringing the election nearer to the peoference is founded. Before he proceeded to that ple, by securing to them, in every State, the imobject, he would add his humble testimony to mediate choice of the Electors; and of protecting the justice of the remark, that the extreme diffi- the right of the minorities in the different States. culty which is experienced in every attempt to But when it is considered that, by the Constitution, improve the present Constitution, afforded the each State has now the power of securing to its most striking evidence of the great wisdom and citizens those objects, when and as the people of care which presided over the deliberation and those States represented in their State Legislagoverned the decision of those who made it. He tures may think proper to do it, he was disinwould further add, that, although he felt much clined to believe that a desire, on the part of any reluctance in originating a proposition of this one State, to interfere in these respects with the character, he had not witnessed the frequent un-internal condition of another, constituted the mosuccessful attempts at amendment which had been tive which induced them to urge the measure unmade with as much regret and dissatisfaction as der consideration. The object which would be was expressed by some. On the contrary, think- effected by it was of a different character. With ing as he did that as yet no improvident amend- regard to one effect, which it was calculated to ment of the original instrument had been made; produce on the different States, there was not, in and, believing, from the slow and scrutinizing the discussion on this floor last year, the least reprocess through which all amendments must pass, serve, and, he presumed, there would not be any that there was little danger that any of equiv-now. The alteration of the system, if adopted, ocal character would obtain, he was induced can only be effected by consent of the parties to to regard the frequent unsuccessful attempts to the present compact, and gentlemen, representing 18th CoN. Ist SESS.-3 |