the point against which to direct their main efforts; while those who are to defend, if not sufficiently strong to guard all posts alike, must leave some not completely secured, that the best skilled in the art of war find much difficulty in maintaining an extensive line, accessible in many points.

The most advisable plan then appears to have been, so to watch the motions of the enemy, as, if possible, to be master of his designs, to oppose with a competent force every attempt to seize the heights, and to guard all the passes in such a manner as to receive notice of the approach, through any one of them, in sufficient time to recall the troops maintaining the others.

This plan was adopted; and the heavy disasters of the day are, principally, attributable to the failure of those charged with the execution of that very important part of it, respecting the intelligence from the Jamaica road. The letter of General Howe states that an American patroling party was taken on this road; and General Washington, in a private and confidential communication to a friend, says, "This misfortune happened, in a great measure, by two detachments of our people, who were posted in two roads leading through a wood, to intercept the enemy in their march, suffering a surprize, and making a precipitate retreat."

The events of this day, too, exhibited a practi cal demonstration of a radical defect in the con

struction

struction of the army. There was not in it a single corps of cavalry. That false economy which miscalculates so much as to deny the means essential to the end, had not yet sufficiently relaxed, to admit of so expensive an establishment. Had the General been furnished with a few troops of light horse, to serve merely as videts, to watch the motions of the enemy, and bring intelligence expeditiously, it is probable that the movement, so decisive of the fate of the day, could not have been made unnoticed. The troops on the lines do not appear to have observed the column which was withdrawn, on the evening of the twenty-sixth, from Flat Bush to Flat Land. Had this important manœuvre been communicated, it would most probably have turned the attention of General Putnam more particularly to the Jamaica Road. It is to the want of videts, that a failure to obtain this important intelligence is to be ascribed. The necessity, too, of changing the officer originally entrusted with the command, was an unfortunate circumstance, which very probably contributed to the event which happened.

Whatever causes might have led to this defeat, it gave a very gloomy aspect to the affairs of America. Heretofore, their arms had been frequently successful, and their soldiers had always manifested a great degree of intrepidity. A confidence in themselves, a persuasion of their superi

ority over the enemy, arising from the goodness of their cause, and their early and habitual use of firearms, had been carefully inculcated, and had been nourished by all their experience preceding this event. When they found themselves, by a course of evolutions in which they imagined they perceived a great superiority of military skill, encircled with unexpected dangers, from which no exertions could extricate them, their confidence in themselves, and in their leaders, was greatly diminished; and the approach of the enemy inspired the apprehension, that some. stratagem was concealed, from which immediate flight could alone preserve them.

To this course of thought, which raw troops, when defeated, so readily take up, the American army was, from the materials which composed it, particularly exposed. The regulars themselves, if they might be so termed, were enlisted, many of them, but for one year; and a very considerable part of the existing force had been called into service but for a few weeks. They knew that, by parrying the danger of the moment, they would return in safety to their families, and throw, at least for a time, the hazards of war on others. Only a degree of personal courage, superior to what is possessed by the great mass of mankind, or a degree of enthusiasm seldom of long and universal duration, will induce troops; under such circum-.

stances,

stances, to support, with such patient suffering, the hardships of an active campaign; and to exhibit such uniform, steady, and persevering fortitude, in posts of danger, that the confidence of their General and their country may be safely reposed in them.

The state of the army, after this event, was, in a letter from General Washington to Congress, thus feelingly described: "Our situation is truly distressing. The check our detachment sustained, on the 27th ultimo, has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled their minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition, in order to repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off; in some instances, almost by whole regiments; in many, by half ones, and by companies, at a time. This circumstance, of itself, independent of others, when fronted by a well-appointed enemy, superior in number to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable; but, when it is added, that their example has infected another part of the army, that their want of discipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government, have rendered a like conduct but too common in the whole, and have produced an entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary for the well

well-doing of an army, and which had been before inculcated as well as the nature of our military establishment would admit, our condition is still more alarming, and, with the deepest concern, I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops.

"All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained, and which I, more than once, in my letters, took the liberty of mentioning to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia, or other troops, than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations have hitherto prescribed. I am persuaded, and am as fully convinced as of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must, of necessity, be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence be left to any but a permanent army.

"Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to every exigency, far exceed that which is incurred by calling in daily succours, and new enlistments, which, when effected, are not attended with any good consequences. Men, who have been free, and subject to no control, cannot be reduced to order in an instant; and the privileges and exemptions they claim, and will have, influence the conduct of others in such a manner, that the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder, irregularity, and confusion, they occasion."

The