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over the remaining battalions from New York, he would still have been unequal to the enemy; and his whole army, with, perhaps, the fate of his country, might be staked on the issue of a single battle, so inauspiciously commenced. therefore, compelled to behold the carnage of his troops, without being able to assist them, and to direct all his efforts to the preservation of those which remained.

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The enemy, believing the Americans to be much stronger than they were in reality, and seeming unwilling to commit any thing to hazard, fortunately made no immediate attempt to force the lines. They encamped in front of them, and on the twenty-eighth, at night, broke ground in form, within six hundred yards of a redoubt on the left.

The situation of the army, on Long Island, had now become extremely critical. In front was a victorious enemy, from whom much was to be apprehended, in case of assault, but whose numbers, and formidable train of artillery, rendered the destruction of their works, by regular approaches, inevitable. The movements of the fleet, too, indicated an intention to make some attempt on New York, and, so soon as the wind should be favourable, to force a passage into the East River: should they succeed in this attempt, and attack him by water, while the army might assault him

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by land, they would render his retreat extremely difficult, if not absolutely impracticable. The troops, too, being obliged to lie in the lines, without shelter from the heavy rains which fell, were excessively fatigued and dispirited, Under these circumstances, it was determined to withdraw from Long Island; and this difficult movement was effected, on the night of the 28th, with such silence and dispatch, that all the troops and military stores, with the greater part of the provisions, and all the artillery, except such heavy pieces as, in the deep roads made by the excessive heavy rains which had fallen, could not possibly be drawn, were carried over in safety. Early the next morning, the enemy perceived the rear-guard crossing the East River, out of reach of their fire. From the commencement of the action, on the morning of the twenty-seventh, till the troops had crossed the East River on the morning of the twenty-ninth, and were freed from the immediate perils to which their situation had exposed them, the exertions and fatigues of the Commander in Chief, who personally inspected almost every thing, were incessant. Throughout that time he never closed his eyes, and was almost constantly on horseback.

The attempt to defend Long Island was so disastrous in its issue, and believed to have been so perilous in itself, that persons were not wanting

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who condemned it; and it is yet represented as à great error in the Commander in Chief. But, in deciding on the wisdom of measures, the event will not always lead to a correct judgment. Before a just opinion can be formed, it is necessary to consider the previous state of things; to weigh the motives which led to the decision; and to compare the value of the object, and the probability of securing it, with the hazards attending the attempt.

The importance of the town of New York, and of Long Island, to either party, has been already stated, and was, throughout the war, very clearly demonstrated It was extremely desirable to maintain the possession of them, if practicable; or, if that could not be done, to consume the campaign in the struggle for them. The abandonment of Long Island, besides giving the enemy secure and immediate possession of an extensive and fertile country, would certainly very much facilitate the success of their attempt upon New York. It was, therefore, to be avoided, if possible.

The impossibility of avoiding it was not evident, till the battle had been fought. It was true that the American force on the island could not be rendered equal, even in point of numbers, to the enemy; but, with the advantage of the defensible country through which it was necessary to pass,

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and of a fortified camp which could only be attacked on one side, considerable hopes might be entertained, without being over sanguine, of at least maintaining the position for a considerable time; and of selling it, ultimately, at a high price. That such an opinion was not ill founded, seems to be evidenced by the cautious movement of General Howe, who, even after the victory of the twenty-seventh, was not disposed to attack it without the co-operation of the fleet, but chose rather to carry it by regular approaches. Nor would the situation of the troops on Long Island have been desperate, even in the event of a conjoint attack both by sea and land, before their strength and spirits were broken by the action of the twenty-seventh. The East River was guarded by very strong batteries on both sides; and the entrance into it, from the bay, was defended by Governor's Island, which was fortified, and in which two regiments were placed. The ships could not lie in that river without first silencing those batteries, which would have been found extremely difficult; and therefore their aid could only be given when a storm of the works should be intended; and when that should appear practicable, the troops might be withdrawn from the island.

There was then, certainly, in the plan of maintaining Long Island, considerable hazard; but not

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so much as to demonstrate the propriety of relinquishing a post of so much importance, without a struggle to preserve it.

With much more appearance of reason, the General has been condemned for not having guarded the road which leads over the hills from Jamaica to Bedford. An attention to this object was more particularly the duty of the officer commanding at the post, whose general written instructions, given two days previously to the action, had directed that the woods should be well guarded, and the approach of the enemy through them reudered as difficult as possible. But his numbers were not sufficient to maintain, in full force, detachments which should guard all the defiles through the mountains; and if a strong corps, capable of, and intended for, serious resistance, had been posted on this road, and a feint had been made on them, while a serious, and successful effort had been made to pass the hills, by the direct road from Flat Bush, or by that along the coast, the defence of which must have been proportionably weakened, the columns, marching directly from Flat Bush, must, on every reasonable calculation, have been in possession of the plain in the rear of the detachment posted on the road from Jamaica, so as to have intercepted their retreat to the camp, before they could have made it good. So great is the advantage in those who attack, in being able to choose

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